Samenvatting

International cooperation between intelligence services poses a dilemma. It is an important tool in countering today’s complex transnational threats, but at the same time, cooperation is a risky business. Intelligence services can never be sure that a partner will reciprocate in kind. Scholars and practitioners often identify trust as one of the foremost conditions to overcome this dilemma. Yet the notion of trust is seldomly conceptualized in these rational-calculative explanations. Contrary to the common view that intelligence services are exceptional in their opportunism and rivalry, social relations and trustworthiness perceptions provide a more dominant explanation for the level of cooperation between intelligence partners than is often assumed by scholars and practitioners. Known reputations, recognized professional standards, and shared traits socially bind intelligence professionals to their community of practice, enabling them to bridge divides like nationality and even conflicting interests. Intelligence services resemble many other organizations in the public and private domains, requiring a de-exceptionalization of their international cooperation.

Often characterized as sinister, the realm of intelligence is instead perhaps the most human of all aspects of government and consists to a large degree of personal relationships. The universal currency is trust.1

Scholarly interest in the mechanism of international intelligence cooperation continues to increase.2 Ever since the start of this increasing interest, in the wake of 11 September 2001, scholars have tended to approach it from a perspective of competition and rivalry. They suggest that cooperation is counterintuitive to intelligence services that only cooperate out of necessity when they feel unable to counter a threat or lack information and resources. When examining the conditions under which international intelligence cooperation takes place, many of these scholars stress the difficulties in this particular field. They focus on Machiavellian constructs such as power and hierarchy or highlight functional restraints on cooperative behavior.3 Recently, a small group of scholars has started to advocate for a more sociological perspective. They take a relational approach, some even suggesting that intelligence services come close to an international brotherhood.4 In many of these publications, trust is mentioned as an important facilitator for cooperation. As stated in the opening quote, Richard Aldrich even sees trust as the universal currency in the intelligence domain. In a similar fashion, former director of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Sir David Omand, recognizes mutual trustworthiness “as the most valuable attribute of any successful [intelligence] partnership.”5

Despite its importance, we know little about the underlying conditions shaping trust among services and intelligence personnel. Trust has hardly been conceptualized in relation to intelligence studies.6 This runs the risk of the debate on international intelligence cooperation getting stuck in oversimplified dichotomies like “friends or foes,” “collaboration or competition,” and “trust or distrust.” This article argues that these dichotomies contribute to the mystification of the intelligence profession, but are not very helpful in understanding the nuanced workings of international intelligence cooperation. Without conceptualization, the notion of trust only becomes a clincher rather than an analytical tool.

This article critically examines trust and the underlying perceptions of trustworthiness, and systematically unravels their role in international intelligence cooperation. It first outlines international intelligence cooperation and focuses on the dilemma of cooperation: intelligence organizations often cooperate without being able to rationally calculate their outcome or control the risks involved. Subsequently, the article introduces the role of trust in dealing with this dilemma. Finally, it conceptualizes trust in international intelligence cooperation, identifying the importance of perceptions of trustworthiness and its three conditions: organizational image, organizational culture, and organizational identity. The article demystifies international intelligence cooperation, showing that the role of social relations and trustworthiness perceptions in this activity is much more common than practitioners and scholars have often advocated so far.