

6 The Netherlands: The Dutch disease

"I say what I think and I do what I say."

(Pim Fortuyn 1948-2002)

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Abstract

The Netherlands has always been regarded as a progressive and tolerant country. A country in which people have the choice to uphold their own values, to build their own future and especially in consultation with others, to give structure to society. For a long time the terms Dutch disease, that stood for the surplus of natural gas that was the foundation for the economy, interpreted here as the surplus of freedom and self-responsibility that are the foundation of society, and the Dutch polder model, that stood for the consultation culture that made the Netherlands a stable nation, applied. Does this still apply to the adolescents who grow up in this society and who have experienced the changes that have taken place since 2001? Do they still have the same choices and the freedom to build their own future? This question was posed to 816 adolescents, aged from 15-18, who attend secondary school, and split up according to the choices they make on a micro (own life perspectives and values), meso (political involvement) and macro level (importance of a united Europe). The results show that there is little optimism with regard to giving structure to the future, that confidence in traditional institutions, in particular the church and politics, is extremely damaged and that adolescents have low expectations of Europe with respect to their own lives. These results do not sketch a pessimistic image of adolescents, but rather they show that as far as adolescents are concerned society can no longer automatically live off a surplus of freedom and self-determination. The Dutch disease, in a social respect too, is threatening to become a real disease. The polder model doesn't seem to make sense anymore.

Introduction: a leading country ?

The Netherlands has always been regarded as a progressive or even leading country in many respects. It played a leading role in the protest against the war in Vietnam and nuclear weapons, and in particular against the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands. It opposed the use of nuclear energy and the bio-industry. The remarkable thing is that the Netherlands has never had such a strong and violent left-winged terror organisation as the Rote Armee Fraction or the

Brigate Rosso. Besides a few exceptions, among others a bomb attack on a politician's house, protest has been restricted to demonstrations, the occupation of nuclear power stations, the molestation of military equipment, setting buildings on fire, setting minks free etc. Much protest resulted in legitimate action groups and political parties who went into consultation with the government and industry in order to achieve their particular items of action. This had effect; cruise missiles were deployed, the nuclear power stations in the Netherlands closed down, many large supermarket chains now sell animal friendly produced meat in the shops etc.

In a moral sense too the Netherlands is a trendsetter. The individuals right to self-determination has become deeply rooted in moral ideas. Legislation concerning abortion, euthanasia, aid in suicide is extremely liberal. Marriage between homosexuals is legal, as is prostitution. Policy with regard to drugs is also extremely tolerant. Hard drugs are prohibited, but all cannabis products are tolerated in so-called coffee shops, and it is even allowed to grow cannabis for private use. Foreigners have always been welcome in the Netherlands, in the beginning as foreign labour, and later as refugees and asylum seekers. Social legislation offered them the opportunity to settle and make some kind of a living.

The term Dutch disease (Investorwords.com; Bout 1999; Uitterhoeve 1997) has often been used to describe these characteristics of Dutch society. It is an economic term and means something like the following: that the foundation on which Dutch society is based (in economical terms, the large supply of natural gas) is not enough because one-sided, to build up a stable society (economy). At the same time the term refers to the raised finger that the Netherlands shows to the world. It wishes to function as an exemplary country in a moral, social, political, religious and economic respect.

In the meantime the supposed deeply traditional tolerance of Dutch society seems to be a somewhat unstable basis, unable to offer adolescents a stable prospect for a good future in a moral and political respect. This is the context the adolescents of today have grown up in, but they are also experiencing changes that are taking place, those changes that set in at the beginning of the new millennium.

In this article I firstly outline the changes that have taken place in Dutch society, following which I put these in the context of the process of modernisation, with adolescents in mind. I then present the results of the empirical study carried out in the Netherlands. Finally I make some discussion remarks from the information.

1 Typical Dutch

On 6 May 2002 a politician was shot dead in the Netherlands. The murder had a tremendous impact throughout the country. A political murder. This was something that was unheard of in the Netherlands. Fortuyn's ideas were extremely controversial. Yet he appealed enormously to many sections of the population. Young and old, rich and poor, the lowest in society and the happy few,

he touched them all and it looked as though his party was to become one of the largest political parties in the Netherlands, where government elections were about to take place. It is not easy to outline his ideas, because he was neither particularly right-winged nor left, and neither did he stand in the middle. It was his way of engaging in politics that attracted so many voters. This can be described best in his own words: "I say what I think and I do what I say."

Dutch society has not been the same since, or rather, the process of change in the Netherlands has been accelerated¹.

This is an event that the adolescents questioned in this study were all extremely aware of, it also marks a transition in Dutch society.

1.1 Context: the Netherlands

The polder model

From the early 1990s onwards the Netherlands went through a period of great economical prosperity. The economy grew and with it the incomes of the population's workforce, for a considerable number spectacularly. More and more women started going out to work, and the phenomenon of the double-income family made its entry. E-business in particular flourished and stock exchange profits were huge. The number of millionaires also grew, despite the devaluation of the guilder by half due to the introduction of the Euro. Young people also benefited from the prosperity. By taking on part-time jobs during their studies, they had an increasing amount of money to spend, which they readily did. The Dutch collective bargaining economy was considered to be an example abroad, and the so-called polder model became an export product. This model implies that there is consultation between the various parties in the socio-economic field: government, employers and employees consult with one another on agreements to be made regarding various terms of employment such as social security, pensions etc. The result of this was that for a long time there was no social unrest in the form of strikes and protest against government measures in the Netherlands. This was helped by the fact that, of old, opposing political parties together formed the cabinet: the so-called purple cabinet, comprised of socialists and liberals. This cabinet stimulated these successful economic developments in every respect.

¹ Whilst this article was being finished (2 Nov. 2004) a religious murder was committed by a Muslim extremist in the Netherlands. An opinion and film maker was murdered. This murder has yet again created unrest in the tolerant Netherlands. Mosques and Islamic schools have been set on fire as a result. The jihad seems to have begun in the Netherlands.

Change: discontent

In the second term of Wim Kok's purple cabinet, discontent slowly set in in Dutch society. This discontent concerned the care and education sectors, multiculturalism and safety in society. Sectors that were not included in the euphoria of prosperity.

Profound changes were made in *Dutch education* during this time. A basic curriculum was introduced for all children aged 12-15. A new type of education arose: the VMBO. This is a combination of what used especially to be a theoretically aimed education, a kind of general secondary education, and an occupational education that was geared towards manual work especially. What the VMBO really meant was that large groups of pupils from the lower classes of society and from various ethnic groups were brought together in one form of education, the result of which was great tension between pupils mutually and between pupils and teachers.

In the second phase of higher secondary education (HAVO) and pre-university education (VWO), the so-called study house was set up. Its aim was to appeal to the independent learning capacities of the pupils.

At the time of these educational changes, teachers became more and more scarce. Many young people no longer aspired to work in education, but saw better opportunities in business especially, where after all, there was plenty of money to be earned. Teachers also sought their fortune in business. The unrest caused by the changes, in combination with the shortage of teachers, made great demands on the quality of education.

The adolescents who were questioned in this study are stuck in the middle of these developments and are in danger of becoming victims of them.

In the *care sector* too a serious situation began to develop. The rationalisation and bureaucratisation of the work didn't lead to an improvement in care. Despite great economic prosperity too little was invested in the care sector. There was less and less interest in work in all levels of the medical profession; after all, there was more to be earned in the business sector. At the same time, because people are living longer, society is being confronted with an increasing number of people who make an appeal to health care facilities. The restriction on the number of traineeships of the past years began to express itself in a shortage of employees in health care. The consequences were overcrowded waiting rooms, long waiting lists for hospital admissions, and even longer waiting lists for admission into retirement homes and nursing homes caused difficulties for people.

The third area of discontent was the increasing stream of *foreign* asylum seekers, (whether or not) economic refugees and Dutch people from the Netherlands Antilles. The favourable economic situation and the liberal immigration policy lead to an explosive increase in the number of foreigners in the Netherlands. The children of the so-called immigrant workers, who in the sixties and seventies came to help strengthen the economy by doing the so-called dirty work, sought their partners in their home country. A large group of asylum seeking political, but also economic refugees made an appeal to the Dutch immigration policy. Due to lengthy juridical immigration procedures many lost sight of their situation and attempted to build up a life in the Netherlands, even though there was a danger of them being deported. If in the end asylum was refused, many illegally went into hiding or ended up in the criminal circuit. At the same time the care for and naturalisation of those who were allowed to enter the country was inadequate. In the large towns problem districts arose, where underprivileged foreigners often lived together in cheap housing, taking illegal countrymen in as well. Family reunions brought with them even more foreigners who were unable to cope with the complicity of Dutch society. Poor social circumstances and unemployment caused many to turn to crime.

The events of 11 September 2001, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the increase in terrorism that seems to be coming closer and closer, also have their repercussions on relations between the various communities in the Netherlands.

In the past years society has become hardened when it comes to *safety*. The term meaningless violence became popular, which is understood as excessive violence that arises as a result of the fact that someone's unbridled desire to develop themselves is called to a halt. There are numerous examples: a passer-by who points out someone's vandalising behaviour is beaten up; someone who is refused entry to a discotheque empties his gun on the door and at the same time kills a number of guests; someone driving their moped on the pavement and therefore putting the lives of others at risk, kicks the person who points this out to him to death.

The sense of insecurity is strengthened more so by the developments I already described regarding the issue of the relation between various communities. This concerns Islamic communities in particular.

Political unrest

It was in this atmosphere of discontent and great concern, of continually increasing differences between the have and have-nots, of the tension between various communities, that it was possible for a political phenomenon like Pim Fortuyn to arise. He gained followers from every class, from young to old, from left to right. Many considered him to be a populist, who used fine words in order to preach an extreme right-winged political manifesto. Comparisons with Haider in Austria, Le Pen in France and Dewinter in Belgium were soon made, although Fortuyn himself

fiercely protested against this. He promised solutions for all sources of discontent in the care and education sectors, and the policy with regard to foreigners and 'he does what he says'.

He had a huge number of supporters, and at the height of his fame, just before his violent death, he would have gained 25% of the votes according to the opinion polls.

His appearance had already considerably hardened political relations, the political debate, which he often treated as some kind of show, hardened on his opponent's side. His death has only aided in strengthening this. Threats towards politicians were of the order of the day. A short period of political instability followed. During the elections shortly after his death, his party gained more than 17% of the votes, 26 of the 150 seats in Parliament. Together with the CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal) and the liberals who had lost, they formed a new government that, from the beginning, was characterised by the quarrelling that occurred within the new party, the LPF (Pim Fortuyn Party). No other single Dutch cabinet has served such a short term since the Second World War. Elections were held yet again in January 2003. The new government, under leadership of the CDA, now also includes the losers from the purple cabinet: the right and left winged liberals. A complete swing in policy since the purple cabinet was also inspired by the worsening economic situation. Cuts in care and education, firm measures in the social support sector and a wage freeze were to set the economy back on its feet. A much stricter asylum policy has been introduced, in order to drastically restrict the number of foreigners coming into the country, and at the same time to nationalise those allowed to enter, and give them a better chance of integration.

Tolerance had already come under pressure since the attacks of September 2001, and relations between different communities had become fiercer, and that on both sides. Fortuyn's statement on the 'backwardness of the Islamic culture' certainly contributed to this. The government entered into a huge discussion on norms and values with regard to the areas of safety and aggression. The Netherlands was to return to its old values of tolerance, solidarity and community spirit, values partly based on Christian-humanist tradition.

1.2 The social environment of adolescents: to choose or not to choose

In the present climate, in which trees no longer reach the skies, in which care and education are under increasing pressure, the number of unemployed is increasing explosively, the image of foreigners is becoming more and more negative, not in the least due to the events of 11 September and the threat of fundamentalist Muslim terrorism in Europe too, adolescents are confronted with a difficult and uncertain future. Not only in their own country, but in Europe too. Youth unemployment makes it difficult for adolescents to plan their future. There is a trend towards the choice of more secure jobs such as those in education and care, and governmental jobs. The opportunities for jobs on the sideline are also decreasing. In this context much is expected of the individual, who must make choices and do his/her best to survive in this world. In

situations in which he/she needs the help of others in particular, it is made clear from all sides that, first and foremost, it is his/her own responsibility.

In the following I will place the actual situation in which Dutch society finds itself in the perspective of a greater movement that characterises our society: modernisation. The modernisation of society leads to what is called a situation of postmodernity. I interpret post modernity as a challenge to the organisation of the social environment (Ziebertz & Kalbheim & Riegel 2003; Wright 2004; Osmer & Schweitzer 2003; Scheuchenpflug 2003)). After all, the modernisation of society is a process whereby much has disappeared, whereby things that were always a matter of course have been turned upside down, but also where new opportunities arise. Adolescents should make the most of these new opportunities. The way in which they do this is sought for in the following. Which trends can be distinguished amongst adolescents with respect to their perspectives on their present lives, their pattern of values that does define the future and with regard to the way they deal with Europeanization?

Modernisation

The process of modernisation is described in detail in the introductory chapters of this book. I wish to restrict myself to the significance of modernisation in Dutch society in the past two decades, the period in which the group of pupils that was studied grew up. I will restrict myself to the same areas as those in the study: individualisation, expressed in life perspectives and opinions on values, the importance of social and political organisations and Europeanization. Modernisation can be found in all areas of the social environment: economic, political, social, cultural and individual. I made a number of remarks regarding the economic area in the introduction. I wish to restrict myself to the areas that are of importance for this study; the individual, the socio-cultural and political.

Individualisation

Individualisation occurs on various levels. In order to gain a good understanding of this concept I define three of these (Bois-Reymond 1998):

Structural individualisation implies the breaking free of the individual from the restrictions and standardisation imposed by one's own social class, sex, family, the religious community, and the place of residence or birth.

Connected to this is cultural individualisation, which I interpret as the erosion of those values connected to the above mentioned structures, such as sense of duty, faith, sexual inequality, and at the same time the rise of new values such as self-development, emancipation and spiritual values like environmental protection and healthy living.

All the above is encompassed in biographical individualisation: the individual develops a personal lifestyle that embraces its own ethics and philosophy.

Structural level

The economic modernisation of Dutch society was accompanied by increasing individualisation. The legislation of the so-called purple cabinet was aimed at the individualisation of the citizen. It was no longer the primary form of cohabitation, the family, that was addressed in law, but more so its individual members. The breadwinner no longer enjoys a special fiscal position, women are stimulated to go out to work, divorced women without their own income are obliged to work and to entrust their children to childcare. Each individual is expected to be responsible for his/her own income.

In an ethical respect individualisation was expressed in legislation concerning abortion and euthanasia. Here too the principle applied that the individual was in control of his/her own life and death. The Netherlands was the first country in the world to make marriage between homosexuals possible, euthanasia became a lawful instrument in health care, abortion a legal means of birth restriction, and aiding in suicide was no longer automatically considered a penal act. All of these decisions were made in consultation with the social organisations involved, political parties and the government. Only the churches remained aloof, merely making a feeble protest, although the Roman Catholic protest from Rome itself was a strong one. In this sense the Netherlands played the role of pioneer. Tolerance towards the use of soft drugs also indicates that the individual is considered to be responsible for his/her own behaviour.

Ethical tolerance also led to social tolerance. The Netherlands allowed large numbers of foreigners to enter the country, mainly from Surinam and the Antilles. These people came to the Netherlands in search of better social circumstances. But refugees and asylum seekers also found their way to the Netherlands. Refugee centres where tens of thousands of people were taken care of sprouted up all over the country. Juridical procedures that were started in order to provide these people with an official residence permit gave many false hope that they might receive one. Many were refused admittance after years of waiting, but were not sent out of the country, so consequently they became illegal aliens. The care for and naturalisation of recognised asylum seekers also left much to be desired. The housing of these people in outdated inner cities meant that they were soon over-represented. Family reunions and childbirth and the arrival of partners from motherlands only added to the problems.

Adolescents of today grow up in this tolerant society in which a high level of self-responsibility is required of them, and in which they are confronted with an uncertain future, whereas on the other hand, before their time there was great economic prosperity.

Cultural level: Adolescents today

The adolescents studied grew up in the socio-cultural and political situation I described above. Those who study adolescents have the tendency to put a stamp on the group they are researching, for example names such as 'generation nix'.

Present day adolescents are often stamped as being a 'flex-generation' and 'delay generation' (Elchardus 1992,1997). During the previous century the time spent as an adolescent has gradually increased. Compulsory education keeps adolescents in school until they are 16, and in the two years following, education is partly compulsory. Adolescents from the upper classes especially sometimes continue to study till they are about 25. The whole of this period is characterised by economic dependency on parents and/or study grants, whilst at the same time adolescents have a large amount of money to spend due to jobs on the side and a large amount of pocket money (Giddens 1991). Also, because the learning and study phase has been lengthened, there is a trend whereby adolescents are considered as being politically and socially independent. They already have the right to vote at the age of 18, and from that age on it is also expected of them that they are responsible enough to make financial decisions, and from 12 onwards they have to be able to prove their identity. This paradox (Bois-Reymond,1998; Elchardus 1992,1997) is also visible in a socio-cultural respect. Because adolescents have a relatively large amount of money to spend, they are considered as being an important target group in commerce. Music, clothing and going out are the main things that adolescents spend their money on and develop their own particular culture in, in other words, one can speak of a youth culture (Janssen 1994). Adolescents are also the ones who use the newest technological developments most, especially where communication is concerned. They have countless means of communication and methods of gaining information (Internet, MSN and SMS) so that they are immediately aware of all the events that take place in the world. They are bombarded with so many different images of reality, with all the values and truths that go with these (Elchardus 1992, 1997). The freedom this gives them, and at the same time the pleasure of unconditionally being able to enjoy everything their world has to offer them, leads to the postponement of those matters that mark the transition to adulthood: graduation, a permanent job, relationship, starting a family. Sex and consumption are the only things that are practised at an increasingly early age by this 'delay generation'. In general they are more optimistic about the future than the elderly, and cultural pessimism does not play a role amongst them (Elchardus 1992, 1997; Zeijl 200; Zeijl & Keuzenkamp & Becker 2004; Janssen 1994). I must mention that this information comes from a study that took place before 2001. The effect of the attack on the Twin Towers and the hardening in Dutch relations since the murder of the politician Fortuyn has not been taken into consideration. Recent research (In het zicht van de toekomst 2004) shows that the Dutch – under 18s were studied – have become less sympathetic towards the dropouts (the homeless, drug addicts, criminals and the poor) in society. They feel that these people need to be taken care of, but prefer not to be confronted with them. At the same time they are concerned about the

increase in individualism, every man for himself, often in connection with intolerance and aggression in society, and there is a fear that this will cause the break up of society and that it is certainly the cause of great loneliness. The report also ascertains that 40% of those questioned still finds it difficult to live a meaningful life. One third of the people living in the Netherlands feels the need for something that makes life more meaningful. There seems to be a slight shift in the degree of life satisfaction of the population: in 2002, 48% was wholly satisfied, in 2003 there was a significant decrease to 43%. In 2003 people were for the larger part satisfied (Geloof jij in ieder voor zich? 2003).

As far as religion is concerned adolescents can be compared with adults: they too have very little attachment to religion, and as children of parents who are not involved religiously the attachment is even less. The 'unshackling' of one or two from the ties of collectivity and religion, on the other hand, occurs more often (Kuitert, quoted from Kerkhofs 1997).

Researchers ascertain that in the area of norms and values of adolescents there is a case of post-materialism (Inglehart 1977). Although faith and the church are no longer important for adolescents, values such as peace, environmental protection and spirituality are becoming more and more important. Adolescents join organisations such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund (Janssen 1998). Their ethics can be characterised as situation ethics, in which they gather together a mixture of their own values and opinions, just as they do in the area of religion (Kerkhofs 1997). In a cultural respect adolescents are increasingly becoming a group of their own.

Biographical level

Individualism has an affect on adolescents in the sense that the transition of a standard course of life to a biography of choices manifests itself (Bois-Reymond 1998; Nelis 1999). I have already mentioned that the period of adolescence is becoming longer and that the transition to adulthood is postponed. More and more often adolescents are the ones to make the decisions concerning their own lives, they themselves decide when they will have their first sexual experiences, which therefore take place outside marriage. They often work whilst studying, but usually in temporary jobs. They live together with a partner, without making any commitments for a lasting relationship. They have children without getting married. They start a new course having worked for a number of years already. Thus the behaviour of this 'flex-generation' does not follow the regular pattern of school – job – steady relationship – marriage – starting a family (Sannen 1998; Thompson 1996). It isn't also to be expected that they continue to make a career in the same profession that they studied for, for the rest of their lives.

Conclusion

These three levels are combined in adolescents. They choose their own biography, without the help of their parents, family and religious community. This individualisation is somewhat paradoxical, because adolescents wish to make their own choices, but at the same time large groups make the same choices. This is obvious in the choice of music, clothing and the way spare time is spent. Adolescents choose a particular lifestyle, and in doing so they belong to a particular distinguished group. Janssen distinguishes a multitude of youth styles, each of which has its own name (in this article I will stick to the Dutch names, some are internationally known, others have a typical Dutch background): punkers, kakkers, discos, sjonnies, anitas, altos, socios, softies, hardrockers, trendies, wavers, rastas, skinheads, gewonen, rockers, voetbalsupporters, asos, doetjes, guppies, eitjes, neppos, stuudjes etc, etc. (Janssen 1994).

Adolescents are continually reflecting on their own lives, their actions and choices; this has become a social requirement, making life problematic.

2 The study and research questions

The following section is a report of the empirical study as it was carried out in the Netherlands. The random sample and method of gaining data are discussed, and then the study questions and answers.

Research questions

As has already been mentioned in the introductory chapter, the research questions concern the life perspectives of adolescents on a personal microlevel, including their personal opinion on values on a mesolevel, which entail the meaning of institutions and on a macrolevel, in which the significance of Europe for these adolescents is brought up.

The main question is to what degree do adolescents here have the opportunities to make choices and to what degree do they make their own choices.

The adolescents in this random sample form a relatively homogenous group according to age, education level and social level. They are from the highest education level and may be considered as the future leading generation and opinion-makers.

Random sample and method of gaining data

In order to gain data teachers of religious education/philosophy of life were approached. These were mainly teachers who were known to the department of Practical Theology of the Faculty of Theology at Tilburg University, because they either graduated there or are involved in teacher training. Those teachers who are registered with an Internet community of Philosophy of life

teachers were also approached. And teachers were approached through the editors of a magazine on this subject. All contact was held through e-mail. This was a laborious process. The gathering of data took a period of approximately a year (February-November 2003), from the first contact up till the time the last questionnaire was sent in.

Approximately 50 of the more than 100 teachers approached replied, those who did not had various reasons for not participating. The most important reason was that the questionnaire did not fit in with their lesson plan. They were indeed asked to allow pupils to fill in the questionnaires during the lesson, in order to be ensured of the highest possible response. Filling in the questionnaire would take at least 60-70 minutes (a lesson lasts for 50 minutes). The subject religion/philosophy is given for an average of one hour a week. One group of teachers appeared not to teach the respondents required, since they only teach pupils in lower school (up till about 15 years of age) (in many schools the subject is no longer taught in upper school), or because they do not teach at a certain level of education (the study is aimed at pupils of the HAVO - Higher General Secondary Education and VWO - pre-university education).

Those teachers who agreed to co-operate allowed pupils to fill in the questionnaires in the framework of their lessons. They did not request permission to do so from parents or the school management. The teachers have been promised an overview of the information that would be relevant to them in the framework of their lessons.

Ultimately 14 teachers promised to have their pupils fill in the questionnaire. 12 of these actually sent back the completed questionnaires. The questionnaires of one school have been misplaced, and in the case of another school the teacher fell ill and no one could be found who was able or willing to take over the task.

The schools that participated are situated all over the country, both in urban and rural areas, in the predominantly Catholic south and the more mixed but mainly Protestant and non-religious west and east. Schools from the far north are not included in the study. Table 6.1 shows an overview of the sample.

The response is more than 50%, which is reasonably satisfactory, despite the fact that those teachers personally occupied themselves with the questionnaire. It was difficult to motivate pupils to voluntarily complete the questionnaire outside school hours. The schools with a high response in particular gave the pupils the opportunity to fill in the questionnaire during school hours. Two schools failed to respond at all, in other words, due to various circumstances the questionnaire was not handed out by the teachers. If these schools are not taken into consideration and the questionnaires that are unusable are not counted the response is greater (55%). Ultimately 816 pupils provided usable questionnaires.

The questionnaire was completed in rather diverse ways by pupils. The way it was completed gave insight into the scales they were more or less able to deal with. They either failed to fill in some of the scales, or indicated that they did not have an opinion. Thus there are continually scales in which there is quite a large number of missings.

Although the schools all have a particular basis, it is noticeable that they do not acknowledge this on their websites. A number of schools do indicate that they are based on Christianity, but they prefer to express that their identity is derived from more than Christianity alone; humanist values and concrete values such as respect and openness are expressly mentioned. The school in Bommel is a so-called regional training centre, and is not denominational.

Eight schools are Roman Catholic, they account for 579 of the respondents (=71%). Four of the schools are Protestant with 88 respondents (=10%). The other two are either general (74 respondents) or ecumenical (75 respondents). Therefore, there is a particularly large share of Roman Catholic schools. This is not reflected in what the pupils say of themselves. 316 pupils indicate that they do not belong to a religious community, 374 pupils state that they are Catholic and 74 Protestant. Of the remaining pupils 25 indicate that they are of a different denomination, without actually specifying which.

Foreign pupils are not distinguished in the study, and this was also not requested. However, there is some indication of this in the fact that 12 pupils state they are Muslim, 1 Buddhist and 1 Hindu. The average age is 17; the random sample includes 57% girls and 43% boys. Most of the pupils are in the last stage of the HAVO (46%) or VWO (43%), the higher levels of secondary education.

3 The empirical analysis

Here the data is explained in order of the three levels in which the questions are asked: micro (life perspectives and values), meso (political consciousness) and macrolevel (Europeanization).²

3.1 The micro-level

Life perspectives (Table 6.2)

The first issue deals with the way in which respondents look on life from the perspective of time. How do they deal with the past, what role does it play when dealing with the present and how do they picture their own future. Does what Augustine wrote apply to them, namely that the past and the future do not exist and that no one can actually talk of them in this manner. 'There are three times: a time present of things past; a time present of things present; and a time present of things future.' (Augustine Confessions). The dimension is included to what degree they seem to have a grasp on their own lives. Therefore the sub-scales are conceived according to the dimensions past-present-future and active-passive. The median of the scale is 3.

The table shows that the dimensions future and past have high scores. In the first place this applies to the future, in both an active as well as a passive sense. The pupils are unable to predict the future, in other words, it will probably not turn out the way they think it will (FUTURE),

but they are wholly confident that they are prepared for it, and flexible enough to be able to deal with it (PLANNING). They are aware that the future is not dependent on their choices, rather they feel that they are capable of adapting their choices to what the future has in store for them. This indicates that they experience the future, based intensely on the present and the opportunities that the past offers them.

With regard to the perspective these adolescents have of the past, they allow themselves just as much to be led by the present. They are not particularly optimistic about their opportunities to improve matters (PESSIMISM), although they do choose to make the best choices they can in a personal atmosphere (SECURING), choosing their own environment as reference point.

The scale that concerns the present has a negative score. The present is a great source of uncertainty for these adolescents (UNCERTAINTY), the choices they make now might not be the choices they make tomorrow, and these certainly do not necessarily have to lead to what they want (PRESENT). They also do not look back on the past with longing (NOSTALGIA).

All things considered the image is rather ambivalent: the adolescents in question have confidence in the future, although this cannot be planned. Both the past and the present are proof of this, because what you do now does not necessarily guarantee a good future. It appears as though Augustine was right, the future and the past are only present as the present and can only be experienced as such.

Values (Table 6.3)

The second aspect of the micro situation concerns values. In the Netherlands in particular, norms and values have become subjects of social discussion since the administration of Jan Peter Balkenende. Following the turbulent days surrounding the death of Fortuyn, the many aggressive reactions in Dutch society as a result, and the issue of meaningless violence, a norms and values debate was started by the government. The object of which is to make society liveable again for everyone, and the only way this can be achieved is by accepting and treating one another with respect. Dutch society threatened to become hardened. There was not only a hardening in a political respect, the strong emphasis on economical progression threatened to make man into a mere pawn in the scenario of a well-oiled economy. On the streets too, the hardening was becoming visible. Acts of meaningless violence in public occurred increasingly. The over-tolerant society, in which anything and everything was possible, gave birth to a monster in the form of compulsoriness. Individualisation led to absolute self-orientation in which others, the weakest in society in particular, came off worst. In schools too, the hardening led to a sense of insecurity. Foreign pupils got the feeling that they were less and less a part of the school, which led to the development of so-called black schools, schools in which the foreign student population gradually

² The data were imported in the SPSS program by my students Olaf van Amelsvoort, Sigrid Schumacher – who also translated the questionnaire into dutch - and Klaartje Tas.

became the majority. Although the rise of Islamic schools is also a sign. After all, only through one's own emancipation is it possible to become a full member of society.

At the same time the area concerning values has been pluralised. Christian values alone no longer define our society. Other cultures and religions bring with them other values. And the values Christianity upholds are no longer all interpreted in the same way. A pluralism of values within Christianity has also taken place. Obedience to the authority of church and government are no longer a matter of course. In the following it will be examined which fundamental pattern of values still exists among the adolescents.

In the first chapter the various dimensions of the pattern of values of society were described: a pattern of values in which the adolescent expresses his/her critical independence with regard to society. It is the pattern in which adolescents express the wish to follow their own course, critically with regard to what they have learnt in their upbringing, without losing sight of the foundation of humanity.

The dimension of the pattern of values that lay emphasis on social integration indicates that adolescents attach meaning to family and work. After all, the family is where their roots lie and in which they put all their effort: studying in order to find a job and possibly start a family. Although their biography of choices shows that they certainly do not necessarily do it in this order.

The third dimension of the pattern of values includes the more socially desirable values, the values that are in fashion, that are desired amongst certain groups in order to be a part of them.

All the values are scored positively by the adolescents. Although they wish to take their own stand it appears that making choices, certainly with regard to opinions on values, is not quite so easy. They absorb everything they learnt in their upbringing, and all the new things they see around them with preferences but without making distinct choices yet. They keep a lot of doors open and for the time being there is no huge rejection of particular values.

The values that indicate critical independence (AUTONOMY and HUMANITY) are represented most strongly in adolescents. This confirms the image of the adolescent who makes choices, who wishes to be autonomous and who at the same time does not want to lose sight of the fundamental values of humanity: taking each person as they come still applies, and at the same time sticking to their own opinion even when it means going against the majority. The rather more trendy values (ATTRACTIVITY, AUTHENTICITY and MODERNITY) that indicate authenticity and being modern are represented the least. Adolescents do not adapt themselves without criticism to the issues of the day. Although it is thought that adolescents spend the whole day chatting on the computer, and that they own the latest mobile phones, these values appear not to be the most important to them. These adolescents are also quite willing to take on responsibilities, even though this may sometimes appear not to be the case. Adolescents appear to be mainly directed towards themselves. That this is not wholly the case is also shown in the dimensions of values that score somewhere in the median (FAMILY ORIENTATION, PROFESSIONAL ORIENTATION and SELF

MANAGEMENT). Adolescents are indeed socially integrated, or wish to be so. They do occupy themselves with a profession and possibly starting a family in the future, but this is not first and foremost in their lives at present. They are aware of the fact that they must prepare themselves for these things, but do not yet wish to take the course that will lead to them. They especially want to be themselves here and now, in relation to others, with in mind that work and a relationship are important.

3.2 Mesolevel

Evaluation of institutions (Table 6.4)

It is sometimes said of adolescents that they do not wish to be brought in connection with certain social organisations. Institutions are under pressure in our individualised society. There seems to be less confidence in traditional institutions, and other, new institutions seem to be replacing these. The preferences of adolescents reflect the change in our society. Confidence is only considered as positive confidence when undoubted.

Universally church and politics come right at the bottom of the list (table 6.4). Adolescents have the least confidence in these institutions. This seems to be the general trend in society with regard to politics. These adolescents have experienced the fiasco of Dutch politics since the murder of the politician Fortuyn. Their lack of confidence in the churches is even greater. Boys have a much stronger opinion on the latter. The adolescents put most trust in human rights organisations such as Amnesty International. This certainly confirms the idea that the more secular institutes have taken over the role of the churches. Often human rights organisations as well as environmental ones are connected (Alma & Janssen 2000), contrary to the information above. The scores with regard to the environment are no longer quite so high.

Confidence in other organisations from the social median varies; the police and judiciary are at the top of the list, whilst pressure groups are at the bottom, newspapers are considered more trustworthy than television. There are no obvious explainable differences. The police score well with the girls, and not the boys. This is remarkable. Authority and power in the form of the police and judiciary were much less appreciated by the last generation of adolescents, whilst in the 70s and 80s pressure groups were much more popular amongst adolescents, the squatter's movement being one of these.

On the one hand there is universality in the great appreciation of Amnesty International, and in the extremely low appreciation of politics and the churches, whereby church members also have little confidence in their own institute. The churches seem to be being replaced by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International, which appeal more to the conscience.

3.3 Macrolevel

The macrolevel concerns the political interest of these adolescents. Confidence in established politics is not particularly high, but does this mean that political matters are not of importance to them? Connected to this is the question to what degree they are politically active, both parliamentary and non-parliamentary. And finally there is the question of the advantages the Europeanization of the Netherlands has for these adolescents.

Political interest (Table 6.5)

As is clear in the above that confidence in established politics is not particularly high. In order to gain a better insight in their involvement in public and political life, the data concerning this is analysed. The composition of this scale has been discussed in detail in chapter two.

It consists of 8 dimensions divided into three fields: public life as the place where politics is practised (ANOMY), the attitude towards political parties as instruments for the practising of politics (INDIFFERENCE, DISTANCE, ALIENATION, POLARITY OF GENERATIONS) and the private sphere, in which the attitude with regard to public life and politics is formed (PRIVATE SPHERE, CONFORMITY, NON CONFORMITY).

These adolescents are just about able to review public life (ANOMY). They feel that it is difficult for people to find a footing in society. This keeps people so busy that there is hardly any time at all to think about the future.

Their judgement of political parties is on the whole a negative one. They feel that there is not a single party that represents the interests of adolescents (INDIFFERENCE). They therefore feel that they will become the victims of the mistakes made by the politicians of today (EXPERIENCED POLARITY OF GENERATIONS), after all, they only act in their own interest. They consider politics as a game played by a small group who alienate themselves from the average person through deception and self-enrichment (ALIENATION). Yet they do feel that politics is important, because it involves matters that concern them (DISTANCE). Boys have a stronger opinion here than girls. Adolescents are most clear in their reaction to all of the above. They like to retreat into their own little worlds (PRIVATE), where they prefer to make do with what they have and are contented with this, rather than distinguish themselves (CONFORMITY). At the same time there is a desire to get out of the rut of society and to do their own thing (NON-CONFORMITY).

Adolescents have no confidence in actual politics, but at the same time they realise that practising politics is very important, because public life is so obscure and yet they wish to make their own way.

Political activism (Table 6.6)

The question now is how would adolescents like to give form to their political involvement. These adolescents are not politically active. They have hardly ever done anything political. They do consider expressing their political feelings in a more parliamentary or demonstrative way, but certainly do not wish to do this in an activist or violent manner. The lack of confidence in politics is reflected in the above figures: boys wish to act in politics, but refrain from doing so, and definitely do not do so in a subversive way. So this generation is quite different from the former generations, in particular those of the sixties and seventies, who fought and demonstrated against all what they didn't like.

Europeanisation (Table 6.7 part 1 and 2)

On a macrolevel the question as to the significance of European unification for the adolescents themselves plays a role. It will have an increasing affect on their social environment.

Their attitude with regard to Europeanization is somewhat indifferent. They believe that nothing will change for them personally and that if anything does change that it can go two ways. They do not have particularly positive expectations, rather, negative ones.

And yet they do believe that Europe offers many possibilities, for them too, it can open doors, reconcile former enemies. They consider the introduction of the Euro as a good means of integration. At the same time they expect that their chances of finding a job are increasing. In a cultural respect they expect that individual cultures and languages will fade and disappear. Here too, it is obvious that they have quite high expectations with regards to possibilities, but that the opposite applies to their confidence in what politicians can actually achieve.

3.4 Significance of the background variables (Table 6.8 part 1 and 2)

The correlations concern the connection between dependant and independent variables. The purpose is to examine to what degree the dependent variables can be explained, based on their connection with the background variables. The condition for a plausible empirical explanation is that it can also be justified in theory.

The first thing that comes to notice in the table is that there are a lot of significant correlations, but that these are relatively weak ($<.11 <.29$). Therefore there is some explanatory value of the background variables but this isn't particularly great. I shall therefore restrict myself to a number of comments that perhaps typify the situation in the Netherlands in particular.

Personality

First we like to correlate the Eysenck personality items. The instrument is described in chapter two. Two dimensions are used: NEUROTICISM and EXTRAVERSION. Both seem to be important determinatives of life perspectives in time. The neurotic personality is emotionally unstable, pessimistic about the future and especially about his abilities to plan his future. Unlike the extravert who is certain of planning his own future. He is autonomous, has things under control.

At the same time the neurotic personality isn't oriented on values. He is orientated on himself. So there is no interest in values which come from the outside. The extravert is orientated on values connected with family and profession and he particularly embraces the aspects of modern hedonistic life (ATTRACTIVENESS). His commitment with politics is as a consequence almost nihil. Neuroticism does correlate with politics. It means not having any confidence in politics and especially not in what benefits Europe can offer. He doesn't feel himself represented by politicians (INDIFFERENCE), politics is too difficult for him (anomy) and he thinks that he will be cheated by politicians (ALIENATION). On the contrary there is some relation with political action, seeking a way to escape out of his frustration by doing something for his own future.

Fear of foreigners

The XENOPHOBIA scale hasn't been used up till now. It is described in chapter 2. Here we use it as a background variable. It measures the way in which there is a negative attitude towards foreign people. In The Netherlands this means, the attitude towards Muslims of Moroccan and Turkish birth. Since the murder on Pim Fortuyn and recently on the Dutch moviemaker Theo van Gogh opinions on Muslims are radically changed. The tolerant Dutch society has turned into aggression against Moroccans and Turkish. This research was done after the murder on Pim Fortuyn (in 2002). XENOPHOBIA like EXTRAVERSION correlates with values ATTRACTIVENESS and MODERNITY. The Islamic religion is considered to be retarded and anti-modernistic, as Fortuyn stated. There is an expected negative correlation with the value HUMANITY, although this is very small. Correlation with values such as family and profession can be considered as confirmation of the fact that the fear for foreigners is connected with the fear that they snap up 'our' jobs and are a threat to 'our' family values.

XENOPHOBIA correlates with the negative attitude towards Europe. These adolescents have low expectations of European unification. XENOPHOBIA is associated in particular with foreigners from outside Europe. But a negative attitude towards foreigners concerns the European foreigner too. In any case this attitude correlates with a negative evaluation of European unification.

The political orientation that goes together with XENOPHOBIA concentrates on ALIENATION (the little guy doesn't count for anything anyway in politics), DISTANCE (it doesn't matter which party is in power) and POLARITY (the future of today's youth is not taken into account). This attitude against politics explains that the xenophobics aren't politically active at all. They have no confidence in political parties even not in issue related groups as Green Peace or Amnesty International. They are on their own.

It is like other research shows: young people, being extravert, are very optimistic about their own future, they think they can handle that, but the common future of mankind, i.e. of society is rather hopeless in their opinion, particularly they are afraid of being washed over by foreigners from outside Europe: the Muslims.

Relevance of Parents

The table shows that the variable Value Orientation has the largest number of correlations with the background variables. This applies to the variable EXTRAVERSION, the variable XENOPHOBIA, the variable parents and sex. This means that Value Orientation on a microlevel is important in this study. The information is most explicit at this point.

It is obvious that parents influence their children's opinions on values, though it is remarkable that there is only a very small connection (11-17%). The Dutch adolescent is influenced in his value patterns not only by his parents but also by numerous other factors. The peer group has not been included in the analysis however; its importance may not be underestimated. The adolescent's world becomes much greater at an early stage than the world at home, which means that personal choices have to be made at an earlier and earlier age. These choices will be made more and more often without parents. This independent position is confirmed by the fact that there is no correlation between parents and the value orientations modernity and authenticity. The independence of these adolescents is strongest in these two orientations. The fact that the variable 'parents' also has few other correlations indicates that the modern Dutch adolescent makes his own choices quite independently, in both a moral and political sense.

It is also notable that religion hardly shows any connection at all with the perspectives studied and that there is even a negative connection with the Value Orientation. It cannot yet be said whether this means that adolescents consider religion and values as being separate, although it is an interesting idea. In Western thinking religion and values are strongly connected to one another. The idea of an autonomous morality has only quite recently been brought up. In this case too it is confirmed that adolescents make their own choices relatively independently. In any case without the church; rather correlations here are negative.

Sex

The distinction between boys and girls is in some cases notable. This is the case where political activism is concerned, where boys are obviously more willing than girls to take part in political and also violent demonstrations. However, this is not remarkably strange.

The difference is also interesting concerning the value orientation. Boys are more modern, in other cases girls are more autonomous, more family and professional orientated, but simultaneously they are more pessimistic about their future. Girls have more confidence in the institutions, mostly in the issue related like human rights movements. Their pessimism about the future and their positive attitude against Europe goes hand in hand with the support to issue related activism.

Religion

Where dutch adolescents are very secularized one could expect that this variable insufficiently makes variety. This expectation has come true. In nearly all cases there is no difference. Church attendance and religious self description explain some variables. They correlate with a nostalgic outlook on the future, where securing tradition is the main thing. Therefore religiously affiliated adolescents aren't oriented on the present. They are not attracted by the gadgets of modern technology and not hedonistic at all. Remarkable is their lack of authenticity. Is religion still related with obedience and altruism one could wonder like in the former days?

Of course the interest groups are popular with these adolescents. They engage with what is good for the sake of God's creation.

3.5 Response to research questions

In the formulation of the research questions it was said that the main question is to what degree adolescents are capable of making their own choices and do they actually make them.

On the microlevel the question is from which perspective of time adolescents do structure their life and future. Do they allow themselves to be influenced by the past or the future? Adolescents realise that the future cannot be made, and that is why the future is more of an extrapolation of the present than the actual imminence of something new. All adolescents have confidence in their own personal future, much more than in society as a whole. They allow themselves to be influenced by values which emphasize their critically independency, such as autonomy and humanity. At the same time they are somewhat traditional, bounded to values as family and profession.

On the meso level they find they have no choices. Politics is boring, politicians cheat you. They do nothing for young people; the future is not a gift to them but only the outcome of the interests of politicians to day. Like political institutions such as parliament and parties also the church deals

in this suspect. Human rights groups do have some grace. And in times of great discontent in society and the increasing feelings of insecurity police and courts win the confidence of these adolescents.

On the macro level there is no engagement with Europe at all, they are rather indifferent to Europe, it will bring both negative and positive consequences. A united Europe won't change anything for them. Still they see that it may be a positive opportunity, but the politicians stand in the way to realize this.

There isn't so much to choose on the structural level, so they choose their own ways on the personal private level.

4 Conclusion

I started this contribution by outlining the situation in the Netherlands among other things by using the term Dutch disease. I explained this term as the presence of great moral tolerance, based on a strong awareness of the right to self-determination. This moral tolerance has come under great pressure. The right to self-determination, that is so strongly characteristic of the individualisation of society, has in the past years led to a society in which 'every man for himself' has gained the upper hand, thus society has hardened. Tolerance came under great pressure. Self-determination became the privilege of the prosperous, of the white person, of the native inhabitant, of the better student, of the healthy, of the successful. The weak, the foreigner, the sick, the poor increasingly became the victim. The economy halted in its growth. It seems as though tolerance can only exist in a society that fares well economically. As soon as there is less to divide then the law of the jungle applies.

At the same time the adolescent is thrown upon his own resources more and more often. Opportunities are offered and forced upon the adolescent from all sides. Their road to adulthood is no longer prepared, no longer follows the natural route. They have to make their own choices in every respect, choices that were not anticipated by their parents and which they could not prepare their children for.

As I have already mentioned, this is the situation in which the adolescents studied grew up. They have seen the results of the Dutch disease.

Therefore, the question is what are the consequences for their perspectives on their own lives and future. Are they capable of making their own choices without being influenced too much by what their parents and educators have done to society, what they have left them with regards to tolerance and opportunities for self-determination?

In short, do these adolescents follow in their parents' footsteps and do they confirm the same self-conscious, open-future image of the modern adolescent?

In a moral respect this does not seem to be the case. These adolescents are certainly not what they seem to be on first sight: young, trendy, self-conscious, independent and modern. After all,

they are the ones who make use of the most modern, fast, communication media, who put globalisation into practice, for whom borders and distances are of no consequence. They are indeed critically independent and autonomous, but not at the cost of thought for humanitarian values. They are almost invisibly oriented towards family and work, rather than towards all the things that modernity has to offer them. Thus the correlation table also indicates that they are influenced in this respect by their parents, which of course is to be expected.

On the mesolevel these adolescents agree with the resistance of the politician Fortuyn. They have absolutely no confidence whatsoever in traditional institutions such as the church and politics. And just like Fortuyn they have a preference for institutes that truly take action, such as the police force and judiciary. They are also not interested in Europe. They tend rather to withdraw into themselves, not to take part in politics, neither parliamentary nor non-parliamentary, although they are well aware of the importance of politics, so they do realise that Europe has something to offer them.

Do these adolescents choose, are they able to choose? This is the question I also asked myself at the beginning of this contribution. Adolescents want to choose their own future, and choose it themselves. This is what they do, and they believe that they will succeed too. They perceive the future based on the present. They live with both feet in the present and perceive that they can put little confidence in politicians and in the organs within which they function. This is very understandable in the situation as it stands in the Netherlands. Politics, both before and after the murder of Fortuyn, has provided little to put confidence in. At the same time world leaders also give no indication of being able to better the world, on the contrary, adolescents have never seen so much war and violence around them.

So do they live without confidence. Yes they do, but they are extremely pragmatic in this respect. They do see what the future has to offer them. They have little confidence in the future of society, but they do have confidence in being able to plan their own future in some way. This coincides with information from the most recent study carried out by the Nederlands Centraal Cultureel Planbureau (Dutch Central Cultural Planning Bureau) (*In het zicht van de toekomst – In sight of the future*). These adolescents have confidence in the opportunities available, that will help them to build a good future, simply because they feel that this is so important, both for themselves as well as for society, but at the same time they lack confidence due to their disappointment in what is actually undertaken by politicians. These adolescents, who in view of their level of education, can be considered as the future leaders, intellectuals and opinion makers of the Netherlands and Europe, do not seem to be particularly interested in actually taking on this task. Contrary to their predecessors. With their protest in the sixties of the last century as a foundation, the present generation of leaders, the so-called baby boomers, automatically participated in the building up of a new world based on their revolutionary ideals in politics, business and the church. The generation that takes over leadership now, builds on the results but sees that the building is not sound, that the foundation is perhaps somewhat weak and not well-established within society as

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a whole, that after all manifests a much more colourful image than the baby boomers could ever possibly have imagined. Although this generation benefited greatly from the enormous prosperity, there is a danger that they will leave little for the future generation. The most important issues of the present, poverty, terrorism and environmental pollution, which at first seemed to be so solvable through the 'war against terrorism, poverty and pollution', appear now to be much greater and more stubborn. It is this new young generation that has to cope with these problems. This will not be easy, now there are also great economic problems. These adolescents will have to act more and more often in a European relation, but it is in this that they have even less confidence.

The excess of confidence in one's own abilities, in the consultation culture, in moral freedom and self-definition is no longer a matter of course. It no longer appears to these adolescents to be a firm foundation on which to build. The events that have taken place since 2001 have shaken up society. Each person will have to find his or her own way and is no longer able to build on what society has to offer. These adolescents are extremely aware of this. The Dutch disease has lost its magic and is truly becoming a disease. The polder model doesn't seem to make sense anymore.

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Tables chapter 6 The Netherlands

Table 6.1: Overview Sample

Town of school	Identity	Questionnaires sent	Questionnaires received]
Bemmel	Ecumenical	175	81 (of which 6 invalid)= 46%
Doetinchem	Neutral	200	77 (of which 4 invalid) = 38%
Echt	Roman Cath.	110	108 (of which 4 invalid) = 98%
Eindhoven	Roman Cath.	270	200 (of which 17 invalid) = 74%
Goes 1	Roman Cath.	100	56 (of which 3 invalid) = 56%
Goes 2	Protestant	100	27 (of which 2 invalid) = 27%
Haarlem	Christian	25	6 (of which 1 invalid) = 24%
Heeswijk	Roman Cath.	110	0
Hoorn	Roman Cath.	100	47 (of which 7 invalid) = 47%
Rotterdam	Roman Cath.	130	85 (of which 6 invalid) = 65%
Spijkenisse	Christian	50	0
Tilburg	Roman Cath.	100	4 = 4%
Waalwijk	Roman Cath.	130	121 (of which 5 invalid) = 93%
Zwolle	Christian	100	63 (of which 5 invalid) = 63%
Total		1700	876 (of which 60 invalid) =51%

Table 6.2: Life planning

Concept	Scale	All
Future-passive	Future	3.47
Future-active	Planning	3.45
Past-passive	Pessimism	3.32
Past-active	Securing	3.30
Past-active/passive	Nostalgia	2.95
Present-active/passive	Uncertainty	2.82
Present-active	Present	2.61

5-point scale: answers mean 1=negative agree, 3=median, 5=positive agree

Table 6.3: Values

Concept	Scale	All
Critically independent	Autonomy	4.28
Critically independent	Humanity	4.07
Socially integrated	Family Orientation	4.04
Socially integrated	Professional Orientation	4.00
Socially integrated	Self management	3.84
Trendy	Attractivity	3.51
Trendy	Authenticity	3.39
Trendy	Modernity	3.22

5-point scale: answers mean 1=unimportant, 3=median, 5=very important

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Table 6.4: Trust in Organisations

Concept	Organisation	All
Issue	Human Rights groups	68 (1)
Regulation	Police	56 (2)
Regulation	Courts	56 (3)
Media	Newspapers	55 (4)
Personal interest	Unions	53 (5)
Regulation	Military	52 (6)
Personal interest	Employer organisation	51 (7)
Issue	Environmental protection groups	50 (8)
Media	Television	46 (9)
Personal interest	Citizen's action group	44 (10)
Politics	Government	40 (11)
Politics	Parliament	40 (12)
Politics	Political parties	32 (13)
Personal interest	Churches	26 (14)

5-point scale: answers 4- 5=positive trust, figures are percentages (in parenthesis: ranking)

Table 6.5 Political interest.

Dimension	Scale	All
Public Life	Anomie	3.07
Political Parties	Indifference	3.15
	Distance	2.87
	Alienation	3.04
Reaction	Pol. Gener.	3.14
	Private	3.52
	Conformity	3.63
	Non-Conform.	3.43

5-point scale: answers mean 1=negative agree, 3=middle, 5=positive agree

Table 6.6 Political Activities

Pol. Action	Refuse to do	Would consider	Have done
Parliamentary	50 %	47 %	3 %
Demonstrative	44 %	54 %	4 %
Political Activist	82 %	16 %	2 %
Violent Activist	89 %	10 %	2 %

Table 6.7A Europeanization

A united Europe	Agree (%)
will not change anything for me personally	41
will affect me most negatively	18
will affect me most positively	4
will have both negative and positive consequences for me	35

Table 6.7B Europe

Disadvantages for the individual through Europe	2.82
Europe as opportunity	3.46

Chapter 6

Tab. 6.8I: Life Perspectives, Values and political orientation by personality, xenophobia, relevance of parents and sex

Column	1	2	3	4	5	
Background-characteristics	Neuro-ticism	Extra-version	Xeno-phobia	Relevance parents	Sex	
Test	corr	corr	corr	corr	mean	
Concepts					female	male
Outlook on Life						
Nostalgia				.10**		
Securing Future	.11**					
Planning	-.24**	.19**				
Uncertainty	.20**					
Present			.21**			
Pessimism	.21**				3.41	3.16
Value Orientation						
Autonomy		.14*		.14**	4.36	4.18
Humanity		.13**	-.11**	.15**		
Attractiveness		.20**	.21**	.11**		
Modernity			.26**		2.95	3.56
Family Orientation		.17**	.10**	.14**	4.21	3.93
Professional Orient.		.14**	.13**	.17**	4.05	3.93
Self-management		.11**		.14**		
Authenticity			.20**			
Political Orientation						
Indifference	.11**		.18**			
Distance			.21**			
Alienation	.12**		.29**			
Anomie	.12**		.20**			
Private Sphere						
Conformity				.13**		
Polarity	.10**		.20**			
Generations						
Non-Conformity						
Europe-negative	.22**		.26**	-.11**	2.77	2.89
Europe positive						
Political activity						
Parliamentary	.12**		-.12**			
Demonstrative	.10**		-.10**			
Political Actionist	.17**		.15**	-.10**	1.07	1.24
Violent Activist	.15**			-.11**	1.08	1.27
Institutions						
Politics-Parties			-.13**	.15**	3.09	3.01
Interest groups			-.10**		3.25	3.16
Media	-.11**	.14**				
Regulation		.10**		.16**	3.53	3.32
institutions						
Issue related groups			-.22**		3.68	3.32

Correlations only $\geq .10$ or $\leq -.10$ Anova sign. $\leq .002$

Chapter 6

Tab. 6.8II: Life Perspectives, Values and political orientation by religious affiliation

Column	6	7	8			
Background-characteristics	Church attendance	Religious selfdescription	Type secular			
Test	corr	corr	mean			
Concepts			New religious	Religious	Secular 1 st gen.	Secular 2 nd gen.
Outlook on Life						
Nostalgia	.11**	.17**				
Securing Future Planning	.17**	.17**				
Uncertainty Present			2.43	2.43	2.78	2.78
Pessimism	-.16**	-.12**	3.41	3.41	3.16	3.16
Value Orientation						
Autonomy						
Humanity		.12**	4.22	4.22	3.85	3.85
Attractiveness	-.13**	-.11**				
Modernity	-.11**	-.11**				
Family Orientation						
Professional Orient.						
Self-management						
Authenticity	-.18*	-.17**				
Political Orientation						
Indifference						
Distance						
Alienation	-.12**					
Anomie						
Private Sphere						
Conformity						
Polarity						
Generations						
Non-Conformity						
Europe-negative						
Europe positive						
Political activity						
Parliamentary	.12**	.11**				
Demonstrative		.11**				
Political Actionist						
Violent Activist						
Institutions						
Politics-Parties	.11**	.10**				
Interest groups	.22**	.26**				
Media						
Regulation						
institutions						
Issue related groups		.12**				

Correlations only $\geq .10$ or $\leq -.10$ and Anova sign. $\leq .002$