The Lisbon Treaty and the coherence of the EU's external action: a case study on the Iraq crisis (2003) and the Bosnia-Herzegovina war(1992 - 1995)

Linda Troost
Student number: 08031746
Class: ES4-4E
Supervisor: Dr. P.A. Shotton PhD

Bachelor of European Studies
The Hague University of Applied Sciences
The Hague, the Netherlands
25 June 2012

Table of contents

Executive Summary

In this dissertation, the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) in order to address and improve the coherence of the EU's external action are examined. In order to understand the coherence problem that existed in the EU's external action before the Lisbon Treaty had been established, three case studies have been conducted. The case studies focussed on the Bosnia-Herzegovina war (1991), the Iraq crisis(2003) and the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in order to address the coherence problem of the EU's external action. Both crises were used as case studies in order to identify what caused the coherence problem in the EU's external action and to determine sources that contributed to the incoherence that existed in the EU's external action. The objective of this dissertation is therefore to examine and determine how effective the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to CFSP have been in improving the coherence of the EU's external action.

The EU's external action has always been the weaker arm of the EU's decision making policy. This became even more apparent during crises such as the Iraq war and the Bosnia-Herzegovina war. The main findings of the case study on the Bosnia-Herzegovina war showed that the situation in the Balkans was the ultimate test for the EU's ability to conduct a common foreign security policy but the war demonstrated the exact opposite and proved a lack of European commitment to construct an effective, common policy. The case study showed that Bosnia became the symbol of European failure as the EU failed to behave as one, coherent actor; taking joint decisions and speaking with one voice. The main findings of the case study showed that Member State divergence was one of the main sources that contributed to the coherence problem that existed in the EU's external action. The Member States failed to take a common position and pursued their own national interests instead of those of the EU as a whole. Furthermore, the case study prove that the EU was not capable of developing a constructive policy towards Bosnia as well as a lack of commitment to have a 'real', coherent security policy and the failure to act through joint decisions as sources contributing to the coherence problem that existed in the EU's external action before the Lisbon Treaty had been established.

The findings of the case study on the Iraq war were, to some extent, similar to those of the case study on the Bosnian war, as Member State divergence was also identified as one of the main sources of incoherence in the EU's external action. It was found that the Iraq war is often referred to as "the great split" as Member States failed to cooperate or take a common position with regards to the crisis. However, the case study also showed that diverging threat perceptions contributed to Member State divergence. Moreover, the results of the case study show that the absence of any

strong CFSP statements and the lack of any effective decision-making procedures capable of overcoming dissent, did not benefit the coherence of the EU's external action.

In the case study on the Lisbon Treaty, it became clear that the Treaty had taken into account crises such as Iraq and the Bosnian war and introduced, primarily, institutional changes and changes to the CFSP in order to address and improve the coherence of the EU's external action. One of the most important changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty was the creation of the new post of HR who, together with the Commission, is responsible for the coordination of all EU external action. Furthermore the Treaty led to the creation of the EEAS, a new service created with the intention to improve the coordination of the EU's responses to crises and to act as some sort of intermediary between all main (institutional) actors involved in European Foreign Policy. Furthermore, the European Council was recognised as an official EU institution and was given the power and responsibility to determine the strategic interests and objectives of the EU for all its external actions. Moreover, the case study on the Lisbon Treaty, showed that the different reactions and positions of the EU Member States have a large impact on the performance of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security on the 'incoherent' responses of the EU to crises.

In general, the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty seem to have had positive effect on the coherence of the EU's external action. The creation of the new post of HR has created more unity in the EU's external action and has great potential to further improve the coherence of the EU's external action as it unifies the EU and Member States by combining their interests into one person. The EEAS has also proved to be effective in improving the coherence of the EU's external action as it has already been successful in certain areas such as the Balkans were it made significant progress in bringing Siberia closer to EU membership. The EEAS has also been successful in redefining policies and assistance to the countries affected by the 'Arab awakening'. Overall the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty thus proved to be effective. However, the HR and EEAS will face the changing environment of the EU in which Member States and EU institutions will compete. They will have to make sure that they maintain their competences. It seems that the only way to keep on improving the coherence of the EU's external action depends on more cooperation at EU level, all Member States working together. Of course, this is easier said than done and only time will tell if the EU is capable of overcoming dissent and if the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty will live up to their full potential and 'eliminate' the coherence problem in the EU's external action for good.

List of abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EC	European Commission
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
HR for Foreign Affairs and Security	High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
MS	Member State
NATO	North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PermStrucCoop	Permanent Structured Cooperation
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States

Introduction

In December 2007 the representatives of the 27 Member States of EU signed the Treaty of Lisbon. This Treaty amended the Treaty on the European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome). One of the aims of the Lisbon Treaty was to complete the EU institutional reform process started by the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties so that the 'EU could function more efficiently' (Blockmans, 2009, p. 9). One of the aims of the Lisbon Treaty was also to enhance efficiency as well as democratic legitimacy of the European Union. However, one of the most remarkable and most important measures included in the Lisbon Treaty was to improve the coherence of the European Union's external action (Blockmans, 2009, p.9). Indeed, the aim of improving coherence of the EU's external action was one of the fundamental reasons for the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty sought to reinforce the EU's capacity to act through strengthened external coherence as before the Lisbon Treaty was introduced, a clear coherence deficit existed (Insight, 2008, 'Treaty of Lisbon clears the way for a more efficient, more democratic, and more secure EU' section ¶ 2).

The coherence deficit

Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, a clear coherence deficit thus existed in the EU's external action. In fact, the EU's external action has always been seen as the 'weaker' arm of EU policy making. The coherence deficit in the EU's external action was not just limited to the EU's external action area but also appeared in other areas. One of the key coherence issues affecting the EU's external action could be found in the relationship between EU institutions and Member States (Santopinto, 2010, p.2). The split of competences between EU institutions created a coordination problem within the EU's area of (external) action(Hertog & Stross, 2011, p. 4). Moreover, competences were shared between too many different actors. Also, the distribution of powers within these institutions led to confusion over the allocation of responsibilities in inter-related areas (Margaras, 2010, p. 3). Part of the coherence deficit before Lisbon could thus be tied back to the counter-productivity of the EU. Moreover, a lack of formal coordinating mechanisms and structures can be identified as contributing to the coherence problem in the EU's external action before the Lisbon Treaty had been established(Merket, 2011, p. 5). Furthermore, it appears to be difficult for the different institutions to take a common stance. With the creation of the Lisbon Treaty, an attempt was made to clarify the positions of the different institutions and their powers (Molina, 2003, p. 7).

Another aspect of the coherence deficit that existed in the EU's external action before Lisbon, was the large number of different EU representatives in the field (Biscop, 2008, p.132). Foreign leaders could at times encounter five or more representatives of the EU, which created a risk of blurring messages and confused local authorities and populations with regards to EU's priorities, strategy and authority(Biscop, 2008 p. 132). Furthermore, part of the coherence problem in the EU's external action could be linked to the enlargement of the EU. It definitely does not make coherence any easier as the national interests of all Member States would have to be coordinated to some extent (Molina, 2003, p. 7). Also, one of the main reasons of the coherence deficit in the EU's external action lays within the preference of Member States for national interests over common European interests which, in situations such as Iraq, prevented them from agreeing on a common position and behaving as a coherent actor (Stahl, 2008, p.10). A coherent actor could be defined as the EU taking joint decisions, speaking with one voice and Member States putting aside their own national interests and instead pursue the EU's common objectives.

Before the Lisbon Treaty was established, two remarkable crises took place in which the EU was greatly involved namely the Iraq crisis(2002-3) and the Balkan conflicts(1990's). Both situations were prime example of the coherence deficit that existed in the EU's external action. The EU failed to act in a coherent manner in both situations and lost influence as well as credibility.

Consequences of the coherence deficit

The coherence deficit that existed before the Lisbon Treaty was introduced had some severe consequences for the European Union. The image of the EU was scattered through situations such as the Iraq crisis and the conflicts in Bosnia in which the EU failed to act coherently and lost credibility and influence (Koenig, 2011, p.1). Furthermore the lack of coherence in the EU's external action created an obstacle to establishing an effective foreign policy. An effective foreign policy requires Member States to take a common stance and thus depends on coherence. Another consequence of the coherence deficit was the EU's inability to speak with one voice. Enabling the EU to speak with one voice will affect its credibility to act as one, unified actor and also its ability to be perceived as a coherent actor (Koenig, 2011, p. 7). The coherence deficit also indicated a lack of communication and interaction between different EU institutions which as a result affected the rapidity at which decisions could be made and therefore the EU's acting in crises (i.e. Iraq) (Koenig, 2011, p.8). The existing coherence deficit before the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty also meant that obstacles were not conquered and continued to stand in the way as Member States failed to provide a common response at EU level(Koenig, 2011, p.13). Another consequence of the coherence deficit is the EU's inability to provide credible and substantial support in crises. The EU

can only provide substantial support if all Member States support the decisions that are being made. The coherence deficit also led to some doubts as to whether the EU's policy were actually effective as they were failing to act 'together' in situations such as Bosnia and Iraq (Stahl, 2008, p. 1).

How did Lisbon try to improve coherence?

The Lisbon Treaty tried to improve coherence within the European Union mainly by introducing institutional changes. The Treaty tried to improve coherence by abolishing the old pillar structure which created problems between the external relations of the community (1st pillar) and the CFSP(2nd pillar) (Laursen, 2010, p. 5). The Lisbon Treaty included three 'innovations' designed to enhance the coherence within the European Union:

1. The European Council was given mandate to develop an overall foreign policy strategy

2. The Lisbon Treaty created the role of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to ensure consistency/coherence of the Union's external actions

3. The External Action Service was introduced to assist the HR. It was also meant to bridge the gap between the Commission and Council Secretariat and to encourage vertical coherence.

With the Lisbon Treaty came the creation of the new position of High Representative (HR). The creation of this position was considered to be a significant contribution towards increasing the horizontal and institutional coherence within the EU (Gaspers, 2009, p.3). The HR got the responsibility for ensuring consistency and coherence of the EU's external actions and this actually defines what the Treaty of Lisbon is aiming at: the Union shall be perceived as one unit, speak with one mouth and implement consistent policies in external matters (Koehler, 2010, p. 11) . Furthermore, the Treaty included the creation of the External Action Service which is considered to act as an intermediary between all the main institutional actors (Gaspers, 2009, p. 11). The establishment of the External Action Service is suggested to contribute to a higher degree of coherence as its service should compromise officials from the relevant departments of the Council's Secretariat and of the Commission (Koehler, 2010, p. 14). Next to these constitutional changes, a new set of 'overarching' EU foreign policy principles and objectives were introduced, which are a likely to have a positive impact on coherence within the EU and its representation in international affairs (Gaspers, 2009, p. 18).

How was coherence included in the Lisbon Treaty?

The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty indicated a greater willingness to develop a common foreign security policy and to improve coherence in the EU's external action after previous failures of coherence in i.e. the Bosnian war (Ciceo, 2010, p.15).

Article 21(3) and Article 24(3) of the Treaty of Lisbon focus on coherence within the European Union. Article 21(3) of the Lisbon Treaty states that "*The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.*" Article 24(3) also clearly shows the Treaty's focus on coherence with the emphasis on the Member States committing themselves to: *"reinforce and develop their mutual political solidarity"* and *"to avoid any action that goes contrary to the interests of the EU or is susceptible to harm either its efficiency or its cohesion in international relations.*

The Lisbon Treaty was thus clearly designed to address the absence of cohesiveness within the EU's external policy.

Central question and sub questions

In order to investigate how the Lisbon Treaty and the CFSP have addressed the EU's coherence deficit in its external action behaviour, two conflicts in which the EU was involved, the Iraq crisis (2003) and the Bosnian war (1992 – 1995), will be compared in order to answer the central question: How successful have the changes introduced to CFSP by the Lisbon Treaty been in addressing the coherence problem of the EU's external actions in the past? Answering this central question will be achieved through the following sub questions:

1. What is coherence? How is it defined?

2. How is coherence measured?

3. What was coherence during the Bosnia conflict (1992-1995)?

    i. Advantages and disadvantages: Problems and solutions

4. What was the EU's coherence during the Iraq conflict (2003)?

    i. Advantages and disadvantages: Problems and solutions

    b. How did the coherence of EU external action evolve between Bosnia and Iraq?

5. How successful has the Lisbon Treaty been in improving the coherence of the EU's external actions? Which changes did the Lisbon Treaty bring to coherence? What problems did it seek to address?

6. What are the future challenges for the CFSP coherence regarding the coherence of the EU's external actions after the Lisbon Treaty?

By answering these questions we will understand what caused the lack of coherence in the EU's external action in both case studies, as well as understand how the Lisbon Treaty as well as the CFSP have sought to address the problems identified. Furthermore, future challenges for EU coherence will be identified and assessed.

We have now seen which events led to the creation of the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, we gained some insight into the coherence deficit that existed in the EU's external action before the Treaty was established. We will now turn to the literature review which will provide us with some useful definitions of coherence. The literature review will be followed by the methodology chapter which will provide an overview of the applied research methods as well as an explanation on how coherence in this dissertation will be measured. After the methodology chapter, the case study on the Bosnia-Herzegovina war will be presented followed by the case studies on the Iraq war and the Lisbon Treaty. The case studies will be followed by the discussion chapter which will link the central question, literature review and findings of the case studies. Finally, a conclusion will be presented determining to the effectiveness of the changes introduced to the CFSP by the Lisbon Treaty in order to improve the coherence of the EU's external action.

Literature review

In this chapter, a review on the literature used for the research of this dissertation including the case studies, will be given. The existing academic literature on the coherence deficit of the EU's external action and the Lisbon Treaty will be analysed i.e. by comparing the author's different perceptions and definitions of coherence as well as their ideas on the possible sources of coherence and solutions to the coherence problem. Furthermore, in this chapter an attempt will be made at defining what coherence is and how it is defined.

Definitions of coherence

In the different existing literature on the coherence phenomenon, different definitions and interpretations of the term 'coherence' can be found. In some cases, the authors clearly make a distinction between coherence and consistency while others choose to use both terms interchangeably and believe that the definitions are somewhat the same. Some authors choose to rely on definitions and perceptions of other authors in their attempt to define coherence, while others create their own definition. In this section, the views of the different authors will be reviewed.

The first author who's perception of coherence that will be reviewed is Stahl. In his study on the Iraq crisis and coherence, Stahl relies on Nuttall's belief that coherence and consistency can be used interchangeably. Stahl makes a division between vertical and horizontal inconsistency by using definitions Nuttall attributed to both terms. Therefore, vertical inconsistency in Stahl's study is defined as a situation in which one more Member Sates pursues national policies which are out of kilter with policies agreed upon in the EU (Stahl, 2008, p. 3). Stahl (2008) also believes in Nuttall's perception of horizontal inconsistency: EU policies pursued by different EU actors which are not complementary to each other (p. 3). Similar to Stahl(2008), Portela and Raube (2009) recognise the horizontal and vertical dimension of coherence. Stahl however assumes that vertical consistency is a necessary pre-condition for the EU to be an 'efficient' actor. In his study , Stahl makes a country selection of Member States which had an institutional say in the Iraq crisis. To avoid generalization, his study focuses on more than half of the then 15 Member States. Furthermore, all of the countries selected for Stahl's study have been EU members since the inauguration of the CFSP. Therefore the Member States Stahl selected for his study are Germany, Denmark, Italy, France, Greece, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.

Where Stahl doesn't give a definition of coherence in general, Blockmans and Wessel (2009) define coherence or the notion of coherence, as referring to a level of internal cohesion, i.e. the

level of institutional coordination within the EU (p. 29). Moreover, the authors refer to coherence as the act of something sticking together. In their paper Blockmans and Wessel (2009) try to investigate whether the new Lisbon Treaty will improve the decision-making and leadership on issues of European Security and Defense Policy and, consequently, the effectiveness of the European Union as an international crisis manager (p. 1). In the paper, an explanatory chapter on the Lisbon Treaty and coherence is included. When reading this chapter it becomes clear that the authors think of coherence a carrier of procedural obligation for institutions to cooperate with each other. They also believe that the need to achieve more coherence and consistency within the EU is not a new challenge but has been heightened (Blockmans & Wessel, 2009, p.30). Cremona (2008) also suggests that coherence in the EU's foreign policy has been recurring in preceding treaties and declarations (Cremona, 2008, p. 1). Cremona therefore seems to agree with Blockmans' and Wessel's view that the concern for coherence is not a new phenomenon but has rather been heightened. Cremona (2008) for example suggests that the coherence issue was already addressed in the Laeken Declaration back in 2001 (p. 1). The Declaration asks: "How a more coherent common foreign should and defense policy should be developed?" Cremona also says that Constitutional Treaty promised to make a number of changes to enhance coherence.

With regards to coherence and consistency, contrary to Stahl, Blockmans and Wessel do make a distinction between coherence and consistency. In their opinion, consistency carries an obligation of result, namely to ensure that no contradictions exist in the external projections of strategies and policies (Blockmans & Wessel, 2009, p. 29). Unlike Stahl (2008), Portela and Raube (2009), choose to not use the terms coherence and consistency interchangeably. They argue that consistency refers to the absence of contradiction while on the other hand the notion of coherence relates more to positive synergies (Portela & Raube, 2009, p. 3). According to Portela & Raube (2009), coherence goes beyond the assumption that different policies should not contradict each other(p. 3). Similar to Portela and Raube (2009) and Blockmans and Wessel(2009), Cremona (2008) also chooses to make a distinction between the terms coherence and consistency. She defines coherence as a broader and more flexible concept than consistency (Cremona, 2008, p. 3). Cremona (2008) agrees with other authors such as Tietje and Wessel that while coherence is a matter of degree, consistency is a static concept (p. 3). She also refers to Gauttier's definition of coherence and it being a principle of action and organisation. The author comes to the conclusion that consistency and coherence are linked to each other but not the same. She believes that coherence may include (but is not limited to) consistency (Cremona, 2008, p.4). Furthermore Cremona (2008), defines coherence as a multilayered concept (p.4). She suggests coherence consists out of three different levels. The first level requirement of coherence would be

consistency, claims Cremona. The second level of coherence is the effective allocation of tasks between actors, avoiding duplication and gaps: rules of delimitation. Cremona (2008) illustrates this by giving an example of the need for each institution to act within the limits of its power (p.5). Finally, Cremona (2008) suggests that the third level of coherence implies synergy between norms, actors and instruments: principles of cooperation and complementarity (p.6).

Like Blockmans and Wessel, Cremona (2008) recognises the institutional aspect of coherence. She argues that coherence has an ambiguous character: it appears to have a primary institutional/political character. She also refers to Tietje's definition of coherence: one of the main constitutional values of the EU. To Tietje's definition, Cremona (2008) adds that coherence provides a context for the operation of fundamental legal principles governing the relations between Member States and the EU institutions themselves and also includes a duty of cooperation (p. 3). Cremona recognises a problem to identify coherence and argues this is caused by the different language versions of the treaties, not using the same terms. It's quite remarkable that Cremona's paper, compared to those of the other authors such as Stahl(2008) and Koehler (2010), contains a much more detailed analysis of the coherence concept.

Another interpretation of the coherence phenomenon is provided by Portela and Raube in which the authors try to investigate how the EU deals with both incoherence and coherence. They try to answer this question by drawing conclusions on the specific nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor. The authors start their paper by explaining that coherence is a principle guiding foreign policies in the EU as well as international actors (Portela & Raube, 2009, p. 1). Koehler (2010) also recognises coherence to be a necessary precondition to the efficacy of foreign policy, not only of the EU but of all international actors. She believes that the old structure of the EU and the differences that used to exist in institutional involvement as well as procedures between different issue areas of the EU's foreign policy, caused coherence problems in the past (Koehler, 2010, p. 1). Furthermore, Koehler (2010) believes that the Lisbon Treaty led to a simplification of the EU's structure and that the institutional changes introduced by the Treaty affected coherence in a positive away. With regards to the coherence principle, Portela and Raube suggest that effectiveness is linked to the principle of coherence, not only in the EU. In their paper, Portela and Raube will mainly analyse how the EU has dealt with coherence i.e. on constitutional level and policy level.

Just like Stahl (2008),Portela and Raube refer to other authors such as Hillion and Nuttall in their attempt to define coherence. They refer to several authors who think of coherence and consistency as two different things. Portela and Raube (2009) seem to agree with Hillion's definition of

coherence: going beyond the assurance that different policies do not legally contradict each other and that coherence is a quest for synergy and added value with regards to EU policies (p. 3). They also refer to Hoffmeister's definition of consistency: referring to the absence of contradiction whereas the notion of coherence relates more to creating positive synergies (Portela & Raube, 2009, p. 3).

Following the introduction of these different definitions of coherence and consistency, Portela and Raube decide to adopt a definition of coherence that does not only refer to the absence of contradiction but also to the production of synergies similar to Cremona's (2009) definition of coherence which also includes a reference to synergy . They also seem to agree with the distinction Missirolli makes between consistency and coherence. He claims that the measurement of consistency is quite straight forward: a policy is consistent or not. In contrast, he argues that one can conceive different degrees of coherence: something can be more or less coherent (Portela & Raube, 2009, p. 3).

Vertical, horizontal and institutional coherence

When examining the phenomenon of coherence we see several authors identify the different dimensions of coherence: horizontal, vertical and institutional coherence. Similar to Stahl (2008), Blockmans and Wessel (2009) and Cremona (2008), Koehler (2010) also recognises these different dimensions of coherence. She believes that coherence indicates, on the one hand, the degree of congruence between external policies of Member States and that of the EU (vertical coherence), while on the other hand it refers to the level of internal coordination of EU policies (horizontal coherence) (Koehler, 2010, p.2). Cremona (2008) introduces a slightly different idea of vertical coherence at refers to it as the relationship between Member States and EU action, in particular in contexts where the Member States and the EU may act simultaneously in relation to the same policy or subject matter (p. 6). Her definition of horizontal coherence is somewhat similar to Stahl's (2008) but seems to be more detailed and more comprehensive. She defines horizontal coherence as a concept implying rules concerning consistency and complementarity. Cremona (2008) says that horizontal coherence is a term that is often used to refer to interpolicy and interpillar coherence (p. 9). In addition to these two forms of coherence, Cremona (2008) also identifies a third form of coherence: institutional coherence. She suggests that this 'dimension' of coherence is relevant in the context of horizontal coherence but also has some relevance to vertical coherence. Cremona (2008) believes that institutions such as the Commission and European Council are enjoined to promote (horizontal) coherence between all EU external policies (p. 15).

Sources of incoherence and inconsistency

In addition to the different perceptions and definitions of coherence that can be found in the existing literature, different views on the existing 'coherence problem' or 'coherence deficit' can be identified. Different authors identify different sources of incoherence and inconsistency as well as the various aspects of the coherence problem. Stahl (2008) for example introduces different reasons for vertical inconsistency in his study. He believes that Member States follow different foreign policies due to different national identities and that this is one of the reasons for vertical inconsistency (Stahl, 2008, p. 5). Portela and Raube (2009) also believe that the origins of inconsistency lie with the Member States' reluctance to strengthen the intergovernmental level by operating through the EU (p. 14). They come to the conclusion that the collective or individual behaviour of the Member States causes inconsistencies (Portela & Raube, 2009, p. 16). Furthermore, Portela and Raube (2009) suggest that the coherence literature might suffer from an overemphasis on the legal-institutional framework which overlooks Member State behaviour (p. 16). The authors claim that it is in the relationship between EU level and Member States that powerful obstacles to a coherent EU foreign policy can be located (Portela & Raube, 2009, p. 16). Portela and Raube (2009) come to the conclusion that the goal to formulate coherent policies is difficult to attain since no clear cut hierarchy exists in foreign relations (p. 17). The authors consider the Member States to be one of the main problems to frame coherent actions. Cavatorta and Chari(2003) seem to agree with Stahl(2008) and Portela and Raube (2009) as they also identify the Member State aspect as one of the most important aspects related to the failure of foreign policy and contributing to incoherence. The authors claim that as long as any Member State attempts to highjack the EU to advance their own narrow national position, or even worse ignore the EU altogether, CFSP is unlikely to be credible and effective (Cavatorta & Chari, 2003, p. 5).

Stahl (2008) comes to the conclusion that no easy pattern emerges when looking at European actors' (de)securitisations strategies (p.24). He presents his findings in regards to securisation during the Iraq crisis in a table. The table shows that i.e. the UK is considered to have applied an early securitisation strategy and France is identified as one of the counties applying a late desecuritisation strategy(Stahl, 2008, p. 24). Stahl stresses though that the timings of the securitisations moves did not pre-determine the content of the securitisations. He argues that the countries securitisation moves were incomplete. In his study on the Iraq crisis, Stahl identifies two types of actors; the early birds and the late commers. The late commers objected to any securitisation move before January 2003 (p. 25). Stahl asks himself why the countries' securitisations diverged during the crisis and comes to the conclusion that due to failure to identify a common external threat and institutional restraints from the CFSP, the Member States' strategies

did not converge (Stahl, 2008, p. 27).

Stahl believes that the different views on the urgency definition and management of the threat Iraq, superseded the commonly desired 'spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity' and impaired the EU's effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations (Stahl, 2008, p. 29). Furthermore, Stahl identifies the beginning of 2003 as the time when the intra-EU rift peeked. Spain joined forces with the UK and its pronounced securitisation strategy while France sided with Germany's determined desecuritisation (Stahl, 2008, p. 29). Stahl claims that the EU never believed in the urgency or the definition of the treat of Iraq. He claims that is the reason why Iraq was not properly securitised before January 2003. Stahl (2008) suggests that the Member States did not see Saddam's regime as a threat but rather its possible damage to transatlantic relations (p.29). Through his study, Stahl also notices a structural deficit within the CFSP. He suggests that the presidency has no incentive to touch upon 'hot potatoes' (Stahl, 2008, p.29). Furthermore, Stahl interprets a lack of vertical consistency as a lack of mandate to speak up and comes to the conclusion that the innovations of the Amsterdam and Nice treaties gave the CFSP a face but no voice (Stahl, 2008, p. 29). Stahl is of the opinion that the incoherence as it was present during the Iraq crisis was caused by a lack of involvement as well as some sort of divergence between European institutions. Blockmans and Wessel (2009) also recognise the fact that coherence of the EU's external action is seriously hampered by the institutional structure of the EU (p.10). According to the authors, competences and procedures that were artificially kept apart in three pillars, contributed to the coherence problem in the EU's external action. Like Stahl (2008), Blockmans and Wessel (2009) identify institutional deficits or institutional incoherence as one of the main sources contributing to the coherence problem within the EU. They suggest that the dissolution of the pillar structure and possibly the merger of the EU and European Community could potentially add to coherence of the EU's external action (Blockmans & Wessel, 2009, p. 10). One could thus assume that Blockmans and Wessel consider the abolishment of the pillars system to contribute to the decrease of the coherence deficit in the EU's external action. Furthermore, they argue that the EU's coherence problems and inability to agree on a common policy, weakened its role at international level. According to Blockmans and Wessel (2009) the coherence problem creates obstacles to determined action in situations such as Iraq which causes inconsistency between policies governed by different EU institutions (p.20). The authors are of the opinion that the classic distinctions between internal-external and hard-soft policies are blurring and that this affects the EU's attempts at achieving more coherence and consistency (Blockmans & Wessel, 2009, p. 29). Stahl (2008) adds that a

disconnection between securitisation strategies, also limits the EU's power of persuasion (p. 31) and its possible achievement of more coherence and consistency in i.e. the EU's external action

Blockmans and Wessel (2009), identify another source of incoherence in the EU's external action. The authors identify enlargement of the EU as a source contributing to incoherence (Blockmans & Wessel, 2009, p. 30). Chances of disagreement and delay in the decision-making process will increase as the number of Member States rises, argue Blockmans and Wessel. Furthermore, Blockmans and Wessel(2009) argue that increasingly diverse interests and approaches to dealing with (security) issues caused by the last 'waves; of enlargement have also stretched the sense of solidarity and commonality to the maximum (p.30). They come to the conclusion that the EU faces the challenge to ensure enlargement does not further disrupt internal cohesion. Blockmans and Wessel (2009) noticed that the willingness of Member States to act together trough their 'Union' is often missing (p.31). They say that the actions of individual Member States in crises such as Iraq are the sad proof of that. Finally, Blockmans and Wessel (2009) come to the conclusion that the pillar structure is one of the main reasons for incoherence in the EU's external actions (p.46). They suggest that the pillar structure introduced an inherent risk of inconsistency as it divided the EU's external relations over two different legal treaty regimes (Blockmans & Wessel, 2009, p. 46). Blockmans and Wessel(2009) seems to think though that the Lisbon Treaty introduced something of a collective defence obligation (p. 47). Portela and Raube (2009) also argue that the pillar structure cause problems of coherence, especially horizontal coherence (p.13). A sense of uncertainty concerning which pillar was in charge of deciding on certain sanctions for example, caused incoherence (Portela & Raube, 2009, p. 13).

With regards to the coherence problem, Portela and Raube (2009) believe that the coherence problem consists out of three different factors: differences among Member States, the unwillingness to use EU institutions and contribution of personnel in achieving coherence (p.20). In their paper, Portela and Raube refer to Stahl's (2008) paper and his findings with regards to the Iraq crisis and incoherence. They seem to agree with Stahl's perception that disagreement between Member States can often not be overcome by institutions in place. In addition, Portela and Raube (2009) find that divergences in the resources of individual Member States add to the problem of coherence (p. 20). The authors suggest that in an ideal scenario, the EU would add a new layer of government functions to the Member States and coherence would thus be achieved by the institutionalisation of coordination (p . 3). In contrast to the other authors, Portela and Raube present clear and detailed ideas of how coherence could be implemented in foreign policy. They create their own scenarios.

Portela and Raube (2009) come to the conclusion that the EU can only benefit from coherence if resources and capabilities are in place and incoherent action by individual Member States does not undermine collective actions by interfering with EU policies (p. 21). Like the other authors, Portela and Raube believe that the EU needs to speak with one voice in order to be perceived as a coherent actor. They believe that the central finding of their investigation is that the sources of incoherence differ across policies. Portela and Raube (2009) conclude that on the basis of the methods through which the EU ensures coherence in the CFSP, the EU does not resemble a state (p.22). According to the authors the EU is only a 'roof' under which different actors and institutions are responsible for conducting different policies. They suggest a formal principle is needed to hold the whole of external competences, decision-making and actions together. Portela and Raube (2009) conclude that incoherence undermines the prime objective of EU foreign policy. In order to achieve coherence, the authors believe that it is necessary to optimize the coordination of European foreign policies. They suggest that foreign policies of Member States and the EU should be complementary and adding up to each other (Portela & Raube, 2009, p. 4).

The Lisbon Treaty and its influence on coherence

Several authors analyse the Lisbon Treaty in order to identify the changes it has brought to i.e. the EU's institutional structure as well as its influence on coherence within the EU. The impact of the Treaty is often discussed as well as the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the new position of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security and their impact on coherence within the EU. In this paragraph the different views of the authors of the academic literature selected, will be presented. They will be further assessed in the chapter of this dissertation that discusses the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty with regards to coherence of the EU's external action, as well as its attempts to address the coherence problem in the EU's external action.

One of the authors who discusses the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is Cremona(2008). In her paper she tries to investigate what the Lisbon Treaty offers by way of an improved legal and institutional framework for coherence in EU foreign policy. Cremona starts by explaining how the Lisbon Treaty was established and which processes and treaties preceded. She suggests that the Lisbon Treaty was not the first opportunity used to address coherence problems in the EU. In order to analyse what the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on coherence has been, Cremona analyses its impact on vertical, horizontal and institutional coherence individually. She claims that in respect to

vertical coherence, three points are notable. One of them is the removal of explicit provision on the primacy of Union law by the Lisbon Treaty. Cremona (2008) also notices a clear emphasis on defining the EU's competence (p.17). The Lisbon Treaty defined that the EU may only act within the limits of powers granted to it by the Member States (Cremona, 2008, p. 17). Finally, Cremona (2008) notices the emphasis on the retention of foreign policy powers by Member States (p.17). She comes to the conclusion that the Lisbon Treaty responds to the challenge of vertical coherence, not by giving more power to the EU but by emphasizing the boundaries to EU power, the concurrent powers of the Member States and their role in furthering EU policy (Cremona, 2008, p.19). Koehler (2010) does not entirely agree with Cremona's view on the new innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. She argues that the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty are not as far reaching as those of i.e. the Constitutional Treaty. However, Koehler (2010) weakens her perception though by saying that she does believe that the innovations could increase effectiveness of European Foreign Policy and that they could strengthen the EU as an international actor (p. 1). Moreover, she believes that the Lisbon Treaty simplified the structure of the EU but failed to unify it (p. 6). She does believe that the Treaty strengthened the EU's status as an international actor as it explicitly regulates the legal personality of the EU and clarifies the Union's relations and status of its institutions. Koehler (2010) says that due to the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU now acts without questioning whether a specific action is a matter of European competency or of Member State responsibility or of both (p. 9).

Compared to Stahl (2008) and Blockmans and Wessel (2009), Cremona makes a more detailed and well organised analysis of how the Lisbon Treaty affected coherence by dividing the analysis into different parts (horizontal, vertical and institutional coherence).In regards to horizontal coherence, Cremona (2008) introduces the idea that horizontal coherence is the theme of the Lisbon Treaty. She also claims that coherence does not necessarily imply the removal of differences between policies and institutional structures but it is rather about recognizing the differences and ensuring that they can live together harmoniously (Cremona, 2008, p. 22). Furthermore, Cremona (2008) suggests that institutional coherence was improved by the abolishment of separate pillars (p.23). She suggests that the Lisbon Treaty included three innovations that were clearly designed to enhance institutional coherence. Cremona (2008) explains that the creation of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as the External Action Service contributed to the EU's coherence (p.23). Cremona has no doubt that the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have the potential to enhance coherence if they work as intended. Koehler(2010) agrees with Cremona(2009) and believes that the incorporation of the intergovernmental and supranational elements into the one position of the High Representative aims at increasing the

horizontal coherence of the European Foreign Policy as it will ensure the consistency of the EU's external action. Koehler (2010) perceives the new position of High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy as an answer to the criticism regarding the previous failure to address incoherence associated with the pillar structure and the separation of issue areas as well as the EU's 'fragmented' representation in international relations (p.11). Moreover, Koehler says that the High Representative's responsibility for ensuring coherence of the EU's external action is precisely what the Lisbon Treaty is aiming at: "The Union shall be perceived as one unit, speak with on mouth and implement consistent policies in external matters". Koehler (2010) comes to the conclusion though that in spite of possible conflicts regarding for example the delimitation of responsibilities between the High Representative, on the one hand, and the members of the Commission, on the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty strengthens the institutional preconditions for more coherence of the European Foreign Policy by introducing the double position of the High Representative (p.12). However, she also senses the risk that comes with the creation of the role of the High Representative. She suspects that the wide scope of the High Representative's responsibility for coherence in external relations of the i.e. the Commission, could constrain the power of certain Commissioners (Koehler, 2010, p. 10). Koehler believes possible tension could arise because the High Representative challenges the president's 'primus inter pares' position within the Commission.

With regards to vertical and horizontal coherence, Koehler believes that the Lisbon Treaty maintains the principles of both for example by creating the position of the High Representative who will ensure both dimensions of coherence. In her paper, Koehler also discusses the recognition of the European Council as an official institution as wells as the EEAS. Koehler (2010) believes that one of the most important innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty concerns the formal introduction of the European Council as one of the EU's constituent institutions as prior to the Treaty, the European Council had never officially acquired the status of an EU institution (p. 12). Furthermore, Koehler identifies the establishment of the European External Action Service(EEAS) as being of great importance in order to ensure the coherence of the EU's external relations and the strengthening of its role as an international actor. She believes that the composition of the EEAS could contribute to a higher degree of coherence in the EU's external relations as it compromises officials from relevant departments i.e. the Councils General Secretariat and the Commission. Koehler (2010) suggests that by revising the institutional arrangements related to the European Foreign Policy, the Lisbon Treaty expands the institutional preconditions for a more coherent and thus more effective foreign policy, even it does not change the legal nature of the principles of horizontal and vertical coherence (p. 15). Koehler comes to the conclusion that despite possible

conflicts, the Treaty provides a stronger institutional basis for a more effective foreign policy of the EU among others. The main finding of Koehler's article is that the Lisbon Treaty definitely contributes to a more coherent foreign policy of the EU and thus strengthens the EU as an international actor. She thus seems to agree with Cremona (2009) and believes that with its contributions, the Treaty is a positive step toward a higher degree of coherence in the EU's external relations, even if it is still far away from achieving its goal of a truly common European Foreign Policy (Koehler, 2010, p. 15).

Koehler argues though that the Lisbon Treaty did not bring any significant changes to horizontal and vertical coherence. She argues that Member States were already obliged to cooperate and coordinate their policies in order to achieve a more coherence in European Foreign Policy (Koehler, 2010, p .3). Koehler also believes that with respect to vertical coherence, the Lisbon Treaty failed to discourage Member States from pursuing their own national foreign policies, diverging from agreed European positions and therefore failed to increase vertical coherence in European Foreign Policy. It's not a surprise that Koehler (2010) comes to the conclusion that, in her opinion, the overall impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the codified principles of coherence in the European Foreign policy is very moderate (p. 5).

Perceptions of the Iraq crisis

We now turn to the Iraq crisis and the EU's 'failure' to behave as one, coherent actor. Different reasons for the coherence problem that existed in the EU's external action during the crisis are identified and analysed. Stahl(2008) and Cavatorta and Chari (2003) introduce different theories in order to find an explanation for the EU's 'great split' during the crisis. In this section of the literature review, their views will be presented. They will be further assessed in the case study.

In Stahl's (2008) article on the incoherent securitisation by the EU during the Iraq crisis, the main problem or issue put forward is the EU's suffering from a deficient common security identity which he considers to be a necessary pre-requisite for EU actorness (p. 2). Stahl (2008) argues that the EU's division in the Iraq crisis affected the EU's chances to be recognised a security actor (p. 1). Moreover, he beliefs that the inconsistent securitisation of the Member States during the crisis revealed structural deficits within the Common Foreign Security Policy. One of the arguments Stahl introduces for the incoherence during the Iraq crisis is related to the division of the Europeans into two camps during the crisis. Stahl (2008) argues that countries were diverged regarding threat perception and the urgency and need for common action (p. 3). In his study, Stahl suggests that, in times of crises, the Member States acted individually and that this contributed to the lack of an

efficient common security identity. Cavatorta and Chari (2003), also identify the Member States' desire to maintain sovereignty regarding foreign policy decisions as one of the main causes for the EU's foreign policy failure in the Iraq crisis (p.2). With regards to the CFSP ,Stahl argues that the CFSP had a structural deficit which contributed to the EU's failure in Iraq. In addition, Cavatorta and Chari (2003) also refer to the ineffectiveness of policies such as the CFSP and the weak institutionalisation of the supranational decision-making structure as contributing to the EU's inability to act as one, coherent actor, taking decisions unanimously and speaking with one voice. Cavatorta and Chari (2003) mention that the EU institutional structure appears to be handcuffed, if not doomed, when seeking to find a unified voice regarding foreign policy (p. 2).

Cavatorta and Chari also try to investigate why the EU was not able to act effectively during the Iraq war and what lessons should be taken from the whole experience. Cavatorta and Chari start their paper by referring to David Cameron's perception on the EU's acting during crises in general: "in handling serious political crises, especially those involving armed conflict, the Union has rarely acted as one or acted effectively." The authors claim that their paper has three objectives. The paper will first aim at considering the theoretical reasons that help explain why the EU has historically failed to create a CDSP. The second aim is to analyse the developments during the Iraq crisis followed by a section that outlines the third and last objective of Cavatorta and Chari considering the future of the EU as an international actor, using concepts introduced by Christopher Hill regarding capabilities and expectations of EU Foreign Policy.

Cavatorta and Chari (2003) don't seem to entirely agree with Stahl's (2008) view of the divergence between Member States causing the EU's failure in Iraq. They believe that the blame for the lack of EU effectiveness is squarely put on the Member States (p. 3). The authors suggest that divisions among Member States due to perceived different national interests, are at the heart of the conscious marginalization of CFSP. The authors believe that Member States have conflicting positions regarding where Europe should stand internationally. Cavatorta and Chari (2010) suggest that the accusations to Member States for failing to pursue a common objective may seem biased in order not to have to shoulder the blame for their ineffectiveness, but it remains true that most Member States and applicant states did their best to sideline the EU (p. 3). Furthermore, they argue that the real issue seems not to be the decision making structure of CFSP itself, but the political will of the domestic actors pointing to the idea that the EU's foreign policy institutional design is not of prime importance (p.4). Moreover, the authors identify the failure of the EU to speak with one voice during the crisis as an event caused by the absence of any strong CFSP statements during the crisis.

Moreover, Cavatorta and Chari (2003) believe that the failure of the foreign policy during the Iraq crisis is related to relations between the EU and the US. Cavatorta and Chari (2003) believe that the US always hoped that Europe would become a more relevant actor in international politics (p.4). On the other hand, the authors recognise the fact that the US never really desired the emergence of an autonomous actors such as the EU, that would potentially represent a serious competitor. They come to the conclusion though that it would be misleading to suggest that the US is to blame for the EU's ineffectiveness. Cavatorta and Chari (2003) claim that the reason for a lack of European coherence regarding transatlantic relations, is the result of the failure by Member States to realise that in many aspects the US needs Europe just as much as the EU needs the US (p. 4).

According to Cavatorta and Chari (2003), the EU could have an international role if Member States start to realise that the EU could offer an alternative to the US (p. 5). They come to the conclusion that Member States would have to reconfigure their national security strategy and stop going their own, separate ways or to use Europe to promote a national world view. In their paper, Cavatorta and Chari refer to Christopher Hill's observations and findings regarding the 'gap' between capabilities and expectations. They think that until the different Member States spend more time attempting to patch up the transatlantic relationship instead of working out a common EU position, an effective CFSP is likely to remain illusory.

Methodology

This chapter will explore the research methods that have been applied in the research conducted for this dissertation. The aims and nature of the research will be examined as well as the different methods of data collection used and explanation for choosing particular methods over others.

The principle aim of the research was to explore the central question and investigate how successful the changes introduced to the CFSP by the Lisbon Treaty have been in improving the coherence of the EU's external actions as well as determining a clear definition of coherence. Furthermore, the research was conducted to investigate how coherence has improved over time and to identify sources of incoherence.

Answering the central question will be achieved through the following sub questions:

1. What is coherence? How is it defined? How is it measured?

2. What was coherence during the Bosnia conflict (1992-1995)?

   i. Advantages and disadvantages: Problems and solutions

3. What was the EU's coherence during the Iraq conflict (2003)?

   i. Advantages and disadvantages: Problems and solutions

4. How did the coherence of EU external action evolve between Bosnia and Iraq?

5. How has the Lisbon Treaty influenced coherence within the EU? Which changes did the Lisbon Treaty bring to coherence? What problems did it seek to address?

6. What are the future challenges for the CFSP coherence regarding the coherence of the EU's external actions after the Lisbon Treaty?

The research thus involves the examination of the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty with regards to the CFSP as well as an investigation of the coherence problem in the EU's external action and determining what coherence exactly is. In addition, a case study on the Iraq crisis and the Bosnian war will be executed in order to analyse how coherence evolved between these different events.

Research methods

In this section the research methods that have been applied in order to find an answer to the central question will be presented. The conducted research method existed out of a case study which allowed for the problems of coherence identified in the academic literature to be tested, as well as secondary research which involved the examination of other researcher's studies. In addition, a descriptive research methodology has been applied in order to establish how coherence evolved over time. Furthermore, a qualitative research method was applied in order to find answers to the central- and sub questions. Finally, desk research has been conducted in order to gain sufficient background information on the topic and to gain some insight into the existing literature on the coherence phenomenon. In the following paragraphs a more detailed overview of the research methods applied, can be found.

Case study

In order to analyse how coherence has changed over time and how the EU's acting with regards to coherence in difference situations has evolved, a case study on the Iraq crisis (2003) and Bosnian War (1992) was executed. The Bosnia Herzegovina conflict and the Iraq war took place before the Lisbon Treaty and CFSP were established. By comparing these two situations, it can be investigated how the EU's acting with regards to coherence has changed with the creation and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the CFSP. The Iraq crisis (2003) and the Bosnian war are often identified as situations in which the EU failed to act as one, coherent actor. Especially the Iraq crisis, which is often referred to as the EU's great split as some Member States completely supported the attack on Iraq while others objected to any form of legitimization of the war (Stahl, 2008, p.29). Therefore both these crisis have been selected for a case study. The case study seemed a viable research method as it allowed a study on the coherence phenomenon in its natural setting as well as the possibility to ask "how" and "why" questions so as to understand the nature and complexity of the topic (Benbasat, 1987, p. 370). The case study requires multiple methods of data collection and the boundaries of the phenomenon are not clearly evident at the outset of the research. It will also allow for the problems of coherence, identified in the literature, to be tested.

The use of a case study approach seemed advantageous and appropriate as the coherence phenomenon is quite a contemporary event. It also seemed more useful to include multiple cases instead of just one single case. Furthermore, the choice to use multiple cases is linked to the purpose of the research, namely to describe the coherence phenomenon, investigate how it has changed over time and making analyses.

Secondary research

In this dissertation a secondary research method is applied. This type of research involves the examination of other researcher's studies. It also includes the use of secondary sources such as books, articles and other literary works on the coherence phenomenon as well as the Iraq conflict and the Bosnian war.

The secondary research is conducted in combination with primary research. This means that the coherence phenomenon is also studied through first hand observations and investigations such as analysing literary texts and using statistical data.

Descriptive research methodology

For the purposes of this dissertation, a descriptive research methodology has been applied. This methodology mainly consists out of using observations of primary research as the main means of collecting data. By using this particular research method, different situations in which the EU was involved with regards to coherence have been examined in order to establish how coherence evolved between Iraq and Bosnia and how the Lisbon Treaty has influenced coherence. The observations will be written down and analysed. The descriptive research methodology has been executed in combination with a comparative research method. Two conflicts in which the EU has been involved and took place at different points in time, will be researched using the comparative research methodology.

Qualitative research method

In general, an overall qualitative research method has been applied. The research that will be conducted is all about exploring issues, trying to understand the coherence phenomenon and answering questions. The qualitative research method is used as it investigates the "why" and "how" and not just "what", "where" and "when". The research mainly focuses on finding answers to the central- and sub questions, one of the main characteristics of qualitative research. There are of course disadvantages to this research method such as its time consuming aspect and the fact that the research is based on other researcher's interpretations and his/her views. However, the disadvantages of quantitative research appear to be bigger than those of qualitative research. A quantitative research method seemed insufficient as the results of this type of research are often more limited and insights, motives, views and opinions are not taken into account. In order to conduct the case study, different views, theories and opinions are needed and thus quantitative research did not seem to be sufficient. Moreover, quantitative research does not seem to focus on the identification of issues. For the central question to be answered, it is important to identify issues with regards to coherence of the EU's external action and to explore different theories as to why

these issues exist and how they could be solved. Using a quantitative research method would thus not be sufficient.

Desk research

A substantial part of the research to be conducted will exist out of desk research or "secondary research". This means that most of the research on the coherence phenomenon is done by analyzing and gathering information from academic literature, such as books and papers, as well as official European journals and Treaties. The desk research approach is chosen in order to gain sufficient background information on the topic as well as to gain some insight in to what literature already exists on the topic and how different opinions with regards to the coherence phenomenon have changed over time. The information gathered through the desk research, will be analysed by comparing different authors theories on what causes the coherence deficit as well as their perceptions of the coherence phenomenon. In short, research performed by other authors will thus be compiled and used in order to establish an overall view of the different authors theories and perceptions. Furthermore, desk research will be conducted in order to establish what kind of information is already available with regards to the central question in order to determine how a new aspect could be added to the issue of coherence in the EU's external action. Overall, desk research seems to be a suitable method to get a good idea of what the topic is about and what kind of perceptions with the regards to the coherence phenomenon exist.

Measuring coherence in the EU's external action

In order to investigate how coherence of the EU's external action has evolved over time, criteria on how to measure this type coherence will have to be established. In this dissertation, a distinction will be made between horizontal and vertical coherence. The reason for making this distinction is based on the fact that coherence on itself can be interpreted in many different ways. Thus, in order to measure coherence within the EU, this dissertation will focus on the extent of cohesion between different EU institutions with regards to the EU's external action as well as the extent of cohesion between the Member States and EU institutions. This division will allow for more specialised analyses to be made instead of focussing on coherence in general. Below, the different types of coherence are briefly outlined.

Horizontal coherence

As mentioned before, horizontal coherence can be interpreted as coherence between EU institutions (Duke, 2011, p. 4). In order to measure the extent of horizontal coherence in the EU's external action, different situations the in which the EU was involved in (Bosnia and Iraq) will be compared, analysed and assessed on the extent to which EU institutions were able to cooperate in a

coherent manner. Furthermore the extent of horizontal coherence in the EU's external action will be measured by analysing the extent to which the EU institutions followed policies that were complementary to each other instead pursuing different policies. The extent to which different EU external policies are streamlined will thus be analysed in order to measure horizontal coherence of the EU's external action (Versluys, 2007, p. 2).

Vertical coherence

Vertical coherence on the other hand is the coherence between Member States and EU institutions (Duke, 2011, p . 4). In this dissertation the extent of vertical coherence will be measured through analysing the extent to which EU Member States and EU institutions were able to act together as well as their ability to take a common position. Their ability to make common decisions and take common external action in crises such as Iraq and Bosnia will also be analysed in order to measure the extent of vertical coherence in the EU's external action. To summarise, in order to measure this type of coherence, the degree of alignment of member states' national policies and activities undertaken at the EU level will be analysed (Versluys, 2007, p.3).

Case Study: Lessons on coherence from the 1991 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Both the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the CFSP have influenced the EU's behaviour as a coherent actor. In order to determine how coherence within the EU and between EU institutions and Member States has changed with the implementation of both the CFSP and the Lisbon Treaty, two conflicts in which the EU was involved will be analysed and compared. First in order to investigate how coherence has actually evolved in the past couple of years, the Bosnia and Herzegovina situation will be analysed. It will be investigated how the EU acted in this situation and how this is different from its acting in the more recent Iraq crisis. After the case study on the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict, the Iraq crisis will be analysed in terms of the EU's acting in this crisis and how coherence developed during this time. Both situations have been chosen as they represent a situation in which the EU was involved before the Lisbon Treaty and CFSP were established. By analyzing both cases it can determined how coherence has changed through the past couple of years and also how the CFSP and Lisbon Treaty influenced coherence of the EU's external action.

For the European public the Balkans were the ultimate tests of the EU's ability to conduct a common foreign and security policy. Many expected the war in Bosnia to be an opportunity for the EU to prove its diplomatic and political strengths in regions of conflict (Brljavac, 2011). However, it actually demonstrated the opposite and proved a lack of European commitment while displaying the US as a key mediator. In the eyes of many Europeans, Bosnia became the symbol of collective failure (Rupnik, 2010).

The war and Member State divergence

Croatian independence had put Bosnia in an impossible position. The Croatian forces planned expansion and ethnic cleansing in Herzegovina. When the Croatian and Serbian president met, many interpreted this as a plan to divide territorially Bosnia-Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia (Cafruny, 1997, p.137). Meanwhile, the Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic, had warned that Croatian independence would pose a great danger to Bosnia. Nevertheless, in September 1991 four Serb autonomous regions were proclaimed in Bosnia and the Bosnian president asked the EU and the US not to recognize secessionist republics until a comprehensive settlement, including Bosnia, could be reached (Cafruny, 1997, p.137). Initially, the EU was considered to have a special role in Bosnia as the US proved unwilling to become directly engaged (Richardson, 2001, p. 300). Still, it was difficult to say that the EU Member States took a common position in the Bosnian war. Member States appeared to be paralyzed and ineffective. They seemed unable to develop a

constructive policy or visible policy instruments, even when new developments took place at their doorstep(Brljavac, 2011). The Member States were clearly diverged. Some European countries such as Germany and Austria were strongly in favour of secessionist republics while Italy for example assumed a more cautious position (Bianchi, 2010, p.1). Italy believed in a 'negotiated solution' with all Member States. They believed this would be less traumatic and destabilising for Bosnia (Bianchi, 2010, p.1). The country believed that the crisis could be solved through mediation, diplomacy and humanitarian and development support. Germany though progressively sided with the Muslim and Croat factions against the Serbs while the UK and France could not agree on a common policy and resolution to the crisis in Bosnia. As tensions between Member States became more apparent during the war and a common position could not be reached, the US gradually became one of the key mediators instead of the EU (Richardson, 2011, p.300). It could be said that there was clearly a lack of coherence between EU policies in the region and those of individual Member States (Rupnik, 2010, p.1). In general, the EU's presence in the Balkans was considered to be a disillusion. It had failed to act through joint actions and destroyed the hope that the hour of Europe had finally arrived (Hursoy, 2010, p.14). The failure of the EU to act as one coherent actor in the Bosnian war can, again, be tied back to Member State governments, pursuing their own interests instead of those of the EU as a whole (Hursoy, 2010). Moreover the crisis in the Balkans and the Bosnian war once again demonstrated the EU's inability to deal with problems right on its 'doorstep' possibly caused by a lack of commitment to have 'real' and coherent security policy (Hursoy, 2010, p.14). Bosnia was not the only crisis in the Balkans in which the Member States diverged. A similar situation which shows the EU's incoherence of its external actions is its divergence over the recognition of a newly emerging, independent and sovereign state of Kosovo (Hursoy, 2010, p.14). France, Italy and the UK immediately recognised Kosovo's declaration of independence. Spain, Slovakia, Romania and Greece on the other hand rejected such a move (Hursoy, 2010, p.14). The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated that EU also needs to act in coherence with local actors such as NATO in order for their actions to be effective and to truly act as a coherent actor.

Institutional and co operational failure

It can be argued that the EU could have been successful in the Balkans if they would have improved the coherence between their operational and political instruments and made more of an effort to cooperate with local 'stakeholders' (Gross and Rotta, 2011, p.1). Another element that contributed to the coherence problem of the EU's external action in Bosnia Herzegovina and other crises in the Western Balkans is the division between the different EU institutions such as the European Parliament, The Council of the European Union and the European Commission.

Therefore, the position of the High Representative(HR) was created with the introduction of the CFSP. The creation of this position can be interpreted as a reaction to the severe coordination difficulties the EU faced in the Bosnian War (Petermann, 2011, p.7). Because the different EU institutions appeared to be quite divided during the Bosnian war, the influence some institutions had, was slightly changed in the Lisbon Treaty and the CFSP. The role of the European Parliament(EP) for example was reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty. The aim of the Treaty was to offer new opportunities for an improved coherence and effectiveness. With the creation of the Treaty, the EP became a co-legislator, having an equal status to the Council of Europe. Some argue that although the EP's role was strengthened with the creation of the Lisbon Treaty, it is still not sufficient. The EP could have been allowed more political participation for example in order to ensure the Common Security and Defense Policy is executed properly (Brljavac, 2011). With the creation of the Lisbon Treaty and CFSP it was stressed again (also included in the Maastricht Treaty) that the Commission and the Council of the European Union are responsible for ensuring coherence and they are obliged to cooperate to this end. The Commission's role was further increased with the creation of the CFSP. Part of its tasks now included working with the Council at different stages in the decision-making process and to promote coherence between European Security and Defense Policy initiatives and Community instruments (Grevi, Helly &Keohane, 2009, p.25). However in order to really improve coherency between different institutions, there will need to be more transparency, a clear hierarchy and better informed decisions (Molina, 2003, p.7). Not only the EU institutions are to blame for the EU's incoherent acting during the Bosnian war. As mentioned before, the Member States also had their fair share in the divergence that existed during the war. The Member States were not able to formulate a unified position even though the situation in Bosnia was so worrying. It can be argued that the Lisbon Treaty did not really changed that and seems ineffective when looking at more recent events such as Libya and Iraq (Brljavac, 2011). It seems impossible for Member States to take a common stance. Member States seek to defend their own interests. Still, it seems logical that in a Union formed by so many different states with different interests it is almost impossible to speak with one voice with regards to security and foreign policies. In addition, Member States do also not seem determined to make efforts on this subject (Petermann, 2011, p.7). It could be argued that Member States should be committed to making sure that the EU's action is properly delivered in crisis's such as Iraq, Bosnia and Libya and that their policies are fully consistent with those of the EU and its goal (Grevi, Helly & Keohane, 2009, p.12). It can be said that coherence will remain a difficult objective to reach, especially when the number of Member States increases. Therefore, enlargement of the Union can be identified as one of the main sources causing incoherence (Molina, 2003, p.11).

Interaction with local actors

The EU's incoherent acting was not just confined to divergence between its Member States but also consisted out of its inability to cooperate with other, local, actors in Bosnia such as the US. Bosnia became a source of friction especially between the European Community and the UN which clearly affected NATO and threatened its credibility (Lamer, 2008, p.10). Europe was determined to find a solution for the Bosnian crisis by itself and did not want any help from the US and they did not want them to interfere in their affairs. American and EU views began to diverge by the end of 1992. The US identified the Bosnian Serbs as aggressors and demanded a more robust action, including the arming of Bosnia and the use of air support (Kramer, 2000, p.137). The EU however rejected the use of force unless the US was willing to provide its own troops. When it became clear that the EU was not capable of ending the crisis, they did ask the US for help but they refused. Besides the EU's 'conflict' with the US, the Member States were also struggling to coordinate their response to the crisis. France and Britain for example both had different visions on what forces to use. It can even be argued that Europe as such did not even exist during this time (Lamer, 2008, p.10). There was too much divergence, disagreement and there was definitely not one, coherent EU. The European countries considered themselves to be distinct actors which caused its strategy towards Bosnia to fail. In fact, most of the strategies the EU applied in Bosnia ended in failure (Brljavac, 2011). US ambassador Charles English summarises the incoherent acting of the EU in Bosnia as a problem caused by the division within the EU itself. Only a handful of Member States actually realised the dangers Bosnia was posing. Only after the Bosnian 'catastrophe' and the Dayton agreement, which brought the war to an end and contributed to establishing peace within Bosnia, the Member States were able to develop a more coherent approach to Bosnia (Brljavac, 2011).

CFSP: Response to Bosnian war?

It can be argued that the Bosnian crisis led to the creation of the Lisbon Treaty and CFSP. The Bosnian war made it clear that the EU did not have the capability to manage crises in its own backyard (Tengroth,J. 2011). There is definitely an emphasis on coherence and consistency in the CFSP and Lisbon Treaty. The CFSP for example increased the role of the European Commission with regards to coherence. In the CFSP its says that the Commission's overall objective is to ensure consistency in the external relations of the Union as a whole and to safeguard the 'acquis communautaire' and EC treaties (Duke, 2006, p.13). As mentioned before, the Lisbon Treaty in particular focused on coherence. It maintained the rule of 'constructive abstention' for those Member States that are unwilling to go ahead with a certain decision (Ciceo, 2010, p.15). The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty indicated a greater willingness to develop a common

security policy and to improve coherence after the EU's failure in crises such as Bosnia. Article 21(3) of the Lisbon Treaty states that "*The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.*" Article 24(3) also clearly shows the Treaty's focus on coherence by the Member States committing themselves to: "*reinforce and develop their mutual political solidarity*" and "*to avoid any action that goes contrary to the interests of the EU or is susceptible to harm either its efficiency or its cohesion in international relations*". However, with the absence of a common purpose and Member States still preferring their own national interests over those of the Union, some say it seems unlikely that the EU will arise the world stage as a coherent actor any time soon (Ciceo, 2010, p.15).

Conclusion

This case study on the Bosnia-Herzegovina war showed which sources contributed to the EU's incoherent acting during the crisis. We can conclude that divergence of the Member States contributed to the EU's inability to act as one, coherent actor, taking joint decisions and speaking with one voice. The clear division between those Member States that were in favour of secessionist republics versus those Member States that believed in a negotiated solution, were all ingredients for the EU's incoherent acting during the war. Furthermore, it can be concluded that the Member States' preference to pursue their own interests instead of those of the EU as a whole, did certainly not contribute to the EU's ability to behave as one, coherent actor during the war. It can also be concluded that the EU's inability to develop a constructive policy or any visible policy instruments as well as its failure to act through joint actions were all sources of incoherence during the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis. Finally, the division that existed between the different EU institutions during the crisis as well as the EU's inability to cooperate with local actors during the crisis in combination with the lack of commitment to construct a real, coherent security policy, caused the EU's failure in the Bosnia-Herzegovina war. The table on the next page summarises the causes of incoherence during the Bosnia-Herzegovina war as identified in the case study.

Causes of incoherence in the Bosnia- Herzegovina war
1. **Lack of European commitment** - EU was not **committed** to prove its diplomatic and political strengths in regions of conflict.
2. **Member States failed to take a common position** - Paralysed and ineffective
3. **Inability to develop a constructive policy or visible policy instruments**
4. **Divergence of the Member States** - Member States in favour of secessionist republics vs. Member States that believed in a negotiated solution - Member States pursuing their own interests instead of those of the EU
5. **Lack of cohesion between EU policies in the region and those of individual Member States**
6. **Failure to act through joint actions**
7. **Lack of commitment to have a 'real' and coherent security policy**
8. **Division between EU institutions**
9. **Inability to cooperate with local actors**
10. **Member States failed to communicate their response to the crisis**

Case study: Divergence in the 2002 Iraq War

In order to investigate how the CFSP and Lisbon Treaty have changed and contributed to coherence within the EU, the Iraq conflict will be examined. The Iraq crisis that took place from 2002 until 2003, clearly showed a division between the Member States and a lack of coherence. The willingness of the Member States to act together was missing. Only a united EU can tackle security problems that are posed by today's globalising world (Solana, 2003, p.3). Therefore, a lack of willingness by the EU member state government within the Council of Ministers to take an actual common position is a crucial source for incoherence in the EU's external policy. When looking further into the Iraq crisis the division in positions between the Member States will become clearer as well as the reasons for this division.

The Iraq crisis and coherence

The Iraq crisis is often referred to as the EU's great split (Stahl, 2008, p.1). It is referred to as the great split as some Member States entirely supported or promoted the attack on Iraq while others refused to comply with i.e. any UN Security Council Resolution (Stahl, 2008, p.1). Also, a source for the EU's lack of coherency in the Iraq crisis might be its struggle to come to a common security identity which means it was not able to come to a common understanding of how the world is and what should be done about it. This is a vital aspect in order for the EU to perform as a coherent actor. On the other hand, some say that the Iraq crisis was an incident waiting to happen. However, Stahl (2008) argues that the Europeans had fallen into two camps namely a Europeanist and Atlanticist camp (p.1). Both had different opinions on the position the EU should take. The Atlanticists believed that Europe and America had to stand united. On the contrary, the Europeanist camp was represented by France and Germany which formed a coalition with Russia. They were calling for an autonomous European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) headquarter in early 2003. The EU's division in the Iraq crisis can interpreted as not being compliant with Art. 11: provisions on a CFSP which stated that Member States should refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations (Stahl, 2008, p.3). The war in Iraq showed that the EU has zero influence if its Member States do not pull together, argues Keohane. The division in the Iraq crisis however can be explained by the fact that the Member States had a preference of national interests over common European interests which as a result prevented them from agreeing on a common position and performing as a coherent actor (Kaya, 2008, p.14). However, in order for the EU to be an effective actor in Iraq, they would have had to act collectively as a coherent actor within the framework of the CFSP (Kaya, 2008, p.14). But how did the EU get involved in the Iraq crisis in

the first place and which positions did the Member States take which caused the great European split?

EU involvement and different Member State positions

In 2002, the Bush jr. government focused on Iraq being its primary security concern. The main reason for this increased focus on Iraq, was the suspected links the country had with the Al Qaida network which was interpreted as a serious proliferation risk (Stahl, 2008, p.10). In addition, the autocratic character of Saddam Hussein's regime, would contribute to destabilising the Middle East. As a result the US tried to convince its allies of the urgency of the threat. It became clear that views of the different EU Member States on how to proceed with Iraq were very different (Stahl, 2008, p.10). The United Kingdom (UK) and Spain agreed with the US and their thoughts on Iraq's inadequate compliance with the UN demand asking for immediate cooperation with its weapon inspectors. They considered further inspections to be pointless. However, France, Germany and Spain disagreed and insisted on an extension of the weapons inspectors' mission(Stahl, 2008, p.10).

After a successful intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq was the next goal for the US and its allies. The divisions between the different Member States became even more visible. Germany was very distinct in its view on the Iraq situation. The German minister of Foreign Affairs and German politician of the Alliance 90/ The Greens Joschka Fischer, highly doubted if there were any connections between Iraq and Al Qaida and chancellor Schröder warned the US not to play around with war or military action (Fischer, 2002, Rede von Bandesaussesminister Fischer zur USA-Irak problematik). The country decided to apply a loud desecuritisation strategy which actually isolated it from the other Member States. One of the other Member States which also took a clear position regarding the Iraq crisis, was the UK. The British Prime Minister, Blair, believed the threat Iraq posed was real and war was not inevitable(Stahl, 2008, p.13). The country was a firm promoter of military action against Iraq from the start. Blair considered Saddam to be a real threat for Britain. The British government seemed to be the only government believing in the urgency of the threat that Iraq posed (Stahl, 2008, p.29). Some say the absence of a shared threat perception was one of the most significant reasons why the Member States ended up so divided. Each Member Sate first formed its own national point of view and only then 'tried' to engage in attempts to form a common position with its European neighbours (Keohane & Everts, 2003, p.176).

When looking further into the divergence of the EU in the Iraq crisis it becomes clear that next to Germany and the UK Spain also took a remarkable position in the crisis. For a long time, Iraq remained a taboo in Spain. The Spanish government believed in their policy of a security which

means Spain was actually trying to remain silent. However, during the entire crisis Spain's securitisation behaviour seems rather inconsistent (Noya, 2003, p.65). They moved from their a security approach (2002) to loud securitisation moves (early 2003) by joining the UK's pronounced securitisation and then chose to approach the crisis as a humanitarian mission (Stahl, 2008, p.23). Still, Spain's and Italy's approach in the crisis are often considered to be quite similar. Italy most of the time sided with the US and its position in the crisis can be interpreted as 'low profile' (Dassú, 2002, p.5). The country avoided actively taking part in the war. Italy did not provide materials or troops but they did grant fly over rights and allowed the US to use bases, however not for direct attacks (Fratini, 2003, 'Reply to the government's report to the Senate on developments in the Iraq crisis, ¶ 1). Italy's position in the Iraq crisis is often compared to Spain's position as it also zigzagged itself through the crisis. It changed from a European to an Atlantic position and started following a desecuritisation strategy instead of its initial a security strategy. Italy following a desecuritisation strategy mend it was moving from a position in which they remained silent to a strategy which implies the attempt of removing an issue from its environment. However, the Italian government avoided any participation in military actions but contributed significantly to the occupation forces (Stahl, 2008, p.22). France's position in the crisis was mostly conceived as an anti-war stance. The country was resistant against US plans and took on a desecuritisation strategy. France claimed to oppose any resolution leading to war (Peterson, 2004, p.15). It was said to be part of the 'late comers' together with the Netherlands and Denmark who objected to any explicit securitisation move before January 2003. On the contrary there were the 'early birds', Germany and the UK, who reacted fairly quickly to US securitisation moves (Stahl, 2008, p.26). As for the 'late comers', The Netherlands decided to not take a prominent position on the Iraq issue as the negotiating parties at the time could not agree on a consistent policy. Therefore, the Netherlands was following an a security strategy which later gradually moved to a desecuritisation strategy. Applying the latter strategy, the Netherlands joined Italy and Spain by following the same strategy and taking on a similar position. Then there was Denmark which was holding EU presidency at the time and tended to dissemble the 'split' between the Member States. They followed a desecuritisation approach in the second half of 2002 (Stahl, 2008, p.15). However, gradually Denmark submitted its troops, prepared itself to actively support the US and in the end officially declared war to Iraq. Still, what caused this great division of the Member States in the Iraq crisis?

Some say the division was caused by the Member States' different views on the definition, urgency and management the threat Iraq posed (Ham,van, 2004, p.216). It can also be argued that the commonly desired: "spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity" was missing and as a result the EU's

effectiveness as a cohesive force was impaired (Stahl, 2008, p.29). Moreover in times of war, differences that already existed between Member States sharpened (Hill, 2004, p.161). Furthermore, Member States had the desire to maintain sovereignty regarding decisions that are taken with regards to security policies (Cavatorta & Chari, 2003, p.4). It can also be argued that the failure of the EU to speak with one voice during the Iraq crisis can be tied back to the absence of any strong CFSP statements during the crisis (p.4). During the Iraq crisis, Member States did not realize and recognise that they would need to act collectively as a coherent actor and speak with one voice. There was no awareness of the fact that their influence could be greater if they would indeed act collectively as coherent actor rather than acting individually (Kaya, 2008, p.1). Therefore one could say that the individual interest should be sacrificed for the sake of common interests of the EU (p.1). Another source that could have caused the incoherent acting of the EU in the crisis could be the larger Member States conducting their policies independently rather than acting together which as a result means that they can act less effectively (Kaya, 2008, p.14). It can be concluded that during the Iraq crisis the Member States clearly had a preference of national interests over common European interests which prevented them from agreeing on a coherent position. Also, a lack of effective decision-making procedures capable of overcoming dissent also affected the EU's capability to act as one, coherent actor. He also argues that Member States only act when it is in their self interest to do so as states are clearly self interested and more concerned with their own security rather than other states' issues if it does not involve them (Missiroli, 2003, p.4). Furthermore, the lack of a common objective and the belief that EU Member States have a national focus instead of a purely European focus which could lead to fragmentation as it occurred in the Iraq crisis (Missiroli, 2003, p.4). Therefore it can be concluded that coherence should be considered as a guiding principle which Member States, institutions and other actors should be obliged to implement.

Conclusion

In this case study on the Iraq crisis, different sources of the EU's incoherent acting during the crises have been identified. We can conclude that one of the main causes to the EU's failure in Iraq, was the divergence of the Member States. The willingness of the Member States to work together was missing. Moreover, they preferred their own national interests over common, European interests. It can be concluded that this is what kept the EU from agreeing on a common position and performing as a coherent actor, taking joint decisions and speaking with one voice. In addition, we can conclude that the Member States' divergence was caused by the different views of the Member States on the definition, urgency and management of the threat Iraq posed to the EU. Furthermore, the Member States' desire to maintain sovereignty regarding the decisions that were taking place in

the field of security policies, also contributed to the EU's failure in Iraq. One could also conclude that the choice of larger Member States to conduct their policies independently rather than acting together, impaired the EU to act effectively in the Iraq crisis. Finally, the absence of any strong CFSP statements as well as a lack of effective decision-making procedures, capable of overcoming dissent, were also identified as sources of incoherence during the Iraq war. The table below sumarises the causes of incoherence as identified in the case study.

Now that the case studies on the Iraq war and Bosnia-Herzegovina war have showed us which sources contributed to the problem of coherence in the EU's external action , we will continue with the case study on the Lisbon Treaty in order to investigate how the Treaty sought to address the problem of coherence in the EU's external action.

Causes of incoherence in Iraq
1. **Divergence of the Member States**   - **Preference of national interests over international interests**   **- Lack of willingness to act together**   **- Lack of willingness of the EU Member States to take a common position towards the crisis**   **- Atlantacists and Europeanist camps**
2. **Different securitisation moves**   - Desecuritisation and **a**securitisation   - No clear Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP)
3. **Diverging threat perceptions**
4. **Desire of Member States to remain sovereignty**
5. **Absence of any strong CFSP statements**
6. **The independent conducting individual policies from Member States**
7. **Lack of effective decision-making procedures capable of overcoming dissent**

Case study: Lisbon Treaty and coherence

The Lisbon Treaty was signed and came into force on 1 December 2009. Previous to the Lisbon Treaty, the Maastricht Treaty was the first treaty that expressed the EU's desire and ambition to develop a common foreign policy. Since then, the EU's foreign policy has gradually evolved into the current policy which can be found in the Lisbon Treaty. Initially, the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty appeared not to be as far reaching as those of previous treaties such as the Constitutional Treaty (Koehler, 2010, p.). Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty had the chance and the potential to increase the effectiveness of European Foreign Policy and to strengthen the EU as an international actor. The main aim of the Lisbon Treaty was ".. to complete the process started by the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice with a view to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the EU and to improving the coherence of its action" (Lisbon Treaty, n.d.). Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty was designed in order to provide the Union with a legal framework and significantly change the institutional and procedural framework within the EU to meet future challenges and to respond to citizens' demand. The Treaty aimed at reinforcing the EU's cohesion, effectiveness and coherence i.e. in external affairs (EU Insight, 2008). Knowing that most Member States were not willing to give up their exclusive power to EU in the field of foreign policy, the Lisbon Treaty's aim was to enhance coherence of the EU's foreign policy. In fact, the aim of improving coherence was one of the fundamental reasons for the Lisbon Treaty to be established. The changes in the Lisbon Treaty were aimed at strengthening the unity of the Member States, which has been the subject of debate for quite some time. Important changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty were changes in decision-making, administrative changes and the creation of the post of the High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy which will be further discussed later on in this chapter. The Lisbon Treaty also sought to address several problems that previous treaties had not been able to solve.

Which problems did the Lisbon Treaty seek to address?

The Lisbon Treaty made an attempt at addressing problems that existed in the EU's external action at the time the Treaty was designed. One of the aims of the Lisbon Treaty, and one of the reasons for its establishment, was to simply the EU's structure and create some institutional amendments related to European Foreign Policy (Koehler, 2010, p.). It sought to address the institutional problem that was present before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. A somewhat 'unclear' relationship between the different European institutions existed. The Lisbon Treaty made an attempt at simplifying the complicated three pillar structure agreed at the Maastricht Treaty (Ciascai, p.27). The 'old' pillar structure created coherence problems between the external relations

of the Community (first pillar) and the CFSP (second pillar). The Treaty sought to merge the former three pillars in order to create more internal cohesion. It goes without saying that the main problem Lisbon sought to address was the coherence problem of the EU's external action. A clear coherence deficit existed and the various provisions in the Lisbon Treaty were aimed at addressing this lack of coherence. The Lisbon Treaty sought to create an enhanced institutional structure and to offer better opportunities for strengthened collective action (Dagan, p. 7). Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon made an attempt at addressing i.e. the coordination problem within the EU's areas of action. It also sought to address the problem with regards to the distribution of power within the EU institutions.

The Treaty did not only focus on addressing institutional problems but it was also aiming at overcoming problems with regards to collective action (Laursen, 2010, p. 5). Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the EU had often struggled to behave and take action as one, coherent actor. One of the best of examples of this is the Iraq intervention in 2003 in which conflicting interest caused the EU to fail. The Iraq crisis demonstrated the internal division between the EU Member States, the continuing primacy of national foreign policies and conflicting national interests (Wilga, 2003, p.5), problems the Lisbon Treaty seeks to address. Member States often choose their own national interest over the interest of the EU as a whole. Therefore, one of the aims of the Lisbon Treaty was to develop a stronger collective identity and thus hopefully increase the chances of solving problems in crises such as Iraq (Laursen, 2010, p. 5). In short the Lisbon Treaty thus aims at the EU being perceived as one unit, speaking with one voice and implementing consistent policies in external matters.

Changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty

With the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty also came some significant changes concerning i.e. the institutional structure of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty retained most of the institutional changes that were already included in the Constitutional Treaty. It amended the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, the latter being renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) (Laursen, 2010, p. 5). The Lisbon Treaty also abolished the old pillar structure which created coherence problems between the CFSP and external relations of the EU. The changes introduced with the creation of the Lisbon Treaty were expected to produce more efficiency to produce more efficiency and legitimacy as well as more coherence and effectiveness in the Union's external action (Laursen, 2010, p. 19). The image on the next page shows the institutional changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and their relation to one another.

The EU's New Institutions
Key points of the Lisbon Treaty reforms

PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
Newly created post; elected for two-and-a-half years

chooses

EUROPEAN COUNCIL
Heads of state or government of member states set the EU's political goals
New: The council will become an official EU institution

appoints the EU's "foreign minister"

proposes the Commission presidents

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Ministers of the member states; creates legislation and determines EU policies
New: In the future, most decisions will be made on a "double majority" basis (i.e. a minimum of 55 percent of member states representing a minimum of 65 percent of the EU's population)

HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE UNION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY
Newly created post; chairs the council of foreign ministers; also vice president of the European Commission; will have own diplomatic service

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Directly elected parliament
New: Gains new powers; is placed on an equal footing with the Council of Ministers for most EU legislation

chooses Commission president

EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The EU's "government"
New: The Commission's president will be elected by the European Parliament, rather than just being confirmed

Source: Der Spiegel

Recognition European Council

With the creation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council gained the status of being an official EU institution. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council had never officially acquired the status of an EU institution (Koehler, 2010, p. 12). It was now given the task to determine the strategic interests and objectives of the EU for all its external action. With its new status and responsibility, the European Council actually brought external relations and the CFSP together. The Lisbon Treaty appears to be the first legal document that fully recognises the importance of the European Council's role in European Foreign Policy (Gaspers, 2009, p. 10). It also introduced the new position of the president of the European Council. Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the presidency of the Council of Ministers would rotate every six months between Member States. Now, the president of the European Council will be elected by the council itself for a period of two and a half years that can be renewed once (Koehler, 2010, p. 12). The aim of this innovation was to increase the continuity of the European Foreign Policy.

New position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security

One of the other innovations that came with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty was the creation of the new position of High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security. The HR will deal with both the external relations of the EU as well as CFSP issues. The HR will be responsible for conducting the EU's foreign and security policy (Gaspers, 2009, p. 3). The position of the HR was designed in order to ensure a more unitary representation of the EU in for example international affairs. There will no longer be a new personality representing the EU on the world stage every six months. One of the HR's main responsibilities is to ensure coherence in the external relations of the EU (Koehler, 2010, p.10). The 'new position' of the HR can be interpreted as an

answer to the EU's previous failure to address incoherence in international relations. It appears as if the HR will combine European and Member States' lines of interest into one person. The responsibility of the HR to ensure coherence and consistency in the EU's external action seems to describe exactly what the Treaty of Lisbon in general is aiming at: "The Union shall be perceived as one unit, speak with one mouth and implement consistent policies in external matters."

The European External Action Service (EEAS)

With the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty also came the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS is not really a new institution but rather a service placed between the Council's CFSP and Community's external policies (Chase, 2011, p. 3). The service was created in order to ensure coherence of the EU's external relations and the strengthening of its role as an international actor (Koehler, 2010,p. 14). It was also established in order to help ensure the EU has a coherent and effective foreign policy (Chase, 2011, p. 1). Furthermore, the EEAS is supposed to act as some sort of intermediary between all main (institutional) actors involved in the European Foreign Policy and thus strengthen the coordination of EU and national foreign policies (Gaspers, 2009, p. 11). In the future, the EEAS could become a first port of call for national officials and the EU to exchange information on developments outside the European Union. This could possibly lead to a greater harmonization of foreign policy activities and ultimately to increased coherence and consistency (Gaspers, 2009, p. 15). Part of the EEAS duties will be to assist the president of the European Council as well as the members of the European Commission in areas of external relations and also closely cooperate with Member States. The service will compromise officials from relevant departments of for example the Council's General Secretariat and the Commission as well as staff from national diplomatic services of different Member States and could thus potentially contribute to a higher degree of coherence in the EU's external relations (Koehler, 2010, p. 14).

In short¸ the Lisbon Treaty thus simplified the EU's structure and reorganized the system of instruments of the CFSP. By dissolving the Community, legally establishing the EU and putting both community and CFSP tools under the EU's roof, it can be argued that the Lisbon Treaty has ended the often counter-productive stove-piping that characterized much of the EU Foreign Policy over the past 15 years (Chase, 2011, p.3). Moreover, by revising the institutional arrangements related to European Foreign Policy, the Lisbon Treaty tried to expand the institutional pre-conditions for a more coherent and eventually more effective, foreign policy. If the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have indeed influenced coherence within the EU will be analysed in chapter three which analyses how the Treaty influenced coherence within the EU.

Addressing the coherence problem

In this section of the case study, the different means by which the Lisbon Treaty sought to address the problem of coherence of the EU's external action, will be presented in the light of the case study evidence. The case study allowed for different issues with regards to the coherence of the EU's external action to be identified. In this section of the case study, it will be investigated how the Lisbon Treaty sought to address these issues and if the provisions introduced in the Treaty have indeed been effective in decreasing the coherence problem in the EU's external action. Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, a clear division between the different European institutions existed which created problems with regards to the allocation of responsibilities in the different areas of the EU's external action and lack of transparency combined with institutional competition created obstacles to the EU's external action and the shaping of a coherent EU foreign policy (Margaras, 2010, p. 3). In addition to the Lisbon Treaty's attempt at clarifying the EU's institutional structure in order to decrease the coherence problem in the EU's external actions, it also sought to address the division between the different Member States that became clear during both the Iraq war and the Bosnia-Herzegovina war. Moreover, the Treaty sought to address the coherence problem of the EU's external action by addressing diverging security policies as well as foreign policy issues. The Lisbon Treaty's attempts at improving the coherence of the EU's external actions will be analysed and linked to the issues identified in the case study in this chapter.

The division of the Member States

As found on the case study on the Iraq crisis, a clear division between the EU Member States existed during the crisis. The willingness of Member States to work together was missing and the Member States seemed to prefer their own national interests over common European interests. As a result, the EU failed to agree on a common position with regards to the Iraq crisis. The EU was incapable of speaking with one voice or taking common decisions and thus failed to behave as one, coherent actor. In a reaction to this 'great split' of the Member States, the Lisbon Treaty sought to improve the cohesion between the different Member States by introducing a common set of overarching principles and objectives which bind them together in i.e. their formulation of foreign policy approaches as well as external relations (Gaspers, 2009, p. 19). It can even be said that the Lisbon Treaty represents an attempt of the Member States to overcome the division that existed during crises such as Iraq. The Lisbon Treaty to some extent improved the solidarity and cohesion between the Member States. It provides for the European Union and its Member States to act jointly in a spirit of solidarity when for example a Member State becomes the victim of a terroristic attack. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty mentions that if an EU Member State becomes the victim of armed aggression "the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and

assistance"(Margaras, 2010, p. 9). The Treaty thus sought to address the divergence of the Member States which created issues in the EU's external action, by obliging Member States to act together and support each other. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty sought to address the problem of coherence between Member States, affecting the coherence of its external relations, with the introduction of the 'permanent structured cooperation'. This innovation encourages Member States that are willing to act together. The idea is that Member States who are willing to cooperate can go together in a closer cooperation (Laursen, 2010, p. 17).

Addressing problems in the coherence of the EU's external actions

In order to improve the EU's responses to crises it is involved in, the Lisbon Treaty sought to improve the external actions of the European Union. As proved in the case study, the EU failed to give a coherent response in both the Iraq crisis and Bosnia Herzegovina war. The Bosnia-Herzegovina war actually became the symbol of collective failure, as can be found in the case study (Rupnik, 2010). The EU seemed unable to develop a constructive policy with regards to the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis (Brljavac, 2011). As a reaction to these failures, the Lisbon Treaty sought to address the issues in its external action by recognizing the European Council as an official EU institution and giving it the task to determine the strategic interests and objectives of the EU for all its external actions (Laursen, 2010). By appointing the European Council as some sort of 'guarantor' of coherence of the EU's external actions, the identification of objectives of the EU's external actions appears to become more efficient. The more actors involved, the longer it will take to decide on an overall strategy or to agree on the objectives of the EU's external actions. Thus, the problem of coherence in the EU's external action is partially addressed by creating more efficiency and giving one EU institution the responsibility to decide on the overall objectives of the EU's external action as well as its strategic interests.

In addition to the new responsibility of the European Council to decide on the overall objectives of the external action of the EU, the most notable innovation by Lisbon Treaty in order to address the problems of coherence in its external action is, of course, the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). With the creation of the EEAS, the Lisbon Treaty sought to monitor the EU's responses to different crises. Currently, the EEAS is still on its way to become a fully functioning service but it definitely has the potential to bring together Member States and EU institutions in order to enhance the EU's responses to crises and hopefully contribute to the coherence of the EU's external action. The Lisbon Treaty also sought to address the coherence problems of the EU's external action, by creating the new position of High Representative for

Foreign Affairs and Security and giving it the responsibility to deal with CFSP issues as well as acting as a chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council. This could be interpreted as an effort to increase the coherence in the external relations of the EU (Laursen, 2010, p. 6). However, some argue that the new competences of the High Representative could give rise to new tensions at EU level and negatively affect the adherence of smaller Member States to EU Foreign Policy strategies and initiatives. It can thus be questioned if the new position of High Representative is the proper way to address problems of coherence in the external actions of the European Union.

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

In 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours, such as Egypt and Morocco, and instead strengthening the stability, security and prosperity of all (The European Neighbourhood Policy, 2010, n.d.). With the creation of the ENP, Member States were urged to cooperate in order to maintain peaceful relationships with neighbouring countries. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty seems to encourage this cooperation between the Member States, as the Treaty commits the EU to 'the development of a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation (Article 8 TEU, n.d.). When looking at this statement, one could conclude that with its commitment to the ENP, the Lisbon Treaty also seeks to decrease the issues of its external actions by focusing on maintaining positive relations with neighbouring countries through Member State cooperation. Furthermore, the ENP benefits from a greater coherence thanks to the creation of the EEAS, which was introduced in the Lisbon Treaty, and supports the HR and Vice-President of the European Commission in their dealing with the ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy, 2010, n.d.).

The division of EU institutions

One of the other means by which the Lisbon Treaty sought to address coherence problems of the EU's external relation is with its attempt to the simplify the EU's institutional structure. Previously, the competencies of the EU in external actions were divided between the competencies of the European Community and the other intergovernmental pillars (Margaras, 2010, p. 3). This division caused various problems as the divergence of responsibilities in inter-related areas was not clear. For instance, there were at least four different Directorates-General (DGs) involved in the external relations and actions of the EU (Margaras, 2010, p. 3). Moreover, a lack of transparency and institutional competition that existed among the different DGs, created obstacles to i.e. the shaping of a coherent EU foreign policy. Furthermore, the case study proved that during the Bosnia-

Herzegovina crisis, the division between the different European institutions such as the European Commission and the European Parliament, contributed to the EU's incapacity to behave as one, coherent actor. Moreover, the division between the different institutions affected the external action of the EU as it failed to construct, one, effective policy with regards to the Bosnia- Herzegovina war. In reaction to the division between the EU institutions, which became clear during the war, the Lisbon Treaty sought to decrease this separation by creating the position of the High Representative which seeks to ensure the unitary representation of the EU. The Treaty also increased the cohesion between the different EU institutions by abolishing the old pillar structure which was established in the Maastricht Treaty and created problems between the EU's external action and the CFSP.

Diverging security approaches

As found in the case study, part of the EU's failure during the Iraq crisis and one of the reasons for the issues existing with regards to coherence in the EU's external action, was the lack of one, common security approach or policy (Stahl, 2008). Different Member States applied different security strategies. As shown in the case study, some Member States would choose to apply a desecuritisation strategy and tried to remove the issue from its environment, while other Member States would choose to apply an asecurity strategy. The Lisbon Treaty sought to address this problem which affected the EU's external actions, by first of all simply renaming the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP) which was established in 1999 by the Common Security and Defence Policy. As mentioned before, the new position of the High Representative (HR) was also created in order to decrease the incoherence of the EU's external action. With regards to incoherent security strategies, the new post of the HR is also expected to have a positive 'spill-over' effect on the field of security (Margaras, 2010, p.4). The effects of the HR on the foreign policy of the EU in general, will be further discusses in the next section on foreign policy issues of the EU.

In addition to the changes introduced in the Lisbon Treaty with regards to a common security policy, the assignment of the president of the European Council was also an attempt of the Lisbon Treaty to address the issues with regards to common security strategies which affected the EU's external actions. The President of the European Council will ensure the external representation of the EU on issues concerning its common foreign security policy (Margaras, 2010, p. 5).

Foreign Policy issues of the EU

The EU's foreign policy and its external action are, without a doubt, related to each other. As shown in the case study, the EU's incapacity to construct and apply an efficient and common, foreign policy in both the Iraq crisis and the Bosnia-Herzegovina war, contributed to the EU's

failure to step up as a strong, coherent actor. In fact, the lack of an efficient, foreign policy during the Bosnia-Herzegovina war made it clear that the EU was not able to manage crises that were happening in its own backyard (Tengroth, 2011). In order to address the lack of an efficient foreign policy, which also affected the coherence of the EU's external action, the Lisbon Treaty sought to enhance the coherence of the EU's foreign policy. As shown in the case study, most Member States are not willing to give up their exclusive power to the EU in the field of foreign policy. Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty referred to article 21 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) which describes the need to pursue common policies and to cooperation in the different fields of international relations (Article 21 TEU, n.d.) in order to boost the EU's foreign policy and to remind the Member States of their responsibilities.

One of the major issues with regards to the EU's foreign policy has always been the question which role and authority the EU should get, and which powers would remain in the hands of the Member States (Van Dijk, 2012, p. 11). Foreign policy has always been an important and quite powerful part of every country's governmental policy. Moreover, it is a policy that governments prefer to determine themselves as it largely determines the country's position in the world of politics. With the creation of the post of High Representative (HR), the Lisbon Treaty sought to address part of this issue. At the same time, it tried to address the lack of a common, efficient, foreign policy. A very important reason to create the post of HR, was to ensure uniform external representation of EU foreign action (Van Dijk, 2012, p. 11) and thus to improve the coherence of its external actions. The HR is there to ensure a consistent and unified voice to international organisations, countries the EU works with and other actors it is involved with. Therefore, the creation of the new post of HR could also be interpreted as an attempt to 'solve' or 'improve' the EU's inability to cooperate with other as found in the case study. The EU's inability to cooperate with local actors during i.e. the Bosnian war, is one of the main reasons for the problems of coherence that exist in the EU's external action. The HR, with its responsibility to ensure a unified message to other actors in different countries the EU is involved in, thus has the capability to improve or rather contribute to the EU's ability to cooperate with local actors. Furthermore, with the creation of the post of HR, the Lisbon Treaty created a clear contact point for everybody that works together with the EU in international matters (Van Dijk, 2012, p. 15) and thus made a serious attempt at improving the coherence of the EU's external action as the HR actually becomes the actor which brings the EU, its Member States and other international actors together.

Permanent Structured Cooperation

As mentioned before, the Lisbon Treaty also introduced the permanent structured cooperation

(PermStrucCoop) in order to encourage cooperation in general between Member States. However, the PermStrucCoop also focuses on decreasing issues with regards to incoherent security policies. It is open to any Member State that is willing to undertake more intensively in order to develop its defence capacities in multinational forces (Margaras, 2010, p.5). The participating Member States will go together so that they can harmonise their security and defense resources. It can thus be concluded, that the introduction of the PermStrucCoop is a clear attempt of the Lisbon Treaty to encourage the establishment of a common and harmonious security policy and thus to 'eliminate' the issue of diverging security approaches causing problems of coherence in the EU's external action. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty seeks to address the lack of a common, sufficient, security policy by recognising the European Defence Agency and depending on its important role of evaluating the performances of the Member States' commitment to the PermStrucCoop. To summarise, the PermStrucCoop allows as many Member States as possible to participate in common security and defence plans (Margaras, 2010, p. 5). This could eventually lead to more unity in security and defense and could thus contribute to the decrease of problems of coherence in the EU's external actions. However, it is up to the Member States to actually adopt the PermStrucCoop in practice by pooling resources together (Margaras, 2010, p. 5). It will require a considerable change of state mentalities as well as a willingness to act together. Therefore, it is up to the Member States to make the PermStrucCoop work; the question is whether they want to make it work?

It can be concluded that the Lisbon Treaty has made some serious efforts with regards to decreasing the coherence problem of the EU's external action. Some of these efforts were quite ambitious such as the creation of one, common, foreign and security policy. It can be argued that some of the innovations, such as the new post of High Representative, could give rise to new tensions at EU level and negatively affect the adherence of smaller Member States to EU Foreign Policy strategies and initiatives. However, the Lisbon Treaty did carefully analyse the issues that existed during different crises such as the Iraq war and the Bosnia-Herzegovina war, and made a serious effort at introducing new innovations that would avoid a repetition of these issues in the future.

Conclusion

The case study on the Lisbon Treaty showed us that the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in order to address and improve the coherence of the EU's external action where mainly innovations that focused on the CFSP as well as institutional changes. The biggest changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty were the creation of the new post of HR for Foreign Affairs and Security, the

creation of the EEAS and the recognition of the European Council as an official EU institution. The case study on the Lisbon Treaty showed us that the new position of HR was created in order to coordinate the EU's external action together with the Commission. With the creation of the HR, the Lisbon Treaty made an attempt at improving the EU's CFSP. As mentioned before the EU's external and CFSP are closely related. This case study showed that with the creation of the HR for Foreign Affairs and Security, the Lisbon Treaty made a serious attempt at creating a post which will deal with the external relations of the EU as well as CFSP issues. Furthermore, the post of HR was created in order to create more unity between the EU and its Member States as it combines the lines of interests of the EU and those of the Member States into one person and CFSP and the EU's external action are being brought together in this new post. Furthermore, the case study showed that the Lisbon Treaty sought to address the coherence of the EU's external action by creating the EEAS. The service was created in order to improve the coordination of the EU's responses to crises and to act as some sort of intermediary between all main (institutional) actors involved in European Foreign Policy. It can be concluded that the creation of the EEAS is quite an effective change introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to improve the coherence of the EU's external action as it compromises officials from different, relevant departments such as the EP and national, diplomatic services of different Member States and thus contributes to a higher degree of coherence with regards to the EU's external action. Moreover, the case study showed that the Lisbon Treaty sought to address the problem of coherence in the EU's external action by recognising the European Council as an official institution. The Treaty of Lisbon gave the European Council the task to determine the strategic interests and objectives of the EU for all its external actions. In fact, the European Council became some sort of guarantor of coherence of the EU's external actions.

Furthermore, we can conclude that, in its attempt to change and improve the coherence of the EU's external action, the Lisbon Treaty also focussed on the sources that were identified in crises such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq contributing to the coherence problem. It can be concluded that the Treaty for example sought to address Member State divergence by introducing a common set of overarching principles and objectives which bind them together in i.e. their formulation of foreign policy approaches as well as external relations (Gaspers, 2009, p. 19). We can conclude that the Lisbon Treaty represents an attempt of the Member States to overcome the division that existed during crises such as Iraq. We can also conclude that the Treaty sought to address the divergence of the Member States, by obliging them to act together and support each other. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty sought to address the problem of coherence between Member States, by introducing the 'permanent structured cooperation'. This innovation encourages Member States that are willing

to act together. The idea is that Member States who are willing to cooperate can go together in a closer cooperation (Laursen, 2010, p. 17). We can also conclude that the Lisbon Treaty sought to address coherence problems of the EU's external actions by attempting to simplify the EU's institutional structure. The old pillar structure was abandoned as is caused problems of coherence between the EU's external action and CFSP. Now that we have seen the changes that were introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in order to address and improve the coherence of the EU's external action, the discussion chapter will link the central question and the findings of the case studies and discuss how effective the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have truly been.

Now that we have identified the sources that contributed to the problem in the EU's external action through the case studies on the Iraq war and Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict and have investigated how the Lisbon Treaty sought to address this problem of coherence, we will now continue with the discussion chapter. The discussion chapter will link the central question, literature review and case studies and will discuss the effectiveness of the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.

Discussion

In the final chapter of this dissertation, a brief overview of the main results as well as an interpretation of these results will be presented. Furthermore, this chapter will discuss the case study findings in the context of the existing, academic literature linking the central question, literature and case study data. In addition, an attempt will be made to answer the central question. Moreover, the research conducted will be critically discussed by looking at how it contributes to the knowledge in the field and how it relates or differs to other authors who have written about the coherence phenomenon. This chapter includes the discussion with regards to the results of this dissertation being similar to or challenging existing research and perspectives on the coherence phenomenon by linking the data from the literature review to the findings of this dissertation. Also, trends and unexpected patterns that have appeared with regards to the findings of this dissertation will be discussed.

Case study findings and previous research

When discussing the different findings of the case study's in relation to previous research on the coherence phenomenon conducted by other authors, we will look at how these findings are similar, different or challenging with regards to previous research. First, the findings of the case study on Member State divergence as a source of incoherence will be discussed in relation to the findings of other authors on this particular source of incoherence with regards to the EU's external action.

Member State divergence

In the case study it was found that Member States are not always to blame for problems of incoherence i.e. in the EU's external action. This challenges previous research that has been conducted on this topic in which Member State divergence has often been identified as one of the main sources for incoherence in the EU's external action. However, it was found in the case study that other factors are equally responsible for causing problems of incoherence in the EU's external action such as the division between EU institutions and the EU's inability to cooperate with local actors during crises. Therefore these particular findings challenge the research of for example Portela and Raube(2009) as well as Stahl(2008) who primarily identify Member State divergence to cause EU failure in crises as well as one of the main sources for incoherence in the EU's external action. As found in the literature review, Stahl(2008) blamed the Member States for preferring their own national interests over the interests of the EU and Portela and Raube (2009) claim that 'origins of incoherence lie with the Member States' reluctance to strengthen their intergovernmental level by operating through the EU. The individual behavior of Member States is what causes inconsistency and incoherence in the EU's external action (Portela & Raube, 2009, p. 16). It can

thus be argued that the findings of the case studies of this dissertation are substantially different from those of previous research. There are some strong arguments supporting the notion of Member States divergence being the main source of incoherence in the EU's external action. The case study also recognises the lack of willingness of Member States to work together and the inability to identify a common external threat during crises influences the extent of coherence of the EU's external action. However, it was also found in the case study that the blame is often squarely put on Member States while there are so many other factors equally contributing to the coherence problem that exists in the EU's external action such as the absence of a strong CFSP containing a strong and efficient decision-making structure. The findings of the case study thus challenge the research of other authors who found that Member States are to blame for incoherence in the EU's external action. When comparing these contrasting results from the case study and research of other authors as presented in the literature review, one could say that we should not entirely eliminate the extent to which Member States are responsible for causing incoherence in the EU's external action, as this is also one of the main reasons for incoherence found in the case study. However, we should also recognize that there are other factors that are equally contributing to the coherence problem that exists in the EU's external action and that we should not squarely put the blame on the Member States.

Institutional sources of incoherence

We now turn to the discussion on the findings of the case study's with regards to institutional division as a source of incoherence compared to the research of other author's who have also conducted research on this topic. When comparing the findings of the case study's with those of previous research on this topic, they seem to be quite similar. The case study showed that a division between the European Parliament, European Council and the European Commission contributes to the incoherence of the EU's external action. Moreover, it showed that the ability of the EU institutions to construct a common approach in crises such as Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was clearly lacking. In previous research it was also found that institutional divergence contributes to the coherence problem in the EU's external action. The findings of the case studies thus seem to be quite similar to the findings of other authors. When we look at the Lisbon Treaty, the case study's proved that the Treaty was created in reaction to institutional divergence, as it mainly introduced institutional changes in order to address the coherence problem of the EU's external action. These findings also seem to be quite harmonious with those of other authors. Moreover, previous research proved that the Lisbon Treaty simplified the EU's structure. However, previous researchers also noticed that the Lisbon Treaty failed to unify EU institutions. When integrating these findings into the discussion on whether institutional divergence is responsible for incoherence in the EU's

external action, the results of the case study are somewhat contrasting with regards to those of previous research. In the case studies it was found that the Lisbon Treaty did introduce very innovative and possibly very effective changes in order to unify EU institutions, such as the European External Action service which will act as an intermediary between all EU actors, including EU institutions. One could thus say that concerning these findings, the case studies of this dissertation and previous research are different. We can conclude that the findings of the case studies are harmonious with previous research in the sense that both proved that institutional division contributes to incoherence in the EU's external action but that they differ based on the fact that previous research found that the Lisbon Treaty failed to unify EU institutions while the case study's results show that the EU has introduced some very innovative and possibly very effective changes in order to unify EU institutions.

When looking at this discussion one could say that yes, the Lisbon Treaty has simplified the EU's institutional structure by abandoning the old pillar structure and changing the influence certain institutions had so that all institutions would have similar competences and no division would exist but that on the other hand, we still have to wait and see if the changes introduced by Lisbon are truly effective and unifying as for example the EEAS still has to find its feet.

Evolvement coherence between conflicts

When we look at how coherence has evolved between the Bosnia-Herzegovina war and the Iraq war, we can see some similarities as to what caused the problems of coherence in the EU's external action in both conflicts as well as some differences which could indicate that coherence of the EU's external action has evolved in a positive way between the different conflicts.

In both case studies Member State divergence has been identified as one of the main sources contributing to the coherence problem that existed in the EU's external action. In the case study on the Bosnia-Herzegovina war for example, which took place in 1991, Member State divergence was already one of the main and biggest sources contributing to the coherence problem of the EU's external action. The Member States failed to take a common position with regards to the war and preferred national interests over those of the EU as a whole. Furthermore, the case study showed a lack of cohesion between EU policies in the region and those of individual Member States. Member States failed to act through joint decisions and to coordinate their response to the crisis. When we look at the Iraq crisis then which took place more than ten years after the Bosnian war, Member State divergence is still identified as one of the main sources contributing to the coherence problem in the EU's external action. The Iraq was even referred to as "the great split". Similar to

the Bosnian war, Member State divergence during the Iraq war contributed to the EU's inability to act as one, coherent actor. Again, Member States preferred their own national interests over those of the EU as a whole and the willingness to cooperate was once more missing. Just like in the Bosnia-Herzegovina war, Member States failed to take a common position. In that sense it could thus be said that coherence did not evolve in a very progressive and positive way as Member State divergence after more than ten years still remains an issue and source contributing to the coherence problem of the EU's external action. On the other hand, it could be argued that in an ever enlarging EU it is almost impossible to get all Member States to cooperate and see eye to eye. The larger the EU, the more different national interests to take into account which will not make the decision making process any easier.

When we kook further into the sources of incoherence in the EU's external action, another resemblance can be found which could indicate that coherence has not evolved at all since the Bosnia-Herzegovina war. The findings of the Bosnia-Herzegovina case study showed us that the situation in the Balkans was seen as the ultimate tests of the EU's ability to conduct a common foreign and security policy. However, the case study also showed that the EU failed to conduct a CFSP and that this was also one of the main sources contributing to the coherence problem in the EU's external action. Moreover, the case study on the Bosnian war pointed out that the EU was not able to manage crises in its own backyard and had thus failed to develop and conduct an effective CFSP. Furthermore, there was clearly a lack of commitment to have a real and effective CFSP. More than ten years after the Bosnian war, an ineffective CFSP was still indentified as a source contributing to the coherence problem in the EU's external action during the Iraq war. During the Iraq crisis no clear CFSP was conducted. In fact, the Member States all applied different securitisation strategies. Moreover, the case study showed us that there was a lack of strong CFSP statements and Member States did not seem to realise that when they would make an effort to develop and effective CFSP, their influence could have been much bigger. It can thus be concluded that the lack of an effective CFSP as a source of contributing to incoherence in the EU's external action has not evolved in a positive way between both conflicts. After more than ten years, the lack of a strong and effective CFSP was still identified as one of the main sources contributing to the coherence problem in the EU's external action.

However, coherence of the EU's external action has also evolved in positive way when we look at the outcomes of the case studies. When we look for example at Member State divergence as a source of incoherence in the EU's external action, it could be argued that it has slightly developed in a positive way. When looking at the Iraq war in comparison to the Bosnian war, Member States

were now developing securitisation strategies that were similar to other countries. They had chosen to apply the same strategies as other Member States and to thus cooperate to some extent. In that sense, one could thus say that Member States were making an effort to coordinate their security policies whilst during the Bosnian war there was a serious lack of any commitment or attempts to cooperate and develop an effective CFSP. However, there was still a division between the Member States during the Iraq war as there were Member States that applied desecuritisation strategies and Member States that applied a-securitisation strategies. Still, the fact that Member States made an attempt to apply similar securitisation moves and thus made an effort to cooperate, could be interpreted as a small development of coherence in the EU's external action between the two conflicts. Furthermore, the inability of the EU to cooperate with other (local) actors during crises, seems to have developed in a positive way since the Bosnia-Herzegovina war in 1991. The case study showed that during the Bosnian war the EU failed to cooperate with local actors such as the US and the UN. The case study findings showed that Bosnia was a source of friction between the EU and the UN which affected NATO and its creditability. The EU was determined to find a solution for the Bosnian crisis by itself and did not want any help from the US. When we then look at the case study on the Iraq war, it can be concluded that the EU made some serious efforts at cooperating with the main local actor: the US. Certain Member States supported the US and agreed on their views of Iraq not complying with the UN demand to cooperate with local weapon inspectors. Therefore, we could say that the EU's ability to cooperate with local actors, which affects the EU's coherence of the external action, has developed in a positive way since the Bosnian war. However, one could argue that the fact that some Member States supported the US and others had a completely different view on the crisis, increased the divergence between the Member States.

It can thus be concluded that the sources contributing to the coherence problem of the EU's external action did evolve in a positive way between both crises as the EU's ability to cooperate with local actors during the Iraq crisis has improved to some extent. Moreover, the divergence between Member States seemed to have somewhat decreased as during the Iraq war serious efforts were made in order to coordinate Member State securitisation strategies. On the other hand, one could argue that Member State divergence has not evolved at all since the Bosnian war as then years later it is still affecting the coherence of the EU's external action. During the Iraq war, Member States still pursued their own national interests over those of the EU as a whole and failed to agree on a common position. Furthermore, the lack of an effective CFSP also continued to be a source contributing to the coherence problem of the EU's external action. More than ten years after

the Bosnian war, the EU still failed to apply an effective CFSP during the Iraq war and strong CFSP statements were still missing. It can thus be concluded that to some extent coherence of the EU's external action has developed in a positive between the two different conflicts but the fact that some sources of incoherence still continue to contribute to the problem of coherence in the EU's external action proves that the EU still has a long way to go if they want to improve the coherence of the EU's external action.

Answering the central question

In this section of the discussion chapter, an attempt will be made at answering the central question of this dissertation: How successful have the changes introduced to CFSP by the Lisbon Treaty been in improving and addressing the coherence of the EU's external action in the past? In answering the central question, the main changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty with regards to the CFSP will be analysed in order to determine how effective they have been in improving the coherence of the EU's external action. The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty are briefly outlined and assessed in the paragraphs below.

The High Representative

The Lisbon Treaty introduced several institutional changes primarily in the field of CFSP such as the creation of the new post of High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security as well as the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). We will first look at the new post of the HR and its effectiveness on the EU's external action. With the creation of the HR , the Lisbon Treaty made an attempt at improving the EU's CFSP. As mentioned before, the EU's external action and CFSP are closely related. With the creation of the HR for Foreign Affairs and Security, the Lisbon Treaty created a post which will deal with the external relations of the EU as well as CFSP issues. Moreover, the HR will be responsible for conducting the EU's foreign and security policy. The Lisbon Treaty thus gave these responsibilities to the HR in order to create more unity and to avoid having to many different actors dealing with the CFSP. The new, unifying aspect of the HR on CFSP proves to be an effective change introduced by Lisbon in order to improve the coherence of the EU's external action. It created the responsibility for the EU to ensure coherence in the EU's external relations as well as combining European and Member State lines of interest into one person. Furthermore, the creation of the HR for Foreign Affairs and Security has proven to be an effective change introduced by the Lisbon Treaty as the HR has the responsibility to ensure coherence and consistency in the EU's external action.

The creation of the new post of HR for Foreign Affairs and Security and as giving it the responsibility to deal with CFSP issues as well as acting as a chairman of the Foreign Affairs council, is thus considered to be an effective change in order to improve the coherence of the EU's external action. However, we could also argue that the creation of the new post of HR will give rise to new tensions and the new position of the HR is thus not that effective at all. The new competences of the HR could give rise to new tensions at EU level and negatively affect the adherence of smaller Member States to EU Foreign Policy strategies and initiatives. Unfortunately, it seems that this is already happening. Until now, the HR appears to struggle with truly improving the coherence of the EU's external action through the CFSP. Catherine Ashton, the current HR, seems incapable of forging a 'single voice' to speak for the EU in i.e. external relations. We have to keep in mind though that the HR is operating in an almost 'impossible' environment which consists out of power struggles between different institutions and Member States (Stocker, 2011). Moreover, one could say that the criticism against the HR and its effectiveness symbolises the unwillingness of Member States to establish an effective, common, foreign policy. It could thus be argued that until now the HR for Foreign Affairs and Security has not been very effective in improving the coherence of the EU's external action(Stocker, 2011). On the other hand, Ashton's previous experience may change the direction of the CFSP and put more emphasis on European interests as Ashton used to be a member of the Commission as well as a Commissioner for Trade (Koehler, 2010, p.11). This could positively affect the EU's external action as the interests of Member States will be taken into account which as a result could stimulate a positive attitude of the Member States towards the EU (feeling of being understood and taken seriously). It can be concluded that the HR definitely has the potential to become one of the effective changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in order to improve the coherence of the EU's external action, but only time can tell if Ashton is able to convince the Member States to speak with one voice and prevent them from giving priority to i.e. bilateral relations over a common EU Foreign Policy.

EEAS

One of the other changes with regards to CFSP that was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in an attempt to improve the coherence of the EU's external action was the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS was initially designed to assist the HR for Foreign Affairs and Security and merged a number of existing EU external relation departments with new ones in order to establish a new foreign policy body (European External Action Service, n.d.). Furthermore, the EEAS is supposed to act as some sort of intermediary between all main institutional actors involved in European Foreign Policy and to thus strengthen the coordination of EU and national foreign policies (Gaspers, 2009, p. 11). The service seems to be one of the most,

potentially, effective changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to improve the coherence of the EU's external action as it compromises officials from relevant departments such as the European Council, the European Commission and national, diplomatic services of different Member States and thus contributes to a higher degree of coherence with regards to the EU's external action. So, in that sense, the EEAS is an effective CFSP change, affecting the EU's external action in a positive way. However, we must not forget that the EEAS is still on its way to become a fully functioning service. That being said, it does have a great potential to bring together Member States and EU institutions in order to improve the EU's responses to crises such as Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina and to thus hopefully contribute to the coherence of the EU's external action. Still, the effectiveness of the EEAS could be challenged by the long delay in its creation which led to a low moral and uncertainty among the personnel transferred to the EEAS. There is a chance that although the personnel of the EEAS is to conduct themselves solely with the interest of the EU in mind, the nationalism of Member States will pose a major challenge to the functioning of the EEAS as well as its effectiveness on the coherence of the EU's external action.

There is evidence though that the EEAS has had some success and proved to be effective, at least in certain regions, for instance in the Balkans where its effectiveness and visibility have been noted and substantial progress has been made in bringing Serbia closer to eventual EU Member Ship (Kelly & Avery, 2011). And although the EU failed to present a united response to the Libyan crisis, it has started, with the aid of proposals of the EEAS, to redefine policies and assistance to the countries affected by the 'Arab awakening' (Kelly & Avery, 2011). It can thus be said that the EEAS, introduced as a change to the CFSP by the Lisbon Treaty, until now has proven to be quite effective. It has the great potential to speak on behalf of the EU as a whole in the field of foreign and security policy and could act an efficient intermediary between the different EU actors in order to improve the EU's foreign policy.

European Council
In this paragraph, the effectiveness of the recognition of the European Council and its new responsibilities introduced by the Lisbon Treaty will be briefly examined.

With the creation of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council gained the status of being an official EU institution. It was given the task to determine the strategic interests and objectives of the EU for all its external actions and moreover brought CFSP and external relations together. The recognition of the European Council and giving it these new tasks and responsibilities proved to be an effective one as the European Council has become some sort of 'guarantor' of coherence of the EU's

external actions. Furthermore, giving one EU institution the responsibility to decide on the overall objectives of the EU's external action seems to be an effective innovation for decreasing the number of actors involved in deciding upon the EU's external action which contributed to its level of incoherence and thus contributing to the EU's external action's coherence. It can be argued that after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the European Council has become the true policy maker of the EU. The dynamic in the Council, where the countries take policy related decisions, is totally different. Now Member States do no longer have the possibility of hiding behind their veto (Mahoney, 2010). They are stimulated to come up with much stronger argumentations, much faster. They must be persuasive because in the end a decision will be taken anyway. The new role of the European Council as introduced by the Lisbon Treaty thus far seems to have had positive effect on the EU's external action. Member States are motivated to participate more actively in the policy decision-making area and are forced to make decisions at a faster speed. This allows the EU to react faster in i.e. crises.

Effective changes?

The effectiveness of the changes to the CFSP introduced by the Lisbon Treaty on the EU's external action is questionable. The effectiveness of the changes with regards to the EU's external action can be interpreted in two different ways. It could be argued for example that despite the adoption of a common foreign policy, individual Member States do not yet act unanimously on foreign policy issues which are often at the core of the EU's external action. Recent events such as the Arab spring are a prime example of this. On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty has managed to pull a certain amount of sovereignty from the Member States in foreign policy matters. Still, instead of creating a cooperative environment for the EU institutions it could be argued that the Lisbon Treaty has rather created a competitive environment with the creation of the HR for example which could give rise to tensions between the different EU institutions and appointing the European Council as the main guarantor for coherence determining the EU's strategy and objectives with regards to its external action and thus eliminating other actors. The EU believes that collectively its members will be stronger than separately, but one could argue that there seems to be little evidence that Member States are indeed ready to give up their sovereignty (Babayan, 2010). The effectiveness of the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty could thus definitely be questioned.

On the contrary, it can be concluded that the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty with regards to CFSP have been effective to the EU's external action. The creation of the new post of HR for Foreign Affairs and Security for example created more unity in the EU's external action and can be considered to be a serious attempt at unifying European and Member States lines of interests into

person. Moreover, the introduction of the EEAS has proved to be effective in certain regions such as the Balkans where the EEAS made significant progress in bringing Siberia closer to EU membership. Furthermore, the EEAS has constructed proposals to redefine policies and assistance to countries affected by the 'Arab awakening'. Also, by compromising officials from different EU institutions such as the European Council and national diplomatic services of Member States, the service has contributed to a higher degree of coherence in the EU's external action. Finally, the recognition of the European Council and giving it new tasks and responsibilities of determining the interests and objectives of all the EU's external actions, decreased the number of actors involved in the decision-making process related to the EU's external action. It proved to be an effective and efficient change contributing to the coherence of the EU's external action as the decision-making process became more efficient and increase the speed at which decisions would be taken thus improving the EU's ability to react in crises. In general, in can thus be conclude that the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to the CFSP have been quite effective with regards to the improvement of coherence in the EU's external action. The EEAS and HR for Foreign Affairs and Security have great potential to further improve the coherence of the EU's external action in the future but they will face the challenges of a changing environment in which Member States and EU institutions are likely to compete. We could thus say that the important innovations of the Lisbon Treaty in order to improve the coherence of the EU's external action are contingent upon the will of the Member States to comply with and implement the Lisbon Treaty to its full extent (Maigaard, 2011). It can be concluded that coherence in the EU's foreign policy and external action is the only opportunity for the EU to be taken serious as a global actor.

Future challenges

In this section of the discussion, an attempt will be made at identifying possible, future challenges for the CFSP regarding the coherence of the EU's external action after Lisbon. After looking at the different changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in order to improve the coherence of the EU's external action as well as the case study on the different crises the EU was involved in, a prediction for future challenges, concerns and risks will be made. The main focus will be put on the European External Action Service (EEAS), as the service itself is still trying to find its feet and will face many challenges along the way. Moreover, future challenges for the CFSP will be examined as well as the implications for the recent Euro crisis on the CFSP. Furthermore, one of the main threats to the EU's external action, as identified in the case study, will be examined in order to determine the future challenges EU enlargement poses to the coherence of the EU's external action as well as its foreign policy. This section will also include some of the future challenges the High Representative will face and the possible consequences for the EU's external action and CFSP. Of

course, no one knows exactly what the future holds or which events the EU will face in the future that will test its foreign policy and external action. However, by tying together the crises that took place in the past and the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in order to improve the coherence of the EU's external action, an attempt will be made to identify some of the major future challenges the CFSP and external action of the EU are most likely to face.

EEAS future challenges

When we look at the challenges the EU's external action will face in the future it is almost impossible to not involve the European External Action Service (EEAS). The structure of the EEAS, reflects the 'double-hatted' approach that was basic to its establishment (Avery, 2011, p.2). As mentioned before, the EEAS was tasked to assist other authors in EU foreign policy. However, one of the main future challenges the EEAS faces is the risk of friction and rivalry between the EEAS and the services of the Commission which would be very damaging since much of the EU's action in international and external actions is related to common policies. In addition, the EEAS' long delay in its creation has also led to uncertainty and a somewhat low morale among the personnel transferred to the EEAS (Avery, 2011, p. 2). Although the personnel is to 'carry out their duties and conduct themselves solely with the interest of the EU in mind', the nationalism of Member States will create a major challenge to the functioning of the EEAS and therefore its effect on the EU's external action. As a result, the EU's foreign policy faces the risk of continuing to be inter-governmental with the Member States as the key decision takers, which come from very different, institutional backgrounds, are likely to differ in their expectations and views of the EEAS (Avery, 2011, p. 2). Small Member States are likely to see the EEAS as an opportunity to increase their presence in the world while, on the other hand, big Member States are expected to be rather skeptical about the EEAS. As a result, there is a chance that they could refuse to significantly contribute to the EEAS and they could thus challenge the EEAS' success and effect on the EU's external action (Hellmeyer, 2012). Moreover, with the creation of the EEAS, the number of actors involved in EU external policymaking has increased and so has the complexity of the policymaking process.

Three main challenges that the EEAS will face in the future, have been identified. The three main difficulties the EEAS will have to overcome in the future are strategy challenges, leadership challenges and the challenge to deliver. With regards to the delivery challenge, the wide gap between the EEAS resources and duties poses a serious challenge to deliver for the EEAS (Whitman, 2012).   Furthermore, the leadership challenge the EU faces is related to its foreign policy. It could possibly face a lack of leadership (Voltolini, 2012). A lack of leadership will

weaken the EU's foreign policy as well as its external action. The EU's capability to identify its core security interests and priorities for collective action and partnerships will severely decrease (Voltotini, 2012). The coherence of the EU's external action is thus expected to be challenged by leadership of the EU's foreign policy and its effect on the EU's capability to take collective action and to commonly define core (security) interests. In addition, the recent crises such as Iraq (2003) and Libya, as well as the European leaders' collective failure to deal with these crises commonly and decisively, have deeply affected the EU's image in the world. The EU is perceived as a region in decline. This view of the EU will seriously hamper the EU's ability to shape the global order of the 21st century (Reinsch, 2012).   Therefore, the EU's external action also seems to face the future challenge of maintaining a positive image of a coherent actor, dealing collectively with crises as a negative image could affect the relations the EU has with its Member States and thus its external action.

The stakes are higher now than in the past as the challenges to the European Foreign Policy are increasing, both in the EU's neighbourhood and beyond (Hemra, Raine & Whitman, 2011, p. 1). New crises such as the unfolding events in the Arab world, has made the need for an effective and coherent European response more urgent. The EEAS faces the risk of not being able to fully develop itself and fulfill its role as an intermediary between the different EU institutions and Member States which could cause countries to lose confidence in the value of the CFSP. This would inevitably lead to increased nationalisation of foreign policy in Europe and a potential weakening of the EU's significance in the world (Hemra, Raine & Whitman, 2011, p. 2). One of the biggest challenges for the EEAS is thus to develop and establish itself as otherwise, without its existence, the EU will face the risk of actors involved in the EU's external action losing their direction and be at cross purposes. The biggest challenge for the next phase of the EEAS's development is to determine a clear direction for the long term, and to ensure that the main actors involved are prepared to support it politically but also with the necessary resources. The EEAS future challenge also consists out of defining a vision and strategy, which it lacks now, in order to make the most of its capabilities and to affect the coherence of the EU's external action in a positive way. In addition, the EEAS faces the difficult challenge of determining the service's long term direction as without it, the EEAS will be driven by improvisation which would not be sufficient for coordinating the Member States or getting the most out of the organisation (Hemra, Raine & Whitman, 2011, p.2). Therefore, in order for the EEAS to be effective it will need a sense of ownership among the main EU institutions, governments and other stakeholders as well as an intelligent effort to advance the EU's common agenda and it will need the support from the Member States, especially the large ones, in both policymaking and implementation.

In addition to the future challenges already mentioned, the EEAS also faces the challenge of gaining the trust and support of the EU's Member States (Lehne, 2011, p. 2). The EEAS can only become a dynamic leader of the European Foreign Policy when the Member States trust the EEAS and support it. Moreover, nothing is more important for the success of the EEAS than a strong sense of ownership on behalf of the Member States. The extent to which the Member States decide to give the EEAS a role and follow its leadership will depend on the degree of trust it enjoys (Lehne, 2011, p. 2). Therefore, one of the future challenges of the EEAS lays in the trust of the Member States in the service. On the other hand though, when the EEAS will develop a closer relationship with the Member States, it might find it more difficult to, at the same time, develop a strong relationship with the Commission, which prides itself on its independence (Lehne, 2011, p. 2). Conversely, if the Member States perceive a Commission 'take over' of the EEAS, there is a chance that they will distance themselves from the EEAS. The EEAS thus faces a risk of possible, future 'take over' of the Commission which could affect the EU's external action as the Member States could distance themselves and the relationship between the EU and its Member States will become more vulnerable.

Furthermore, the EEAS also faces the challenge of attaining a strong leadership position and, as mentioned earlier, defining a clear direction for the service, or its activity will turn into 'empty words' (Lehne, 2011, p. 2). The EEAS should therefore cooperate closely with the HR, who could take a stronger lead in setting priorities and in giving strategic direction. Moreover, the EEAS will also face the risk of its responses to foreign policy challenges to remain unconvincing (Lehne, 2011, p. 11). It will probably face a need to concentrate its attention and resources on policy issues where it can actually make a difference. One can thus conclude that there is much at stake in the further handling of the EEAS. If no action is taken and the EEAS fails to fully develop and establish itself, the service can rapidly become irrelevant while Member States return to primarily nationally defined foreign policy (Lehne, 2011, p. 18). If, however, the trust and support of the Member States can be won, if the Commission engages constructively, if the HR displays a more visible leadership and if the institutional capacity of the EU foreign policy can be improved, it should be possible to achieve a more effective and coherent EU foreign policy. However, mobilizing the political will to get this done will be the real challenge.

Challenges for the High Representative (HR)
While the new office of the High Representative (HR) could lead to a more coherent, external action of the EU, it also poses one of the main future challenges to the EU's external action. The overlapping competences with the President of the European Council could lower the level of the

HR to mere coordinative and administrative tasks. The HR has a position which is clearly placed in an area of conflict between and within the EU institutions (Koehler, 2010). In the daily practice the HR attracts the risk of being under strict examination, both of the national governments in the Council as well as the colleagues in the Commission. Moreover, the HR could possibly be controlled by the president of the European Council as representative of the Member States if he or she would interpret his role in such a sense. Furthermore, the HR has a special status within the Commission which results from his/her appointment by the European Council. This 'exceptional' status, as well as the responsibility for overarching coordination of the Commission's policies with an external dimension, is a potential source of tensions between the HR and certain Commissioners and the President of the Commission. In the future, tensions could arise because the HR challenges the President's 'primus inter pares' position within the Commission. The HR's responsibility to ensure coherence and consistency of the EU's external action may thus be challenged in the future by possible tensions between him/her and other EU actors (Koehler, 2010, p. 10). In addition, one of the future challenges of the EU thus lays in ensure and protect the competences of the HR as well as making sure that its responsibility to deal with CFSP issues, which will reflect upon the EU's external action, will be maintained by avoiding the 'overshadowing' of the Commission or Council which could risk the HR's duties and could possibly limit them to merely administrative tasks (Wessels & Bopp, 2008, p. 31). Moreover, one could conclude that the Lisbon Treaty creates new potential for future conflicts between the HR and the president of the European Council as well as the president of the Commission. The effectiveness of the European Foreign Policy therefore will be challenged in the future and will greatly depend on the possible agreements between single institutions (Koehler, 2010, p. 13).

Future enlargement

The future enlargement of the EU could also be identified as one of the main future challenges to the coherence of the EU's external action. In the case studies, enlargement of the EU has already been identified as one of the sources contributing to the coherence problem of the EU's external action. When, in the future, the number of Member States will further increase, chances are that delays in the decision-making process and disagreements, will also increase. Due to further enlargement, increasingly diverse interests and approaches in regards to dealing with certain issues are expected to stretch the feeling of solidarity and commonality to the maximum (Blockmans & Wessel, 2009, p.30). The EU will thus have to face the challenge of ensuring enlargement does not disrupt the coherence of the EU's external action as it could possibly complicate or give another dimension to the EU's relationship with other Member States and could possibly complicate the speed and efficiency in which the EU takes action in for example crises that take place in other

Member States . A larger EU will also require institutional change and more efficient decision-making procedures. Furthermore, it will require a rebalancing of the respective representation of large and small countries (House of Lords, EU Committee, p.47). An overstretched and ineffective EU cannot play a stabilizing role in its neighbourhood and the wider world and will consequently have a negative impact on the EU's external action. With the EU still moving ahead with its enlargement, European leaders and many European citizens remain critical about further EU enlargement (House of Lords, EU Committee, p.47). If the EU decides to further expand, the EU will face the future challenge of ensuring that the enlargement does not endanger the ability of the EU's institutions to function effectively (Archick, 2012, p. 14). Some key Member States fear that the expansion of the EU will weaken their ability to drive EU policies and to set the tone and agenda in EU institutions. Future enlargement of the EU could thus put its external relationships and actions under pressure.

However, the biggest challenge is of course to get all Member States to agree on Foreign Policy issues. The EU won't get anywhere unless everyone is agreed on the CFSP. It is all about getting 27 Member States to agree, all of which have a veto (Skoog, 2011). This has always been an issue complicating i.e. the EU's external action, and will continue to be a challenge in the future, especially when the number of Member States increases. Moreover, when the EEAS was set up and took over the rotating presidency from i.e. geographical working groups in Brussels, it took away the driving force of initiative and energy that was put into the EU foreign policy by the rotating presidency(Skoog, 2011). This is what causes one of the main challenges now to European Foreign Policy. The EEAS now faces the challenge and responsibility of putting energy and leadership into the service. The EU is a club of values which biggest future challenge seems to be to respond more coherently. However, concurring this challenge is of course complicated by the wide variety of Member State stances on particular issues and the need to take decisions unanimously (Skoog, 2011). One of the other challenges the CFSP faces is caused by the current, inward looking mood in the EU on account of the Euro crisis. This will take away the energy from foreign policy at a time when the EU's external partners have high expectations (Skoog, 2011). Therefore, the EU's external relations as well as its actions will be stretched to the maximum. The 'recipe' to concur these challenges and address these concerns seems to be more cooperation at EU level and with strategic partners (Skoog, 2011). But with a still expanding union currently existing out 27 Member States, all having different opinions as well as national interests, reaching a common position and cooperating together seems to be one of the biggest future challenges the EU faces.

Conclusion

This discussion with regards to the future challenges for the CFSP regarding the coherence of the EU's external action, shows that one of the main future challenges for i.e. the EEAS lies in gaining the trust and support of the Member States. The service can only become a dynamic leader of the European Foreign Policy when Member States support and trust it. Furthermore, it can be concluded that Member State enlargement poses one of the greatest challenges to the coherence of the EU's external action in the future. The wide variety of Member State stances on particular issues will increase and complicate the decision-making process as well as the EU's ability to take decisions unanimously. Moreover, the sense of solidarity and commonality is expected to stretch to the maximum and thus the EU faces the challenge of ensuring that future enlargement will not disrupt the coherence of the EU's external action. Furthermore, it can be concluded that one of the biggest challenges for the CFSP will be to reach any agreement among all, current, 27 Member States. The EU will not get anywhere unless everyone is agreed on CFSP. It is thus all about agreement which will continue to be a major challenge if the number of Member States keeps on growing. Finally, it can be concluded that one of the main future challenges the High Representative (HR) could face, will be to ensure and protect its competences as well as to make sure that is responsibility to deal with CFSP issues will be maintained by trying to avoid a 'take over' from the Commission or Council. To conclude, one could say that the key to concurring these future challenges is cooperation at EU level and all Member States thus working to together, taking joint, unanimous decisions. Still, this is easier said than done....

Conclusion

In this dissertation we sought to determine how effective the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to the CFSP have been in effectively addressing the coherence problem of the EU's external action. In order to determine how effective the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have truly been at improving the coherence of the EU's external action, three separate case studies which focused on the Bosnia-Herzegovina war (1991), the Iraq crisis (2003) and the Lisbon Treaty have been conducted.

The data in the case studies on Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina, showed us that different sources contributed to the coherence problem that existed in the EU's external action. It became clear that for example during the Bosnia-Herzegovina war of 1991, the divergence of the Member States greatly contributed to the coherence problem that existed in the EU's external action. The EU's inability to act as one coherent actor and to thus take joint decisions and to speak with one voice, mainly caused the EU's failure in the Bosnian war. The case study showed that there was a clear division between those Member States that believed in a negotiated decision and those who favored secessionist republics. Furthermore, when looking at the case study findings we can conclude that the Member States' preference to pursue their own national interests rather than those of the EU as a whole contributed to the EU's inability to formulate one, coherent response which contributed to the coherence problem of the EU's external action. Therefore, it can be concluded that one of the main findings of the case study on the Bosnia-Herzegovina war proved that Member State divergence was one of the main and greatest sources contributing to the coherence problem of the EU's external action. However, the EU's inability to develop a constructive policy or any visible policy instruments also contributed to the EU's failure to act as a coherent actor during the crisis. Moreover, when taking into account the findings of the case study, it can be concluded that a division between the different EU institutions was also responsible for the coherence problem in the EU's external action. Also, when we look at the findings of this case study, we can conclude that the EU's incapability to cooperate with local actors during crises in combination with the lack of commitment to construct a real, coherent security policy, certainly did not benefit the coherence of the EU's external action. It can thus be concluded that Member State divergence, a division between EU institutions as well as the EU's inability to develop a constructive policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina in combination with a general lack of European commitment were all sources contributing to the coherence problem that existed in the EU's external action before the Lisbon Treaty was established.

In addition to the case study on the Bosnia-Herzegovina war, the case study on the Iraq war also provided some interesting date with regards to the sources of incoherence in the EU's external action. Similar to the case study on Bosnia, the case study on the Iraq war, also identified Member State divergence as a source contributing to the coherence problem of the EU's external action. It was found that the willingness of the Member States to cooperate, contributed to the EU's inability to act as a coherent actors during the crisis. Similar to the findings of the case study on the Bosnian war it was found that Member States preferred their own national interests over those of the EU as a whole. When looking at both case studies it can be concluded that Member State divergence is was kept the EU from agreeing on a common position and performing as one coherent actor. Taking the findings of the case study on the Iraq war into account,   we can conclude that the Member States 'divergence was caused by the different views of the Member States on the definition, urgency and management of the threat Iraq posed to the EU. Moreover, the case study data showed us that the Member States desire to maintain sovereignty regarding the decisions that were taken in the field of security policies also affected the coherence of the EU's external action in a negative way. Finally, when looking at the case study on the Iraq war, we can conclude that the Member States' choice to conduct their policies independently rather than acting together, in combination with the absence of any strong CFSP statements as well as the lack of any effective decision making procedures contributed to the coherence problem in the EU's external action.

When we then look at the case study on the Lisbon Treaty, we could conclude that the Treaty made some very serious attempts at addressing the coherence problem that existed in the EU's external action. The Treaty sought to improve the coherence of the EU's external action primarily by introducing changes to the CFSP as well as institutional changes. It created for example the new post of High Representative(HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security. The HR will deal with both the external relations of the EU as well as CFSP issues. Moreover, the HR will be responsible for conducting the EU's foreign and security policy. We can conclude that the creation of this new post has been an effective change with regards to the coherence of the EU's external action as it created more unity in the EU's external action. It can also be concluded that the new function of HR is a serious, and potentially, very effective change with regards to the coherence of the EU's external action introduced by the Lisbon Treaty as it unifies European and Member State lines of interest into one person. The case study on the Lisbon Treaty also showed us that that one of the main innovations in order to address the coherence problem in the EU's external action, was the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS was created in order to ensure that the EU has a coherent and effective foreign policy. Moreover, the EEAS was created with the aim of the service to act as some sort of intermediary between all main (institutional) actors involved in

the European Foreign Policy and to thus strengthen the coordination of the EU and national foreign policies. When looking at the findings of the case study on the Lisbon Treaty, we can conclude that the EEAS was actually created in order to coordinate and improve the EU's responses to crises and to thus improve the coherence of the EU's external action. The case study findings lead us to the conclusion that the creation of the EEAS has been an effective innovation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in order to improve the coherence of the EU's external action as it contributed to a higher degree of coherence in the EU's external action. Furthermore, we can conclude that the EEAS has already proven to be effective in certain areas such as the Balkans where it made signification progress in bringing Serbia closer to EU Membership.

On the basis of this data, it can be concluded that, overall, the challenges introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have proven to be effective in improving the coherence of the EU's external action (please see table on the next page). The EEAS and HR for Foreign Affairs and Security have great potential to further improve the coherence of the EU's external action. However, the HR and EEAS will have to face the challenges posed in the changing environment of the EU in which the HR will have to face the challenge of ensuring and protecting his/her competences and making sure that his/her responsibility to deal with CFSP issues, which reflects upon the EU's external action, will be not be overshadowed by the EC or the European Council. In this changing environment, the EEAS will have to gain the trust and support of Member States in order for it to become a dynamic leader. Moreover, the EEAS will need to attain a strong leadership position, defining a clear direction for the service, or its activity will turn into empty words. We can conclude that improving the coherence of the EU's external action is all about more cooperation at EU level, all Member States working together, taking joint and unanimous decisions. Still, this is easier said than done and only time will tell if the EU is capable of overcoming dissent and if the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty will live up to their full potential and 'eliminate' the coherence problem in the EU's external action for good.

Central question	Case study on Bosnia-Herzegovina	Case study on Iraq
How successful have the changes introduced to CFSP by the Lisbon Treaty been in addressing the coherence problem of the EU's external actions in the past?	*Identifying sources that contributed to the coherence problem in the EU's external action* - Lack of European commitment - Member States failed to take a common position - Inability to develop a constructive policy or visible policy instruments - Divergence of the Member States - Lack of cohesion between EU policies in the region and those of individual Member States - Failure to act through joint actions - Lack of commitment to have a 'real' and coherent security policy - Division between EU institutions - Inability to cooperate with local actors - Member States failed to communicate their response to the crisis	*Identifying sources that contributed to the coherence problem in the EU's external action* - Divergence of the Member States *Preference of national interests over international interests* *Lack of willingness to act together* *Lack of willingness of the EU Member States to take a common position towards the crisis* - Different securitisation moves - No clear Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) - Diverging threat perceptions - Desire of Member States to remain sovereignty - Absence of any strong CFSP statements - The independent conducting individual policies from Member States - Lack of effective decision-making procedures capable of overcoming dissent

Case study on the Lisbon Treaty *Changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to address the coherence problem in the EU's external action*	How effective have the changes been in addressing and improving the coherence of the EU's external action?
-New post of High Representative(HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security * Addressing the coherence problem by giving the HR the responsibility of coordinating all of the EU's external actions together with the Commission and combining the interests of the EU and Member States into one person. - **Recognition of the European Council as an official EU institution** * European Council was given the responsibility to determine the strategic interests and objectives of the EU for all its external actions. It became some sort of 'guarantor' of coherence of the EU's external action. → Giving one actor the responsibility to determine the objectives of the EU's external action eliminated the many actors that used to be involved and	- **High Representative** * Created more unity in the EU's external action through combining the interests of the EU and those of Member States * By giving the HR the responsibility to conduct the EU's foreign and security policy more unity was created and the number of different actors dealing with CFSP was decreased which improved the decision making process with regards to the CFSP * However, new position could give rise to new tensions at EU level * Future challenge: maintain competences and get all EU actors to speak with one voice in an environment in which Member States and EU institutions will always compete - **Recognition of the European Council**

improved the decision-making process. **- Creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS)** * Service was created with the intention of improving the coordination of the EU's responses to crises * EEAS will become an intermediary between all EU actors in order to improve cohesion between the different actors * established in to help ensure the EU has a coherent and effective foreign policy	- Has been an effective change as it the responsibility to determine the strategic interests and objectives of the EU for all its external action was given to one EU actor and thus eliminated the many actors that used to be involved and improved the decision-making process. - European Council motivated Member States to participate more actively in the policy decision-making area and are forced to make decisions at a faster speed. This allows the EU to react faster in i.e. crises. **- EEAS** * compromised officials from different, relevant departments which created more unity with regards to the EU's external action * great potential to bring together Member States and EU institutions in order to improve the EU's responses to crises * EEAS proved to be effective in certain areas as it already made significant progress in bringing Serbia closer to EU membership .Moreover, the service helped redefine policies towards count*ries that have been affected by the Arab awakening.* * *Future challenges:* Gaining trust and support from Member States in order to become a dynamic leader - Risk of friction and rivalry between the EEAS and the services of the Commission - the nationalism of Member States will create a major challenge to the functioning of the EEAS

Resources

Alcalde, J. (2008, June) *Revisiting coherence in EU foreign policy*. Hamburg review of social sciences, Volume 3, Issue 1.

Avery, G. (2011). *The EU's EAS: new actor on the scene.* European Policy Centre.

Babayan, N. (2010). *Now who answers the phone in Europe? Cooperation within the CFSP after the enlargement and the Lisbon Treaty.* Caucasian Review of International Affairs, vol.4, no. 4

Biscop, S. and Franco, A. (2008). *The Lisbon Treaty and ESDP: Transformation and integration.* Egmont papers, no.24

Blockmans, S. and Wessel, R. (2009)*The European Union and crisis management: Will the Lisbon Treaty make the EU more effective?* CLEER Working Papers.

Bretherton,C. and Vogler, J.(1999) *The EU as a global actor*. London: Routledge.

Cafruny, A. (1997) *The EU and the war in former Yugoslavia*. Great Britain: Kluwer Law International

Cavatorta, F. and Chari, R. (2003) *The Iraq War: Killing dreams of a Unified EU*. European Political Science, Volume 3, Issue 1.

Chase, P. (2011). *The EU's External Action Service: will it deliver?* Brussels Forum, 2011.

Ciascai, G. (2012). *The impact of the institutional innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon on the EU's external action.* Dimitrie University.

Ciceo, G. (2010) The *future CSDP. Can the Treaty of Lisbon strengthen the authority of the EU in this field?* L'Europe Unie no. 3-4.

Cremona, M.*(*2008) *Coherence through law: what difference will the Treaty of Lisbon make*? Hamburg review of social sciences, Volume 3, Issue 1.

Dagand, S. (2008). *The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP*. European Security
       Review, no. 37.

Dassú, M. (2002, September) *How to deal with the European perceptions.* (Paper prepared for the
       CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, 2002)

Denison, R. (2011) *The CFSP and the EU: reflections on the Libyan conflict.* University of North
Carolina.

Diedrichs, U. (2004)*The European Parliament in the CFSP: More than a marginal player*. The
       International Spectator, No. 4

Duke, S. (2006) *The Commission and the CFSP.* European Institute of Public Administration
       Working Paper, 2006, No. 1.

Duke, S. (2011, March) *The Lisbon Treaty Benchmarks and the European External Action Service:
       Coherence, efficiency and visibility and the EEAS.*(Paper presented at the European Union
       Studies Association Conference, Boston, Massachusetts)

Everts, S. and Keohane, D. (2003). *The European Convention and EU Foreign Policy: Learning
from failure.* Survival 45, no. 3.

Fischer,J. (2002) *Rede von Bandesaussenminister Fischer zur USA-Irak problematik.* Deutschen
       Bandestag 2002.

Gasper, J. (2009). *The quest for European Foreign Policy consistency and the Treaty of Lisbon.*
       United Kingdom: University of Cambridge

Grevi, G., Helly, D. and Keohane, D.(2009*) ESDP: The first 10 years*. European Union Institute for
       Security Studies.

Gross, E. and Rotta, A.(2011, June) *The EEAS and the Western Balkans*. IAI Working Papers,
       no.11.

Van Ham, P. (2004). *The EU's war over Iraq: the last wake-up call, in European Foreign Policy: From rhetoric to reality?* United Kingdom: Oxford.

Hemra, S.,Raines,T., Whitman, R. (2011). *A diplomatic entrepreneur. Making the most of the EEAS.* Chatham House Report.

Hertog, L. and Stross, S. (2011). *Policy coherence in the EU system.* Conference paper: "The EU as a global player"

House of Lords. (2005). *The further enlargement of the EU: threat or opportunity?* London: Authority of House of Lords.

Hursoy,J. (2010) *The European Union Foreign and Security Actions and the Western Balkans*. Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, Issue 1.

Juncos, A.(2005, November) *The EU's post-conflict intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Southeast European Politics, Vol. 6, No. 2.

Kaya, T. (2008) *A coherent and effective foreign and security policy for the EU?: The case of the Yugoslav crisis and the Iraq crisis.* Journal of Yasar University, Volume 3, No. 12

Kelly, S. and Avery, G. (2011). Op-ed: One year on: measuring the EEAS success. EU External Affairs Review.

Koehler, K. (2010*). European Foreign Policy after Lisbon: Strengthening the EU as an international actor.* Caucasian Review of International Affairs, vol.4, no.1.

Koenig, N. (2011) *The EU and the Libyan crisis: in quest of coherence?* The International Spectator, Vol. 46, No. 4.

Kramer, H. (2000)*The EU in the Balkans: another step toward European integration.* 2000 Journal of International Affairs , Volume 5, No. 3

Lamer, W. (2008) *Translatlantic Tensions.* Institute for the Study of America.

Laursen, F. (2010). *The EU as an international actor after the Treaty of Lisbon: an academic perspective.* Dalhausi EUCE occasional paper, no.9.

Lehne, S. (2011). *More action, better service. How to strengthen the EEAS.* Carnegie endowment for international peace report, 2011.

Margaras, V. (2010). *CSDP and the Lisbon Treaty fudge: no common strategic culture, no major progress.* European Policy Unites Network working paper, no. 28.

Menon, A. (2004) *From crisis to catharsis: ESDP after Iraq.* International Affairs Volume 4, Issue 80.

Missiroli, A. (2003) *EU, just a regional peace keeper?* European Foreign Affairs. Review 8, 4

Molina, P. (2003) '*Enlargement, coherence and development policy*' in Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués (eds.), Beyond Enlargement: The New Members and New Frontiers of the Enlarged European Union. Barcelona: Insitut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus).

Noya, J. (2003) *Irak y la opinion pública*, in: Bardaji, R.:Irak: *Reflexiones sobre una guerra*. Spain: Real Instituto el cano de Estudios Internacionales.

Peterson, J. (2004). *Keynote article: Europe, America, Iraq: worst ever, ever worsening?* Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 42

Portela,C. and Raube, K. (2009). *(In-)Coherence in EU Foreign Policy: Exploring sources and remedies.* (paper presented at the European Studies Association bi-annual convention, 2009)

Richardson, J.(2001) *European Union: power and policy making.* Great Britain: Routledge.

Rupnik, J. (2010, June) *The challenges of EU enlargement in the Balkans*. European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Santopinto, F. (2010). *The Lisbon enigma: crisis management and coherence in the EU*. NOREF Report, no. 7

Skoog, O. (2011). *EU CFSP – challenges and opportunities.* (n.d.)

Solana, J. (2003). *A secure Europe in a better world.* Thessaloniki: European Council.

Stahl, B. (2008) *Incoherent securitisation: The EU in the Iraq crisis.* Hamburg review of social sciences, Volume 3, Issue 1.

Treaty of Lisbon clears the way for a more efficient, more democratic and more secure European Union, 2009, October, Insight, p.1

Tulmets, E. (2008) *The European neighbourhood policy*. Hamburg review of social sciences, Volume 3, Issue 1.

Van Dijk, A. (2012). *The EU's Foreign Policy in the 2011 Libya conflict.* The Netherlands.

Versluys, H. (2007). *Coherence in EU external action: the case of humanitarian aid.* (Paper presented at the 10th biennial EUSA conference, 2007).

Wessels, W. and Bopp, F. (2008). *The institutional architecture of the CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty- Constitutional break through or challenges ahead?* Research paper no.10

Wilga, M. (2003). *CFSP and its Member States vis-à-vis the Iraq crisis*. (Paper prepared for 'Europa 'meeting, 2004).

Online sources

Akcadag, E.(2011,October 3) *Did Lisbon created hopes shattered in Libya?* Turkey:Bilgesam. Retrieved March 21,2012 from the Bilgesam website: www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=384:did-lisbon-created-hopes-shatter-in-libya&catid=70:ab-analizler&Itemid=131

Bianchi, E. (2010) *Italian Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans.* Retrieved March 21, 2012, from the Foreign Policy.it website: http://foreignpolicy.it/adon.pl?act=doc&doc=2680

Brljavac, B. (2011, October 5) *Constitutional changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: a failed Europeanization process*. Turkey: Turkish Review. Retrieved March 21, 2012 from the Turkish Review website:

www.turkishreview.org/tr/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=223126

Brljavac, B. (2011, October 12) *Europeanisation Process of Bosnia and Herzegovina : Responsibility of the European Union ?* Turkey: EurasiaReview. Retrieved March 21, 2012 from the EurasiaReview website: www.eurasiareview.com/12102011-bosnia%E2%80%99s-failing-europeanization-process-who-is-to-blame-analysis/

European Commission.(2010). *European Neighbourhood Policy*. Retrieved from the European Commission website:

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/neighbourhood_policy/index_en.htm

Fratini, F. (2003). *Interview with Franco Frattini, Italian Foreign Minister.* Retrieved May 25, 2012 from the Iraq Watch website:

http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/Italy/italy-mfa-frattini-032903.htm

Hellmeyer, M. (2012). *The EFPU Roundtable: The EEAS*. Retrieved June 5 from the LSE International Relations website:

http://lseinternationalrelations.wordpress.com/2012/03/22/efpu-roundtable-the-european-external-action-service/

Mahoney, H. (2010). *European Council seen as winner under Lisbon Treaty.* Retrieved June 5, 2012 from the EU observer website: http://euobserver.com/18/30142

Maigaard, F. (2011). *Prospects for a CFSP*. Retrieved June 5 from the Fair Observer website: http://www.fairobserver.com/article/prospects-common-european-foreign-policy

Reinsch, M. (2012). EFPU Roundtable: EU Foreign Policy after Lisbon: the view from the strategic partners. Retrieved June 5 from the LSE International Relations website: http://lseinternationalrelations.wordpress.com/2012/05/31/efpu-roundtable-eu-foreign-policy-after-lisbon-the-view-from-the-strategic-partners/

Stocker, S. (2011). Recent criticism of the HR reflects the unwillingness for an effective EU
    Foreign Policy, says Director of Eurostep. Retrieved June 11, 2012 from the Eurostep
    website: http://www.eurostep.org/wcm/eurostep-weekly/1560-recent-criticism-of-the-high-
    representative-reflects-the-unwillingness-for-an-effective-eu-foreign-policy-says-director-of-
    eurostep.html

Tengroth, J. (2011) *The Battle Group concept.* Sweden: Swedish Armed Forces. Retrieved March
    21, 2012 from the Swedish Armed Forces website:
    www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/Organisation/Nordic-Battlegroup/The-Battlegroup-concept/

Voltolini, B. (2012). EFPU Roundtable: Influencing the EU Foreign Policy process. Retrieved June
    5 from the LSE International Relations website:
    http://lseinternationalrelations.wordpress.com/2012/02/23/efpu-roundtable-influencing-the-
    eu-foreign-policy-process/