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# **Transatlantic War on Terrorism**

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## Executive Summary

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In its past, terrorism has evolved from old terrorism into new, even more catastrophic terrorism. Today, hundreds or even thousands of people can become victim from one moment to the other, through which the fear for terrorist attacks has increased a lot lately. Next to that, Europe has become much more attractive for terrorist attacks through several reasons. Europe is easy to enter for terrorist, Europe already has a lot of terrorist groups inside its borders, and NATO interventions can lead to anti-EU-terrorism, therefore it is important that the EU becomes a strong unity with one strong counter-terrorism policy.

As a response to the increased threat of terrorism, the EU has established an Internal Security Strategy and the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy. The Internal Security Strategy is made to “protect people and the values of freedom and democracy, so that everyone can enjoy their daily lives without fear” (European Council, March 2010, p. 12). The security model is built upon ten strategic guidelines with the emphasis on the EU-wide approach. The European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy has a strategic commitment: “to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice” (European Council, April 2005, p. 2). The strategy consists of four aspects that fit under its strategic commitment: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. Most important points within this strategy are to combat radicalisation and recruitment of terrorist, to reduce the vulnerability of targets to attack, to pursue terrorists across borders and to put an end to sources of terrorist financing (Europa, n.d.).

Also the United States developed a Counter Terrorism Strategy, namely America’s National Strategy for Counter Terrorism. This strategy is established with the goal to disrupt, dismantle and eventually defeat Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents to ensure the security of America’s citizens and interests (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011). The US uses core principles to guide their counterterrorism efforts. These principles are: adhering to US core values, building security partnerships, applying to counter-terrorism tools and capabilities appropriately, and building a culture of resilience.

When comparing the US Counterterrorism Strategy and the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy, it can be concluded that both strategies differ much from each other. The US and EU face different threats from (Islamic) terrorism, they have different perceptions about common threats and they use different tools and means in their combat against terrorism.

When comparing the statistics of both countries, it is noticeable that the US needs to deal with far less terrorist attacks than the EU. Looking at statistics of both countries, a significant decrease of terrorist attacks is noticeable since the establishment of the EU's Counter Terrorism Strategy. Therefore, the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy can be called an effective strategy, but in comparison with the US strategy, some improvements can be implemented, in order to create a truly effective strategy. These improvements consists of an increase in cohesion and cooperation between Member States, executing further extensive research, and further enhanced transatlantic cooperation.



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## 1. Introduction

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### 1.1 Problem Indication

Since the end of World War II, Europe has participated in several peace missions. The most current missions, were interventions in conflict areas like Syria, Mali, Iraq and Afghanistan, which provoked the risk of revenge attacks by Islamic militants. Nowadays, Europe is facing an increased risk of terrorist attacks in Europe from, in particular, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, North Africa countries and even from inside Europe itself (Crumley, B., 2010). As a consequence, people are becoming more and more afraid for this, so called, anti-EU-terrorism. These threats have a direct impact on the safety and stability of Europe and therefore it can be determined as security problems of the EU (Rettman, A., January 23, 2013).

As a response to these problems, the EU came up with the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy in 2005, in order to combat terrorism and make Europe safer, and later on the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) in 2010 to create security and stability in Europe. Both strategies provide guidelines for action in order to create a safer Europe. Nevertheless, the Counter Terrorism Strategy is already eight years old and meanwhile a lot has changed in Europe concerning their security situation. The EU has become more engaged with EU trainings missions and therefore, EU visibility has increased and thus they have become a target. It is of great importance that the EU is well prepared for possible attacks and therefore, Europe needs an effective security- and counter terrorism strategy (Rettman, A., January 23, 2013).

The same issues are on going in the United States. The US is the world's only superpower, through which it becomes vulnerable for animosity of other countries. The terrorist attack of 9/11 was the first time America was directly attacked by an outsider on its own soil, which showed that the US is a target. As a response, the US "tightened its immigration laws; increased the protection of its border, ports, and infrastructure; criminalized providing material support for terrorist groups; and tore down the wall between the intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies, which had crippled counterterrorist efforts for decades" (Sofaer, A.D., January/February 2010, p. 109). In 2011 they developed America's National Strategy for Counterterrorism, with the main aim to defeat Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011).

### 1.2 Problem Statement

Europe and the United States both need to deal with terrorist threats, through which they have security issues in common. It can be seen as two more or less similar problems. Nevertheless, they

have crucial differences. They both have created counterterrorism strategies with different main aims to be achieved. Especially their historical background and political approach on terrorism is in big contrast with each other. Therefore, this report aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the contrast between the European and American counter terrorism strategy. Nevertheless, the focus remains on Europe's strategy by looking at its effectiveness by the use of terrorism situation and trend reports. Therefore the research question of this report is as follows:

*Is the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy an effective policy when compared to the American National Strategy for Counter Terrorism?*

### 1.3 Research Questions

In order to answer the main question, a number of sub questions must be answered:

- What is the development of terrorism in Europe?

Within this sub-question a theoretical background will be given to understand the overall research better. First the definition of terrorism will be determined. After that, the history of terrorism and the change from old terrorism to new terrorism will be explained. Furthermore the growing fear for terrorist attacks will be clarified and the current battle against terrorism will be given.

- What is the current internal debate on security?

This chapter will discuss the internal debate in Europe about security, with the main focus on terrorism. To describe this debate, two current conflict situations, which provoked revenge attacks against the EU, will be explained. Therefore, the Mali Crisis and the Syrian Conflict are used, because of the fact that these conflicts are very current issues and because of the fact that within the EU the opinions are divided about these issues.

- What is the policy context of Europe's Counter Terrorism Strategy?

This chapter will provide an overview of Europe's policy in the field of terrorism. This overview is based on two reports: the Internal Security Strategy of the EU and the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy. The ISS will be used to give a clear overview of Europe's security policy in general and the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy will be used to describe the steps taken to combat terrorism and make Europe safer. After the description of both of these strategies, a discussion will follow.



- What is the policy context of America's National Strategy for Counterterrorism?

This chapter will provide an overview of America's policy in the field of terrorism.

- What is the contrast between Europe's counter-terrorism strategy and America's national strategy for counterterrorism?

In this chapter a comparison will be made between the counter terrorism strategy of Europe and the United States. This chapter provides an analysis about the differences between the European Strategy and America's strategy. The specific comparison with the US has been chosen because it is a western state, like Europe, and the terrorism issues in this country, in past and present, are enormous since 9/11. Nevertheless, on historical and institutional level concerning security, Europe and the US differ much from each other. These differences will be discussed in this chapter.

- Are there points of improvement to create a truly effective policy?

In this chapter points of improvements will be given based on the earlier executed research. Therefore, Europol's EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report from 2007 and 2012 will be used. The data from these reports will be compared with US data on this subject. After that, points of improvement will be given.

#### **1.4 Research Methodology**

The intention of this compare-and-contrast research is to assess the effectiveness of the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy compared to America's National Strategy for Counterterrorism. The research method chosen is the "lens comparison", in which the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy weights more heavily than America's National Strategy for Counterterrorism. So America's strategy is actually used as a "lens" through which Europe's strategy will be viewed. The lens comparison is useful in this case for assessing the effectiveness of Europe's strategy that, before this analysis, seemed perfectly understood (Walk, K., 1998).

Lens comparisons provide the opportunity to do a detailed research of two reports in which just one will be extensively examined, which will be in this case the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy. Therefore, a description will be given of the policy context of the Internal Security Strategy and the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy, and also of America's National Strategy for Counterterrorism. After these policy context descriptions, a discussion will follow about the

differences and similarities between the two strategies. In the last chapter, points of improvement will be given (if necessary), by the use of statistics from Europol, as a measuring tool.

This research consists of desk research in which the analysis will be based upon the following reports:

- European Council. (April 2005). *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*.
- European Council. (March 2010). *Internal security strategy for the European Union. Towards a European Security Model*.
- Europol, (March 2007). *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007*.
- Europol, (2012). *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2012*.
- National Strategy for Counterterrorism. (June 2011).

Furthermore, to understand the concept of terrorism, the following books have been used:

- Crenshaw, M. & Pimlott, J. (1997) *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism*. Armonck, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
- Muller, E.R., Rosenthal, U. & Wijk, de R. (2008) *Terrorisme*. Studies over Terrorisme en Terrorismebestrijding. Deventer: Kluwer
- Rosenthal, U. & Muller, E.R. (2007) *The Evil of Terrorism*. Diagnosis and Countermeasures. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas
- Siegel, L. (2009) *Criminology*. Belmont, California: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Sofaer, A.D. (January/February 2010) *Foreign Affairs Vol.89 No.1*. The Best Defense? Preventive Force and International Security
- Whittaker, D.J. (2004) *Terrorist and Terrorism in the Contemporary World*. New York: Routledge.

## **2. Development of Terrorism in Europe**

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### **2.1. Definition of Terrorism**

Before the development of terrorism can be described, it must be defined what the definition of terrorism is. It is a difficult issue because some people see an assault as terrorism, but others see it as the only solution to get justice. One person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. So what precisely is terrorism? (Crenshaw & Pimlott, 1997). Over time, the definition of terrorism has changed. When it was introduced for the first time in 1795 in France, during the period of Reign of Terror, terrorism was defined as systematic use of terror as a policy. Later, in 1937 the League of Nations defined terrorism as "all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public" (Siegel, L., 2009, p. 328).

There are more examples of terrorism definitions. This variety is a consequence of the different perspectives used. In appendix one an analysis can be found about an enumeration of terrorism definitions made by the American National Criminal Justice Reference Service. Authorities have different views than onlookers and victims have different views than terrorists themselves. So whether someone can be called a terrorist, heavily depend upon the view of those who would define. In order to be able to make a distinction between a person's view of terrorist or a person's view of a freedom fighter, a short definition for both has been given. Roughly said, a terrorist target civilians and a freedom fighter "conducts a campaign to liberate his people from dictatorial oppression, gross disarmament, or the grip of an occupying power" (Whittaker, D.J., 2004, p. 4). So the terrorist can be regarded as a criminal, regardless of motivation, whether the freedom fighter is devoted to an inescapable struggle from oppression. The terrorist can be distinguished from the others by its choice of target and the mode of activity. (Whittaker, D.J., 2004). This view will be used in this research report.

Based on the information above, this report will maintain the definition as stated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). They see terrorism as an outrage that has been planned in advance, is conducted to achieve political change, is directed against civilians, and is the work of a group.

### **2.2 History of Terrorism**

It is important to describe the history of terrorism in order to be able to understand current and future events. When looking back at past terrorist events, it is easier to discover characteristics and the significances of nowadays terrorism.

Over time, terrorism always has existed. For example, the specific murder campaigns of the Assassins in the early Middle Ages and the mobilization of with plague infected soldiers and civilians during sieges. However, the term terrorism was for the first time introduced in 1795. At that time in France there was a reign of terror: 'La régime de la terreur'. In this period there were a lot of state enemies executed. These violent revolutionary acts were soon described as terrorist acts. The revolutionaries saw terror as an instrument of governance. "It would confer virtue, justice and a sense of order upon citizens, promoting and defending the Right against the Wrong" (Whittaker, D.J., 2004, p. 20).

Hundred years after the French Revolution terrorism occurred in Tsarist Russia. A group of Russian students and intellectuals fought against the Tsarist autocracy and corruption. They thought that only violent subversion would fight state denial and freedom. This group of terrorists was willing to kill the Tsar if that was necessary, they would see it as a small price to pay. However, they did not want to shed blood unnecessarily, if possible they wanted to stay humane. Nevertheless, their planned activities failed and the unrest disappeared until the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 (which cannot be called a revolution of terror, for that reason it will not be included in this research).

In the beginning of the twentieth century the focus shifted towards the east and the south of Europe. In the first decade of this century the tension within the Ottoman Empire and Habsburg Empire increased. Violence was the strategy for Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek and Turkish nationalists. A decade later, after the termination of the First World War, dissatisfaction led to violence in the hope to achieve political change. Meanwhile forceful methods, which violated the basic human rights, became the rule in for example Germany, Italy and Poland. By the time radio and 24-hour printing machinery were used for terrorist purposes, terrorism received the name techno-terrorism. Because of the defeatism and economic slump in the 1930s, terrorism increased dramatically and it became an instrument of state power. The Second World War knew no boundaries. It was a war of total terror. (Whittaker, D.J., 2004).

Since the 1970s, groups like the RAF, the Moluccans, the ETA and the IRA determined the terrorist climate in Europe. Hijackings, attacks and bombings were the strategy for the groups to get attention for political or religious goal they pursued.

### **2.3 Old and New Terrorism**

The changes terrorism has undergone in its history have evolved it from old terrorism into new terrorism. There is a clear distinction between those two forms of terrorism.

The old form of terrorism, which is not used a lot anymore, is called classic terrorism. This form of terrorism is being executed by recognizable organizations like the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom). These organizations are focused on specific objectives. They pursue a maximal effect by threatening, however they want to limit the use of lethal violence. They often chose vital objects as target and they try to strike at symbolic moments on the calendar. They have a national focus and they want to obtain success on short term. These terrorist organizations are claiming an area or region of a sovereign state. A good example for old terrorism is the hijacking in 1975 and 1977 in the Netherlands by a South-Moluccan group. During this hijack the terrorists shot two hostages dead in the first days. In 1977 a more or less same scenario occurred. The reason behind this assault was the fact that the Dutch government had promised the Moluccan their own state in the Moluccas, but eventually the Dutch government did not fulfil her promise. As a reaction some of the Moluccans radicalize (Rosenthal, U. & Muller, E.R., 2007).

There are also terrorist groups who want or wanted to achieve an ideological revolution: the RAF and the Brigade Rosse. To bring their objectives into the spotlight, terrorist groups who execute old terrorism use despicable methods: targeted killings of public persons, hostage taking, hijacking and kidnapping. However, the terrorists prefer not to kill citizens but to use them solely as a negotiation method. After all they prefer “a lot of people watching than a lot of them dead” (Rosenthal, U. & Muller, E.R., 2007, p. 5). However, this form of terrorism is not used a lot anymore.

According to Erwin Muller (Professor of Security and Justice) and Uri Rosenthal (Minister of Foreign Affairs) new terrorism, also known as catastrophic terrorism, has as a pervasive characteristic: the catastrophic extent of the suffering caused. In these cases hundreds or even thousands of people can be victim from one moment to the other. The best example of new terrorism is the attacks of 9/11 in the United States, where two airplanes flew into the Twin Towers and one airplane into the Pentagon. Nevertheless, this is not an example of an attack on European soil. Exactly 911 days after 9/11, Madrid (Spain) was victim of catastrophic terrorism. The city was attacked on March 11, 2004 with several explosions in four trains. Nearly 200 people died and there were more than 1500 people injured. Another example is July 7, 2005. Three subway trains and one bus are blown up in London. In total 56 people died and there were more than 700 people injured. Suicide terrorists executed this attack. A few days later the police shot an innocent man to death in the London subway, because he was being seen as a terrorist. Of course there are much more examples of these catastrophic terrorist attacks, but the attacks in Madrid were the first confrontation with catastrophic terrorism in Western Europe. Directly after the attacks of March 11

it was emphasized that the attractiveness of Europe for the execution of catastrophic terrorist attacks was bigger than Europeans thought before. Also the attacks in London confirmed the suspicion that catastrophic terrorist attacks were coming closer. Moreover, the attacks even seem to be the work of '*home grown*' terrorists, people who were not different from the ones the citizens were living and working with. They had not even noticed the radical ideas and beliefs of these terrorists. When the British realized '*they are really among us*', the fear was growing even more (Muller, E.R., Rosenthal, U. & Wijk, de R., 2008, p. 16).

## **2.4 The Increased Fear for Terrorist Attacks**

Since 9/11 Europe has become much more attractive for terrorism. There are multiple reasons for the increase of attractiveness lately. One of these reasons is that Europe is easy to enter. Europe is accessible through land from the Middle East and there are a lot of private and public ways of transport. Next to that, in various European countries Islamic terrorist groups can count on sympathy from certain parts of the Muslim society. In this society there is even a growing number of Muslims who are sensitive for ideas of fundamentalist ideologies and their followers. So attacking Europe has become a good alternative for groups like Al Qaida, instead of America where it has become too difficult to execute attacks.

Another point of concern is the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty organization's (NATO) has intervened in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Libya. Their central role "has raised the incentive for terrorists to strike back at Germany, France, and Britain" (Choe, J., August 6, 2007, Paragraph 2). These countries are big targets due to their support for the wars against terrorism. For example Britain's support for the Iraq war makes it a big target, the same goes for Spain and Italy. These three countries already felt the threat for attacks. Think of the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the attacks on the London subway in 2005. Also Italy arrested already three people who were suspected of operating a terrorist training school. Currently France is at risk due to their intervention in Mali this year. The terrorists do not appreciate these kinds of peace missions performed by Europe. As a reaction, Europe is threatened with revenge attacks, also called anti-EU-terrorism. Moreover there are complaints about Europe's effort to fight this anti-EU-terrorism. There are concerns about the lack of cohesion among EU member states, now that cooperation is crucial. Once terrorists reach European soil, they can move freely through European borders. Though domestic intelligence agencies prefer not to share information with other EU member states. A good example of this unwillingness was shown with the European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, when only seven out of thirty-nine countries approved it (Choe, J., August 6, 2007).

Another reason for the growth of fear arose from the fact that the terrorist groups who performed

old terrorism are likely to change their way of approach to catastrophic terrorism. This is a very big risk of modern days, because organizations like the ETA must have noticed that catastrophic terrorism more or less guarantees unlimited attention from the media, the authorities and the population. If the change from old to new terrorism appears to be true, the risk for the future will be the used methods from radical movements, like extremist animal activism, anti-globalism, and anti-technology fanaticism. The risk will not be in what the radical movements want to achieve, but the risk will be in the terrorist methods they want to use. These methods can become catastrophic terrorist methods (Muller, E.R., Rosenthal, U. & Wijk, de R., 2008).

## **2.5 The War Against Terrorism**

Governments all over the world want to fight terrorism. The first international counter terrorism conference was held already in 1937. Over time, more conferences followed. Despite all the effort to establish one international anti-terrorism treaty, nobody succeeded yet. Until now, it was not possible to come to an agreement, also because of the fact that everybody thinks of terrorism as a different phenomenon.

When looking at the cooperation between Europe and North America, it can be concluded that in general European's are not very willing to follow the path of the American's in their counterterrorism approach. The Europeans want to rely more on police work and intelligence, and not so much on military operations like the American's do. The European Union does not agree with some US decisions, especially the imprisonment of suspects at Guantanamo Bay, and the use of top-secret CIA prisons to interrogate high-level suspects (these points will be further explained in the following chapters). These points of disagreement hinder the transatlantic cooperation (Choe, J., August 6, 2007).

## **2.6 Conclusion**

To conclude the development of terrorism, it is clear that terrorism has a long history with a lot of misconceptions and ambiguities. First of all it is not that simple to define its conclusion. Over time, society looked different at terrorism, so as a consequence its definition changed. Next to that, different people have different perspectives. In order to maintain the most neutral definition, the definition used in this research will be the CIA's definition of terrorism: Terrorism is an outrage that has been planned in advance, is conducted to achieve political change, is directed against civilians, and is the work of a group.

The history of terrorism has told us something about the characteristics and the significances of today's terrorism. Over time terrorist acts became more and more catastrophic. Old terrorism transformed into new/catastrophic terrorism. With new terrorism, hundreds or thousands of people

can be victim from one moment to the other.

All together, the fear for terrorist attacks has increased a lot lately. Europe has become much more attractive for terrorist attacks than before. Europe is easier to enter than the USA and there is an increasing number of Muslim citizens in Europe who are sensitive for ideas of fundamentalist ideologies and their followers. Also the fact that the NATO has intervened in conflict areas like Afghanistan and Iraq cause for uncertainty and fear, because these interventions have raised the incentive for terrorists to execute anti-EU-terrorism. Another point of concern lays in the used methods from radical movements. If they change their methods from old terrorism into new terrorism, the risk of catastrophic events will be even bigger.

In order to resolve these threats, good cooperation between states and countries is necessary. Nevertheless, the existing cooperation is not as successful as it should be. As long as countries do not agree with each other, terrorism will remain as it is today, and the threats will only increase.



### 3. Europe's Internal Debate on Security

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#### 3.1 Introduction

In order to be able to determine the effectiveness of the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy, it is necessary to take a closer look at the internal situation of Europe concerning counter terrorism. It is important to know how the Member States deal with the fight against terrorism. When looking at Europe's internal debate on terrorism it can be said that the discussion is often about the disunity of the European Union (The European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2006). The fight against terrorism is primarily the responsibility of the EU Member States, consequently the role of the European Union in the field of counter-terrorism is more focussed upon the coordination between the Member States' national policies (Gargantini, G., 2011). Moreover, every EU Member State has its own counter-terrorism policy. For example, the issue of radicalization is handled very differently in every EU Member State. In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, much of the policy attention goes to radicalization and there is a lot of attention for informing the general public about terrorism. In contradiction with other EU Member States, these two countries both want to prevent radicalization from taking place. Therefore, they both want to intervene at an early stage of the process. This attention is much less in the national policies of France, Germany and Italy. (Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum., 2006). These differences go much further. The EU Member States still have a lot of different opinions about common issues and make decisions as individualistic states. This disunity originated from the great wars in Europe's history. The existing bipolar world order during the Cold War was replaced by a multipolar world order in the post-cold-war period. Also in Europe a multipolar order emerged, which made disorder more realistic (The European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2006) and brought disunity over Europe's conception of global security (Leonard, M., October 14, 2013). This chapter will provide examples of the existing disunity in Europe on security. Every Member State wants to keep Europe safe from terrorist attacks, however not everybody believes that this is obtainable in the same way. Examples will be given of current missions executed by EU Member States, which caused for a threat increase of anti-EU-attacks.

#### 3.1 Mali Crisis

On January 16, 2012, a conflict emerged between several rebellious groups and the Malian government. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) wanted more independence for Azawad, an area in northern Mali. On April 2012, the MNLA had taken control of Azawad, in order to create an independent homeland for the Tuareg people. Islamist groups like Ansar Dine initially supported the MNLA. However, cooperation was struggling due to different visions, especially when, after a while, the Islamist groups put strict Sharia law into practice. On

July 17, 2012, the MNLA had lost the control to the Islamist groups like the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, a splinter group of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Sawers-Diggins, L., January 30, 2012). When the Mali government asked for foreign military aid, the French military agreed to intervene and to support Bamako's counter-offensive against Al-Qaeda-linked fighters, who were moving toward Mali's capitol (Aljazeera, January 11, 2013). The decision to assist in this conflict was not the decision of a unified Europe. The NATO was not relevant in this crisis, although it should have a role in this decision. France as a sovereign state decided to give Mali the help they needed, whereas "the EU as a whole seemed to have lost its appetite for political and military involvement beyond funding contingents of African troops and setting up a training mission to help the Malian army reconstruct itself" (Pierini, M., February 8, 2013, paragraph 11). When looking at the EU defence and security cooperation, only the "big three" (France, UK and Germany) have considerable military capabilities. However, Germany remains reluctant to deployment of troops, as the Federal Minister of Defence, Thomas de Maizière, had stated in his speech on the Occasion of the 49th Munich Security Conference (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, February 1, 2013), so actually Europe can only count on two substantial armies when it comes to EU defence and security operations. According to Marc Pierini (a visiting scholar at Carnegie endowment for international peace, EU diplomat from 1976 to 2012, the first coordinator for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and counsellor in the cabinet of two European commissioners), "unless EU political leaders revise their thinking—Germany on foreign intervention, the UK on whether it belongs to the EU, and the "big three" on whether they want a strong foreign and security policy leadership in Brussels—the Mali crisis illustrates a simple fact: there is very little prospect for a comprehensive EU security policy in the short and medium term" (Pierini, M., February 8, 2013, paragraph 16).

### **3.2 Syrian Conflict**

The Syrian civil war started on March 15, 2011, with demonstrations, which were part of the Middle Eastern protest movement called Arab Spring. The aim of these demonstrations was the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian army had the task to suppress the uprising and they were allowed to shoot the protesters. In April 2011, the protesters turned into an armed rebellion. Late 2012, the influence of the Islamist group Jabhat al-Nusra grew within the armed rebellion and on the other side Hezbollah started to support the Syrian army (Syria Deeply, January 16, 2013). The war's death toll is now updated to approximately 100,000 people (Black, I., June 13, 2013). The EU and other countries condemned the actions of Assad against the protesters. However, like the Mali conflict, the EU did not make a unified decision on the Syria conflict. Whether to intervene or not, or whether to arm the Syrian rebels or not, were decisions which highlighted the disunity within the EU. About these issues the EU ministers actually agreed to disagree, through which all the 27 Member States were free to decide whether to supply the Syrian

rebels or not. There were a lot of different opinions about this issue. For example, the Austrian Foreign Minister Michael Spindelegger did not agree with the deal. He said, “We are a peace movement and not a war movement” (EU Business, May 28, 2013, paragraph 7). The Belgian Foreign Minister Didier Reynders called it “not a real European solution” (EU Business, May 28, 2013, paragraph 8). On the contrary, Vivien Perusot at the Brussels-based IFRI think-tank said the deal “highlights the limits of EU diplomacy. Member States want freedom of action but also EU legitimacy” (EU Business, May 28, 2013, paragraph 13). France and Great-Britain believe that with the threat to arm the Syrian rebellion, they send a political message to President Assad that they do not approve of his regime and that the EU wants to seek a joint solution to the Syrian conflict. Moreover, according to the London's Daily Telegraph's defense editor Con Coughlin, “Each state having its own policy is hardly the kind of decisive policy-making that will persuade the Assad gang that their days are numbered” (EU Business, May 28, 2013, paragraph 15). These decisions clearly display Europe's disunity on the area of security.

### 3.3 Conclusion

In conclusion it can be said that Europe's internal debate is about the disunity within the EU. Apart from the cooperation between intergovernmental institutions like Europol, Eurojust and the European Border Agency, for which effective coordination and cooperation is ensured by COSI (Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security), the EU Member States still want to make decisions on their own as sovereign states, especially when it comes to military intervention. This impedes international cooperation and cohesion. The Mali crisis and the Syrian conflict mentioned above are examples of this specific decision-making situation in the EU. Nevertheless, it would be wise if there arose more cooperation and cohesion within the EU because of the fact that interventions in Mali, Iraq and Afghanistan can have consequences. Anti-EU-attacks are likely to occur and in that case it would be better to be a strong unity with one strong clear policy. Because although the EU as an entity does not experience a specific terrorist threat, the EU should keep in mind that some “Member States are perceived as enemies of Islam and designated as ‘legitimate’ targets due to their involvement in Iraq or in Afghanistan or to specific factors such as the law banning the Islamic veil in France schools” (Europol, December 2, 2004, p.4). As shown in the examples above, the EU Member States want to stay individual European countries, which make them more vulnerable. “The vulnerability of individual European countries makes them so interdependent that none of them can effectively protect their citizens on their own” (Lugna, L., 2006, p.105). The Schengen agreement caused for the fact that the threat of an attack can happen everywhere, within the borderless area. So every state is under the threat of attack, therefore they all must work together to stop the next one.

## **4. The Policy Context of Europe's Counter-Terrorism Strategy**

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### **4.1 Introduction**

According to the European Council, security is one of the main priorities within the European Union and since the increase of crime related risks and threats this security is endangered. Criminal groups undermine the values and prosperity of our open societies. Therefore the European Union created the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) in order to be able to guarantee security and stability in Europe (European Council, March 2010). Following the attacks in Madrid and London, a specific counter-terrorism strategy was established in 2005. With this strategy the European Union wants to combat terrorism and make Europe safer (European Council, April 2005). This chapter will provide an outline of Europe's counter-terrorism policy, by using first the ISS to give a clear overview of Europe's security policy in general, and after that by using the EU counter-terrorism strategy. After each Strategy description a short discussion will follow. This discussion will be further discussed in chapter six of this research.

### **4.2 Internal Security Strategy for the European Union**

The ISS is aimed to integrate existing strategies and conceptual approaches and the ISS is responsive to the context of the Stockholm program. "It is designed to prevent crimes and increase the capacity to provide a timely and appropriate response to natural and man-made disasters through effective development and management of adequate instruments" (European Council, March 2010, p. 9).

Economic growth, before the financial crisis, and the opportunities in a free and democratic union created a prosperous society. However, these freedoms cause for increased risks, as terrorists and other criminals are capable of abusing these freedoms. Therefore, security has become a key factor in the lives of Europe's citizens. Zero risk is not feasible, but the European Union must create a safe environment in which people feel protected. This can be seen as the ISS's vision, "protecting people and the values of freedom and democracy, so that everyone can enjoy their daily lives without fear" (European Council, March 2010, p. 12). Moreover the Internal Security Strategy indicates the common threats and challenges that the EU must face, describes the EU's common internal security policy and it defines a European security model (European Council, March 2010).

When focusing more on the approach of the ISS against Europe's common threats, it can be seen that terrorism is a main challenge. Terrorists have no respect for human life and democratic values. It is a continuously evolving threat to Europe's security due to its global reach, its dangerous consequences, its ability to recruit through radicalization, the distribution of propaganda over the

Internet and the different ways by which it is financed. As a response to this challenge, cooperation between Member States is necessary next to all the own national security policies and strategies of the EU Member States. Examples are the *Centre de Cooperation Policière et Douanière* in Luxembourg, the *Salzburg Forum* and the *Baltic Sea Task Force* (including non-EU members). Moreover, an EU-wide approach is more important, since terrorists can move freely within the Schengen area. This is necessary so that national borders, different legislation, dissimilar languages and ways of working do not hinder progress in stopping cross-border terrorism. Recently, the EU already has made a lot of progress due to the increased law-enforcement and judicial cooperation. To simplify cooperation between Member States, a lot of instruments are developed. The most important instruments can be found in Appendix 2 (European Council, March 2010).

In general, to prevent and fight terrorism, the ISS makes a lot of use from EU agencies like Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and the counterterrorism coordinator. These agencies produce frequently threat assessments. Next to that, work programs have been developed in order to be able to report the concerns of citizens and the risks they are facing in a methodical way. Furthermore, special instruments are used for the exchange of information and to enable joint investigations and operations. Examples are the European Arrest Warrant, the Schengen information system and networks, the use of DNA and fingerprint data, and joint operations and investigation teams (European Council, March 2010).

In order to fulfil the ISS's main aim, common tools and policies need to be developed to tackle common threats and risks using a more integrated approach. This approach exists of the principles that can be found in Appendix 3. These principles are used as the basis for the ten strategic guidelines for action in order to guarantee the EU's internal security over the coming years:

I. A wide and comprehensive approach to internal security

To achieve a safe and secure Europe, the use of horizontal and vertical dimensions is important. The horizontal dimension of security consists of support of judicial cooperation, civil protection agencies and also of the political, economic, financial, social and private sectors, including NGO's. The vertical dimension consists of international cooperation, EU-level security policies and initiatives, regional cooperation between Member States and Member States' own national, regional and local policies (European Council, March 2010).

II. Ensuring the effective democratic and judicial supervision of security activities

The involvement of the European Parliament and national parliaments has greatly increased (European Council, March 2010).

### III. Prevention and anticipation: a proactive, intelligence-led approach

Effective prosecution of perpetrators is essential, however a stronger focus will be put on the prevention of terrorist attacks, which can help to reduce consequent human or psychological damage. Therefore a proactive and intelligence-led approach is needed as well as acquiring all the evidence, because successful legal action is only possible when all necessary information is available. Also the development and improvement of prevention mechanisms, such as analytical tools or early-warning systems, is necessary. Also the European passenger names record (PNR) is a good tool, which ensures a high level of data protection. Moreover, it is important to be one step ahead of the terrorists, in that way it is easier to anticipate what might happen. Then it is possible to address the root causes, and not just the consequences of the attacks. Therefore security policies must cooperate with other sectors like educational institutions, the private sector and civil society organizations, in order to prevent these sectors from terrorism (European Council, March 2010).

### IV. Development of a comprehensive model for information exchange

Strengthen the instruments that build mutual trust between the authorities responsible for safeguarding security in the EU must be continued. In this way, the exchange of information between Member States is ensured through an information exchange model, which must always respect the right to privacy and protection of personal data (European Council, March 2010).

### V. Operational cooperation

The Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI), is based on national and EU threat assessments and priorities. Their main activity is to ensure effective coordination and cooperation between specific authorities, like Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, CEPOL and Sitcen (European Council, March 2010).

### VI. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters

Member States' judicial authorities must effectively cooperate. Within this cooperation Eurojust must play a major role in maintaining security (European Council, March 2010).

### VII. Integrated border management

Integrated border management plays a major role in preserving security. The European border surveillance system (Eurosir) will develop even further and the cooperation and coordination of Frontex and other EU agencies will be further extended. Also new technologies are very important for the security of Europe's borders. Mechanisms like automated systems, advance registration and frequent-traveller schemes improve Europe's border security by carrying out the most necessary controls. To achieve improved integrated border management, close cooperation between law-

enforcement and border-control authorities is essential. Also the Visa Code, the Schengen information system and electronic border-control systems, like an exit-entry system, should improve even further (European Council, March 2010).

#### VIII. A commitment to innovation and training

Working together is very important in the field of technology. Promoting and developing new technologies through a common approach, will help the EU in developing technological standards and platforms customized to its security needs. Also professional training in Europe should be developed and encouraged further. “Highly trained European professionals sharing a similar culture will add value in the context of competition in a globalized society, as well as in the field of security” (European Council, March 2010, p. 28).

#### IX. External dimension of internal security/cooperation with third countries

International cooperation is important to safeguard the security of European citizens abroad. Building relationships with third countries can cause for opportunities for dialogue about mutual interest, concerns and the possibility of cooperation. Also the cooperation and coordination with international law enforcement organizations like Interpol should be improved. Next to that, special attention should be paid to ‘weak and failed states’ so that they do not become centres of organized crime or terrorism (European Council, March 2010).

#### X. Flexibility to adapt to future challenges

It is necessary to have a “broad, pragmatic and realistic approach”, which adapts constantly to changing circumstances (European Council, March 2010).

### **4.3 Discussion of the ISS**

The catastrophic events in Norway in July 2011, executed by Anders Breivik, show that the Internal Security Strategy does not yet function to its highest potential. Over time, situations change a lot like mentioned in the tenth strategic guideline. The increase of lone actors, home grown terrorism and radicalisation of EU citizens is nowadays a new source of concern (which will be further discussed in chapter 6 of this research). Therefore it is important that the EU always should stay ahead of new developments in this specific area (European Commission, November 25, 2011). Furthermore there are some critiques about the integration of the ISS and whether the strategy is clear enough or remains too vague. According to Félix Arteaga, a senior analyst for security and defence, “the aim is to make police and judicial cooperation on criminal matters a policy, but it remains to be seen if this will happen, if it will be just another policy and which of them will be under the control of member states, the Commission or the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” (Arteaga, F., 2010, paragraph 25).

#### **4.4 The European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy**

The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy can give a clearer view of Europe's actions against the threat of terrorism. The Strategy's strategic commitment is as follows: "combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice" (European Council, April 2005, p. 2). This Strategy is focused on four aspects that will fit under its strategic commitment: prevent, protect, pursue and respond, which will be further explained later on in this chapter.

The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy states that the Member States have the primary responsibility of combating terrorism (article 4 of the Treaty of Lisbon) and the EU can only add value to this combat, by strengthening national capabilities, facilitating European cooperation, developing collective capability and promoting international partnership. The EU wants to strengthen national capabilities by sharing knowledge and experience, so that it becomes easier to fight terrorism. Next to that the EU wants to facilitate European cooperation by working together and sharing information safely between Member States and institutions. They also want to activate and evaluate mechanisms that can lead to facilitation of cooperation between Member States, but also between police and judicial authorities. The EU also wants to develop collective capability in order to make a policy against the threat of terrorism. Hereby one must make best use of the capabilities of EU agencies like Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, MIC and SitCen. At last, the EU want to add value to the fight against terrorism, by promoting international partnership because it is important that Europe cooperates with organizations outside the EU, in particular the United Nations but also other organizations and third countries. This makes it easier to achieve international agreement and in that way it is possible to strengthen Europe's capacity and cooperation addressed to counter-terrorism (European Council, April 2005).

Furthermore, the European Council must always have political oversight and the European Council, Parliament and Commission must execute a high level of political dialogue on counter-terrorism. Next to that the Comité des Représentants Permanents (COREPER) should monitor the progress on the Strategy with regular follow-up and updates by the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the commission. In addition these above-mentioned measure contribute to the four aspects: prevent, protect, pursue and respond (European Council, April 2005).

##### **4.4.1 Prevent**

To keep people from joining terrorist groups, the EU established a strategy and a plan of action to combat radicalization and the recruitment for groups like Al Qaeda. The EU has a main focus on these points in the strategy, because they believe that radicalization and recruitment is the main threat for the Union nowadays. Terrorism is not justified and the majority of society does not



accept extreme ideologies. Nevertheless, it is just those few people who do accept it and join terrorist groups. It is very important to determine what the motives are behind the decision to become involved in terrorism. Therefore, the EU must analyse and identify methods, propaganda and the conditions why people join terrorist groups in order to be able to combat terrorism (European Council, April 2005).

Combating radicalization and terrorist recruitment is mainly a task for the Member States on national, regional and local level. Though, the EU will assist the Member States with, for example, the coordination of national policies, sharing information and the determination of a good approach. Nevertheless, the challenge is beyond the control of the governments and that is why also Europe's citizens should fully devote to this challenge (European Council, April 2005).

Because of the current globalization, it has become easier for terrorist to execute their actions. Travelling has become easier and the same goes for making money and communication transfers. Therefore, radical ideas and trainings are easier to approach than before. This kind of behaviour must be noticed using community policing and monitoring travel to conflict zones. It is also important to disrupt this behaviour by, for example, the prevention of people who want to access terrorist trainings, the development of a strong legal framework to prevent incitement and recruitment and we must evaluate how we can disturb terrorist recruitment by the Internet. The EU also wants to tackle radicalization and recruitment through cooperate internationally, using cooperation and assistance programs with third countries and using international organizations (European Council, April 2005).

Another problem is the propaganda with a special extremist worldview. When people see this often, violence becomes justified. This kind of propaganda incites conflict because it would be alleged evidence of a clash between West and Islam. To address this, mainstream opinions should prevail over those of the extremists. Next to that, it is necessary to get our own message across more effectively, to change the perception of national and European policies. Our own policy should not exacerbate division (European Council, April 2005).

There are different conditions in society which can cause for the fact that individualists can radicalize more easily. Causes can be poor or autocratic governance, quick but unmanaged modernization, a lack of political or economic prospects or through a lack of educational opportunities. In Europe, these causes are in general not present. That is why outside the Union, the focus should be more on human rights, democracy, education and economic prosperity and we should act more in conflict areas. Also, we should concern more about inequalities and

discrimination and we should promote intercultural dialogue and long term integration where appropriate (European Council, April 2005).

#### **4.4.2 Protect**

Protection is the second key part of the strategy. Key targets should be better protected through reducing their vulnerability for attacks. Member States have the main responsibility for improving the protection for key targets and the EU is responsible for the interdependence of border security, transport and other cross-border infrastructure. In areas where EU-level security regimes exist, like border and transport security, the EU and in particular the European Commission played a very important role in raising standards (European Council, April 2005).

The protection of our external borders should increase, in order to make it more difficult for terrorists to enter our country. Improvements in technology are needed to capture and exchange passenger information and to include biometric information in identity- and travel documents. This will lead to an increased effectiveness of our border controls and it will cause for more insurance for Europe's society. The European Borders Agency (Frontex) will provide risk assessments to strengthen the controls and surveillance for Europe's external borders even further. The establishment of the Visa Information System and the second generation Schengen Information System will ensure that the authorities have access to important information and they will be able to share this information. As a consequence it is possible to refuse (if necessary) access to the Schengen area (European Council, April 2005).

Furthermore, we should cooperate to raise standards for the security of transport. In this manner, it is possible to deter terrorist attacks and the vulnerability of transport operations. These measures will be developed by the implementation of agreed EU legislation on aviation and maritime security. Research is an essential feature for these measures (European Council, April 2005).

To further enhance our protection, we have come to the agreement to establish a Program of work, with the main aim improving the protection of critical infrastructure in Europe. Also, by means of collective work, in particular EU research, methods should be developed to protect crowded places from attacks (European Council, April 2005).

#### **4.4.3 Pursue**

The EU wants to disturb terrorist activities even further and pursue them across borders. The EU also wants to disturb terrorist' planning, networks and the activities of recruiters. Keeping in mind human rights and international law, the Union wants to cut off the funding of terrorists and the access to materials (European Council, April 2005).

On national level, the authorities need means to collect and analyse intelligence and to pursue and investigate terrorists. That is why the EU needs to follow the recommendations of the EU's peer evaluation process. After that, the Member States should report their improvements on the national capabilities and machinery in response to the recommendations (European Council, April 2005).

The development of collective understanding of the threat of terrorism is essential for the development of common policies.

Tools like the European Arrest Warrant are working very well for pursuing and investigating terrorists outside Europe's borders. Right now it is very important to take new measures to bring into practice the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions. An important measure to obtain this principle is the European Evidence Warrant. This measure enables Member States to gather somewhere else in Europe evidence, which shall help to condemn terrorists. The cooperation in sharing information between police and judicial authorities, in particular Eurojust and Europol, should improve further. Furthermore, more joint investigation teams should be established (where necessary), for cross-border investigations (European Council, April 2005).

The availability of law enforcement information should be developed even further and put into practice. The development of new IT systems like the Visa Information System and the next generation Schengen Information System, should provide improved access for authorities responsible for internal security but in addition data remains safely protected (European Council, April 2005).

Terrorists should also be deprived of the means they use to mount their attacks. The means to communicate can be deprived through retention of telecommunications data (European Council, April 2005).

Like mentioned above, the EU wants to cut off the funding of terrorist groups. They already have taken measures to freeze the terrorists' assets. The next step the EU wants to execute is the implementation of EU legislation against money laundering and cash transfers, they also want to deprive money (wire) transfers of terrorists. The Financial Action Task Force recommendations, which are part of the EU's strategy to fight terrorist's funding, recommend letting financial research being part of the overall terrorism investigation (European Council, April 2005).

Terrorist threat turned to Europe, often occurs outside the EU. That is why 'pursue' has a

worldwide dimension. The EU wants to strengthen the international consensus through the UN and other international organizations and through dialogues and agreements with key partners. Assistance will be given to priority countries, to help them introduce and implement the necessary mechanisms to deprive terrorism (European Council, April 2005).

#### **4.4.4 Respond**

The EU indicates in her strategy that they can never decrease the risk of terrorist attacks to zero. That is why it is important to know how Europeans deal with attacks when they occur and what the effects of an attack are. The response to an incident is often the same, therefore our response to an incident must use existing structures, including the Civil Protection Mechanism, developed by the EU to respond to other major European and international crises (European Council, April 2005).

When an incident occurs with cross-border effect, there is a need for sharing operational and policy information as quickly as possible, media coordination and mutual operational support, on the basis of all possible means, also military resources. The ability of the EU to undertake consequent and collective action is very important to have an effective and efficient response. The development of EU crisis coordination arrangements will also contribute to the coherence of EU response to terrorist attacks (European Council, April 2005).

Member States have the leading role in providing emergency response to a terrorist attack in their own country. Yet the need remains that the EU has the capacity to respond to an extreme emergency that is too much for the resources of one Member State and which can lead to a serious risk for the Union as a whole. Reviewing and evaluating the current framework for mutual support (the community mechanism for civil protection) is very important for Europe to remain safe (European Council, April 2005).

The development of a risk-based approach to capability assessment (considering the preparations for big events that are judged as the most likely to occur and which will have a greatest impact) will enable Member States to develop capabilities to be able to respond whenever there is an emergency (European Council, April 2005).

The solidarity, assistance and compensation of victims of terrorism and their families is a big part of the response against terrorism on national and European level. Member States must ensure that there is a suitable compensation available for the victims. Through sharing best practice of national arrangements and the development of contact between national victim's associations, the European Commission wants to enable the EU to take steps for the improvements of supporting those who are suffering the most under terrorist attack (European Council, April 2005).

Internationally it is necessary to assist EU citizens in third countries, to protect our military and civilian assets and to assist with EU crisis management operations.

#### **4.4 Discussion of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy**

One of the strengths of the EU Counter-terrorism strategy is that it covers all the possible angles, which are needed for a truly successful counter-terrorism policy. It covers the parts of *before* the attack and *after* the attack (which is further explained in appendix four). In addition the four objectives of the strategy cause for a clear and comprehensive strategy, especially its presentation of the key priorities is well executed. Nevertheless, there are also some critiques about the four objectives. According to Raphael Bossong, professor International Security Policy and European Integration, “The objectives of the Strategy are so broad that almost any policy can be presented as being relevant” (Bossong, R., June 2008, p. 10).

When looking at the objective *prevent*, it can be said that this is still a weak objective due to several obstacles: “the EU is almost completely excluded from operational intelligence-sharing; it has a weak external foreign and security policy; and it has almost no competences in matters of integration, education and social policy” (Bossong, R., June 2008, p. 18). Especially the fact that intelligence sharing remains limited causes for weakness. According to Bossong, “intelligence is also a ‘currency’ to obtain other valuable information or political favours. Therefore, it is not appealing to share it on the basis of general rules with all EU member states” (Bossong, R., June 2008, p. 19).

One of the most important measures in the objective *protect*, is its critical infrastructure protection. This measures needs to protect all core transport, energy and communication networks. Next to that, also border and travel security increased. However, especially the critical infrastructure protection is still a recent development. As a consequence, there are not many concrete results yet. Nevertheless, there are some doubts about the relevance of some of these protective measures. Some believe that an increase of border security is not necessary due to the fact that radicalised EU nationals pose the main threat and not migrants (Bossong, R., June 2008).

About the objective *pursue*, it can be said that the European Arrest Warrant is a very successful measures of criminal justice cooperation even as the framework decision on the retention of electronic communication traffic data. Also Eurojust and Europol operate successfully. One of the most concrete measures under the objective *pursue* are the EU’s actions in the fight against the financing of terrorism, because financial surveillance is a very successful tool in uncovering hidden networks or members of a terrorist group. Nevertheless, the objective’s success is limited

due to the major problems in its implementation, especially in matters of judicial and police cooperation. The oversight mechanisms are weak and the EU instruments to pursue terrorists are not efficiently used at operational level. For example, “the exchange of information between national police and Europol remains unsatisfactory” (Bossong, R., June 2008, p. 13). Next to that, also the necessary *trust* for cooperation is a point of concern. This cannot be simply created by EU legislation. These obstacles, on cultural and institutional level, are only possible to overcome very slowly (Bossong, R., June 2008).

At last, the objective *respond*, has a moderate level of success in the area of civil protection, by improving information exchange and coordination in the case of emergencies. Nevertheless the impact of this mechanism basically remained on paper. In addition, the created procedures like the EU emergency and crisis coordination arrangement, caused for doubt about the EU’s ‘added value’ to the control of real crisis situations. Doubts remain through technical limits, resource constraints, and political limits. Because Member States still rely on a EU response, when a terrorist attack occurs (Bossong, R., June 2008).

In chapter six and seven of this research, the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy will be further discussed.

## **5. The Policy Context of America's National Strategy for Counterterrorism**

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### **5.1 Introduction**

In this chapter an outline will be given of America's National Strategy for Counterterrorism. The United States has a lot of experience with terrorist attacks, which makes its counter-terrorism strategy very significant. The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 is probably the most well known example of terrorist attacks in US history. Since this day, the US started a war against Al Qaeda and with its counter-terrorism strategy they mark the progress they have made since the beginning of the war and they define the challenges that remain. In this chapter, first this strategy will be described and after that a discussion will follow in which the contrast between the two specific strategies shall be defined.

### **5.2 The Policy Context**

America's National Strategy for Counterterrorism is a strategy, which focuses mainly on defeating Al-Qaeda, because they believe that the terrorist threat from Al-Qaeda is the most threatened in the past decade since 9/11. This strategy sets out the approach to one of the President's top national security priorities: "disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents to ensure the security of America's citizens and interests" (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011, p. 1). This strategy is established because Al-Qaeda has continued to evolve; therefore America's approach should evolve also. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism is carrying out pressure on Al-Qaeda and meanwhile focuses on building partnerships and capabilities and on improving America's resilience. Next to that the strategy also aims at different areas of focus, not only on the core of the group in Pakistan and Afghanistan anymore, but also on individuals inspired by Al-Qaeda within the United States who are capable of doing harm to the US society. The strategy's mission is to "achieve a future in which Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents are defeated – and their ideology ultimately meets the same fate as its founder and leader" (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011, p. 2).

The US aims to achieve eight overarching counter-terrorism goals, all together they form a framework for the success of the US in their global counterterrorism mission. These goals are the following:

- Protect the American People, Homeland and American Interests
- Disrupts, Degrade, Dismantle and Defeat Al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates and Adherents
- Prevent Terrorist Development, Acquisition, and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

- Eliminate Safe havens
- Build Enduring Counterterrorism Partnerships and Capabilities
- Degrade Links between Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates and Adherents
- Counter Al-Qaeda Ideology and Its Resonance and Diminish the Specific Drivers of Violence that Al-Qaeda Exploits
- Deprive Terrorists of their Enabling Means

On the basis of core principles, the US counterterrorism efforts are guided. These principles consist of:

1. Adhering to US Core Values
2. Building Security Partnerships
3. Applying to Counter-terrorism Tools and Capabilities Appropriately
4. Building a Culture of Resilience

#### **5.2.1 Adhering to US core values**

Adhering to US core values is important because terrorist offer only injustice, disorder and destruction. Therefore it is important that the USA is its counterpart and stands for freedom, fairness, equality, dignity, hope and opportunity. The core values of the US consist of:

- Respect for Human Rights
- Encouraging Responsive Governance

Governments that place the will of people first and respond to the needs of their citizens, stand directly against Al-Qaeda's ideology. Through these government actions, discontent among the citizens will diminish, something that Al-Qaeda actively attempts to exploit. Consequently effective governance reduces Al-Qaeda's resonance and contributes to its irrelevance (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011).

- Respect for Privacy Rights, Civil Liberties and Civil Rights
- Balancing Security and Transparency

Well-informed citizens are a source of strength, because only then citizens can make informed judgments about their own security, they can act responsible and with resilience. Therefore the US informs the American people about the threats they face and the steps that are being taken to counter these threats. Yet, sometimes information cannot be made public in order to protect personnel, sources and methods (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011).

- Upholding the Rule of Law

Therefore the US wants to maintain an effective, durable and legal framework for counterterrorism operations. This framework must provide the necessary tools to defeat US opponents, must withstand legal challenges, survive careful investigation and must maintain sufficient



flexibility to adjust to changes. Next to that the US must bring terrorists to justice (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011).

### **5.2.2 Building Security Partnerships**

Building Security Partnerships is very important for the US because they cannot defeat Al-Qaeda alone. That is why they want to join with key partners and allies so that they can share the burden of the war against terror. Therefore the US should:

- Accept Varying Degrees of Partnership

The US believes that they cooperate best with nations that share their common values and have the same democratic institutions. With these countries the US wants to share intelligence, perform joint training and operations and cooperate in countering radicalization and community resilience programs. Though partnerships with countries who the US has little in common with except for the desire to defeat Al Qaeda, can be in the interest of the US. During the cooperation, the US wants to show these countries the value of upholding human rights and responsible governance. As a consequence these countries will be more stable and successful when they move towards these principles (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011).

- Leverage Multilateral Institutions

To increase the engagement of US partners, to reduce the financial burden on the US and to enhance the legitimacy of US' counterterrorism efforts, the US wants to strengthen the activities of multilateral institutions at international, regional and sub-regional levels (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011).

### **5.2.3 Applying Counter-Terrorism Tools and Capabilities Appropriately**

Applying Counter-Terrorism Tools and Capabilities Appropriately is necessary due to the evolvement of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents. Therefore it is important that the US evaluates its tools and capabilities also and they must ensure that these tools and capabilities are appropriate and in accordance with US laws and values. Therefore the US must:

- Pursue a "Whole-of-Government" Effort

The national strategy of the US integrates all the capabilities of each department and agency, in order to apply the right tools at the right time to the right situation (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011).

- Balance Near- and Long-Term Counter-terrorism Considerations

The US must always balance the costs and risks of its actions against the costs and risks of its inactions, because sometimes certain tactical successes can have unintended negative consequences (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011).

### **5.2.4 Building a Culture of Resilience**

Building a Culture of Resilience is important in order to be able to respond and recover from an

occurring terrorist attack. Next to that, a culture of preparedness is as much important as a culture of resilience and therefore the US must:

- Build Essential Components of Resilience

Al-Qaeda believes that economic and physiological damage drives the US to change its course in their foreign and national security policy. To show Al-Qaeda wrong, the US continues to defend effectively in order to protect their vital assets. Probably this will not cause for Al-Qaeda to abandon terrorism, but it can discourage Al-Qaeda from attacking particular targets or convince them that their efforts are unlikely to succeed. Next to that, the US wants to demonstrate that they have the individual, community and economic strength to absorb, rebuild and recover from any terrorist attack, a real culture of resilience (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011).

## **6. The Contrast between Europe's Counter-Terrorism Strategy and America's National Strategy for Counterterrorism**

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### **6.1 Differences in the Approach to Counter Terrorism**

When comparing America's National Strategy for Counterterrorism and Europe's Counter Terrorism Strategy, it is noticeable that they have security issues in common. The problems are more or less the same; nevertheless the strategies have crucial differences. Starting with the reports' main aims, a big contrast is noticeable. Whether Europe's aim is to "combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice" (The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, April 2005, p. 2), America's aim is to "achieve a future in which Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents are defeated – and their ideology ultimately meets the same fate as its founder and leader" (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011, p. 2). Moreover, the US is focusing more on one specific threat, named Al-Qaeda, and Europe's strategy is more focused on all possible terrorist threats, in which also the well being of Europe's citizens is mentioned.

For these different aims that they hope to achieve, they use different approaches to terrorism. When comparing the European approach with the American approach, three factors can be distinguished:

1. The US and EU face different threats from (Islamic) terrorism
  2. The US and EU have different perceptions about common threats
  3. The US and EU have different tools and means they use in their combat against terrorism
- (Shapiro, J., November 9, 2005)

#### **6.1.1 Different Threats from (Islamic) Terrorism**

First of all, in Europe there exists a different terrorist threat than in the US. Europe has long historical ties with the Muslim world, think of the Islam invasion in Spain and France, the crusades, the European colonization in North Africa and South Asia and the Ottoman Empire in South East Europe. This long history of conflict and cooperation has resulted in large populations of Muslims coming to Europe for our education and employment (appendix five shows The European Union's Estimated Muslim Population of today). Although these populations have lived in Europe for over four or five generations, many of them are not yet integrated very well in European society and therefore they live often in isolated, Muslim-dominated areas. Under these people, the unemployment rate (especially now during the economic crisis) is extremely high and they often need to deal with discrimination against them on the job market. As a consequence they

feel alienated, lawless and offended, through which they often get involved in radical political activity or in some cases radical militant activity (Stewart, S., April 4, 2013).

Next to this group of potential terrorist, Europe also needs to deal with terrorist groups like the ETA and IRA (which were discussed in chapter two of this research). Officially the IRA has not been violently active anymore since July 2005, however there are still some members who still try to achieve their higher goal by the use of violence (Volkskrant, December 7, 2012). So as an answer to the statement that Europe faces a different terrorist threat than the US, it can be said that Europe needs to deal more with terrorist threats inside its border and America needs to deal mostly with a far enemy, named Al-Qaeda. Far enemy groups in general are often very destructive and willing to use WMD, the same goes for Al-Qaeda (Shapiro, J., November 9, 2005). This fact is noticeable in the US' Strategy. In this strategy the threat of nuclear weapons and weapons for mass destruction (WMD) are specifically mentioned. The US sees this as a big threat and even refers to it as an overarching goal in their strategy. The European strategy does not specifically mention a nuclear threat and also WMD are not specifically mentioned.

#### **6.1.2 Different Perceptions about Common Threats**

The US and the EU both view the problem of terrorism differently, on institutional level and historical level. On institutional level the difference is that the EU is afraid to lose control when they involve the public, in contrast to the US who is afraid of losing support when they do not involve the public. Next to that, the EU is more focused on *managing* the terrorist problem, by the use of domestic intelligence and the effort to cut them off from sponsors, whilst the U.S is more focused on *defeating* the terrorist problem (Shapiro, J., November 9, 2005).

On historical level, the difference is in the fact that the US has a relatively small and well integrated Muslim population, whereas the EU has a very large population with poorly integrated Muslims on its soil. In Europe, the integration of Muslims has become a really big domestic issue and this issue has become involved in any other domestic issue in Europe, whether this issue is about immigration or welfare reform. As a consequence, when the EU thinks of their Muslim population, counter-terrorism has become just one issue and not the biggest issue (Shapiro, J., November 9, 2005).

#### **6.1.3 Different Tools and Means for the Combat against Terrorism**

Countering terrorism is handled differently in the US and the EU. For the US collectivity is very important. In their Strategy they talk much about partnerships and cooperation. They mention this a few times in the overarching goals and in the principles. The Americans want to fight terrorism as one nation, you can also see this in the shared values they have. In Europe this is very different. To combat terrorism is mainly the responsibility for the Member States (Article 4 of the Treaty of

Lisbon). The EU can only assist the Member States in their combat, so actually the EU only has a small role in counter-terrorism. According to the director of the Brookings Institution, Europe is even in some extent “a prisoner of its least motivated and least capable members” (Shapiro, J., November 9, 2005, p. 2).

Another difference in the Strategies that is remarkable is the American way of talking about their values compared to the European way of talking. In the national strategy of America, the American values are heavily emphasized in order to counter the terrorist ideology. Next to that, they want to create a better world by showing their values to other countries, in order to create more secure and successful countries. Europe’s strategy does not mention the use Europe’s values in order to counter the terrorist ideology. They also do not have the ambition to create a better world, by the use of their values.

An example of America’s values is spreading democracy. This is a difference between Europe and America because Europe thinks of instability as something bad and does not see democracy as a panacea, while the US thinks of instability as something that is OK, because eventually it could lead to democracy. For the US it is very important to promote democracy around the world, their foreign policy is even about democracy promotion. In their eyes they do this not just for their own, but also for the good of the world. According to former president Ronald Reagan, promoting democracy would be the same as promoting peace. However, the EU does not believe in this theory. This difference in the way of thinking between the both is noticeable in the following example. When the US was in war with Iraq (with one of its aims to spread democracy and peace), they saw this as a part of the war on terror. In contrast, “Europe saw the US in Iraq as part of the problem. Europe is very worried about Iraqi returnees coming back to Europe” (Shapiro, J., November 9, 2005, p. 2).

## **6.2 Points of Concern during Transatlantic Cooperation**

Since the election of President Obama, Europe’s and America’s counter-terrorism policies are linked more closely to each other. For example the statement of closing Guantanamo Bay in 2009 was a joint statement by the US and the EU. Nevertheless, some prominent transatlantic differences in cooperation remained (Ginsborg, L., Scheinin, M. & Vermeulen, M., June 2011).

The first difference is the above-mentioned example, the closure of Guantanamo Bay. This closure is delayed, which emerges a lot of European concern. They are worried about violations of human rights, which possibly emerges at Guantanamo Bay. The US from their side, believe that the EU “could and should do more to help with closing Guantanamo by taking more Guantanamo Bay detainees on European soil” (Ginsborg, L., Scheinin, M. & Vermeulen, M., June 2011, p. 2).

Secondly, the geographical scope of the battlefield is a difference between the US and the EU. They both have different opinions about the question when and where the fight against terrorism can turn into an armed conflict. Europeans see terrorism as a serious crime, whether the US call this a war (Ginsborg, L., Scheinin, M. & Vermeulen, M., June 2011).

Thirdly, there exist a difference in data privacy and data protection between the US and EU. According to the EU, it is a basic right that personal data remains private. They put a lot of effort in keeping this data out of the hands of law enforcement authorities. Negotiation between the US and EU to establish information sharing agreements, remains difficult due to the fact that the EU has a lot of concerns about the capability of the US to protect European citizens' personal data sufficiently (Archick, K., April 22, 2013).

### **6.3 Conclusion**

In conclusion there are a lot of crucial differences between the US Strategy and the EU Strategy. When looking at the differences in the approach to counter terrorism, it is noticeable that they first of all face different threats. Europe mostly faces a terrorist threat from inside its borders, the US mostly faces a far enemy, in specific Al-Qaeda. This leads to a different approach, because as a consequence the US focuses more on a nuclear threat and the threat of WMD than the EU.

Both countries also have different perceptions about the threat they face. The EU is more afraid to lose control, whether the US is more afraid to lose support. The EU is more focused on managing the terrorist problem and in contrast the US is more focused on defeating the terrorist problem. Furthermore, because the integration of Muslims has become a really big domestic problem in the EU, for Europe counter terrorism is not its biggest concern anymore, just one out of many.

When looking at the tools and means both countries use to combat terrorism, the difference mainly lays in institutional differences. The Americans fight terrorism as one nation with shared values, whether the EU just has a small role in countering terrorism, the main responsibility is for the Member States. Moreover, the Americans put the emphasis on their values to counter the terrorist ideology, especially by the use of democracy promotion, something that Europe does not do.

Points of concern during cooperation transatlantic cooperation are for the Europeans the delayed closure of Guantanamo bay. The Americans think that Europe is not cooperative enough on this point, according to them the EU should put more effort in the solution of this problem. Furthermore, they both see the fight against terrorism differently; the EU sees it as a serious crime, whether the US calls it a war. The EU has also concern about the capability of the US to protect

European citizens' personal data.

## **7. Working Towards a Truly Effective Strategy**

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### **7.1 Introduction**

In the previous chapter the contrast between the American and European Strategies has been discussed. However with the statement of these differences alone, it is impossible to determine the EU Strategy's effectiveness. Therefore Europol's EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report of 2012 (TE-SAT 2012) will be used, in comparison with the same report of 2007 (TE-SAT 2007). The report of 2007 will be used because the collected data in this report is from the period immediately after the establishment of the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy. In comparison with the 2012 report it is easier to analyse the development of the terrorist situation in Europe. Eventually, this data will be compared with US data, through which it is possible to determine which strategy is more effective and what should be improved in the European strategy.

### **7.2 Comparison between TE-SAT 2007 and TE-SAT 2012**

The collected data in TE-SAT 2007 covers a period from October 2005 until the end of 2006. In this period there was a total of 549 terrorist attacks, 810 arrested suspects and 202 trials in the EU (Europol, March 2007). TE-SAT 2012, states that in 2011 there was a total of 174 terrorist attacks, 484 arrested individuals and 316 trials in the EU. In this version, the following was added to this information: "lone actors were responsible for the killing of two persons in Germany, and 77 persons in Norway" (Europol, 2012, p. 8). From the above-mentioned data it can be concluded that in five years, the amount of terrorist attacks diminished with 375 attacks, the amount of arrested suspects diminished with 326 arrests and the amount of trials increased with 114 trials. In appendix six an overview can be found of attacks and arrested suspects from 2007 until 2011. It can be said that the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy is reaching its goal, due to the fact that the number of attacks is decreasing since its establishment, and that justice prevails due to the increase of trials.

Looking at its effectiveness of Europe's Strategy per type of terrorism, TE-SAT 2007 states that in 2006 most of the attacks, more specifically 424 attacks, were executed for separatist reasons (appendix seven) (Europol, March 2007). TE-SAT 2012 states that in 2011 most of the attacks were still executed for separatist reasons, however the amount of attacks for separatist reasons decreased significantly with 314 attacks. Although the amount of attacks by type of terrorism decreased all in this period, the amount of attacks for the reason 'not specified' increased with 9 attacks (appendix seven) (Europol, 2012). So apparently in this area, the strategy is not yet effective enough. In chapter 5.4 this point will be further discussed.

### 7.3 American Data on Terrorist Attacks

There is not much data available on terrorist attacks in the US after the establishment of the US National Strategy for Counterterrorism in June 2011. In appendix eight a chart can be found with the total and fatal terrorist attacks in the US by year from 2001 to 2011. The number of attacks decreased enormously from 2001 to 2011. Whether 40 attacks took place in 2001, in 2011 this number was less than 10 (Plumer, B., April 16, 2013). It is impossible to say whether the US Strategy is successful and reaches its goal because there are no data available after June 2011, but it can be said that there are far less attacks in the US than in Europe. This is partly due to the facts discussed in chapter 2.4: Europe is easier to enter, most terrorist groups are already inside Europe's borders, due to Europe's interventions they raised the incentive for revenge attacks, and there is a lack of cohesion among European Member States.

### 7.4 Today's biggest threats

According to Europol's TE-SAT report of 2012, the amount of attacks for the reason 'not specified' increased with 9 attacks since 2007 (see chapter 5.2). This means that these 'not specified' attacks are becoming bigger threats within the EU nowadays, therefore more special attention should be paid in Europe's Counter Terrorism Strategy. These 'not specified' threats are analysed as follows in Europol's TE-SAT 2012:

- An increase in lone and solo actor plots
- Radicalism to violence
- Terrorist presence in the virtual world of the Internet
- Cross-border cooperation between violent extremist groups
- Ideologically-motivated electronic attacks (Europol, 2012)

Next to these increased threats, the EU's biggest threats are still attacks that are executed for separatist reasons. Although this threat decreased in the past few years, still 63% of the total attacks in 2011 are executed for separatist reasons. In conclusion, next to lone and solo terrorist, radicalism, terrorism via internet, cross-border terrorism and electronic attacks, more attention should be paid to separatism within the EU.

### 7.5 Points of Improvement

From the above-mentioned threats, it can be concluded that Europe has a wide variety of threats and it is *this* variety that the EU should focus on more. Moreover, this variety consists of terrorists within its borders, therefore the internal security is more important than its external security for this point.

When looking at each different threat, some points of improvement can be given. To decrease the



threat of cross-border cooperation between violent extremist groups, the EU should improve cohesion and cooperation between its Member States. Right now the EU is not fighting terrorism as one. The role of the EU in this battle is very small and the responsibility is for the Member States. Every Member State within the EU looks differently at terrorism and they often see their own problems as more important than the overall shared problem. Looking at the US, they do fight terrorism as one nation, by the use of their shared values, through which it is easier to expel terrorists inside its borders. In order to improve Europe's situation on this point, the role for the EU to combat terrorism should increase and the cooperation between Member States should increase, for example by enhancing information sharing. Also Europe's shared values should be more emphasized in order to create a feeling of collectivity.

The EU already has put a lot of effort in solving the problem of separatism, with good results. For example, the ETA has never been so weak as it is now due to the dismantling of ETA-cells and the seizure of explosives. Because terrorist attacks for separatist reasons are decreasing, the EU's Counter Terrorism Strategy can be called effective on this point. Nevertheless the EU should continue with their efforts in this area in order to completely rule out terrorism for separatist reasons. Because, despite the decrease, there are still a lot of attacks carried out for separatist reasons. In order to improve, the EU should again follow US' example. Therefore the EU should focus more on the problem of losing support, than on the problem of losing control. When the EU gains support, it is easier to eliminate violent actions from terrorists with separatist ideas.

Another serious threat that must be eliminated is the increase of lone and solo actors. An example of such lone and solo actors is the attacks in Norway in July 2011 by Anders Breivik. These kinds of threats should be analysed further (like discussed in chapter 2.2.1.) in order to prevent people from joining terrorism or starting with terrorism. Methods, propaganda and the conditions why people join terrorism must be further identified. Right now not much is known about these kinds of people, so further research must be done to expel lone actors. The same applies to radicalism. Inequalities and discrimination, which could lead to radicalism, should be further erased and the promotion of intercultural dialogue and long-term integration must further increase. Furthermore special attention should be paid to Internet. Through Internet radical ideas and trainings are easier to approach than ever before and there is a lot of terrorist presence over the Internet. Also for this point research must be carried out to make the Internet eventually more safe and secure.

Furthermore, it would be a great asset to further enhance transatlantic cooperation. It will be tough because there are a lot of differences, but "working together does not imply that you have to think of the problem in exactly the same way" (Shapiro, J., November 9, 2005, p. 3). However there will

be a lot of mutual benefits, like information sharing arrangements, extradition and mutual legal assistance, and accords on transport security (Archick, K., April 22, 2013).

## 8. Conclusion

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To conclude this research, an answer should be given to the following research question: *Is the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy an effective policy when compared to the American National Strategy for Counter Terrorism?* When just looking at the collected data from chapter 7, it can be said that the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy reaches its goal, due to the fact that the total terrorist attacks decreased with 68% since the establishment of the EU's Counter Terrorism Strategy, and it prevailed justice because of the fact that the amount of trials increased with 36% since its establishment. However, when comparing the EU strategy with the US strategy, the EU policy is not as effective as it could have been. In the US there are far less attacks than in the EU. Whether there were 174 terrorist attacks in the EU in 2011, in the US there were less than ten terrorist attacks.

When looking at the four objectives of the EU counter-terrorism strategy, its achievements are still very weak. Intelligence sharing remains limited, critical infrastructure protection still needs to be further developed, doubts remain about the relevance of some protective measures, and EU instruments to pursue terrorists are not efficiently used at operational level.

Moreover, to create a truly effective strategy, changes and improvements need to be implemented. Basically, the EU must adapt better to future challenges. Therefore, they must focus more on the diminishment of the following threats: separatism, the increase in lone and solo actor plots, radicalism, terrorist presence on the Internet, cross-border cooperation between violent extremist groups, and ideologically-motivated electronic attacks. These threats are Europe's biggest challenges and therefore a lot of effort must be taken.

In order to decrease these threats, the EU should first of all improve cohesion and cooperation between its Member States. They should use the example of the US: combat terrorism as one nation by the use of their shared values. The EU must get a bigger role in the fight against terrorism and also Europe's shared values should be more emphasized in order to create a feeling of collectivity.

Secondly, the EU should not be so afraid of losing control, but should focus more on the problem of losing support. Next to that, they should enhance the feeling of being unified. When they overcome this problem, it will be easier for the EU to eliminate violent actions from terrorists with separatist ideas.

Thirdly, it is important to eliminate solo actors and radicalism. Therefore extensive research is needed, so that patterns of behaviour can be discovered. In this way, the EU can prevent people from becoming terrorist on the long term. Next to that, inequalities and discrimination should be further erased and intercultural dialogue and long-term integration should be further promoted to prevent people from becoming radical. Therefore it is also needed to pay special attention to the Internet, in order to make it safer and more secure.

Last of all, transatlantic cooperation should be further enhanced. Both of the strategies are very different: “the European approach to counter terrorism, can be described as a multilateral, norm-based, law-enforcement-driven approach to counter-terrorism, attaching a lot of importance to human rights. The US on the other hand is seen to prefer a unilateral, practice-based, bottom-up approach, which looks primary at international humanitarian law as a framework for its counter-terrorism policies” (Ginsborg, L., Scheinin, M. & Vermeulen, M., June 2011, p. 2). However, cooperation will lead to a lot of mutual benefits.

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## Appendices

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### Appendix 1: Frequencies of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions of Terrorism

Below an analysis can be found, made by Schmidt and Jongman. It is an analysis, which represents the Frequencies of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions. It is an analysis on the occasion of 311 definitions of terrorism made by the American National Criminal Justice Reference Service.

<b><i>Element</i></b>	<b><i>Frequency</i></b>
1. Violence, force	83,5%
2. Political	65%
3. Fear, terror emphasized	51%
4. Threat	47%
5. (Psych) effects and (anticipated) reactions	41,5%
6. Victim-target differentiation	37,5%
7. Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32%
8. Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30,5%
9. Extra normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30%
10. Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28%
11. Publicity aspect	21,5%
12. Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination	21%
13. Civilians, non-combatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17,5%
14. Intimidation	17%
15. Innocence of victims emphasized	15,5%
16. Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	14%
17. Symbolic aspect	13,5%
18. Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9%
19. Clandestine, covert nature	9%
20. Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence	7%
21. Criminal	6%
22. Demands made on third parties	4%

*Source: Muller, E.R., Rosenthal, U. & Wijk, de R. (2008) Terrorisme. Studies of Terrorisme en Terrorismebestrijding. Deventer:Kluwer*

## Appendix 2: ISS Instruments for Facilitating Cooperation within the EU

Below the most relevant instruments for facilitating cooperation within the EU can be found:

- **Analysis of future situations and scenarios: threat anticipation.** Europol and other EU agencies produce regular threat assessments.
- **Adequate response: planning, programming and handling the consequences.** Work programs have been developed which enable us to address the dangers to and the concerns of citizens in a methodical way. Strategies and specific work plans have also been developed on counterterrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, organized crime and civil protection. Furthermore, the Community Civil Protection Mechanism coordinates the response of Member States to natural and man-made disasters.
- **Effectiveness in the field: the work of agencies, institutions and bodies.** A number of agencies specific to the EU have been created and these include: **Europol**, whose main aims are to collect and exchange information and to facilitate cooperation between law enforcement authorities in their fight against organized crime and terrorism; **Eurojust**, which drives coordination and increases the effectiveness of judicial authorities; and **Frontex**, which manages operational cooperation at the external borders. The EU has also created the role of the **Counterterrorism Coordinator**. Other bodies and networks have also been established in the fields of training, drugs, crime prevention, corruption and judicial cooperation in criminal
- **Tools based on mutual recognition, for information sharing and to facilitate joint investigations and operations.** Instruments based on mutual recognition include the European Arrest Warrant and provision for the freezing of assets. Databases such as the Schengen information system and networks have also been established for the exchange of information on criminal records, on combating hooliganism, on missing persons or stolen vehicles and on visas which have been issued or refused. The use of DNA and fingerprint data helps put a name to anonymous traces left at crime scenes. EU legal instruments facilitate operational cooperation between Member States, such as the setting up of joint investigation teams, the organizing of joint operations and close cooperation to ensure the security of international events, including major sporting competitions.
- **Evaluation mechanisms have been developed to assess the effectiveness of our actions.** For example, peer-to-peer evaluation exercises in the field of terrorism and organized crime have contributed to the improvement of mutual trust.

*Source: Internal security strategy for the European Union. (March 2010). Towards a European Security Model.*

### Appendix 3: ISS Principles and Guidelines for Action

- Justice, freedom and security policies which are mutually reinforcing whilst respecting **fundamental rights, international protection, the rule of law and privacy**;
- **Protection** of all citizens, **especially the most vulnerable**, with the focus on **victims** of crimes such as trafficking in human beings or gender violence, including victims of terrorism who also need special attention, support and social recognition;
- **Transparency and accountability** in security policies, so that they can be easily understood by citizens, and take account of their concerns and opinions;
- **Dialogue** as the means of resolving differences in accordance with the principles of **tolerance, respect and freedom of expression**;
- **Integration, social inclusion and the fight against discrimination** as key elements for EU internal security;
- **Solidarity** between Member States in the face of challenges which cannot be met by Member States acting alone or where concerted action is to the benefit of the EU as a whole;
- **Mutual trust** as a key principle for successful cooperation.

*Source: Internal security strategy for the European Union. (March 2010). Towards a European Security Model.*

**Appendix 4: Two-By-Two Matrix of Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Respond**


	Before Attack	After Attack
Countering Intentional threats	<p><i>Prevent</i></p> <p><b>WEAK</b></p> <p>Almost no operational intelligence role. Deep limits to structural counter-radicalisation policies due to weak foreign &amp; integration policy capacity</p>	<p><i>Pursue</i></p> <p><b>MODERATE</b></p> <p>Added value due to numerous measures in criminal justice cooperation and fight against terror financing, but deficits in implementation, info-sharing &amp; trust</p>
Controlling structural hazards/effects	<p><i>Protect</i></p> <p><b>MODERATE</b></p> <p>Dynamic developments in travel and border security, critical infrastructure protection &amp; security research. Latter still new and weak, but all measures may lack relevance for terrorism.</p>	<p><i>Respond</i></p> <p><b>WEAK to MODERATE</b></p> <p>Added funds and programmes for civil protection (CBRN), emergency coordination &amp; victim support, yet so far largely untested. Contribution of ESDP also below political rhetoric</p>

Source: Bossong, R., (June 2008). *The EU's Mature Counterterrorism Policy – A Critical Historical And Functional Assessment*

## Appendix 5: The European Union's Estimated Muslim Population



Source: Stewart, S. (April 4, 2013) Stratfor Global Intelligence. *The Acute Jihadist Threat in Europe*.

**Appendix 6: Failed, Foiled or Completed Attacks & Arrested Suspects, 2007 to 2011**

*Source: Europol (2012) EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2012.*

## Appendix 7: Failed, Foiled or Completed Attacks in 2007 & 2012 by Type of Terrorism

2007


498

Source: Europol (March, 2007) *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007*

2012

Member State	Religiously-inspired	Separatist	Left-wing	Right-wing	Single-issue	Not specified	Total 2011
Denmark	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
France	0	85	0	0	0	0	85
Germany	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Greece	0	0	6	0	0	0	6
Italy	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
Spain	0	25	21	1	0	0	47
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-	26	26
<b>Total</b>	0	110	37	1	0	26	174

Source: Europol (2012) *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2012*.

**Appendix 8: Total and Fatal Terrorist Attacks in the US from 2001 to 2011**

Note: There were 208 total attacks and 21 fatal attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2011.

Source: Plumer, B., (April 16, 2013). Wonkblog. *Eight facts about terrorism in the United States*