


- THESIS -

**DO THE PVDA, THE CDA AND THE VVD
CONSIDER A EUROPEAN DEFENCE ORGANISATION AS AN
ADDITION TO NATO, VALUABLE AND NECESSARY?**



By: Ms. T.C.E. Kipp
20052047, 4BBb

Thesis supervisor: Mr. F. Termes

Date: 10-06-2009

**The Hague School of European Studies
The Hague University of Professional Education**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the Netherlands, there have been many discussions about whether or not to establish a European Defence Organisation. However, due to the political party D66 (Democrats '66), this discussion has been revived in 2006 to such an extent that it really had an impact on political agendas of the Dutch political parties. D66 declared that a European Defence Organisation would increase the efficiency of European cooperation. This thesis inquires into the views of three political parties concerning the establishment of a European Defence Organisation: the PvdA as largest social democratic party, the CDA as largest confessional party and the VVD as largest liberal party. The central question is: "Do the PvdA, the CDA and the VVD consider a European Defence Organisation as an addition to NATO, valuable and necessary"? The PvdA is a political party which is generally not in favour of the use of military force and military intervention, but in favour of international solidarity and diplomacy. Therefore, the PvdA sees executing humanitarian actions and peace keeping missions as NATO's core activity. The CDA is a political party which operates in the middle spectrum of political ideologies: religious involvement in social problems and the preservation of the Christian values. The Christian Democrats value Defence and believe that the government needs to invest in the Dutch armed forces. Moreover, the CDA likes to export peace and security beyond EU borders and sees NATO as EU's security provider. The VVD is a political party where the liberal values of liberty, tolerance and responsibility are at the base of its existence. Moreover, the VVD likes to invest in NATO as EU's primary security provider, and feels that the European countries should share the defence burdens equally with NATO. In this scope, responsibility should also be shared and therefore, the EU should contribute with military operations, such as the EU Battle Groups missions (humanitarian, peace-keeping and security restoring missions).

Regarding the views on the Dutch defence policy, the PvdA, the CDA and the VVD share more similarities than differences. All three parties are against the creation of a European army for countries should not lose their sovereignty. In addition, the three parties express their wish for a more efficient defence policy, based on international cooperation. Furthermore, all three parties would like the Netherlands to share the defence burdens equally with NATO, although the PvdA states that NATO should not expect much from the Netherlands given its (small) size. In addition, all three parties feel that the EU Battle Groups (Helsinki Headline Goals) should only operate on low risk missions. The VVD and the CDA would like the 'Defence expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product' to be raised to the NATO standard of 2%. By contrast, the PvdA does not see the need for this GDP increase. Furthermore, the CDA is, just like the VVD and the PvdA, convinced that the European Defence Agency can provide for European standardisations of military equipment and bring European defence industries together, which will lower the defence expenditures and prevent duplication. Within the VVD and PvdA, experts and Members of Parliament are divided about the question whether or not

to install a European Defence Organisation with its own European army. Only within the CDA do all the experts and Members of Parliament agree with its defence policy. To continue, the VVD and the CDA agree that the EU must not develop into a federal super state. The CDA and the VVD consider NATO to be the most important organisation in the field of security and defence policy and they state that nothing should diminish this status. By contrast, the PvdA expressed to be in favour of European autonomy. To continue, the CDA and the VVD are in favour of increasing the defence budget of the Netherlands. By contrast, the PvdA does not favour an increase of the defence funds. The VVD and the CDA are not against the creation of a European Defence Organisation within NATO in order to gain more power within this organisation. In this way, European countries within NATO can form a European bloc. In addition, the VVD and the CDA see ‘unanimity’ within the EU decision-making process as the reason why a European Defence could never work: this has already been proved during the Yugoslav conflicts. To conclude: the PvdA, the CDA and the VVD do not consider a European Defence Organisation as an addition to NATO valuable and necessary in the field of political ideology, finance, economics and ethics.

ABBREVIATIONS

CDA	Christian Democratic Alliance [Netherlands]
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy [EU]
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force [NATO]
D66	Social Liberal Party [Netherlands]
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative [NATO]
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe [NATO]
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMU	European Monetary Union
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity [NATO/WEU]
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy [EU]
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HHG	Helsinki Headline Goal [EU]
JSF	Joint Strike Fighter
MC	Military Committee [NATO]
NAC	North Atlantic Council [NATO]
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force (HHG)
PSC	Political and Security Committee [EU]
PVDA	Party of Labour [Netherlands]
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander in Europe [NATO]
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy [Netherlands]
WEU	Western European Union
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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PREFACE

The reason why I have decided to write my thesis about a European Defence Organisation has three causes. Firstly, the fact that I have been raised in a military (and political aware) family has made me interested in defence subjects. Secondly, the discussion about a European Defence Organisation has been revived in the Netherlands since the political party D66 (Democrats 66) has pleaded to be in favour of a European Army. Thirdly, during a visit to the European Parliament in Brussels (January 2009), I heard more pleas for a European Defence Organisation (EU Member of Parliament A. Neyts-Uyttebroeck and EU Member of Parliament J. Maaten). These three factors have made me curious to such an extent that I decided to write my thesis about the question whether or not to install a European Defence Organisation as part of the EU. In addition, the fact that the European Parliament Elections take place in 2009 and the fact that NATO celebrates its 60th birthday in 2009, have contributed to my personal interest.

As one might expect, I can not take all of the credit since I would not have been able to write my thesis without the contribution of other people's time and effort. For this reason, I would like to acknowledge drs. R.W. Knops, MA, and drs. Wessels, MA, for their time during their interviews. I would also like to acknowledge Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, for putting my thesis in perspective and for demonstrating the practical side of European's and NATO's defence policy. In addition, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor drs. F.M. Termes, MA, for always giving me constructive criticism.

It goes without saying that I could not have written my thesis without the support of my family and friends. I would like to thank my parents, Chris Kipp and Carola Broekman, for I could always count on their help and support, for they were always prepared to reserve some time for me and for giving me advice. To conclude, I would like to express a special thanks to Christian Van Maaren, who has encouraged me to do better, for helping me with the technical aspects of my thesis and for not being afraid to be critical.

INTRODUCTION

The question whether or not there is a need for a European Defence Organisation has been subject of discussion for many years in west European countries and the Atlantic countries (Canada, United States of America). This discussion started after World War II during the European integration process which began with the Brussels Treaty Organisation (1948). This organisation was signed by: France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK. The Brussels Treaty Organisation was created to develop a common defence system that enabled its members to act as a united front against military, political and ideological threats. It proved to be the source of inspiration to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949. Looking at these two defence organisations, the Brussels Treaty Organisation and NATO were both quickly established. By contrast, it took the EU many years to create its own *European Security and Defence Policy* (ESDP), which obtains its legal basis within the Maastricht Treaty: “the progressive framing of a common defence policy which might lead to a common defence” (EU Commission, 2005, “European Security and Defence Policy”). The ESDP was established within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This CFSP is an EU pillar that was founded at the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on the European Union, 1993).

In the years between 1993 and 2006, there have been many discussions about whether or not to establish a European Defence Organisation, but this discussion has been revived in 2006 to such an extent that it really had an impact on political agenda's of the Dutch political parties. This was due to the Dutch social-liberal political party D66 (Democrats '66), which declared in November 2006 to be in favour of the establishment of a European Army, which would increase the efficiency of European cooperation (D66, 2006, “Het gaat om Mensen – D66 Tweede Kamer Verkiezingsprogramma 2006/2010”). Moreover, in the light of the European Parliament elections in 2009, some candidates and current EU Members of Parliament have stated to be in favour of, or against, a European Defence Organisation. These are for example: Jules Maaten, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Hans van Baalen, Jan Marinus Wiersma. Apart from this discussion, the size of the Dutch defence budget has also been subject of many lively debates. However, these two subjects are more intertwined than one might suspect. For example, the question if the Netherlands is able to pay for an extra European Defence Organisation next to NATO is often posed.

This thesis will inquire into the establishment of a European Defence Organisation and in particular the views of three political parties concerning this subject. The central question is: “Do the PvdA, the CDA and the VVD consider a European Defence Organisation as an addition to NATO, valuable and necessary”? Because these three political parties have been the main stream of Dutch policy, this thesis therefore looks into the views of the three political ideologies:

socialism, confessionalism, liberalism respectively and the belonging largest political parties. The choice for the PvdA (Party of Labour), the CDA (Christian Democratic Alliance) and the VVD (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) in this thesis is demonstrated in figure 1 and 2 in appendix two. In figure 1, the amount of seats in the Second Chamber is demonstrated per political party. In figure 2, the political preferences of the Dutch population in 2009 can be found. As one can observe, this thesis does not go into the conservative right-wing ideology, for the conservative right-wing parties in the Netherlands are relatively young compared to the PvdA, the CDA and the VVD. Two conservative right-wing parties are for example: Proud of the Netherlands (TON) and the Party for Liberty (PVV).

Next to literary research, this thesis consists of the results of three interviews: Mr. R.W. Knops, MA, who is chairman of the CDA Defence Committee – Mr. M. Wessels, MA, who is senior policy assistant of the VVD and specialised in defence policy – and Lieutenant General A.G.D. van Osch, MA, who is the Permanent Military Representative to the NATO and EU Military Committee in Brussels, Belgium. Unfortunately, no one at the PvdA was able to respond to the thesis questions, except for a short comment from Mr. Van Dam, MSc, who is spokesman Foreign Policy of the PvdA. Due to the fact that some aspects of the PvdA reports were not clear enough and the PvdA could not answer the thesis questions, one can observe that certain aspects of the PvdA defence policy could not have been explained to such an extend in comparison to the defence policies of the VVD and the CDA.

In the first part of this thesis, the historical context of the EU and NATO will be provided in order to comprehend the developments of the international defence policies and the current situation. In the second part, the question if the political parties consider a European Defence Organisation as an addition to NATO necessary will be answered. In addition, the answers to the question whether the points of view of their Second Chamber Committees of Defence differ from the party itself will be given. Moreover, this thesis also answers the question if the political parties would like a European Defence Organisation to be part of the EU or of NATO. The third part of this thesis investigates whether or not the previous answers reflect the practical side of NATO's and the EU's defence policy. In addition, the question if two defence organisations, NATO and a European Defence Organisation, within Europe are feasible, usable and efficient will be answered. These answers are obtained through literary research and personal interviews. The conclusion in chapter four will answer the central question.

To understand the influence that defence has had in Western Europe and subsequently the EU, a survey of dates and occurrences can be found in the appendix 'important dates'. When reading this thesis, one should consult the appendix ("Important Dates", p.61) in order to comprehend the dates, treaties and the mentioned events in great detail. Furthermore, a time-line which indicates the historical context of defence policy in Europe can be found in figure 3 on page 10.

1. Chapter one

BACKGROUND

The last 100 years, Europe's history has been subject to many changes: wars and peace treaties succeeded each other, disunity, and started cooperation pacts between European countries (World War I, World War II). Years of insecurity, war or the threat of war has created, next to fear, a binding factor for some European countries for they could act as a united front against their enemies. There was one common purpose for the European countries which were in conflict with each other: to defeat the enemy and to gain victory. Last century, European wars have had an international character, starting with World War I (WWI) (1914-1918) and quickly followed by World War II (WWII) (1940-1945). This last war had left Europe divided. After 1945, there were two superpowers in the world: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (US). In addition, there was a high level of tension between the capitalist West and the communist East. The USSR seized power over certain East European countries which was not received well by the other members of the Allied Forces. This was the beginning of the Cold War which started in 1946. "During a speech at Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, visiting British Prime Minister Winston Churchill proclaimed that Europe was divided by an 'Iron Curtain' as the nations of Eastern Europe fell increasingly under Soviet control. Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia all fell under Communist control by early 1948" (US Department of State, "United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War").

After WW II, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK desired for a common defence system in order to prevent the horror that World War I and II had brought. It is therefore not strange that one can state that European integration started with defence: the Brussels Treaty Organisation (1948), followed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (1949). The Brussels Treaty Organisation was a European organisation, whereas NATO strengthened the Euro-Atlantic post-war bond. "NATO participation formally committed the USA and Canada to the defence of Western Europe; and, ultimately, to the maintenance of a formidable military presence in Europe throughout the Cold War period" (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p.192). As NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay expressed: NATO's goal was to 'keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down' (Tremblay, 2008, "Why not Simply Abolish NATO?").

In short, one can observe that with the Brussels Treaty Organisation, peace and security were more important items for the West European countries than economic integration. It was not a common economy that would unite Europe and safeguard its future, but a common defence organisation. However, the first step that linked economic interests with security was the Schumann Plan (1950) which led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community

in 1952. This supranational organisation tried to prevent Germany to restore its military superpower by controlling the two fuels of war: coal and steel. By doing so, the first step that would lead to the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and the establishment of the European Union, many years later, was taken. In 1954, the successor of the Brussels Treaty was established: the Western European Union (WEU). The WEU was a defence organisation that coordinated the defence policies of its Western (capitalist) European member states. The WEU had to integrate the defence policies of its members and “was a forum in which defence issues could be discussed without a US presence” (Smith, 2003, p.41). At the beginning, the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were part of the WEU that was established during the Treaty of Brussels in 1948. Yet, in October 1954, West Germany (admitted to NATO) and Italy could join the WEU as well. The WEU “became an organisation grouping members of the EU which were also NATO members, but remained relatively dormant until it was ‘re-activated’ in the 1980s” (Howorth, 2007, p.5). The creation of a European Defence Organisation would demonstrate a bipartite goal: not only would it stimulate integration in Europe but it could also make clear that United States (US) military support is a requisite. This last aspect is now heavily discussed by European states that feel that they are too much dependent on the US. However, the US never saw European integration (WEU) as a threat, but more as an insurance that would prevent conflicts in Europe. What’s more, a European Defence pillar within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) could prevent competition in the field of defence, bring European states to contribute equally to the defence burdens and prevent a diminution of European defence budgets. Nevertheless, the US felt that “a European pillar could have its use, but it must not interfere with NATO’s role or the US’ lead and influence” (Hunter, 2002, p.9).

When Germany became a NATO member in 1955, the communist block established the Warsaw Treaty Organisation as an answer to and antipole of NATO. In 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis represented the Cold War climax. A high level of tension remained for 27 years until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 which led to the following consecutive events: the unification of Germany and the end of the Cold War in 1990, the end of the Soviet Union (USSR) and the end of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in 1999. The binding factor that united the capitalist West in the protection of West Europe and North America against the communist East ceased to exist. There was no longer one concrete enemy and one concrete goal. Nevertheless, in all the years of the Cold War, European countries did not establish a European Defence Force (or Organisation). Although, one should not forget that France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and West Germany signed the European Defence Community Treaty (EDC) in 1952 and therefore did an attempt to create a European Army. Still, all was in vain when the French parliament refused to ratify the EDC Treaty in 1954. “The EDC disaster cast a long shadow over the development of a

political dimension: a supranational approach to foreign and defence policy was unacceptable to the member states” (Smit, 2003, p.29).

The Maastricht Treaty (TEU) in 1993 contained an important step in Europe’s defence policy history. This year was not randomly chosen: the Yugoslav conflict “ruthlessly revealed the weakness of the European military ability” (Homan, Kreemers & Osinga, 2001, p. 20). The indecisiveness of the EU and its choice to not intervene during the bloody Balkan wars and accordingly the Bosnia conflict (1992-1995), gnawed at the conscience of some EU Member States. Moreover, EU’s power was questioned worldwide. As a result, the second EU pillar that was established within the TEU was the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). As part of the CFSP, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) obtains its legal basis within the treaty: “the progressive framing of a common defence policy *which might lead to a common defence*” (EU Commission, 2005, “European Security and Defence Policy”). The US that built up Europe in the field of defence was, as a member and one of the founding fathers of NATO, very concerned by this statement. NATO, and therefore the US, did not want any competition in the field of defence.

In 1996, at the Berlin Brussels Bargain, it was agreed that NATO gives the WEU the possibility to act as an effective military organisation. The WEU could make use of NATO’s military assets and capabilities. Moreover, NATO members agreed on a European pillar within NATO, thus rejecting the idea that the WEU could act autonomously and beside NATO. “The NATO Alliance would help to facilitate the creation of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), but not as a completely independent entity, likely to rob NATO both of resources and, potentially, of capacity to be politically and militarily effective” (Hunter, 2002, p.13). In other words: the ESDI would become an individual part of NATO and “could make use of ‘separable but not separate’ military capabilities” (Hunter, 2002, p.30)

Given the fact that NATO does not have its own military resources for it is dependent on the military contribution of the member states, the EU member states came to the conclusion that important aspects of NATO’s military capabilities and assets were owned by the US. Supported by many EU countries (though not publicly), France was not comfortable with the idea that the United States (with the largest military power and capacity) would have the final say within NATO, whether or not to contribute to WEU operations. To continue, France did not want the WEU to play its part beyond Article 5 of NATO (an attack on one of NATO’s members is considered as an attack on all of the members), but France wanted to give the ESDI more meaning. These disagreements between NATO and the EU were a political power struggle between the US and France. “[...] Championing ESDI was widely believed to be a French motive: it represented a realm of activity (military) in which France could exercise a major leadership role within Europe – a country virtually guaranteed to have decisive economic, and hence overall political pre-eminence

within the EU” (Hunter, 2002, p.28). Germany, of course, could have the same power within the EU, but the reluctance to intervene in the Bosnia conflict (1992-1995), showed that it lacked the ability to decide on defence matters at that time (1996). Moreover, Germany, as largest EU country, checkmated the other EU countries for it supported the independency of the federal state Croatia which enabled Croatia to show the other federal states that they were free to get out of the federation. This event was detrimental to the common character of EU’s foreign policy. As George Orwell could have said about the EU at that time: “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others” (1945).

After the Cold War era, the Soviet threat ended almost entirely. This left NATO, the European Economic Community (EEC) and simultaneously the WEU, confused about their role on the world stage. There was no common purpose and binding factor anymore. In addition, the Yugoslav conflicts (1991: Slovenia, 1991-1995: Croatia, 1992-1995: Bosnia, 1998-1999: Kosovo) that followed the ending of the Cold War also did not bring unity. In contrast, Canada and the US believed it was time that the EU should be able to act without their support. In addition, the former Yugoslavia was to be the baptism of fire for the EU. Because of the fact that the United Kingdom (UK) within the WEU did not want military intervention, the EEC considered that a diplomatic and economic intervention was to solve the Yugoslav conflict (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p.196). However, a dangerous EEC monitoring mission was not able to compel a ceasefire in 1991 and it took the lives of five civilian EEC monitors. “This tragic incident, perhaps more than any other, highlighted the limitations of an exclusively civilian approach to the conflict; and hence the need for access to peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities” (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p.196). Ultimately, it took US’ involvement with the NATO bombardments that led to the end of the Balkan conflicts.

According to Howorth, the ESDI was replaced in 2006 by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) because the ESDI did not work (2007, p.44). “It was dependent on the WEU which lacked political clout, political legitimacy and political credibility, but it also relied for military capacity on borrowing, from the USA, assets which were either jealously guarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or simply not available because they were urgently needed by the US military itself” (Howorth, 2007, p.44). According to Bretherton and Vogler, “Bosnia sowed the seeds for the development of the ESDP, most obviously by its demonstration of EU impotence, necessitating a humiliating reliance upon US action that might not always be forthcoming” (2006, p.196).

In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam set out the Petersberg Tasks: the WEU has not only to be capable to offer humanitarian aid, but should also be able to exercise peace operations – not only to restore the peace, but to compel peace as well. Initiated by the UK, the 1998 St. Mâlo Declaration was signed by Prime Minister Blair and President Chirac (France). Initially, the St.Mâlo declaration was based upon earlier EU agreements, like the fact that the decision about whether or not to carry

out an ESDI would be made by the EU and not by the WEU (Maastricht, 1992). Moreover, “the declaration envisioned what had already been agreed upon at the June 1997 Amsterdam EU summit: the creation of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CFSDP) with the means and mechanisms to permit the EU nations to act ‘autonomously’ should NATO not decide to act in some future scenario requiring military action” (Sloan, 2003, p.172). “In addition, it also asserted that ‘the Union must have the capacity for *autonomous action*’ “(Hunter, 2002, p.30).


Even so, the St.Mâlo declaration can be considered important, though only an agreement of symbolic importance, made by France and the United Kingdom (UK) (Hunter, 2002, p.32). Still, looking at the fact that France and the UK are two of the three most powerful and influential countries of the EU, the declaration carries more political weight than the preceding agreements.

It is not strange if the Berlin-Brussels agreements and the St.Mâlo declaration could evoke misunderstandings for they contradict each other. The Berlin-Brussels grand bargain wanted the ESDI to have a WEU-NATO framework, intertwined though separable, and the St.Mâlo declaration wants the ESDI to function separate from and next to NATO. The European Council reacted positive to the St.Mâlo declaration. “At the same time, the December 1998 Vienna summit’s ‘Presidency Conclusions’ noted that ‘the reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European States, including the obligation of some Member States within NATO’ “(Hunter, 2002, p.32). Clearly, an explanation of the above by NATO and the EU could help to provide for more understanding in the difficult agreements, especially the words ‘separable but not separate military capabilities’.

The Franco-British meeting in St.Mâlo was caused by a mutual concern about the lack of EU military capacity during the conflicts in Bosnia and later on, Kosovo. Looking at this defence meeting, one should take into consideration that it was the UK that renounced military intervention at the start of the Yugoslav conflict. Moreover, the UK, after not signing the European Monetary Union Treaty (EMU), was afraid that it could come across as not very interested in the European cause of integration (Sloan, 2003, p.172). During the Balkan (Yugoslavia) conflicts, the EU showed the world that it not only lacked capabilities and assets in order to act, but it was not resolute as well. In other words, the EU demonstrated that it was not able to provide for its own security. “The lack of military instruments to support the policy aims of the Union, even before the humiliating events of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, contributed to pressure for the development of an EU defence dimension” (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p.190). Furthermore, European states felt that they were too much dependent on the US. The Balkan conflicts and the St.Mâlo Declaration had been the cause of the trans-Atlantic debate about the question whether or not to establish a European Defence Organisation. It was made clear in St. Mâlo that the ESDI should be able to provide itself with information, communication and military capacity in order to exclude US dependency. Furthermore, the Declaration also included the notions that “military action would


take place ‘when the Alliance as a whole is not engaged’, and that these European capacities should be developed ‘without unnecessary duplication’ “(Hunter, 2002, p.31). Looking at these goals, it is difficult to make someone understand that the EU wants to obtain an autonomous European Defence Organisation with the same capacity as the NATO on the one hand, but on the other hand, stating that there may not be two NATOs within Europe. Given the fact that NATO, with 28 member countries, consists of 21 EU member states, one could also question if an ‘extra’ defence organisation in Europe is really necessary. Still, it was the ‘Kosovo syndrome’ which led to the establishment of the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) in 1999 (Howorth, 2007, p.207).

Figure 6 - Europe: NATO and EU countries (Source: Tamara Kipp)



In the same year, at the Helsinki EU summit (1999), the French President Chirac and the UK Prime Minister Blair initiated a proposal that would stimulate a European defence force: Rapid Reaction Force. This defence force is also known under the name: Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG). The EU Council at Helsinki decided that the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) could carry out European military missions and could execute the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ (Howorth, 2007, p.103). “The main elements of this Force were to be *60,000 troops, 100 ships and 400 aircrafts, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year*” (Howorth, 2007, p.103). And yet, “a well-trained integrated armed force that is able to carry out a military operation is missing” (Doel, 2004, p.8). In short, the Headline Goal Task Force (or: RRF) remains an ambition that, even at this moment, is not yet in touch with reality. This was also acknowledged at the EU Thessaloniki Summit of 2003. Though, under “the Berlin Plus arrangements of 2002, it was declared that the EU enjoys ‘*assured access to NATO planning*’, ‘*presumed access to NATO assets and capabilities*’, and a pre-designated Europeans-only chain of command under the Deputy Supreme Commander Europe (DSACEUR)” (Howorth, 2007, p.102). In other words, because the EU is not ready yet to execute large scale military operations, it can count on NATO’s support.

Finally, looking at Europe's violent history, the question remains why Western Europe did not choose for its own military institutions and defence organisation. The Cold War drove a wedge between the Western and Eastern part of the world, that is to say: the capitalist west and the communist east. But still, Western Europe decided to be military dependent on the United States within NATO by the 1992 Petersberg Declaration and subsequently the 2002 Berlin Plus Agreement. The European Defence Agency (2004) could be considered as a step towards a European Defence Organisation, although it does not receive a lot of funds from its Member States. One could question this decrease of defence funds, because an enlargement of the defence funds could result in financial gain: when European countries enlarge the capacity to produce defence goods, European companies and simultaneously European workers will benefit as well. Furthermore, the EU could also improve its position in the defence industry. This competitive environment can enhance the chance of gaining the 'best product for the best price'. However, the EU does not strive for an increase of the defence budget. "As French Minister of Defence Alain Richard put the point in May 2001: 'the complexity of technology and the high level of fixed costs is a strong incentive for us (Europeans) to join our forces and share the effort. The only way for our companies and research agencies to achieve the highest standards, is to combine our assets and capabilities' "Hunter, 2002, p.81).

Figure 3 – Time-line (Source: Tamara Kipp)

2. Chapter two

THE NETHERLANDS: POLITICAL BACKGROUND – DEFENCE POLICY

The question whether or not to create a European Defence Organisation as part of the EU (or EEC), next to NATO or as part of NATO has always been subject of discussion on the North American continent, the European continent and therefore in the Netherlands as well. As far as this discussion is concerned, the political points of view of the three largest confessional (CDA), social (PvdA) and liberal (VVD) political parties in the Netherlands are investigated in this chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to answer the thesis' sub-questions. Does the political party (PvdA, CDA or VVD) consider a European Defence Organisation necessary? Would the political party like a European Defence Organisation to be part of the EU or NATO? Moreover, do these points of view reflect the points of view of their Second Chamber Committee of Defence as well? In order to put the answers in perspective, figure 6 (p. 8) and figure 4 and 5 in the appendices (p. 73) demonstrate the amount of EU countries that are member of NATO as well. In Chapter four (Conclusions), the central question will be answered: Do the PvdA, the CDA and the VVD consider a European Defence Organisation as an addition to NATO, valuable and necessary?

As one can observe in figure 7 on page 74, the Dutch Defence expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product have been cut in half from 1985 (2,8%) until 2008 (1,4%). This change can have many causes. The end of the Cold War ended the military threat from the East.

Figure 8 - The increase of the working population **Figure 9 - Unemployment and economic growth**





Figure 8 (Source: CBS, 2004, “Werkloosheid en economische groei”)

Figure 9 (Source: CBS & Hijman, 2004, “Sociaal economische trends”)

“It had been clear since the early post-cold war period that allied defence budgets would fall, as indeed they have done, and thus there would be less work for existing European defence industries” (Hunter, 2002, p.77). In other words: defence became less important in the Netherlands. In addition, the development of the unemployment rate and the development of the economic growth over the years can also be considered as causes. When the unemployment rate is high, there might be less money left for the defence budget. The same goes for the economic growth: when there is a negative economic growth, a state might consider to decrease its defence expenses and not to invest in new defence equipment. As one can observe in figure 8, this was not applicable to the Netherlands. However, the Dutch defence budget did not increase although the amount of unemployed dropped. In order to find out the reason why the Netherlands decreases its defence budget, despite a propitious economical climate, one could start a whole new investigation. In figure 10, one can also see that the state expenses on defence have increased in 2006. This is due to the participation of Dutch defence forces in international military operations (Afghanistan), which have increased the defence costs. As one can observe in figure 11, the EU expenditures have increased as well. This can also affect the defence budget, leaving less money that can be spent on defence. Despite the decrease of defence expenditures, the Netherlands still has great ambitions for defence (Homan, Kreemers & Osinga, 2001, p.73). The Netherlands is striving towards multilateral and bilateral cooperation to enhance the efficiency of the individual EU member states, which can unite the EU military capacities (Homan, Kreemers & Osinga, 2001, p.73).

Figure 10 - State expenses on foreign policy




(Source: CBS, 2007, “Uitgaven buitenlandse beleid sterk gestegen”)

This development might lead to cost savings. In addition, the level of ambition determines how much the Netherlands contributes to the HHG. “The Netherlands has a big share: 17.3% of the size of its own defence force is reserved for HHG tasks” (Homan, Kreemers & Osinga, 2001, p.73).


Figure 11 - Contributions European Union

Milliard of guilders (1 euro = 2,20371 guilders)



(Source: CBS & Gert Buiten, 1997, “Bijdrage Rijk aan EU even hoog als overheidstekort”)

Figure 12 - Dutch expenditures international cooperation



(Source: Arkesteijn, 2006, p.6)

As one can see in figure 12, the Netherlands has increased its expenses for NATO, and decreased its expenses for the European Security and Defence Policy. This negative trend is also shown in figure 13 (next page). One can observe in this figure that the Netherlands is decreasing its budget for the NATO Stabilisation Force in Iraq, but it is increasing its contribution to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. However, the contributions of both military operations exceed the expenditures for Europe. Even the Dutch contribution to the UN exceeds the European contribution. From figure 12 and 13, one could conclude that the Netherlands does not consider the EU as the best organ that is capable to execute military crisis operations.

Figure 13 - Dutch expenditures for the execution of crisis management tasks

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<i>mln euro</i>					
Europe	91,1	73,1	63,8	43,8	34,7
Stabilisation force Iraq	—	—	36,5	79,9	42,2
Afghanistan	—	42,0	63,6	33,2	75,7
UN-contributions	53,8	44,6	34,3	65,4	53,0
Remaining	53,4	12,9	15,7	21,0	9,6
Total	198,3	172,7	214,0	243,2	215,1

(Source: Arkesteijn, 2006, p.6)

In this chapter, one can observe that the decrease of defence expenditures does not cohere with the governing parties of that time. The Dutch defence budget, irrespective of the political parties that were seated in government, always decreased (see: figure 7, p.75). Thus, one can conclude that in the Netherlands, the decrease of the defence budget has nothing to do with political beliefs. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the history, beliefs and values of the PvdA, CDA and VVD in order to comprehend their current positions on the Defence Policy (European Defence Organisation). The political points of view will be addressed in the following order: the PvdA in 2.1, the CDA in 2.2 and finally, the VVD in 2.3.

2.1 PVDA

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the thesis' sub-questions. Does the PvdA consider a European Defence Organisation necessary? Would the political party like a European Defence Organisation to be part of the EU or NATO? In addition, do these points of view reflect the points of view of their Second Chamber Committee of Defence as well?

2.1.1 Party History


The Party of Labour (PvdA) is a social-democratic party that, in 2009, has 33 members seated in the Second Chamber and 14 members seated in the First Chamber of government (PvdA, 2005, "De geschiedenis van de Partij van de Arbeid"). Furthermore, six PvdA members are seated as Ministers in the Government. In addition, the PvdA has 7 seats in the European Parliament. At this moment, the PvdA exists for 63 years and within these years of existence, the PvdA has been the largest political party in the Netherlands several times. To continue, there were moments in its history that the PvdA was even able to win one third of all the Dutch government seats. Furthermore, the PvdA took part in 33 government cabinets. "That is why this party is being considered to play an important role in the post War era in the Netherlands" (Parlement en Politiek, 2006, "60 jaar PvdA").

The PvdA was established in 1946 due to a fusion of three other political parties: the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDAP), the Liberal Democratic Alliance (VDB) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The working class, which had been the centre of its existence, had to make way for the ideology that individuals should be granted opportunities in order to develop themselves in such a way that it contributed to society as a whole (PvdA, 2005, "De geschiedenis van de Partij van de Arbeid"). In 1949, the PvdA declared to be in favour of NATO membership. However, it stated to be against military intervention in order to grant Indonesia (former Dutch colony) its independency. In the 1960s, the PvdA declared not to agree with NATO's policy of that time. Moreover, in 1981, the PvdA expressed that the placing of nuclear weapons (cruise missiles) in the Netherlands was not in line with their political ideology. Therefore, many PvdA members took part in the Amsterdam 'peace demonstrations'. In addition, the party did not want the Netherlands to take part in the war in Iraq (Dam, 2007, "Niet klakkeloos achter Amerikanen aanlopen"). However, according to the CDA, the PvdA was in favour of investing in defence equipment in 2002. In 2009, the CDA states: "That is why we have supported the decisions of the 'Kok II-Government' to take part in the Joint Strike Fighter Project" (Knops, 2009, "JSF/Vervanging F-16").

In brief, the PvdA is a political party which is generally not in favour of the use of military force and military intervention, but in favour of international solidarity. Looking at the anti-military beliefs (against use of force) of the 1950s, the political ideology has changed a bit over the years.

At this moment the PvdA has not such strong anti military beliefs as it did in its years of establishment. However, the PvdA is still dedicated to diplomacy and only sees the use of force necessary when the party can exclude all the aspects in order to ensure that military intervention is based on legitimate reasons. Therefore, the PvdA sees executing humanitarian actions and peace missions as NATO's core activity.

Figure 14 – PvdA Amount of seats in Second Chamber



(Source: Parlement en Politiek, 2005, "Aantal zetels in de Eerste en Tweede Kamer")

2.1.2 PvdA political points of view

"Ever since the seventies of last century, PvdA members of government have tried to use the European cooperation and unification in order to obtain a more efficient defence policy" (Eijsink, 2007, p.17). Even Henk Vredeling, the first PvdA Defence Minister (1973) made efforts to make defence policy part of the European integration, but this was not received well in Europe due to the relation with NATO during the Cold War. According to the PvdA plan 'In service of The Netherlands, in service of the world' (2007) by the Second Chamber Defence Committee of de PvdA, the political party still believes that the Dutch military forces could cooperate more efficiently internationally. In addition, international cooperation should be more than a series of simple contributions as well. In this regard, the PvdA values international cooperation in the field of military training, assets and an excessive international cooperation on certain military capacities as well (Eijsink, 2007, p.30). Thus, cooperation with other European defence forces would contribute to the efficiency level. The PvdA focuses on a cooperation project with the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, France, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and a cooperation

project to establish one air transport command within NATO. The PvdA realises that in order to obtain more international cooperation, a certain amount of effort and investments is required and therefore the results will only be visible on the long term (Eijssink, 2007, p.30).

The Dutch contribution to the EU Battle Groups (HHG) and the NATO Response Force (NRF) will stimulate integration between the four armed services of the Dutch military force: the navy, the air force, the army and the constabulary (military police). Simultaneously, this strengthens international cooperation. This is necessary in a world where conflicts and especially terrorism cross borders more and more, and where a distinct enemy is not always obvious. Above all, “a UN mandate should always be required in order to make military intervention legitimate” (Eijssink, 2007, p.10). Nevertheless, cooperation with and between Dutch and international armed forces is not enough. Cooperation should also be sought in other governmental and non-governmental organisations concerning peace and security. However “since cooperation is not always noncommittal, cooperation should be directed tightly and can even be extorted” (Eijssink, 2007, p.11).

The PvdA states that, in order to meet the requirements of an increased international military cooperation, the Dutch military forces should be modernised in such a way that the amount of its activities can be enhanced. Though, the PvdA does not clarify how it wants to obtain this modernisation of the defence forces. Cooperation between and within Dutch armed forces should be increased and the Dutch defence force has to enhance international cooperation as well. This modernisation will allow the Dutch military forces to act in demanding international crisis and peace operations which can last for a long period of time. The Netherlands, “as a medium-sized country, should focus on the organisational middle spectrum” (Eijssink, 2007, p.13) for it can not be considered as a large country with unlimited military capabilities. One of the main tasks in Dutch defence policy is to enhance, in international context, the international legal order and stability world-wide. Therefore, the PvdA would like to invest in the annual defence budget. According to the PvdA, a more active and efficient defence force will need an investment of 3.6 billion euros that in the long term will lead to costs savings (Eijssink, 2007, p.33). Of these investments, 52 million euros will be spend on international defence cooperation in 2009 (Eijssink, 2007, p.33). To save expenses, various actions should be taken, for example: the closing of a military airport, the disposal of three F-16 squadrons (air force), 44 Leopard Tanks (army) and three frigates (navy). “Little patrol vessels that are more concentrated on coast guard duties could replace frigates entirely or partly, which can lead to considerable savings in the personal and material operation” (Eijssink, 2007, p.14). Contrary to Eijssink’s statement to dispose of navy materials, the EU (with France and the UK) likes to establish a carrier Battle Group. Contrary to Eijssink, Wiersma states: in order to be able to act during crisis operations, “[...] EU member states should increase their own military capabilities for certain military capacities are needed in order to join European operations” (2008, “Nieuwe Voorzitterschap”). The PvdA likes some aspects of the ‘defence

company' to become privatised (services, logistic support) for this will reduce the defence costs as well.

The ESDI should be stimulated in order to share responsibilities within NATO. However, "EU decision making should go hand in hand with the US acceptance of a relative European autonomy" (Koenders, 2000, "Een Europees Leger?"). This means: the PvdA does not want to create a European super state (PvdA-fractie, 2007, "PvdA-fractie: geen referendum"). "With the PvdA seated in the government, the Netherlands will not follow the Americans gratuitously" (Van Dam, 2007, "Niet klakkeloos achter Amerikanen aanlopen"). However, the PvdA does not believe in threatening with military power if such power is not being used on rare occasions. "The events in the former Yugoslavia have made the necessity for military action painfully clear" (Koenders, 2000, "Een Europees Leger?"). The EU should, just like superpower Russia, China and the US, be able to act quickly: like a beacon that is able to challenge international threats. "A European initiative is necessary in order to achieve a better organisation of the world, which has become increasingly disorganised" (PvdA, 2009, p.5). Looking at these statements, one can conclude that, despite the party's military ambitions, the PvdA does not want the EU to become a federal state which can provide for its own security and can execute military operations without the support of NATO or the UN. "Put under the charge of the 'Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe' or the United Nations, the EU should be willing to simultaneously execute military missions within and outside Europe" (PvdA, 2009, p.10). According to the PvdA European Parliament Election Programme of 2009, the EU needs an independent defence force in order to achieve these goals and on the long term, this permanently available defence force should consist of national defence forces.

In addition, according to Van Dam (personal interview, March 11, 2009), the PvdA considers the European Security and Defence Policy as being part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy to be a positive thing. Nevertheless, "this only concerns a coordination mechanism; there will not be a European Army" (Van Dam, personal interview, March 11, 2009). Furthermore, the ESDP should act as a EU defence instrument which is established independently and which is not an addition of NATO (Van Dam, personal interview, March 11, 2009). Van Dam also indicates that NATO and the EU will be more intertwined in the future, for NATO is more and more becoming a political organisation. "The ESDP gives the EU the possibility to operate independently without the Americans and the Canadians and with countries that are on the one hand part of the EU, but on the other hand, not part of NATO" (Van Dam, personal interview, March 11, 2009).

In short, the PvdA is striving for a more efficient defence policy, based on international cooperation. Eijssink (2007) likes to invest in defence on the one hand, but on the other hand, certain military equipments should be disposed of in order to create cost savings. Eijssink (PvdA Member of Parliament and spokeswoman defence) and Wiersman (2008) within the PvdA contradict each other on this matter: Wiersman (Member EU Parliament for the PvdA) states that

Dutch defence capabilities should be increased, whereas Eijssink declares that certain defence capacities should be disposed of. Moreover, Koenders (Minister for Development Cooperation) reveals in 2000 to be in favour of European autonomy and the 2009 PvdA European Parliament Election Programme likes the EU to fulfil a role like the superpowers Russia, China and the US. However, the Second Chamber Committee of Defence says in 2007 that the PvdA does not want to create a European super state. In addition, Van Dam (Member of Parliament and the PvdA defence committee) notes in 2009 that the PvdA is against the creation of a European Army. These three PvdA statements are difficult to link and not easy to comprehend. So, it can be assumed that within the PvdA, differences of opinion exist about the use and size of the Dutch armed forces. Furthermore, it remains unclear how the PvdA (disposal of military assets) ideas of costs savings will be explained to NATO, since NATO will not be enthusiastic about granting military assets and capabilities to a country that does not honour its NATO agreement of defence expenditures and does not want to invest in military equipment. One can observe that since its establishment, the PvdA has shifted from a party which is generally against the use of force and military intervention, to a party that is positive towards an EU defence instrument as part of the ESDP which, with military intervention, can export international peace and security.

2.2 CDA

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the thesis' sub-questions. Does the CDA consider a European Defence Organisation necessary? Would the political party like a European Defence Organisation to be part of the EU or NATO? In addition, do these points of view reflect the points of view of their Second Chamber Committee of Defence as well?

2.2.1 Party History

In 2009, the Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA) sits in the Dutch government with the PvdA and the Christian Union (Christen Unie). The party has eight ministers seated in the government: eight Ministers of which one is also Prime Minister (Balkenende).

The CDA (Christian Democratic Alliance) was established in 1980 as a fusion of three other confessional parties: the KVP (Catholic People's Party), the ARP (Anti Revolutionary Party) and the CHU (Christian Historical Union). These three parties already operated in a federal alliance since 1973. Within the three parties, the role of the Bible was always discussed. "This fundamental discussion ended in a victory for the moderate Christians: the Bible should only serve as a guideline for political actions" (Parlement en Politiek, 2005, "25 jaar CDA"). Therefore, it became able for non Christians to be a member of the alliance. 'On its way to a responsible society' was the slogan of the three allied parties in 1972. In 1976, Dries Van Agt became party leader and stated: 'we will not bend to the left and we will not bend to the right' (CDA, 2009, "Geschiedenis van het CDA"). In 1990, the CDA had the following starting points: responsibility, justice, solidarity and using Gods tools well. The term 'responsibility' in this slogan was stressed (Parlement en Politiek, 2005, "25 jaar CDA"). In the 1980's the CDA was most popular and became the largest political party in the Netherlands in 1982, 1986 and in 1989. After 1989, election victories did not occur until 1998. In 2002 and 2003, the CDA regained its status of the largest political party in the Netherlands. The CDA report 'new roads, fixes values' of 1995 was followed by the election program 'Competition of Ideas'. "More than 30.000 CDA members and constituents made suggestions for the program" (CDA, 2009, "Geschiedenis van het CDA"). With Balkenende as party leader, the CDA has expressed that norms and values should return to society. In 2002, with the PvdA (and PvdA Prime Minister Kok) as largest party in the government and CDA in the opposition, it was decided that the Dutch F-16 defence aeroplanes could not be employed in the future. On the basis of this decision, the CDA likes to invest in defence in order to obtain the best aeroplane for the best price and which can provide for the best opportunities for the Dutch industry. "That is why we have supported the decisions of the 'Kok II-Government' to take part in the Joint Strike Fighter Project" (Knops, 2009, "JSF/Vervanging F-16). Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, as Minister of Defence during cabinet 'Balkenende I', became NATO's secretary general from January 1st 2004 until Augustus 2009.

In short, the CDA is a political party which operates in the middle spectrum of political ideologies: religious involvement in social problems and the preservation of the Christian values. Its political beliefs are thus considered to be both social progressive and conservative (Christianity). The CDA is a political party with is situated between the liberal right (VVD-capitalism) and the social left (PvdA-labour). However, its views can be considered conservative: responsibility, Christian norms and values are the basis of its ideology. The Christian Democrats value Defence and believe that the government needs to invest in the Dutch armed forces.

Figure 15 – CDA Amount of seats in Second Chamber

	Votes percentage	Amount of seats Second Chamber	Gain/loss of seats	Amount of Ministers
1977	31,9	49	+1	10
1981	30,8	48	-1	6
1982	29,3	45	-3	10
1986	34,6	54	+9	7
1989	35,3	54		7
1994	22,2	34	-20	0
1998	18,3	29	-5	0
2002	27,9	43	+14	6
2003	28,6	44	+1	8

(Source: Parlement en Politiek, 2005, "25 jaar CDA (1980-2005)")

2.2.2 CDA political points of view

For the Christian Democrats, the EU is not only a common market, but a community of values and accordingly, a political union where a security policy should be embedded (Knops, personal interview, March 12, 2009). Fifteen years ago, the CDA was more trans-Atlantic focussed than in 2009. At this moment, the CDA has shifted its focus a bit more to the EU than in 1994. The entirely trans-Atlantic focus was due to the Cold War: the US had been an ally to the Netherlands since WW II and that was all there was to it. At this moment there is more room to look at other defence policy possibilities, for the Netherlands is not bending under a large security threat like the Cold War. Still, the CDA clearly states that NATO should be the corner stone of the Dutch and EU defence policy.

After years of not being a full member of NATO, France has restored its full membership. "The French are giving up their self-imposed isolationism, which caused their army to lag behind the US and UK" (Van Herpen, 2008, p.1). Furthermore, with its full NATO membership, France hopes that its defence industry will profit from being part of such a large military organisation. This

French ambition goes for the EU as well. According to Knops, the seemingly sympathetic French movement of President Sarkozy to establish a European Defence will always fail whenever there is no political uniformity (Knops, personal interview, March 12, 2009). If there is more European uniformity within NATO, the EU can counterbalance the Americans who have always decided what happened within NATO because European countries were so much divided amongst each other (Knops, personal interview, March 12, 2009). However, the Netherlands should still consider the US to be its first ally. Furthermore, “lasting American involvement and interest in NATO’ must go hand in hand with ‘European consensus on and willingness to make a full contribution to resolving the international security issue’”(CDAWI, 2007, p.43).

The CDA welcomes the further development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that is based upon equal cost sharing within the EU. Furthermore, it is wise to prevent the technological gap between the US that spends 4% of the GDP on Defence, and Europe, with countries that spend 1.8% of the GDP on Defence, to become wider (CDAWI, 2007, p.11). Nevertheless, the EU can not cope with more responsibilities and an expansion of operability for it is not even capable to meet the current ambitions. Therefore, the CDA stresses that the ESDP should be complementary to NATO, operating only on low risk missions. The low risks missions are for example the EUFOR Mission in Congo, Bosnia Herzegovina and Tchad (figure 10, p. 25). To continue, “a separate headquarters for the EU is not required because the EU can use NATO capacities under the Berlin Plus agreement” (CDAWI, 2007, p.11). For high risk missions, the CDA prefers NATO’s military intervention for it is more experienced. Knops (2009) worries that the European Security and Defence policy will be in vain as long as the EU countries will diminish their defence budgets more and more, up to a point where it goes far below the NATO norm.

The Netherlands should not stop investing in defence during the economical crisis (2009). “A comparison with the crisis of 1930 is permitted when the Netherlands declared to be neutral during the World War I and some years later, the Germans were on our doorstep and we had nothing” (Knops, personal interview, March 12, 2009). “People should start thinking anti-cyclical, because we are in an economic crisis, investing in the JSF (for example) can create a lot of employment, in other words: buying military equipment is just what we need to do right now” (Knops, personal interview, March 12, 2009). In the light of the Berlin Plus Agreement to share intelligence, “Europe can not expect the U.S. to make significant efforts to conduct professional surveillance and then share it with third parties at no charge, even with allies”(CDAWI, 2007, p.48). The EU does not have the money nor the means for a European Army for it falls short in the High-tec area and the Low-tec area (for example: transport). What’s more, the CDA would also like to see a deletion of article 296 of the EU Treaty in order to allow European defence industries to compete. Many countries abuse this article to protect and subsidise their own defence industry for the article says that every member state is allowed to take measures to protect its security in relation to the production of military equipment. According to the CDA, the Dutch industry will

benefit from more free competition in the defence industry for it stimulates the selection of 'the best product at the best price' which the JSF is a good example of (CDAWI, 2007, p.49).

The CDA is against a European Defence Organisation that can operate autonomously next to NATO. "The government holds a monopoly on the deployment of the armed forces, which is inextricably linked to democratic accountability" (CDAWI, 2007, p.7). Even if a European copy of NATO would be made, this would not conceal the political disputes that have been going on the last ten years between France, the U.K. and Germany. The largest EU countries have proved not be one united front. This can create difficulties when the EU is to act quickly during crisis situations, for these countries are the ones that matter in Europe. That is why the CDA considers the French full entry into the NATO as a positive development. "The French are giving up their self-imposed isolationism, which caused their army to lag behind the US and the UK" (Van Herpen, 2008, p.1). In addition, one should not forget that the French industrial lobby hopes that "French armament sales will be boosted after France's return to the military organisation" (Van Herpen, 2008, p.1). Even though France was not an official member of NATO in the military field, France has contributed to NATO nevertheless. In return of the full NATO accession, President Sarkozy expressed, during the EU presidency, its wish to develop a European defence which is not desirable in the eyes of the CDA. According to Van Herpen, "Sarkozy is aware of the fact that a European defence can only be built inside, not outside and against, NATO, will return to the fold" (2008, p.4). However, European cooperation packs that allow European countries to jointly execute military practise and an EDA that pays attention to European economies and defence industries is more than welcome. Moreover, the CDA does not believe that building up a European Defence Organisation next to NATO is necessary when almost every EU country is a NATO member (78%). This can be compared with having to mayors (EU and NATO) in one municipality (Europe): there is a large possibility that these mayors will cost society extra money, although they copy each others work. However, Turkey is not a member of the EU and Cyprus is not a NATO member which causes problems that should be solved. Turkey as a member country of NATO, has a political issue (almost conflict) with Cyprus (EU member state). Turkey does not recognise Cyprus (Greek Cypriots). For this reason, despite the Berlin-Plus agreements (2002), Turkey does not want to share military information, military personnel, capabilities and assets with the EU since this information, according to Turkey, will fall in the hands of Cyprus (Greek Cypriots) – as well as the other way around (Member of the European Parliament Neyts-Uyttebroeck, MA, personal interview, January 30, 2009). This problem between Turkey and Cyprus leads to difficult working conditions within NATO and EU. Still, 78% of all the EU countries are a member of NATO.

Nevertheless, a European Defence Force next to NATO already exists: the EU Battle Groups. The CDA is in favour of these Battle Groups that are one of the outcomes of the Helsinki Headline Goals. In practise, these Battle Groups were hardly employed, same goes for the NATO Response Force which has not been employed yet. Due to the fact that the EU lacks defence assets and

capabilities, “the military structure is not being used” (Knops, personal interview, March 12, 2009). At the NATO Prague Summit of 2002, the NATO Response Force initiative was launched. The NRF is able to deploy 25,000 troops and can execute military operations for period of 30 days or longer. The NRF is an intervention force that is capable to respond to many (security) threats like natural disasters (hurricane Katrina) and terrorist attacks. Though, a lot of Dutch troops are laid down for these kinds of duties which are not being employed. Moreover, longer NRF commitments (longer than 6 month period) are also not being used. Europe falls short in its military assets and capabilities. A European large scale military operation is still dependent of the willingness of the US to lead such an operation and to contribute the military assets that are needed (Homan, Kreemers & Osinga, 2001, p.100). European armed forces are barely deployable in an expeditionary sense, what became painfully evident during the great need for troop deployments in Lebanon and Afghanistan (CDAWI, 2007, p.48). In the CDA book ‘as far as the world extends’, it is stated that “ ‘whenever decision-making of the UN Security Council stagnates or does not do justice to an emergency situation’, the Netherlands must consider to ‘decide to participate in a coalition of available countries, particularly in the case of reciprocal solidarity of the Atlantic alliance and the European Union’ ” (for example: NATO intervention in Kosovo) (2007, p.43). Even the Helsinki Headline Goal remains unfinished in spite of NATO’s effort like the ‘Defence Capabilities Initiative’ and the ‘Prague Capabilities Commitment’, next to the ‘European Capabilities Action Plan’ (CDAWI, 2007, p.48). An extension of the Berlin Plus Agreement is, according to the CDA, desirable. “The committee also advocates a reverse Berlin Plus structure: NATO using EU capabilities, such as the Gendarmerie Force” (CDAWI, 2007, p.50).

All in all, there is no better alternative for NATO as security provider. “For NATO to remain the most powerful defence organisation in the world, NATO should not increase an admission of other countries” (Knops, personal interview, March 12, 2009). Not only does NATO have more experience, but it has more defence capacity as well. During the Kosovo conflict, the ethnic cleansing of the Serbians in this part of Yugoslavia could only be stopped by the enormous employment of the American army. The Rapid Reaction Force that was established during the HHG (60,000 troops within 60 days) can not act very fast during crisis operations and conflict prevention. According to Knops (2009), the NRF is therefore more likely to be used than the RRF. “With the acceptance of the Solana paper ‘A secure Europe in a Better World ‘in December 2003, the EU has developed a serious strategy [...]’ (CDAWII, 2007, p.47): at this moment, the EU’s military force has extended to such a degree that it is able to take over NATO operations (SFOR Bosnia). In figure 10 (p. 25), the EU military and civilian operations are shown. On this map, one can observe that the EU does already execute small military operations within and across EU borders. In addition, the Netherlands periodically operates in the Battle Group unit as part of the ‘rapid-deployment initial’ of the RRF.

Figure 10.



(Source: Council of the European Union, 2009)

According to the CDA, the Netherlands should not restrain itself to only focus on the EU and NATO, for these growing organisations simultaneously take with them a growing indecisiveness and disunity, not desired in crisis situations. Consequently, ad hoc coalitions have arisen not to replace NATO or the EU, but it is sometimes the only way to ensure immediate action – for example: Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq (CDAWI, 2007, p.52). The CDA does believe it to be a wise decision to strengthen the ESDP since it strengthens NATO simultaneously. The EU is to follow NATO's example of common funding within the ESDP for EU operations.

Additionally, it is preferred that international military operations take place under the command of NATO. Furthermore, the CDA is convinced that European standardisations of military equipment will lower the defence expenditures. The European Defence Agency (EDA) is to facilitate this process and should therefore receive more funds. If the European Defence industries do not cooperate more, the costs of defence material will increase. Moreover, "in order to carry out a strong European foreign policy, the CDA feels that the EU should speak with one voice during international conflicts" (Alting van Geusau et al., 2009, p.3). "We do not support a European army fully subsuming national armed forces" (CDAWI, 2007, p.47). The Community does not even have its own Foreign Policy or a Security Policy. Most importantly, countries will never risk losing their sovereignty to the EU. Besides, European countries have shown to invest too little in defence for it to be sufficient for a European Defence Organisation. The EU Members of Parliament for the CDA agree with the national party ideology on defence (Verhees, personal interview, April 14, 2009).

In short, the CDA is against a European Army that fully subsumes national armed forces: countries should not lose their sovereignty. Nevertheless, the party hopes that the EU countries will unite within NATO in such a way that the EU can gain more say and therefore, counterbalance the Americans. The CDA does not believe that building up a European Defence Organisation next to NATO is necessary when almost every EU country is a NATO member. Furthermore, the party stresses that the ESDP should be complementary to NATO, operating only on low risk missions. In this scope, the CDA is in favour of the Battle Groups, which are one of the outcomes of the Helsinki Headline Goals. In the CDA book 'as far as the world extends' (2007), it is stated that 'whenever decision-making of the UN Security Council stagnates or does not do justice to an emergency situation', the Netherlands must consider to 'decide to participate in a coalition of available countries, particularly in the case of reciprocal solidarity of the Atlantic alliance and the European Union' (for example: NATO intervention in Kosovo). To continue, the CDA hopes that the EU is to follow NATO's example of common funding within the ESDP for EU operations. In addition, NATO should be the corner stone of the Dutch and EU defence policy. The CDA prefers that international military operations take place under the command of NATO. Furthermore, the CDA is convinced that the EDA can provide for European standardisations of military equipment and bring European defence industries together, which will lower the defence expenditures. To

conclude: “lasting American involvement and interest in NATO’ must go hand in hand with ‘European consensus on and willingness to make a full contribution to resolving the international security issue”(CDAWI, 2007, p.43).

2.3. VVD

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the thesis' sub-questions. Does the VVD consider a European Defence Organisation necessary? Would the political party like a European Defence Organisation to be part of the EU or NATO? In addition, do these points of view reflect the points of view of their Second Chamber Committee of Defence as well?

2.3.1. Party History

In 2009, the People's party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) is seated in the opposition since it had been the governing party for 14 years. After losing one of their party members (Rita Verdonk), the VVD has 21 seats in the Second Chamber.

The VVD was established in Amsterdam on January 24, 1948. The VVD was the result of a merge between two political parties: the Party of Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid) and Committee-Old (Comité-Oud). Mr. D.U. Stikker, the founder of the Party of Freedom, became NATO's secretary general from April 21st 1961 until August 1st 1964.

"The VVD did not use the word 'liberal' in its new name (after the merge) because of the negative associations of that time: 'liberalism' after WWII was connected with the economic downturn and the unemployment of the 30's" (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2006, "Geschiedenis Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie"). Nevertheless, the liberal house of the VVD was based on the three liberal pillars: liberty, tolerance and responsibility. The individual should have the liberty to develop itself and make its own choices. However, the liberty of one individual ends where the liberty of the other individual begins. In other words: while using one's liberties, one should not limit the liberty of others. Moreover, when one uses its liberty, one should always be responsible and tolerable. "In the basis program of the VVD, it is stated that 'it is an indispensable condition that mankind should enjoy as much liberty as possible in spiritual respect, political respect and material respect' " (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2006, "Geschiedenis Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie"). From 1952 until 1959, the VVD was a political party that was seated in the opposition. With the exception of 1965-1967, the VVD governed from 1959 until 1973.

Partly due to the changes in society of that time, the VVD enjoyed an enormous growth of party members and party seats from 1972 until 1982. Individualism increased and people did not restrain (limit) themselves to the precepts of their religious group and joined other organisations which were not connected to the religious group. In addition, religion became less important in the Netherlands. The influence of globalisation (television and media) partly caused this change. In 1989, the VVD was seated in the opposition again. However, "the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union led to the revival of the VVD liberal value of freedom" (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2006, "Geschiedenis Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie"). Thus, in 1994, the VVD returned to the government ('Purple' Coalition) and it became the second

largest governing party in 1998. From 15 Mai 1989 until 15 November 1994, Mr. F.W. Van Eekelen who was Minister of Defence in cabinet 'Lubbers II', became secretary general of the WEU.

To continue, the VVD seated in the government in 2002 and 2003. The freedom that some VVD party members (A. Hirsi Ali and G. Wilders) enjoyed within the party caused commotion. Consequently, Wilders left the VVD in 2004 and created its own political party (Party for Liberty - PVV). Since the elections of 2006, the VVD is seated in the opposition, just like the PVV.

In short, the VVD is a political party where the liberal values of liberty, tolerance and responsibility are at the base of its existence. The liberty of an individual is limited when the liberty of the other individual begins. However, responsibility and toleration of other values and beliefs should go hand in hand with the liberal freedom.

Figure 16 – VVD Amount of seats in Second Chamber

	Valid VVD votes	VVD Amount of Seats
Years	%	
1948	7,9	8
1952	8,8	9
1956	8,8	9
1959	12,2	19
1963	10,3	16
1967	10,7	17
1971	10,3	16
1972	14,4	22
1977	17,9	28
1981	17,3	26
1982	23,1	36
1986	17,4	27
1989	14,6	22
1994	20,0	31
1998	24,7	38
2002	15,4	24
2003	17,9	28
2006	14,7	22
© Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Den Haag/Heerlen 1-6-2009		

(Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2007, "Verkiezingen; Historische uitslagen Tweede Kamer")

2.3.2. VVD political points of view

Fifteen years ago, the VVD valued NATO's worth greatly during the threat from Eastern Europe (Wessels, personal interview, March 20, 2009). The reliable NATO was the only solution during the threat of the Cold War and the Yugoslav Conflict, whereas in 2009, without these conflicts,

there is more scope to think of other solutions regarding security (Wessels, personal interview, March 20, 2009). However, at this moment, Russia seems to play a more assertive role (Russia conflict with Georgia – 2008), but an acute threat of that side is not an issue anymore. Anyhow, the VVD is a political party that traditionally has its eye primarily fixed on NATO for Europe's security and defence policy.

Whatever is decided in Europe in the field of security and defence policy, it must not diminish NATO's importance (Wessels, personal interview, March 20, 2009). However, the VVD is, just like the CDA, positive towards European countries that decide for themselves to form cooperation packs in order to execute small, less risky military operations. In other words: the VVD is not against EU military operations. Nevertheless, the VVD feels that dangerous military operations should be backed up by NATO. The VVD is not in favour of a separate European Defence Organisation. NATO should not be decoupled and duplication and discrimination must not occur: the three d's.

On December 8 1998, during the annual NATO foreign ministers' summit, Secretary of State Madaleine Allbright expressed the US wish of an ESDI 'within NATO' and it welcomed EU ambitions to increase its military capabilities (Hunter, 2002, p.33). In addition, Allbright pointed out that "any successful initiative must avoid pre-empting Alliance decision-making by 'de-linking' ESDI from NATO, avoid 'duplication' existing efforts, and avoid 'discriminating' against non-EU members – also known as the three "Ds". 'De-linking' referred to the St.Mâlo declaration that desired for an independent ESDI with an autonomously acting Europe. Or rather, it underlined to respect the Berlin-Brussels agreements. Under the 'de-linking' standard another concern was expressed: 'decoupling'. A decoupled security and defence policy between NATO and the EU could risk European burden sharing within NATO. Moreover, it could strengthen European feelings of security, for the Berlin-Brussels agreement enhanced European military capacity and simultaneously provided the possibility for Europe to operate without NATO's consent. "By this argument, the ESDI should reinforce European confidence in US commitments to European security and thus the political and military coupling of the two sides of the Atlantic" (Hunter, 2002, p.35). To continue, the EU should not discriminate non-EU members who could therefore not be a WEU member. Every country should answer to the same conditions in order to become part of the EU. In the Maastricht Treaty, it was embodied that NATO members that were not EU members could fully participate in WEU operations (Hunter, 2002, p.28). Thus, the 'd' of discriminating was designed to stimulate a European Common Foreign and Security Policy with a EU Defence to press the Petersberg Tasks and "it relates to the abiding sense within NATO of shared experience, shared risks, and a shared political-strategic perspective" (Hunter, 2002, p.38).

The most important aspect of an ESDI within NATO is that duplication must be prevented. The EU should not invest in assets and capabilities which NATO can already provide for. Duplication will result in a waste of money, waste of time, and a waste of scarce resources. Regarding

duplication, the US was especially concerned about an unnecessary waste of money since the majority of the European NATO member states cannot even meet NATO's defence spending standard of 2% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In addition, one could say that, looking at the 1996 Berlin-Brussels agreements, duplication is entirely superfluous. Regarding the duplication of military goods, it is significant to point out the fact that the EU and NATO do not have their own military personnel, capabilities, information and assets. The NATO as well as NATO's defence capabilities are dependent on to what extent the member states are willing to contribute in the defence sphere during NATO-EU operations. In practice, the EU will not enter into a large scale military operation without the support of NATO, thus making the risk of duplication very small.

Regarding the Netherlands, the VVD states that a European Defence Organisation with its own European army is not feasible since the Dutch army already has a great shortage of military personnel and therefore, the party considers it not to be possible to deliver military troops for both NATO and EU (Wessels, personal interview, March 20, 2009). In addition, the VVD considers the EU to be a political dwarf compared to NATO (Homan, Kreemers & Osinga, 2001, p.29) and has noticed that the European countries have big differences in opinion regarding matters of war. "The credibility of the 'adequate political Union' has been put to the test by the lack of decisiveness and will-power of a large number of European Allies of the US during the bloody conflicts in the Balkan-wars" (Homan, Kreemers & Osinga, 2001, p.10). Although the ESDP was established in 1993, the EU was not capable to employ military troops. "The Kosovo conflict has ruthlessly revealed the weakness of the European military ability" (Homan, Kreemers & Osinga, 2001, p. 20). The lack of EU uniformity and decisiveness led to the intervention of the American army, under NATO flag, which ended the conflicts and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.

VVD experts are divided about the question whether or not to install a European Defence Organisation with its own European army. Hans Van Baalen is against the establishment of a European Defence Organisation, whereas the VVD Members within the European Parliament (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) are in favour of the notion. According to Wessels, this is because the Members of the European Parliament (Maaten, Hennis-Plasschaert) have never been in the VVD political group and therefore, did not receive the strong VVD tradition of 'NATO first' (Wessels, personal interview, March 20, 2009). The VVD does feel that it is time that Europe takes more responsibility during international military operations. "West European countries have always been able to fall back on the U.S. in order to prevent and solve international conflicts" (Wessels, personal interview, March 20, 2009). However, the European foreign policy should always be put into effect in close cooperation with NATO. The EU should not have its own military force. The EU and therefore, the Netherlands, will always need the U.S. A good example is the EU catastrophe during the Bosnia conflict with the Serbians: the EU tried to solve this conflict diplomatically with the UN (United Nations Protection Force: UNPROFOR) but forgot that machine guns do not stop tanks. The EU demonstrated that they were not by force and not able

to intervene decisively to solve such a conflict. Within the EU, the lack of decisiveness prevents quick and meaningful intervention. Thus, the EU will always need NATO and the US for military actions.

The VVD is not against the creation of a European Defence Organisation within NATO in order to gain more power within NATO (since the majority of NATO consists of European countries). A European Defence pillar within NATO could contribute to European uniformity and therefore increase the level of decisiveness. When European countries within NATO are not divided anymore, a European bloc (see: figure 4 and figure 5, page 73) can be formed. This European bloc makes it easier for the European countries to say no to U.S. decisions within NATO and therefore, diminish the feeling of 'U.S. rules' within NATO. Nevertheless, it is important that such a European Defence Organisation within NATO should prove its worth. In addition, the Turkish problem with Cyprus (Greek Cypriots) has to be solved quickly "especially when Turkey wishes to become an EU member" (Wessels, personal interview, March 20, 2009). The VVD states that the main condition to allow Turkey to gain EU membership is when Turkey is able to maintain normal contact with Cyprus and vice versa (Wessels, personal interview, March 20, 2009). When Turkey is not a member of the EU, it will increase the possibility that the EU can speak with one voice within NATO, since Cyprus is an EU member. It is important that a European Defence Organisation within NATO has the same military procedures, jargon and doctrines as NATO and a disconnection from NATO must not occur within communication flows (codes). These are the most important aspects during military operations. Otherwise, the vulnerability of NATO will increase during crisis operations. Therefore, "military personnel should enjoy a universal training for this will increase the effectiveness of military operations" (Wessels, personal interview, March 20, 2009). The Rapid Reaction force is in the eyes of the VVD not ambitious enough: 60,000 troops within 60 days is a too long period of time to be able to operate during crisis situations. The EU must have the power and will to operate more quickly. Nevertheless, the VVD does not like the idea of a federal EU government and the idea that the EU will be developed into a super state (Bolkestein et al., 2008, p.2).

In short, the VVD is a political party where the liberal values of liberty, tolerance and responsibility are at the base of its existence. These three values are intertwined and can't be seen as individual values. The VVD considers NATO to be the most important organisation in the field of security and defence policy and nothing should diminish this status. Nevertheless, there are differences in opinion about the question whether or not to install a European Defence Organisation with its own European army. Hans Van Baalen is against the establishment of a European Defence Organisation, whereas the VVD Members within the European Parliament (ALDE) are in favour of the notion. Nevertheless, the VVD declares to be against a European Defence Organisation which can take autonomous action, separable of and next to NATO. However, the VVD is positive towards European countries that decide for themselves to form cooperation packs in order to

execute small, less risky military operations. In this way, the European countries show that they are willing to share the defence burdens equally with NATO. In addition, the VVD feels that it is time that Europe takes more responsibility during international military operations. Furthermore, in order to enhance European uniformity and the level of decisiveness, the VVD is not against the creation of a European Defence Organisation within NATO in order to gain more power within NATO. In addition, the EU must not develop into a federal super state. The VVD sees unanimity as the reason why a European Defence could never work: this has already been proven not to work during the Yugoslav conflicts. Moreover, the VVD considers that duplication with NATO should always be prevented and that the problem with Turkey and Cyprus should be solved without the creation of an extra Defence Organisation. The political party VVD is divided about whether or not to install a European Defence Organisation next to NATO. These beliefs can both be explained by the liberal value of liberty, tolerance and responsibility.

3. Chapter three

NATO's VIEW ON EU DEFENCE POLICY

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the question whether the political views of the VVD, the CDA and the VVD reflect the practical side of NATO's and EU's defence policy. Moreover, the question if a European Defence Organisation is to be part of the EU or of NATO and if this is feasible, usable and efficient will be answered.

3.1. History


After WWII, the European countries were concerned about the attitude and the expansionist policies of the USSR. Even though the Western European countries slowly demobilised their armed forces after 1945, the USSR kept its defence machine working at the same level as it did during WWII. On top of that, the Soviet Communist Party did not keep its goals and ideologies a secret. Josef Stalin communicated to the Allied leaders that he had Polish and Czech nationals which were to rule from Moscow and turn the countries into communist states. Given the fact that 'Stalin's army' was already present in these countries, this statement was taken very seriously. Moreover, "Stalin also told the Allied leaders that it would be in the national interest of the Soviet Union to have a heavy presence in the region so Eastern Europe could serve as a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and what they perceived as European aggression" (The Cold War Museum, 2008, "The Czechoslovakia Coup"). This was enough reason for the United Nations to expect that the USSR would not honour the sovereignty and independence of the European states that were threatened with aggression by the USSR. "The imposition of undemocratic forms of government and the repression of effective opposition and basic human and civil rights and freedoms in many Central and Eastern European countries, as well as elsewhere in the world, compounded these fears" (NATO, 2006, p.16). Furthermore, between 1947 and 1949, some political events really showed Europe that the threat of the USSR should be taken very seriously; Turkey, Greece and Norway were threatened with the loss of their independent sovereign state to Soviet communism; the 1948 communist coup in Prague (Czechoslovakia) represented the destruction of the last existing democratic state in Eastern Europe and Berlin was imposed by an illegal Soviet blockade in April 1948 which prevented food and other supplies to get into Germany.

These events led to the founding of the Brussels Treaty Organisation in 1948, which established the Western Union Defence Organisation (WEU). "It was also the first step in the process leading to the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance" (NATO, 2006, p.17). This Treaty was the result of negotiations between Canada and the US, which were characterised by securing the security of Europe and North America. This led to the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1949 by the Brussels Treaty Members: Iceland, Portugal,

Italy, Norway, Denmark, the US and Canada. “The treaty, a model of brevity and clarity, paved the way for the Alliance’s adaptation to the constantly changing dynamic of international security” (NATO, 2006, p.9). NATO was to protect its members’ security and freedom by political and military means, based on the rule of law, democratic values and respect of human rights. Furthermore, “through the treaty, member countries committed themselves to sharing the risks and responsibilities of collective security and undertake not to enter into any other international commitments which might conflict with the treaty” (NATO, 2006, p.17).

After the end of the Cold War, NATO had to change its role that it had played on the world stage. In the 1990s, a new strategy was formed and NATO “undertook peacekeeping tasks in areas of conflict outside the Alliance, opening the way for a lead role in multinational crisis-management operations and extensive cooperative arrangements with other organisations” (NATO, 2006, p.9). At a Brussels NATO meeting in 1994, the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was established within NATO as a support for WEU military operations. “In this way, the WEU was simultaneously developed as the defence component of the EU and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of NATO” (NATO, 2006, p.245).

Figure 17 Indexed Dutch defence expenditures and price-index rate gross national product



(Source: Arkesteijn, 2006, p.2)

When in 2002 EU decisions and actions in the field of defence were transferred from the WEU to the EU, it changed the relationship between NATO and EU. “In the NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP issued in December 2002, the two organisations ‘welcomed the strategic partnership established between the EU and NATO in crisis management, founded on our shared values, the indivisibility of our security and our determination to tackle the challenges of the new century’ ” (NATO, 2006, p.248). In addition, on September 11 2001, the communist threat was replaced by

the terrorist threat which strengthened the idea that NATO's role was to be the multinational security provider that was not constrained by geographical limits. For example, NATO leads the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from August 2003, assists the Interim Government of Iraq with the training of its security forces in 2004 and it assisted the peacekeeping mission of the African Union in Darfur (Sudan) in April 2005 (NATO, 2006, p.24). In the Netherlands, as one can see in figure 17, the defence expenditures raised significantly due to the terrorist attacks in 2001.

However, these expenditures slightly decreased until 2002. From 2002 until 2005, the defence expenses gradually show a positive trend. This shows that the Dutch government is willing to spend more on defence when there is an acute threat. This threat might also explain why the 'Defence expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product' (see: figure 7, page 74) have remained steady at 1.5% until 2007. Though, it does not explain why the 'Defence expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product' did not raise soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. To continue, one could also question why the 'Defence expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product' fell to 1.4% in 2008. This might have been caused by a diminution of the international threat of terrorism.

Until 2000, no formal relationship existed between NATO and the EU, although "the WEU acted as the interface cooperation between NATO and those European countries seeking to build a stronger European security and defence identity within NATO" (NATO, 2006, p.243). However, this changed after the Balkan wars, when the EU decided to establish the ESDP pillar within the Maastricht Treaty. The ESDP policy had to be coordinated with NATO and NATO would provide for the majority of the functions that once belonged to the WEU. "This led to the development of a strategic partnership (NATO-EU Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) between the two organisations and the agreement of the Berlin Plus arrangements, which provide access to NATO's collective assets and capabilities for military operations led by the European Union" (NATO, 2006, p.243). These decisions established the basis for the two organisations to cooperate in the sphere of crisis management and "to work out the detailed modalities for the transfer of responsibility to the EU for the NATO-led military operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2003, and, from December 2004, in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (NATO, 2006, p.28) (see: figure 10, p.31).

Since this change of character of NATO operations, NATO's defence force had to be adapted in order to execute small-scale crisis response operations. Thus, in 2002, at the NATO Prague Summit (the Prague Capabilities Commitment); the NATO Response Force (NRF) was created. The NRF is able to deploy 25,000 troops and can execute military operations for a period of 30 days or longer. The NRF was an initiative of the US Secretary for Defence, Donald Rumsfeld (2002) (NATO, 2008, "The NATO Response Force - At the centre of NATO transformation"). However, NATO did not like any confusion about whether the EU's RRF (Helsinki Headline Goal) or NATO's NRF

should intervene during military crisis situations. “[...] NATO would need to know what the EU, through ESDP, was contemplating in terms of operation, in order to assess what military assets might not be available to NATO, even though nominally subject to recall – given that the Europeans’ national ‘NATO’ forces and ‘rapid reaction forces’ are, for the most part, one and the same” (Hunter, 2002, p.74). NATO requested transparency on this issue so it could weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the ESDP (EU) and its brother (predecessor), the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) at NATO. One disadvantage of the ESDP is that the EU has not proven to be decisive during crisis situations. During the Yugoslavia Conflict in 1995 (Bosnia) and 1999 (Kosovo), the EU showed the world that it could not act as a powerful, decisive community. However, during the conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008, the EU proved that it could act very quickly. Even the decision-making went very fast: within three weeks, an EU monitoring mission was present in Georgia and that was everything that the EU could do without the support of NATO ” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009).

“In theory, the European arrangements have the advantage, in terms of being able to conduct a crisis management operation that does not require a formal handing over of responsibility from one institution to another – with all of the inherent difficulties that such a process could entail” (Hunter, 2002, p.86). In addition, one should not forget that NATO has no government: the Council of NATO is simply a get-together of representatives from sovereign member states. In the same way, one cannot compare NATO’s secretary general with a minister (of foreign affairs). In 2003, the EU and NATO had a joint crisis management exercise that was based on the Berlin Plus agreements. In the same year, the NATO-EU Capability was established: it examines the relation and interaction of the NRF and the EU Battle Groups, which are part of the NATO-EU agenda under the Berlin Plus agreements (NATO, 2006, p.251).

“During the intervening years (before the conflict in Georgia), it was demonstrated that the EU did not have the combination of military resources and political will to take on operations such as the Implementation Force (IFOR) or Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, and the US provided most of the key resources for the air war against Serbia over Kosovo” (Sloan, 2003, p.170). However, the EU has taken on more responsibility the last seven years. A good example hereby is the 2008 monitoring mission in Georgia, and the EUFOR has taken over the SFOR mission in Bosnia. “At the institutional level, international organisations including the UN, the EU and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are recognising the need to meet threats such as terrorism square on, with all the resources available, and to coordinate this effort rather than to rely on the resources of any single operation”(NATO, 2006, p.28). In addition, “NATO remains an inter-governmental organisation in which each member country retains its sovereignty and decisions are taken jointly by the member countries on the basis of consensus” (NATO, 2006, p.15).

In short, NATO's role in the world changed significantly since its establishment in 1949 until 2009. After WWII, NATO was a collective defence organisation which protected its members against the soviet threat during the Cold War. This Cold War provided the binding factor that held the sovereign NATO member states together. However, the military character of NATO changed during the Cold War since NATO became aware of the fact that military support can be safeguarded through close political cooperation between its member states. This became even clearer during the Yugoslav conflict in the 1990s. The EU proved that the community could not agree on military intervention and thus, the US within NATO had to intervene and solve the Yugoslav conflict at the Balkans. Due to the indecisive, almost ambivalent, attitude of the EU during the Yugoslav conflict, the EU Member States realised that they were not capable to act as a powerful community which is able to protect Europe by military intervention. Looking at the history of the EU, which was based on preventing wars in Europe through the European Coal and Steel Community, it was shown that even 60 years later, the EU needs NATO to protect its security. At the same time, NATO feels that the EU could take on more responsibility in the field of defence. Consequently, a bridge between the European and Atlantic gap was built: the establishment of the ESDP which is supported through the Berlin Brussels Bargain of 1996 and later on, the Berlin Plus agreements of 2002. At this moment, the EU is, just like NATO, operating beyond its borders. Moreover, the EU is really showing that it shares responsibility with NATO by taking over NATO missions. However, the 'Defence expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product' of the Netherlands is with 1.4% still lower than the NATO demand of 2%. So, one can conclude that the defence responsibilities between NATO and the EU are not being fairly shared yet.

3.2. NATO points of view

The gap between the US and the EU Member States within NATO (NATO-EU) still exists because of the fact that every country is still trying to put its nation's interests first. On the one hand, there should be more material cooperation between NATO and EU (and within the EU), but on the other hand, the EU Member States hope that their defence industries are the ones that can benefit from this development. Therefore, there is a very little chance that the most optimal products are being made. Thus, in the field of the defence policy, there are different interests involved. Still, every large conflict can only be solved with large cooperation packs that consist of the EU, the US and Canada" (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). The Netherlands shares this view. However, France likes to execute EU's defence policy in a 'European-only' context. France wants to build up a more powerful EU. However, the EU still consists of sovereign states that, on the basis of consensus, decide whether or not to intervene. Given the fact that the EU is not a federal state, this is a logical consequence. Even the Dutch government tries to stimulate its own defence industry. So, the disunity can be explained without

labelling it with a negative judgement: there is not just one EU Member State to blame for this development.

Given the fact that the EU is not a federal state, it means that the EU has a larger government than, for example, the US. In the 27 EU Member States, there are: 27 ministers of defence, 27 Chiefs of Staff, 27 Defence Staffs, 27 boards of defence material etc. Of these elements, the US has just one of each, and also just one government (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). So, the level of decisiveness of the US is far higher than that of the EU. Only if the EU could become a federal state, the EU could reach the same level as the US in the field of defence and the level of decisiveness. "The vast majority of the Netherlands does not agree with the notion of federalism" (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). Even the EU has not expressed the ambition to become a federal state. All but one of the EU Member States that are not a NATO member, do have the disposal of a NATO partnership. The goal of this partnership is to enhance cooperation, transparency, mutual confidence and it enables the NATO partners to join in action. One could argue that, because of the NATO partnerships, another Defence Organisation in Europe is superfluous. Furthermore, the EU has chosen to focus on the crisis management tasks, also called: the Petersberg Tasks. "It is therefore quite logic that for large military operations the EU always chooses NATO" (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). The EU already has two EU Battle Groups that can act during crisis management operations and peace operations. These Battle Groups can deploy scouting units within five days, which is comparable to NATO's NRF reaction time (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). Large NRF operations have not been executed due to the fact that at this moment, a lot of other military forces are being employed.

General Van Osch is completely satisfied with the Dutch defence policy: "we see primarily NATO as the security provider and as the organisation on which we should focus" (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). NATO provides the Netherlands with interoperability and modernisation, and it enhances cooperation with the US "which the Netherlands need" (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). However, the level of efficiency within the EU can be increased on the level of military cooperation, task specialisation and material cooperation. "A lot of material projects do not get started because of the various interests of the different national defence industries" (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). For example, in the Netherlands, the Ministry of Economic Affairs is involved when there are large defence material projects. The Ministry of Economic Affairs will then assess how the Dutch industry can benefit from it so this industry can get orders. To sum up, the differences of Member States' interests can be one of the reasons why one could argue if an independent European Defence Organisation could work. That is why some argue that there should be a European pillar within NATO. This will

diminish the competition and enhance cooperation. “The Dutch government sees NATO as the organisation in which we can promote our interests the best and more importantly, as the organisation that can enable enhanced European cooperation in the field of defence” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009).

According to General Van Osch (2009), the EDA is at the moment an organisation that does not do projects on its own and therefore, should not receive more funds (personal interview, April 20, 2009). However, a lot of EU countries complain that the EDA does not do enough. Conversely, the EDA states that, because of the small amount (lack) of funds, it does not have enough capacity and people in order to execute and expand its tasks. “At this moment, the EDA is mainly an organisation that organises defence projects and sees to it that countries talk to each other. Furthermore, it increases transparency so that countries see which doctrines they should follow in order to start material projects with each other where there is need for it” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is one of the players that also takes part in this game. The EDA initiates these projects and does not lead them. However, a lot of EU Member States feel that the EDA should be able to take up this task as well. Nevertheless, thanks to the EDA, projects that improve EU’s capability have started, for example: the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the EU Network Enabled Capabilities (NEC). When EU Member States work together in the field of defence material, the defence costs will decrease and the output will increase. It is a lot cheaper to gather one industry and one interest: the product size will increase which will enhance efficiency. Therefore, EU defence material cooperation is very meaningful. In the same scope, “a European Army or a European Defence Organisation which can operate autonomously, next to and independent of NATO is not wise and will only increase the costs” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). In the same way, the level of efficiency is raised by taking care that military units can be employed for both organisations: NATO and EU. The risk of only having multinational units is that they are only used for an international unit. In this way, looking at the consensual decision-making of the EU, every EU Member State has to agree with military employment. Looking at EU’s disunited attitude during the Yugoslav conflict, one could have observed that this does not work well. Therefore, the EU has Battle Groups in which countries can decide for themselves whether or not they would like to join. Nevertheless, one can also argue that one international (multinational) defence unit can increase the level of efficiency (training together, bigger interoperability). However, the political decision-making within the EU will get more difficult and in the end, probably hinder eventual military actions.

“The Netherlands should do whatever it can to not be dependent of third parties, unless we are too small to make our own decisions (when there is no other way)” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). For example: the Netherlands needs ‘strategic airlift’, but our defence budget is too small. That is why the Netherlands shares the costs:

“we buy an airplane with other countries and for the amount (share) that we have bought; we receive flight hours” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). At this moment, France and the UK are even trying to initiate a carrier Battle Group. In other words, the small defence budget compels the Netherlands to form cooperation packs with other EU countries. One could thus question if this small budget in fact advances EU cooperation in the field of defence. However, it does not advance the relationship with NATO and the position of the EU within NATO. The difference between the US that spends 4.0% of the GDP on defence, and the Netherlands that spends 1.4% on defence, does not only bring harm to the EU-NATO relationship of ‘shared responsibilities’, but it simultaneously lets the US know that the Netherlands (as well as the majority of the EU states within NATO) counts on, and is dependent of NATO as security provider. General Van Osch states that “the Netherlands should raise its defence budget to 2% of the GDP” (personal interview, April 20, 2009).

The Turkey-Cyprus problem (almost conflict) does not cause problems for defence cooperation within the EU, but it does hamper defence cooperation between NATO and the EU in almost every way. For example: Cyprus has delivered an Officer of Staff for the Atalanta Headquarters (EU counter piracy mission) on the operational as well as the tactical level. As a result, Turkey could not contribute to the mission any more. One could therefore consider the decision to admit Cyprus to the EU before this problem was solved, as unwise. “At this moment, Cyprus can, and Cyprus does block every EU decision which includes Turkey. At the same time, Turkey blocks NATO cooperation with the EU” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). This is due to the fact that when Turkey decides to cooperate with the EU, which includes Cyprus, it would automatically mean the recognition of Cyprus as a country, which Turkey denies. On top of that, Turkey resents Cyprus for the fact that it blocks Turkey’s admittance to the EU. “This problem is the main cause for bad cooperation between NATO and EU” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). However, it does not stop good defence cooperation within the EU. According to Van Den Doel (2004, p.9), the Berlin-Plus agreements have made Turkey to stop its obstruction because it signed the agreement. However, this is not correct. “Turkey has signed the Berlin-Plus agreement, but under the condition that ‘Cyprus is not involved’ ” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). Nevertheless, the current Berlin-Plus operation in Bosnia (ALTHEA) works well: both NATO and EU are satisfied. However, Cyprus, with the support of Greece, prevents (blocks) the Berlin-Plus agreement to be used one more time (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). Cyprus is capable to block this decision, since a decision can only be reached by consensus. “Because of this conflict, a European Defence Organisation within NATO is impossible” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009).

Due to the St. Mâlo meeting, the Netherlands is more involved with ‘capability planning’: what kind of defence material is necessary within the EU. The 21 countries that are a member of the EU and NATO prevent duplication for themselves: they do not want to spend more on defence than necessary (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). In addition, NATO does not like duplication either since the majority of the EU countries do not spend enough money on defence (figure 7, p. 74). Furthermore, General Van Osch cannot imagine that the EU gets involved with a conflict in which the Americans believe that it is against US’ interests (personal interview, April 20, 2009). Additionally, General Van Osch feels that the NRF and the RRF contribute to the overall capacity of both EU and NATO (personal interview, April 20, 2009). With the NRF and the RRF, there is an extra option: for a NATO operation, the NRF is used and for an EU operation, the Battle Groups are employed. Furthermore, when there is a very large military conflict, the military units can swap operations. To continue, “the US preferred that the EU could solve the Bosnia conflict on its own. However, the EU lacked the political will and the means. Even if the EU had the will, it lacked defence assets and capabilities. This definitely goes for the transport capacity and intelligence” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). Furthermore, there is a very good cooperation between NRF and RRF: there is no competition. At the informal level, there is a very good contact between the Directorate General of the EU military staff and the Directorate General of the International Military Staff (NATO) every two weeks. “There were no clear agreements made about the NRF and RRF, everything is being agreed upon in an informal manner which works really well” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). For example, when there is a conflict which includes Turkey as a NATO member, the NRF is employed. When there is a conflict with a country that is not a NATO member (Sweden), the RRF is used. Consultation takes place when countries are not a member of NATO and the EU.

The EU Battle Groups have the same doctrines and procedures as NATO: NATO is ‘leading’. Moreover, a unit that is employed for an EU Battle Group that will last six months can be offered to the NRF the other six months because the military procedures are the same. The EU and simultaneously the Netherlands see NATO at the basis of military security. In addition, the EU tries to consolidate its position within NATO, but not in competition with NATO: “we have to spend our money as well as we can” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). There are a lot of conditions that a military unit should meet to before it can join a NRF mission. These conditions are presented by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). The EU Battle Groups do not have to meet certain conditions. The political conditions are that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the side of NATO and the Council on the EU side, decide what to employ and how to employ the Battle Group. According to General Van Osch, the EU took action quickly during the conflict between Georgia and Russia, even the decision-making process went fast (personal interview, April 20, 2009). Within three weeks, there was an EU

Monitoring Mission in Georgia. The EU proved its worth during this conflict – “I am very proud” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). During the Yugoslav conflict there were no such things as Battle Groups and at the moment; the EU has two Battle Groups. “Of course the EU was not able to stop the Russians; the EU does not have the capacity. Moreover, NATO did not want to intervene because it condemned the behaviour of President Saakashvili” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). However, just like during the Yugoslav conflict (Bosnia), the US stepped in and challenged Russia openly by threatening Russia that there were consequences to Russia’s actions. The EU does not have that kind of power. Even so, despite the French ambitions, “France does not want an EU Defence Force to intervene in large conflicts, that is why they have returned to NATO” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009).

In short, one of the most important reasons why there is still a Euro-Atlantic gap within NATO is due to the fact that its members are sovereign states that all try to put its nations’ interests first. However the EU Member States and NATO know that large conflicts and crisis situations can only be solved when the Member States join forces. The Netherlands shares this opinion as well. However, the decision-making process which is based on consensus does not contribute and enhance the decisiveness of the EU. This is currently shown by the Cyprus-Turkey problem: Cyprus within the EU blocks every EU decision in the field of defence which involves Turkey. Therefore, the EU needs NATO in order to restore peace and safeguard the security in the EU. The Dutch government sees NATO as the main security provider and has chosen to only focus on this organisation when it comes to safeguarding the security within the EU. Moreover, the relationship with NATO provides the Netherlands with an increase of interoperability and modernisation. The EU can not play this role. Moreover, the Dutch government considers NATO to be the only organisation that can enhance European cooperation in the field of defence. The Netherlands is not yet very enthusiastic about the EDA since it is an organisation that does not execute projects on its own. However, the Netherlands does value that the EDA have started projects that improve EU’s military capability and it values defence material cooperation between NATO and the EU. When this cooperation is effective, the defence costs will decrease and the output will increase. Therefore, a European Army or a European Defence Organisation which can operate autonomously, next to and independent of NATO is thus unwise and will only increase the defence costs. Moreover, since NATO’s memberships and partnerships exclude just one EU country one could argue that another Defence Organisation within Europe is superfluous. The risk of only having multinational units is that they are only used for an international unit. In this way, given the consensual decision-making of the EU, every EU Member State has to agree with military employment. Looking at EU’s disunited attitude during the Yugoslav conflict, one could have observed that this does not work well. Therefore, the EU has Battle Groups that provide for the solution. In this way, the EU countries can decide for themselves whether or not they would like to join. These Battle Groups

enable the EU to take up more responsibility within the EU, which is shown by the actions that were taken by the EU during the Georgia-Russia conflict. Because of the fact that the Netherlands, as a NATO member, has promised NATO to join forces during military operations, the Netherlands is forced to form cooperation packs with other EU countries for it does not have a sufficient defence budget that enables the Netherlands to buy the defence material that is needed. In other words, countries with small defence budgets cooperate on the basis of 'having insufficient defence funds' and therefore, they are dependent of each other. So, the lack of defence funds can be considered as the current binding factor for European countries within NATO and EU. The binding factor of the Cold War was replaced by the terrorist threat and now by the 'defence budget crisis'. To put it in another way, the Netherlands has made the political choice to not reserve a large defence budget in order to support a European Defence Organisation that can act autonomously and next to NATO (see: figure 12).

4. Chapter four

CONCLUSIONS

Looking at Europe's violent history, the question why Western Europe did not choose for its own military institutions and defence organisation could be due to the fact that the European countries did not want to give up their sovereignty and because of the fact that therefore the countries could only make decisions on the basis of consensus. For a long time, the Cold War provided for the binding factor within Europe because it drove a wedge between the Western and Eastern part of the world, that is to say: the capitalist west and the communist east. After the Cold War, Western Europe decided to remain military dependent on the United States within NATO by the 1992 Petersberg Declaration and subsequently the 2002 Berlin Plus Agreement. The European Defence Agency (2004) could be considered as a step towards a European Defence Organisation, although it does not receive a lot of funds from its Member States. One could question this decrease of defence funds, because an enlargement of the defence funds could result in financial gain in times of economical recession: when European countries enlarge the capacity to produce defence goods, European companies and simultaneously European workers will benefit as well. Furthermore, the EU could also improve its position in the defence industry (when defence materials are purchased). This competitive environment can enhance the chance of gaining the 'best product for the best price'. Since the defence industries in Europe are not able to compete with the US defence industry yet, the European countries are dependent on the US. To continue, the EU does not strive for an increase of the defence budget but more cooperation in the field of defence (materials) which makes the EU defence policy more efficient and reduces costs.

NATO's role in the world changed significantly (since its establishment in 1949) until 2009. After WWII, NATO was a collective defence organisation which protected its members against the soviet threat during the Cold War. This Cold War provided the binding factor that held the sovereign NATO member states together. However, the military character of NATO changed during the Cold War since NATO became aware of the fact that military support can be safeguarded through close political cooperation between its member states. This became even clearer during the Yugoslav conflict in the 1990s. The EU proved that the community could not agree on military intervention and thus, the US within NATO had to intervene and solve the Yugoslav conflict at the Balkans. Due to the indecisive, almost ambivalent, attitude of the EU during the Yugoslav conflict, the EU Member States realised that they were not capable to act as a powerful community which is able to protect Europe by military intervention. Looking at the history of the EU, which was based on preventing wars in Europe through the European Coal and Steel Community, it was shown that even 60 years later, the EU needs NATO to protect its security. At the same time, NATO feels that the EU could take on more responsibility in the field of defence.

Consequently, a bridge between the European and Atlantic gap was build: the establishment of the ESDP which is supported through the Berlin Brussels Bargain of 1996 and later on, the Berlin Plus agreements of 2002. At this moment, the EU is, just like NATO, operating beyond its borders. Moreover, the EU is really showing that it shares responsibility with NATO by taking over NATO missions. However, the 'Defence expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product' of the Netherlands is with 1.4% still lower than the NATO demand of 2%. The difference between the US that spends 4.0% of the GDP on defence, and the Netherlands that spends 1.4% on defence, does not only bring harm to the EU-NATO relationship of 'shared responsibilities', but it simultaneously lets the US know that the Netherlands (as well as the majority of the EU Member States within NATO) counts on, and is dependent of NATO as security provider. The reason why defence, and simultaneously the defence budget, became less important in the Netherlands remains unclear. However, it had nothing to do with the development of the unemployment rate and the development of the economic growth over the years. Furthermore, the decrease of defence expenditures does not cohere with the governing parties from 1985 until 2008. For the defence budget, it does not make a difference whether the PvdA, the CDA or the VVD are seated in government: the defence funds have always decreased. One can conclude that the VVD and the CDA, which claim to have the defence interests' and the defence budget at heart, do not change the defence funds while they are in government. In other words: one could argue if defence really has a high priority on the political agenda of the CDA and VVD.

Another important reason why there is still a Euro-Atlantic gap within NATO is due to the fact that its members are sovereign states that all try to put its nations' interests first. However, the EU Member States and NATO know that large conflicts and crisis situations can only be solved when the Member States join forces. The Netherlands shares this opinion as well. However, the decision-making process which is based on consensus does not contribute and enhance the decisiveness of the EU. This is currently shown by the Cyprus-Turkey problem: Cyprus within the EU blocks every EU decision in the field of defence which involves Turkey. Even though NATO also makes its decisions on the basis of consensus, the large power of the US can compel other NATO members to act as the US deems fit. The EU does not have a country which has the same amount of power as can be compared to the US within NATO. In other words, the EU lacks a country which can cut the Gordian knot. Because of the slow consensual decision-making process of the EU, the EU needs NATO in order to restore peace and safeguard the security in the EU. By comparison, the Dutch government sees NATO as the main security provider as well and has chosen to only focus on this organisation when it comes to safeguarding the security within the EU. Looking at defence expenditures from 2001 until 2005, the Netherlands has increased its expenses for NATO, and decreased its expenses for the European Security and Defence Policy. As said before, this development can be interpreted in such a way that the Netherlands does not consider the EU as the best organ that can execute military crisis operations. Moreover, the relationship with NATO

provides the Netherlands with an increase of interoperability and modernisation. The EU can not provide for these benefits. Moreover, the Dutch government considers NATO, and not the EU, to be the only organisation that can enhance European cooperation in the field of defence. The Netherlands is not yet very enthusiastic about the EDA since it is an organisation that does not execute projects on its own. However, the Netherlands does value that the EDA has started projects that improve EU's military capability and at the same time, the Netherlands values defence material cooperation between NATO and the EU. When this cooperation is effective, the defence costs will decrease and the output will increase. Therefore, a European Army or a European Defence Organisation which can operate autonomously, next to and independent of NATO is considered unwise by the CDA, the VVD and the PvdA: it will only increase the defence costs.

Moreover, since NATO's memberships and partnerships exclude just one EU country, one could argue that another Defence Organisation with its own European Army within Europe is superfluous. The risk of only having multinational units (within a supranational European Army for example) is that they are only used for international operations. In this way, given the consensual decision-making of the EU, every EU Member State has to agree with military employment. Looking at EU's disunited attitude during the Yugoslav conflict, one could have observed that this does not work well. Therefore, the EU has Battle Groups which provide for the solution, since the EU countries can decide for themselves whether or not they would like to join during a military operation. These Battle Groups enable the EU to take up more responsibility within the EU, which is shown by the actions that were taken by the EU during the Georgia-Russia conflict. Because of the fact that the Netherlands, as a NATO member, has promised NATO to join forces during military operations, the Netherlands is forced to form cooperation packs with other EU countries for it does not have a sufficient defence budget that enables the Netherlands to buy the defence material that is needed for international military operations. To put in another way, countries with small defence budgets cooperate on the basis of 'having insufficient defence funds' and they are therefore dependent of each other. So, the lack of defence funds can be considered as the current binding factor for European countries within NATO and the EU. In short, one can state that the binding factor of the Cold War (1946-1990) was replaced by the terrorist threat (2001 - recent) and in 2009 by the 'defence budget crisis'. To put it in another way, the Netherlands has made the political choice that it does not reserve and has the money to support a European Defence Organisation that can act autonomously and next to NATO. Moreover, the small defence budget makes the European countries, and simultaneously the Netherlands, within NATO less powerful and more dependent on the US.

Ever since the seventies of last century, the Dutch political party PvdA has tried to use the European cooperation and unification in order to obtain a more efficient defence policy. The PvdA values this efficiency, based on international cooperation. Eijssink (2007) likes to invest in defence on the one hand, but on the other hand, certain military equipments should be disposed of in order

to create cost savings. Contrary to Eijssinks' statement to dispose of navy materials, the EU (with France and the UK) likes to establish a carrier Battle Group. Eijssink (PvdA Member of Parliament and spokeswoman defence) and Wiersman (2008) within the PvdA contradict each other on the amount of defence equipment as well: Wiersman (Member EU Parliament for the PvdA) states that Dutch defence capabilities should be increased, whereas Eijssink declares that certain defence capacities should be disposed of. Moreover, Koenders (Minister for Development Cooperation) reveals in 2000 to be in favour of European autonomy and the 2009 PvdA European Parliament Election Programme likes the EU to fulfil a role like the superpowers Russia, China and the US. However, the Second Chamber Committee of Defence says in 2007 that the PvdA does not want to create a European super state. In addition, Van Dam (Member of Parliament and the PvdA defence committee) notes in 2009 that the PvdA is against the creation of a European Army. These three PvdA statements are difficult to link and not easy to comprehend. So, it can be assumed that within the PvdA, differences of opinion exist about the use and size of the Dutch armed forces. Furthermore, it remains unclear how the PvdA (disposal of military assets) ideas of costs savings will be explained to NATO, since NATO will not be enthusiastic about granting, through the Berlin Plus agreements, military assets and capabilities to a country that does not honour its NATO agreement of defence expenditures and does not want to invest in military equipment. One can observe that since its establishment, the PvdA has shifted from a party which is against the use of force and military intervention, to a party that is positive towards an EU defence instrument as part of the ESDP which, with military intervention, can export international peace and security. However, the PvdA sees executing humanitarian actions and peace missions as NATO's core activity.

For the Christian Democrats (CDA), the EU is not only a common market, but a community of values and accordingly, a political union where a security policy should be embedded. Fifteen years ago, the CDA was more trans-Atlantic focussed than in 2009. At this moment, the CDA has shifted its focus a bit more to the EU than in 1994. The entirely trans-Atlantic focus was due to the Cold War: the US had been an ally to the Netherlands since WW II and that was all there was to it. At this moment there is more room to look at other defence policy possibilities, for the Netherlands is not bending under a large security threat like the Cold War. Still, the CDA clearly states that NATO should be the corner stone of the Dutch and EU defence policy. Therefore, the CDA is against a European Army that fully subsumes national armed forces: countries should not lose their sovereignty. Nevertheless, the party hopes that the EU countries will unite within NATO in such a way that the EU can gain more say and therefore, counterbalance the Americans. The CDA does not believe that building up a European Defence Organisation next to NATO is necessary when almost every EU country is a NATO member. Furthermore, the party stresses that the ESDP should be complementary to NATO, operating only on low risk missions. In this scope, the CDA is in favour of the Battle Groups, which are one of the outcomes of the Helsinki Headline Goals. These

Battle Groups operate under the political guidance of the EU Council and the character of the mission determines which countries and how many countries will take part in the Battle Group, which consists of approximately 1500 military soldiers. In the CDA book 'as far as the world extends' (2007), it is stated that 'whenever decision-making of the UN Security Council stagnates or does not do justice to an emergency situation', the Netherlands must consider to 'decide to participate in a coalition of available countries, particularly in the case of reciprocal solidarity of the Atlantic alliance and the European Union' (for example: NATO intervention in Kosovo). To continue, the CDA hopes that the EU is to follow NATO's example of common funding within the ESDP for EU operations. In addition, NATO should be the corner stone of the Dutch and EU defence policy. The CDA prefers that international military operations take place under the command of NATO. Furthermore, the CDA is convinced that the EDA can provide for European standardisations of military equipment and bring European defence industries together, which will lower the defence expenditures. The CDA emphasises on the 'sharing responsibilities' with the US (and NATO), also when it comes to the sharing of the defence costs, for international peace and security concerns (EU and NATO simultaneously).

Fifteen years ago, the VVD valued NATO's worth greatly during the threat from Eastern Europe. The reliable NATO was the only solution during the threat of the Cold War and the Yugoslav Conflict, whereas in 2009, without these conflicts, the VVD states that there is more scope to think of other solutions regarding security. Just like the CDA, the VVD considers NATO to be the most important organisation in the field of security and defence policy and nothing should diminish this importance. Nevertheless, there are differences in opinion about the question whether or not to install a European Defence Organisation with its own European army. Within the VVD, two members of the EU Parliament group ALDE differ in opinion; Hans Van Baalen is against the establishment of a European Defence Organisation, whereas Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert is in favour of the notion. Nevertheless, the VVD declares to be against a European Defence Organisation which can take autonomous action, separable of and next to NATO. However, the VVD is, just like the CDA, positive towards European countries that decide for themselves to form cooperation packs in order to execute small, less risky military operations. In this way, the European countries show that they are willing to share the defence burdens equally with NATO. In addition, the VVD feels that it is time that Europe takes more responsibility during international military operations. Furthermore, in order to enhance European uniformity and the level of decisiveness, the VVD is not against the creation of a European Defence Organisation as a European Pillar within NATO in order to gain more power within NATO. Above all, the EU must not develop into a federal super state. The VVD sees unanimity as the reason why a European Defence could never work: this has already been proven not to work during the Balkan conflicts. In addition, the VVD considers that duplication with and within NATO should always be prevented and that the problem with Turkey and Cyprus should be solved without the creation of an extra

Defence Organisation. In short: the political party VVD is divided about whether or not to install a European Defence Organisation next to NATO. These beliefs can be explained by the liberal value of liberty, tolerance and responsibility.

In conclusion, in the field of **ethics**, the PvdA, the CDA and the VVD like to protect EU's peace and security, even across EU borders when there is a conflict or crisis situation which can affect the EU. Furthermore, in the field of **political ideology**, the PvdA (Eijssink) does not value NATO as much as the VVD and the CDA. To continue, the PvdA states that the Netherlands should not follow the US gratuitously within NATO. Moreover the PvdA likes to stimulate European autonomy on the one hand, but on the other hand, the EU should not develop into a European Super State. In contrast to the PvdA, the CDA and the VVD consider NATO to be the most important organisation in the field of security and defence policy and nothing should diminish this importance. In addition, the CDA and the VVD agree with the PvdA that the EU should not be changed into a federal super state. All the three political parties are in favour of more material cooperation within the EU and NATO. Moreover, they all agree that there should be more international (EU-NATO) cooperation when it comes to the training of the military units. The VVD is, just like the CDA and the PvdA, positive towards European countries that decide for themselves to form cooperation packs in order to execute small, less risky military operations. In other words: the three political parties are not against EU military operations. However, they all feel that dangerous military operations should be backed up by NATO. Within the political party, the PvdA is divided on the notion whether or not to establish a European Defence Organisation as an addition to NATO, just like the VVD. However, the VVD is not against strengthening the 'European Pillar' within NATO. Within the CDA, no differences of opinion exist on this matter: the CDA does not want a European Defence Organisation as an addition to NATO. Furthermore, the VVD and the CDA stress that the problem between Turkey (NATO) and Cyprus (EU) has to be solved quickly.

In the field of **finance**, the VVD and the CDA would like the 'Defence expenditures as a percentage of the gross domestic product' to be raised to the NATO standard of 2%. By contrast, the PvdA does not see the need for this GDP increase. To continue, the PvdA likes to invest in defence in order to achieve more efficiency and simultaneously reduce certain Dutch defence capacities in order to lower the costs. The CDA feels the need to invest in defence for it can, momentarily, not answer sufficiently to the challenges of international military crisis operations. According to the VVD, there is a need for more defence personnel. Therefore, investing in defence is necessary. In short, all three political parties like to invest more in defence, but all for different reasons. The PvdA likes to modernise defence so that it will lead to costs savings on the long term and the VVD and CDA feel that an expansion of the defence budget is necessary in order for the Netherlands to be able to take part in international military operations. Moreover, according to the CDA, an investment in defence will stimulate the Dutch (defence) industry and can create jobs during the economical crisis.

To continue in the field of **economics**, the CDA thus values an investment in defence for it will stimulate the defence industry (and simultaneously the Dutch economy). Furthermore, the CDA likes the defence industries to cooperate more in order to get the 'best product for the best price'. The VVD also likes the defence industries to compete more. The PvdA likes some aspects of the 'defence company' to be privatised (services, logistic support) for this will reduce the defence costs.

To conclude: the PvdA, the CDA and the VVD do not consider a European Defence Organisation as an addition to NATO valuable and necessary in the field of political ideology, finance, economics and ethics.

5. Chapter five

RECOMMENDATIONS

Since I have not examined all the political parties of the Netherlands, I recommend an inquiry of every Dutch political party with the same central question in order to see what kind of differences exist on the defence policy and to what extent the political parties share the same views. Furthermore, given the change of the political climate that is subject to polarisation in the Netherlands, it would be interesting to inquire into the conservative right wing party ‘the PVV’ (Party for Freedom), which has won the European elections in 2009 and the socialists left wing party, the SP – these parties are both seated in the opposition. Additionally, I would also recommend an inquiry of D66 which have stated to be in favour of a European Defence Organisation and also has been a winner during the European elections. As one might expect, it would be interesting to know what other political parties within the EU feel about a European Defence Organisation. What is more, I recommend an inquiry into whether the political parties in the US like a European Defence Organisation as an addition to NATO. In addition, it would be very interesting to examine why the Dutch defence budget, irrespective of the political parties that were seated in government, always decreased in the period 1985 until 2008.

6. Chapter six

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7. Chapter seven

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Appendix one**IMPORTANT DATES****1922 – Beginning of Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)****1946 – Beginning of Cold War**

“During a speech at Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, visiting British Prime Minister Winston Churchill proclaimed that Europe was divided by an “Iron Curtain” as the nations of Eastern Europe fell increasingly under Soviet control. Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia all fell under Communist control by early 1948” (US Department of State, “United States Relations with Russia: The Cold War”).

1948 – Brussels Treaty Organisation

Created to develop a common defence system that enabled its members to act as a united front against military, political and ideological threats.

This treaty was the inspiration source for the North Atlantic Treaty.

Signed by: France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK.

1949 – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

A political and military organisation (Euro-Atlantic) that was created to protect the freedom and security of its members.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party of Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such actions as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” (Sloan, 2003, p.230).

Signed by (1949): Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.

1950 – Schuman Plan

French Foreign Minister Schuman initiated a plan that would reconcile France and West Germany.

1952 – European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, April 1951)

A supranational organisation, erected in order to unite the French and West German coal and steel production. This had to prevent another world war and bring economic integration in Europe. Signed by: France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, West Germany.

1952 – European Defence Community (EDC)

Signed by the six ECSC countries in order to create a European army and a federal Europe which would prevent Germany to rearm.

1954 – French national parliament refuses to ratify the EDC Treaty

“The EDC disaster cast a long shadow over the development of a political dimension: a supranational approach to foreign and defence policy was unacceptable to the member states” (Smit, 2003, p.29).

1954 – Establishment of the Western European Union (WEU)

A defence organisation that coordinated the defence policies of its members.

Until the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the Nice Treaty (2001), it was the only organisation that could act during crisis operations and could execute the Petersberg Tasks (1992). “In a declaration attached to the Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty), the role of the WEU was stated to be ‘the defence component of the European Union’ and ‘the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance’ (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p.194).

Created through the Brussels Treaty Organisation in 1948.

Signed by: Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the UK, and West Germany.

1955 – West Germany becomes member of NATO**1955 – Warsaw Treaty Organisation**

Signed by: USSR, DDR, Tjecho-Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Albania.

A political and military organisation created as an anti-pole of NATO (U.S. Department of State, 2009, “The Warsaw Treaty Organisation”).

1958 – European Economic Community (signed in Rome, March 1957)

This treaty would transform Europe into a common market that allows its members to have a free circulation of goods, services, capital and labour.

1961 – The erection of the Berlin Wall**1962 – Cuban Missile Crisis**

This crisis represents the Cold War climax. Tension between the US and the Soviet Union was created when the Soviet Union placed nuclear missiles on Cuban soil. This led to a direct threat of a nuclear war. The US demanded the closure of the Soviet Union missile basis in Cuba. This crisis was solved when the US promised to withdraw its missiles which were pointed at the Soviet Union and vice versa (U.S. Department of State, 2009, “The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis”).

1970 – European Political Cooperation (Luxembourg Report)

The EPC represents EC cooperation on foreign policy issues. National positions could be coordinated through regular meetings that could lead to a decision of common action.

1985 – Schengen Agreement

This agreement removes internal borders which enables persons to travel freely between the EEC member states that signed the agreement.

Signed by (1985): Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands

From 1990, other European states signed as well: Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece and even Switzerland (2008) (European Parliament, 2009, “Schengen Agreement”).

1989 – Fall of Berlin Wall**1990 – ,Wiedervereinigung’: the unification of Germany which absorbed the**

Deutsche Demokratische Republik (communist East Germany) into Bundesrepublik Deutschland (capitalist West Germany).

1990 – End of Cold War**1991 – End of Soviet Union (USSR)****1991 – End of Warsaw Treaty Organisation****1992 – Petersberg Declaration**

During the WEU Ministers summit, it is agreed that all WEU members’ military assets, capacities and personnel are at the disposal of the WEU, NATO and EU.

1993 – The Maastricht Treaty (signed February 7, 1992)

This treaty erects the European Union which rests on three pillars: the European Communities (EC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar (JHA). In addition, the EEC (European Economic Community) transforms into the EC (European Community). What is more, the **European Security and Defence Policy** (ESDP) obtains its legal basis within the treaty: “the progressive framing of a common defence policy which might lead to a common defence” (EU Commission, 2005, “European Security and Defence Policy”).

In short, the treaty stimulates European integration on different levels; not only economic integration and defence integration but, European citizen integration as well. Moreover, the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) was established which led to a common currency within the EU: the Euro.

1994 – European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)

The ESDI was a European pillar within NATO, initiated by the U.S. (Clinton administration). The US felt that Europe should be able to act whenever the US chooses not to intervene militarily and that the EU would hereby benefit from an improved European defence capacity.

According to Howorth, the ESDI was replaced by the ESDP because the ESDI did not work (2007, p.44). “It was dependent on the WEU which lacked political clout, political legitimacy and political credibility, but it also relied for military capacity on borrowing, from the USA, assets which were either jealously guarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or simply not available because they were urgently needed by the US military itself” (Howorth, 2007, p.44).

1996 – Berlin Brussels Bargain

NATO gives the WEU the possibility to act as an effective military organisation.

NATO members agreed on a European pillar within NATO, thus rejecting the idea that the WEU could act autonomously and beside NATO.

The most significant part of the agreement was that the WEU could be head of some operations and could make use of NATO Headquarters (including the Combined Joint Task Force – CJTF), command structures (including the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe – DSACEUR) and assets. Though, these key elements could only be used with the approval of the North Atlantic Council and under the condition of NATO’s surveillance. Moreover, if NATO would need these forces for a NATO operation at the same time, the assets and forces would be withdrawn from the WEU. To put it in another way: NATO will always come first. The advantage of the CJTF was that it could prevent

military command duplication, for military assets and capabilities could be immediately given by NATO. In order to come to meet NATO member state Turkey, it became possible for all the European member states within NATO to join operations led by the WEU. Above all, it was made clear that “[...] the Alliance – i.e., NATO – would remain the ‘essential forum’ for security consultations and pursuit of ‘common security objectives’; that the allies were ready to ‘pursue common security objectives through the (NATO) Alliance, wherever possible’; and that there would be ‘full transparency between NATO and the WEU in crisis management’” (Hunter, 2002, p.16).

1997 – Treaty of Amsterdam (revised Maastricht Treaty)

This treaty provided that every EU member has the right to take part in the WEU decision-making during the **Petersberg tasks**. The Petersberg tasks set the boundaries of military tasks. These tasks indicate that the WEU not only has to be capable to offer humanitarian aid, but also should be able to exercise peace operations - not only to restore the peace, but to compel peace as well.

Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden (as non WEU members) have agreed to meet the Petersberg Tasks Agreement (as an integral) part of this treaty.

In other words: non NATO members and countries that are not even a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace could influence NATO decisions. Moreover, the decisiveness of the WEU to operate during humanitarian responses, peace-keeping and peace-making tasks will diminish greatly. Supported by many EU countries, France was not comfortable with the idea that the United States (with the largest military power and capacity) within NATO would have the final say in whether or not to contribute to WEU operations. “The obvious question was thus posed: would the US be willing, when actually challenged, to take the final step – to implement its pledge, even to put some of its own military personnel under WEU command, outside of the NATO command structure – or would it balk at the last moment” (Hunter, 2002, p.27)? To continue, France did not want the WEU to play its part beyond Article 5 of NATO, but France wanted to give the ESDI more meaning. These disagreements between NATO and the EU were a political power struggle between the US and France. “[...] Championing ESDI was widely believed to be a French motive: it represented a realm of activity (military) in which France could exercise a major leadership role within Europe – a country virtually guaranteed to have decisive economic, and hence overall political pre-eminence within the EU” (Hunter, 2002, p.28). Germany, of course, could have the same power within the EU, but the reluctance to intervene in the Bosnia conflict (1992-1995), showed that it lacked the ability to decide on defence matters at that time (1996).

1998 – St. Mâlo Declaration

Initiated by the UK, the St. Mâlo Declaration was signed by Prime Minister Blair and President Chirac (France). This declaration sets out the ambitions of the EU's second pillar: "the creation of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) with the means and mechanisms to permit the EU nations to act 'autonomously' should NATO not decide to act in some future scenario requiring military action" (Sloan, 2003, p.172).

Blair and Chirac, wanted to re-open the discussion about the relationship between NATO-WEU as well as the relationship with ESDI. What was interesting about the St.Mâlo declaration was not so much about what was said, but more importantly, what was not said by France and the UK. It did not mention the Berlin-Brussels agreements (NATO has final say) and that the ESDI was not to exist next to NATO. "In addition, although the declaration did mention in this context, as part of a list of sources for military capabilities, those pre-designated within NATO's European pillar, it also asserted that 'the Union must have the capacity for **autonomous action**' " (Hunter, 2002, p.30). This last statement has been the cause of the trans-Atlantic debate. It was made clear that the ESDI should be able to provide itself with information, communication and military capacity in order to exclude US dependency. Furthermore, the declaration also included the notions that "military action would take place 'when the Alliance as a whole is not engaged', and that these European capacities should be developed 'without unnecessary duplication' "(Hunter, 2002, p.31). Looking at these goals, it is difficult to make someone understand that the EU wants to obtain an autonomous European Defence Organisation with the same capacity as the NATO on the one hand, but on the other hand, stating that there may not be two NATOs within Europe. Given the fact that NATO, with 28 member countries, consists of 21 EU member states, one could also question if an 'extra' defence organisation in Europe is really necessary.

1999 – Cologne Meeting

The European Council decides that the WEU is included in the EU. As a result, the WEU is abolished.

This also meant that NATO would lose its partner that was able to give immediate updates on the EU's point of view on defence matters, without having to undergo the EU's time wasting bureaucracy. "For years if not decades, the WEU had served as a form of 'buffer' between NATO and the EU" (Hunter, 2002, p.72) and by ending this understanding, a new relationship had to be built up. Regarding the new EU-NATO relationship, France was afraid that NATO could obtain so much influence within the EU that the US would be able to have a say in EU policy. NATO, on the other hand, still felt

uneasy about the fact that France did not change its mind about an ESDP that could act 'autonomous'.

1999 – Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG)

At the Helsinki EU summit, the French President Chirac and the UK Prime Minister Blair initiated a proposal that would stimulate a European defence force: Rapid Reaction Force. This defence force is also known under the name: Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG). The EU Council at Helsinki decided that the **Rapid Reaction Force** (RRF) could carry out European military missions and could execute the 'Petersberg Tasks' (humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping and peace-making) (Howorth, 2007, p.103). "The main elements of this Force were to be *60,000 troops, 100 ships and 400 aircraft, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year*" (Howorth, 2007, p.103). These RRF operations could act autonomous without the help and support of NATO (Doel, 2004, p.27). One of the outcomes of the permanent structured cooperation (HHG) has also led to the establishment of **EU Battle Groups**. The countries that have joined the permanent structured cooperation, have simultaneously compelled themselves that they can make units available that can be employed quickly. "Per mission, a combat group is put together that is right for the specific execution of tasks" (Doel, 2004, p.28). A Battle Group consists of approximately 1500 military soldiers. Moreover, the character of the mission determines which countries and how many countries will take part in the Battle Group. Before a Battle Group mission, a 'framework nation' is appointed that will make its own headquarters available. The EU Battle Group operates under the political guidance of the EU Council of Ministers and consists of the countries that take part of a EU Battle Group mission (Doel, 2004, p.29). "In the Netherlands, it is not required that the national parliament has to approve of the participation to a EU Battle Group, but it is unthinkable that Dutch defence forces are being employed for non article V (NATO) operations when the majority of parliament is against the notion" (Doel, 2004, p.30).

Yet, the chance that the HHG would be put to the test is considered small since it was agreed at Helsinki that the collective defence will remain in the hands of NATO. Furthermore, it was noted by the EU members that they 'will avoid unnecessary duplication and the HHG *does not imply the creation of a European army*' (Sloan, 2003, p.175). Moreover, a collective defence would not be approved by Austria, Sweden, Finland and Ireland for this could end their status as 'neutral countries'. The EU wanted to install permanent political and military bodies within the European Council in order to be involved in crisis management and guide military operations. The Political and Security Committee (**PSC**), a committee within the EU Council, was to take decisions in the political sphere of the CESDP and was to act as a 'consultant' of the EU Council in the

field of foreign policy. In addition, it was responsible for the implementation of Council decisions for the EU member states. The European Union Military Committee (**EUMC**) of chiefs of defence was to act as an advisory body which gave military advice to the PSC and, like the PSC, was responsible for the implementation of EU Council decisions concerning military policy. The EU Military Staff (**EUMS**) was to provide military support and expertise for the EUMC. These three levels commenced to function since March 2000.

To continue, a high representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy was installed as a previous result of the Cologne meeting (1999) and received a second title as secretary general of the European Council – “thus firmly embedding these critical issues in the EU institution based on the member states rather than in the supranational commission; and to these the Europeans added a third title for this official: secretary general of the WEU, as a step on the way forward to an WEU that was being absorbed within the EU, as envisioned by the Amsterdam Treaty (subject to EU Council decision)” (Hunter, 2002, p.66). The NATO secretary general, Javier Solana (Spain), was to fulfil these three positions and commenced with this new EU title at October 1999. Solana wrote the ‘Strategy Document’ that emphasised that the collective defence remained NATO’s concern. As far as Solana’s new position was concerned, it was above all a sign that the EU and NATO were on the same path, therefore not a threat to NATO. This feeling was strengthened during the EU Capabilities Improvement Conference in November 2000, when was made clear that the EU did not have enough capabilities in order to execute large scale military operations like the Petersberg Tasks.

In addition, “the crisis management role of the WEU was transferred to the EU at the Helsinki meeting” (NATO, 2006, p.247). “The Headline Goal also led to the creation of an EU Defence Agency (2004) that focuses on the development of defence capabilities, research, acquisition and armaments” (NATO, 2006, p.251).

2000 – EU Capabilities Conference

At the conference, it was made clear that the EU did not have enough capabilities in order to execute large scale military operations like the Petersberg Tasks. Therefore, the EU was not a threat to NATO.

2002 – NATO Response Force (NRF)

At the NATO Prague Summit of 2002, the NATO Response Force initiative was launched. The NRF is able to deploy 25,000 troops and can execute military operations for a period of 30 days or longer. The NRF was an initiative of the US Secretary for Defence, Donald

Rumsfeld (2002) (NATO, 2008, “The NATO Response Force - At the centre of NATO transformation”).

2002 – The Berlin Plus agreements

Under “the Berlin Plus arrangements, the EU enjoys ‘**assured** access to NATO planning’, ‘**presumed** access to NATO assets and capabilities’, and a pre-designated Europeans-only chain of command under the Deputy Supreme Commander Europe (DSACEUR)” (Howorth, 2007, p.102) “which will always be an American” (Lieutenant General drs. A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009).

By stating that the EU could make use of NATO’s assets and capabilities, NATO stated that not the WEU, but the EU would be head of the ESDI.

However, Turkey as a member country of NATO, has a political issue (almost conflict) with Cyprus (EU member state). Turkey does not recognise Cyprus (Greek Cypriots). For this reason, despite the Berlin-Plus agreements, Turkey does not want to share military information, military personnel, capabilities and assets with the EU since this information, according to Turkey, will fall in the hands of Cyprus (Greek Cypriots) – as well as the other way around (Member of the European Parliament Neyts-Uyttebroeck, MA, personal interview, January 30, 2009). This problem between Turkey and Cyprus leads to difficult working conditions within NATO and EU. However, Neyts-Uyttebroeck stresses to be in favour of admitting Turkey to the EU. According to Theo van den Doel (2004), the possibility that the EU can make use of NATO assets has increased enormously since Turkey as a NATO member country has renounced its obstruction to the Berlin-Plus agreement. However, Lieutenant General Van Osch as Permanent Military Representative to the NATO and EU Military Committee in Brussels has made clear that this is not the case (Lieutenant General A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). In fact, cooperation is still being hindered due to the issue between Turkey and Cyprus. Ever since the beginning, Cyprus blocks every EU decision that involves Turkey, and Turkey does not want to cooperate with the EU (on matters of defence) for this would in their eyes mean the automatic recognition of Cyprus, what Turkey still denies. “Therefore, Turkey has added in the Berlin-Plus agreement that it shares military capabilities and assets with the EU ‘as long as Cyprus does not take part in an EU operation’ “(Lieutenant General A.G.D. van Osch, MA, personal interview, April 20, 2009). According to General van Osch (2009), this is causing poor collaboration between EU and NATO.

2003 – Nice Treaty (revised Maastricht Treaty, signed in February 2001)

In this Treaty, the EU member states have agreed in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (second EU pillar) to enhanced military cooperation. The Treaty enables a group of

EU member states to join forces in military affairs. This enhanced military cooperation needs the approval of the EU Council. The High Representative for the common foreign and security policy has to report the actions of this enhanced cooperation to the EU Parliament and the Council of the EU.

2003 – Thessaloniki Summit

At this EU summit, it was acknowledged that: “A well-trained integrated armed force that is able to carry out a military operation is missing” (Doel, 2004, p.8). In short, the HHG Task Force (or: RRF) remains an ambition that, even in 2009, is not yet in touch with reality.

2004 – European Defence Agency (EDA)

This institution was created to improve the EU’s military capabilities by a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers, “to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve the European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and in the future” (EDA, 2007, “Background – Functions and tasks”).

The EDA tries to avoid duplication of military assets and tries to harmonise military initiatives within the EU. The EDA receives its funds from the EU member states that decide individually how much of their defence budget they want to spend on the EDA. In 2009, all the EU member states except Denmark participate in the EDA.

The EDA has four functions (EDA, 2007, “Background - Functions and Tasks”):

- to develop defence capabilities,
- to promote Defence Research and Technology,
- to promote armaments cooperation,
- to create a competitive European Defence Equipment Market and to strengthen the European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base.

Van Den Doel questions if the EDA can really judge EU member states for the financial data do not provide for an insight in operational capacities and therefore, is less usable for the decision-making (2004, p.19).

Member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.


2004 – The ATHENA mechanism

ATHENA is a mechanism, created by the Council of the EU, in order to administer the costs of military (defence) operations (Council of the European Union, 2007, “EU Council Secretariat Factsheet” section A).

Appendix two:**CHOICE OF POLITICAL PARTIES****Figure 1 - Seats of political parties**

Parties	Second Chamber 22 / 11 / 2006		Week 09 26 / 2 / 2009		Week 11 12 / 3 / 2009	
	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats
CDA	26,5	41	22,1	34	23,6	36
PvdA	21,2	33	17,8	28	18,4	28
SP	16,6	25	10,8	17	10,4	16
VVD	14,7	22	11,2	17	10,0	15
PVV/Wilders	5,9	9	13,3	20	14,9	23
GroenLinks	4,6	7	6,0	9	5,3	8
ChristenUnie	4,0	6	4,1	6	4,4	6
D66	2,0	3	8,8	13	8,3	12
SGP	1,6	2	1,9	2	1,8	2
Partij voor de Dieren	1,8	2	1,6	2	1,3	2
Verdonk	0,0	0	1,8	2	1,3	2
Other Parties	1,2	0	0,6	0	0,3	0
	100%	150	100%	150	100%	150

(Source: Synovate, "Politieke Barometer", 2009)

Figure 2 - Dutch Political Preference since August 2008

(Source: De Hond, 2009)

Appendix three:**FIGURES****Figure 4 – NATO member countries and years of admittance**

	Albania	2009		Latvia	2004
	Belgium	1949		Lithuania	2004
	Bulgaria	2004		Luxembourg	1949
	Canada	1949		Netherlands	1949
	Croatia	2009		Norway	1949
	Czech Rep	1999		Poland	1999
	Denmark	1949		Portugal	1949
	Estonia	2004		Romania	2004
	France	1949		Slovakia	2004
	Germany	1955		Slovenia	2004
	Greece	1952		Spain	1982
	Hungary	1999		Turkey	1952
	Iceland	1949		United Kingdom	1949
	Italy	1949		United States	1949

(Source: NATO, 2009, “NATO Member Countries)

Figure 5 -  EU member states

Austria	Greece	Portugal
Belgium	Hungary	Romania
Bulgaria	Ireland	Slovakia
Cyprus	Italy	Slovenia
Czech Republic	Latvia	Spain
Denmark	Lithuania	Sweden
Estonia	Luxembourg	United Kingdom
Finland	Malta	
France	Netherlands	
Germany	Poland	

Figure 7 - Defence expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product

Country / Pays	Average / Moyenne 1985 - 1989	Average / Moyenne 1990 - 1994	Average / Moyenne 1995 - 1999	Average / Moyenne 2000 - 2004	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008e
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Based on current prices / Sur la base des prix courants									
Belgium	2.7	1.9	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
Bulgaria (a)	//	//	//	//	2.5	2.5	I	2.8	2.6
Czech Republic	//	//	//	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.4	1.4
Denmark	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3
Estonia	//	//	//	//	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.9	1.9
France (b)	3.7	3.3	2.9	2.5	2.6	2.5	I	2.4	2.3
Germany	2.9	2.1	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3
Greece (c)	4.5	3.9	4.1	3.2	I	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.8
Hungary (c)	//	//	//	1.6	I	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2
Italy (c)	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	I	1.4
Latvia	//	//	//	//	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.7
Lithuania	//	//	//	//	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1
Luxembourg (c)	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	I
Netherlands	2.8	2.3	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4
Norway	2.9	2.8	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.3
Poland	//	//	//	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9
Portugal (c)	2.5	2.4	2.1	1.7	I	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.5
Romania	//	//	//	//	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.5	1.5
Slovak Republic	//	//	//	//	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5
Slovenia	//	//	//	//	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.5
Spain	2.1	1.6	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Turkey (c)	2.5	2.8	3.2	3.2	I	2.4	2.1	2.2	1.8
United Kingdom (a)	4.4	3.7	2.7	2.3	2.2	I	2.5	2.4	2.2
NATO - Europe *	3.1	2.5	2.1	I	1.9	I	1.9	I	1.7
Canada	2.1	1.8	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3
United States (d)	6.0	4.6	3.3	3.4	4.0	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.0
North America	5.6	4.4	3.2	3.3	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8
NATO - Total *	4.5	3.5	2.7	I	2.7	I	2.8	I	2.6

II: not applicable

I: break in continuity of series

(Source: NATO, 2009, "Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence")

EDA DEFENCE DATA: THE NETHERLANDS**Defence Data for NETHERLANDS in 2007****General**

Defence Expenditure	€8,387 million
Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP	1.50%
Defence Expenditure per Capita	€513

Reform

Number of military personnel	46843
Number of civilian personnel	14622
Defence Investment per Soldier (Equipment Procurement and R & D)	€32,488
Personnel Expenditure	€3,913 million

Operation

Operation & Maintenance expenditure	€2,118 million
Operation Costs (Deployed)	€304 million

Investment

Investment	€1,522 million
Defence equipment procurement expenditure	€1,521 million
Defence R & T expenditure (Subset of R & D)	€107 million


European Collaboration

Collaborative defence R & T expenditure	€22 million
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Deployability

Average number of Troops Deployed	3161
Average number of Troops Deployed out of total military personnel	7%
Total Deployable (Land) Forces:	17724
Sustainable (Land) Forces:	3056

(Source: EDA, Defence Data for NETHERLANDS 2007)



(Source: EDA, Defence Data for NETHERLANDS 2007)

Appendix four

PVDA INTERVIEW

RE: Scriptievragen Europese Defensieorganisatie medio maart

Van: **Dam van M.H.P. (Publiek)** (M.vDam@tweedekamer.nl)

Verzonden: woensdag 11 maart 2009 14:00:11

Aan: Tamara Kipp (t.kipp@hotmail.com)

Tamara,

Tijd voor een interview heb ik helaas niet. We zijn wel voorstander van een Europees Veiligheids- en Defensiebeleid (EVDB) als onderdeel van het Gemeenschappelijk Buitenlands en Veiligheidsbeleid (GBVB). Het betreft hoofdzakelijk een coördinatiemechanisme, er komt niet een Europees leger. Wij vinden dat je een Defensie-instrument nodig hebt als je buitenlands beleid wilt voeren, want een hond die alleen maar blaft en niet kan bijten daar trekt niemand zich iets van aan. EVDB is overigens vooral nuttig voor operaties die door de VN zijn gemandateerd ter bescherming van bijvoorbeeld de burgerbevolking (zoals in Tsjaad) of de scheepvaart (zoals voor de kust van Somalië).

Het EVDB moet niet worden gezien als aanvulling op de NAVO. Het is een zelfstandig Defensie-instrument dat hoort bij de EU en onderdeel is van het buitenlands beleid van de EU. Dat komt onafhankelijk van de NAVO tot stand. De EU streeft ook andere doelen na dan de NAVO, al zul je in de toekomst zien dat beide steeds meer in elkaars verlengde komen te liggen. De NAVO wordt namelijk ook politieker. Het EVDB geeft de EU eigenlijk de mogelijkheid om zelfstandig te opereren zonder de Amerikanen en Canadezen en met landen die wel bij de EU zitten, maar niet bij de NAVO (zoals Zweden).

Ik hoop dat je hier voldoende aan hebt.

Martijn van Dam

Appendix five
CDA INTERVIEWS

- SCRIPTIE -

**VINDEN DE PVDA, HET CDA EN DE VVD
EEN EUROPESE DEFENSIEORGANISATIE ALS AANVULLING OP
DE NAVO WAARDEVOL EN NOODZAKELIJK?**



Mr. R.W. Knops, MA is since the year 2005 Member of Parliament. He is also chairman of the Defence Committee, member of the Second Chamber committees Foreign Policy, Defence and European Affairs, CDA spokesman on the Defence policy and spokesman on the European Security and Defence policy.

INTERVIEW: DE HEER R.W. KNOPS



10.00 uur – 11.00 uur

12 maart 2009

Tweede Kamer

Door: Tamara Kipp
Studente Hogere Europese Beroepen Opleiding
Internationaal Bestuur en Beleid
Haagse Hogeschool te Den Haag

INHOUD

Opleiding	
Doel scriptie.....	
Resultaten interviews	
Interviewvragen	



Opleiding

Als vierdejaarsstudente aan de HEBO (Hogere Europese Beroepen Opleiding) houd ik mij bezig met internationale- en Europese politiek. Vakken als o.a. Bestuurskunde, Internationaal Recht, European Decision Making en Volkenrecht maken deel uit van mijn specialisatie 'Internationaal Bestuur en Beleid'. Ter afsluiting van mijn Bachelor zal ik een scriptie schrijven die voldoet aan de eisen die mijn opleiding stelt: een scriptie die een recente internationale politieke ontwikkeling betreft.

Doel scriptie

Met mijn scriptie wil ik onderzoeken wat de verschillende opinies binnen de drie politieke stromingen (Socialisme, Liberalisme, Confessionarisme) van de Nederlandse politiek zijn aangaande een eventueel te vormen Europese Defensieorganisatie. Om hier achter te komen zal ik bij de verschillende politieke partijen interviews afnemen zodat mij duidelijk wordt wat de standpunten van de politieke partijen zijn en de ontwikkelingen die tot deze opinie hebben geleid.

Resultaten interviews

De uitkomsten van de interviews zal ik op twee manieren verwerken in mijn scriptie. Ten eerste zal ik de bevindingen onderzoeken met de daarbij horende literatuur. Ten tweede zal ik de resultaten van het interview voorleggen aan een hoge vertegenwoordiger van de NAVO zodat ik beter inzicht krijg in de praktische kant van deze organisatie en een eventueel daarbij te vormen Europese Defensieorganisatie. Uiteindelijk zal ik alle voor-, en nadelen afwegen om zo een conclusie te kunnen vormen. Ondanks het feit dat ik de Nederlandse visie op EU- en NAVO-beleid onderzoek zal ik mijn scriptie in het Engels vertalen zodat het internationale karakter van mijn scriptie wordt versterkt.

INTERVIEWVRAGEN

1. Waarom heeft het CDA geen standpunt over een eventuele Europese Defensieorganisatie op haar website gepubliceerd?

Goede vraag. Dat is niet bekend. CDA is alleen voorstander van de NAVO. We zijn tegen de Franse lijn van een Europese Defensie. Op de website staat alleen dat waar de publiekspolitiek vragen over krijgt. Het CDA is van een Europese Defensieorganisatie als such geen voorstander. Wij zijn voorstander als NAVO als atlantische bondgenootschap. We zetten in op de NAVO, die heeft een commandostructuur die uitermate geschikt is voor het uitvoeren van militaire operaties in welk scale/spectrum dan ook. Sinds de Berlijn-Plus afspraken mag de EU daar ook al gebruik van maken, al is dat nog nauwelijks gebeurd. We zijn tegen een Franse lijn: Europese Defensieorganisatie naast de NAVO. We pleiten ervoor dat de landen binnen de NAVO zich sterker en meer eensgezind opstellen. Dit heeft vreemd genoeg vrijwel nooit met militaire capaciteiten te maken, maar alles met politieke eensgezindheid. We zijn tegen om een nieuwe structuur op te bouwen naast de NAVO. Waarom: bijna alle landen zijn zowel lid van de EU als de NAVO. Turkije is geen lid van de EU en Cyprus niet van de NAVO > Dat is een probleem en moet opgelost worden. Toch 95% van de landen zitten in dezelfde tak.

2. Wat is het standpunt van het CDA aangaande een eventuele Europese Defensieorganisatie?

Er kan een Europese Defensiemacht bestaan náást de NAVO. Kijk maar naar het systeem van de EU Battle Groups, dit komt voort uit de Helsinki Headline Goals. Daar is het CDA voor, maar in de praktijk zie je dat ze nauwelijks zijn ingezet. Het probleem van Europa is niet zozeer het gebrek aan Europese capaciteit want het Europese leger is groter dan het Amerikaanse leger (als je alles bij elkaar optelt). Het probleem is de grote versnippering. Geen enkel land wil zijn autonomie overdragen aan bijvoorbeeld de Duitsers. Al hebben we een Duits-NL legerkorps, onze NL minister van defensie zal altijd in command blijven over zijn NL eenheden. De Kamer zal nooit toestaan dat die autoriteit of onze troepen rechtstreeks onder buitenlands commando staan. NAVO commando's is natuurlijk heel lastig ivm internationaal recht. Dat maakt dat we als vlak landje onze eigen dingen organiseren, van sommige dingen hebben te veel, van sommige dingen te weinig. Wij zijn niet voor een duplicatie van commandostructuren, het CDA gelooft wel in EU Battle Groups. Het blijft heel moeilijk om met steeds meer landen samen te werken door de verschillende culturen en verschillend materieel. Er is nog een hele lange weg te gaan.

3. Hoe heeft dit standpunt zich binnen het CDA ontwikkeld? *Was 10 jaar geleden de opinie anders?*

Ja, 15 jaar geleden wel. Het heeft zich ontwikkeld in dat we meer Europees moeten doen. We waren meer transatlantisch ingesteld, zeker vanwege de Koude Oorlog. De VS was sinds de WOII onze bondgenoot en daar moesten we het mee doen. We kiezen heel duidelijk voor de NAVO als hoeksteen voor ons veiligheidsbeleid. En onze stelling: als je binnen de NAVO als Europese landen eensgezindheid hebt, kun je tegenwicht geven aan de Amerikanen. De NAVO bepaalt meestal wat er bij de NAVO gebeurt, maar dit kon meestal omdat de Europese landen zo verdeeld waren. Ik vind nog steeds dat wij de VS als onze eerste bondgenoot moeten zien. Zeker nu China zegt dat het zijn defensie-uitgaven verhoogd ondanks financiële crisis. India Iran Pakistan Afghanistan - er zijn een aantal gebieden in de wereld die een mogelijke dreiging kunnen gaan vormen. Ik maak me zorgen dat de woorden 'we moeten een gezamenlijk Europees Defensie- en Veiligheidsbeleid hebben', een schone of stille dood gaan sterven doordat een aantal landen in de EU hun defensiebudgetten zo laten afglijden naar niveau van ver onder de NAVO-norm.

Kijk maar naar de discussie over de JSF die helemaal uit z'n verband wordt getrokken: "Een duur toestel van 5-6 miljard, terwijl we dat ding gewoon in de begroting staat voor de komende 30 jaar en die 5 miljard is gewoon een optelsom van al die bedragen die allemaal bij elkaar staan in de begroting voor het geval van vervangingsinvestering. De F-16's zijn gewoon een keer op, maar het beeld is dus dat het een speeltje is en mensen denken: 'we hebben nu een ander probleem -banen - AOW'. Wel begrijpelijk, maar je moet toch ook nu nog blijven investeren in Defensiematerieel omdat je dit op de lange termijn moet zien. Je koopt zo'n JSF niet voor morgen of overmorgen, maar voor de komende 30 jaar. Het CDA wil het beste toestel voor de beste prijs. Wij zijn echter de enigen die dit zeggen. Bij de PvdA speelt het mee dat de achterban het niet ziet zitten en dat zij liever investeren in uitkeringen en sociale voorzieningen. Niemand wint verkiezingen met het thema JSF. Je moet anti-cylich denken: we zitten nu in een economische crisis, dit kan gigantisch veel werkgelegenheid opleveren in een bepaalde sector dus je moet dit nu juist wél doen!

4. Verschillen de standpunten van de fractiecommissie Defensie met de standpunten van het CDA (de partij)?

Over het onderwerp is er echter wel verschil in opinie. Maar in de Eurodelegatie, Maria Martens - de EP Defensie spreekt nauwelijks over de relatie NAVO-EU. Het gaat veel meer om Europees buitenlands beleid en ontwikkelingssamenwerking en defensie op Europees Niveau en het Europees Parlement speelt nauwelijks een rol. De focus is veel meer op diplomatie en ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Er is ook een Eurocommissaris bijvoorbeeld voor OS maar niet voor Defensie, hoewel wél voor Buitenlands Beleid. Met Obama zullen een aantal landen die de laatste tijd negatief zijn geweest ook een wat positiever houding naar de VS hebben.

5. Vindt u dat het partijprogramma aangaande Defensie op bepaalde punten moet veranderen?
6. Vindt er veel overleg met EU Defensiefracties plaats, en zo ja: is dit van invloed geweest op het huidige standpunt van de CDA Defensiefractie?

Defensie is nog steeds een nationale aangelegenheid, en dat beperkt zich dus echt tot de nationale parlementen. Bovendien stuurt het Europees Parlement geen Europees Leger aan dus. Eén persoon gaat een keer per week naar een delegatievergadering van onze CDA europarlementariërs. We hebben goede contacten, maar het onderwerp defensie is nauwelijks aan de orde. Dit wordt ook gezien als nationale aangelegenheid.

7. Denkt u dat de behoefte aan een Europese Defensieorganisatie wordt gevoed door een onvolwaardige relatie tussen de EU lidstaten binnen de NAVO en de VS? *Vindt u dat er een kloof tussen de EU en de NAVO bestaat, en zo ja: hoe kan deze het beste overbrugd worden?*

Bijna alle Europese landen die lid zijn van de NAVO, zijn ook lid van de EU. Dus het overlapgebied is groot. Een totaal verdeeld Europa is de bron van alle ellende. De Verenigde Staten hebben één krijgsmacht en als ze zeggen dat ze gaan 'dan gaan ze' en dat is bij ons het probleem. Ze zijn in bij de EU in zekere zin niet gelijkwaardig maar dat komt meer door de politieke bende en besluiteloosheid. Absoluut. Als we stappen zouden maken om de nationale soevereiniteit op te geven door bijvoorbeeld een Eurocommissaris Defensie in het leven te roepen, zou de weerstand tegen Europa alleen maar toenemen. Daarbij hebben politieke partijen hun eigen politieke agenda en daar zoeken ze argumenten bij en degene die dit het beste kan vertolken – wat het beste aansluit bij de bevolking – wint de verkiezingen. Helemaal niet rationeel.

8. Bent u van mening dat een Europese Defensieorganisatie onderdeel van de NAVO of van de EU zou moeten worden?

Het liefst doet het CDA alles met de NAVO samen, alleen dat kan niet want alle Europese landen zijn lid van de NAVO. Berlin-Plus is dus heel praktisch en goed. Voor een Europees leger zijn in principe al de structuren – de commandeuren. Toch is er geen beter alternatief voor NAVO als security provider. Er is op wereldniveau geen enkele organisatie die zo veel kracht kan leveren. Daarom ben ik tegen een verdere uitbreiding van de NAVO.

9. Denkt u dat het hebben van twee Defensieorganisaties binnen Europa, met verschillende operationele procedures, werkbaar is?

NAVO heeft al een ervaring van 50 jaar. Daarom moeten we vasthouden aan hun standaarden, procedures en doctrines. Het enige waar het verschil inziet is de 'rules of engagement' maar dat is alleen binnen het politieke domein: hoe ver mag een militair gaan?

10. Kijkend naar crisissituaties, denkt u dat het beschikken over twee Defensieorganisaties de kwetsbaarheid van de EU vergroot of verkleint?

Een eenheid van beleid met dezelfde procedures en doctrines, zorgt voor efficiency en daardoor kunnen de EU en de NAVO beter omgaan met crisissituaties. Als Europa niets doet, geen eenheid van beleid – dan zijn we aan de Amerikanen overgeleverd. Alles begint bij een politieke eenheid. Ik hoop dat door het toetreden van Frankrijk tot de NAVO, op militair vlak, dat Frankrijk ziet dat de NAVO een uitstekend middel is om in te grijpen tijdens als security provider tijdens crisisbeheersingsoperaties.

11. Hoe denkt u dat nationale eenheden met twee Defensieorganisaties zullen worden ingezet? *Wat betekent dit voor de Defensieleiding?*

Je moet 'National dedicated clubs' hebben. Bataljon 1 voor de NAVO. Bataljon 2 voor Europa. Voor de aansturing van operaties is het hebben van meerdere clubs complexer dan dat je er één zou hebben. Van de krijgsmachtdelen zijn we gegaan naar de operationele commando's onder leiding van de Commandant der Strijdkrachten. Vroeger was er een Chef Defensiestaf als adviseur van de minister. Wat de Commandant der Strijdkrachten alleen mist is een echt geïntegreerd hoofdkwartier waar hij ook echt alle eenheden kan aansturen. En dit kan natuurlijk ook werken voor onze nationale eenheden die toegewezen zijn aan de EU/NAVO/VN. Het kan bijna niet anders dat de procedures 'NAVO-wise' zijn.

12. Denkt u dat de 'Helsinki Headline Goal' al een stap in de richting van een Europese Defensieorganisatie is?

*Denkt u dat het leveren van 60.000 manschappen binnen 60 dagen goed genoeg is voor de **Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)** in relatie tot civiele/militaire crisisbeheersing en conflictpreventie (Petersbergtaken) in de EU?*

Zal, in het geval van calamiteiten de RRF naast de NRF (NATO Respons Force) opereren of zal de RRF onderdeel uitmaken van de NRF?

De vraag of een scenario waar 60.000 manschappen nodig zijn, echt snel gebeurd. Zelfs de NRF is nog nooit ingezet. Daarnaast is 60 dagen natuurlijk niet snel, de Duitsers stonden in 3 dagen

hier. Het is lastig om dit te beschouwen als een stap naar een Europese Defensieorganisatie. Het is wel duidelijk dat Defensie nu op de agenda staat en dat er ontwikkelingen zijn ook. Al de stappen die Frankrijk heeft gemaakt zijn nu in tegengestelde beweging. De Fransen wilden dupliceren: echt naast de NAVO een Europese Defensieorganisatie opbouwen, maar het feit dat ze nu volwaardig militair zijn toegetreden tot de NAVO laat eigenlijk zien dat ze zijn teruggekomen op het idee – mijn inschatting. Dat gaat niet gebeuren, kost de EU lidstaten ook te veel geld en dat is er niet. Ik hoop echt niet dat er een aparte Europese Defensieorganisatie komt. Wel een verdere uitwerking van het Berlijn-Plus akkoord. Laat nu de Europese landen gebruik maken van de NAVO structuur.

De NAVO zal veel sneller zal zijn met de NRF dan de RRF. En als er iets gebeurt, kan je je afvragen hoe dit dan zit met de politieke besluitvorming. Je ziet dat er eigenlijk een mes door Europa valt en er gebeurt niets. Zoals de vlag er nu bij hangt is de NAVO sneller en effectiever. Het komt de hele tijd terug op de politieke autonomie van de verschillende landen die allemaal in debat moeten in de nationale parlementen.

De verhouding tussen de EU en de NAVO is heel erg gespannen. Nu zijn het gescheiden takken. Het maakt het lastig elk land voor twee scenario's capaciteiten achter de hand moet houden.

INTERVIEW MARIJN VERHEES

Mr. M. Verhees is policy advisor of L. Van Nistelrooij (CDA), Member of European Parliament in the EPP Group of the Europeans People's Party (EPP – Christian Democrats).

Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 19:58:02 +0200
Subject: Re: Scriptie CDA - HEBO studente
From: m.verhees@gmail.com
To: t.kipp@hotmail.com

Hoi Tamara,

Zoals je kunt zien ziet het CDA de NAVO als het hart van ons extern veiligheidsbeleid. Dat neemt niet weg dat de EU in de eigen achtertuin in de toekomst wel in staat wil zijn om orde te houden, ook wanneer de de VS niet mee wil doen. Het EU defensiebeleid, dat gebruik zal maken van de navo-infrastructuur, moet daarom worden gezien als een soort regionale aanvulling op de NAVO, en zeker niet als concurrentie.
Met vriendelijke groet,

Marijn Verhees

Appendix six
VVD INTERVIEW

- SCRIPTIE -
**VINDEN DE PVDA, HET CDA EN DE VVD
EEN EUROPESE DEFENSIEORGANISATIE ALS AANVULLING OP
DE NAVO WAARDEVOL EN NOODZAKELIJK?**



Mr. M. Wessels, MA, is senior policy assistant of the VVD and specialised in foreign policy and defence policy

INTERVIEW: DE HEER WESSELS



10.25 uur – 11.25 uur
20 maart 2009
Tweede Kamer

Door: Tamara Kipp
Studente Hogere Europese Beroepen Opleiding
Internationaal Bestuur en Beleid
Haagse Hogeschool te Den Haag

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Opleiding

Als vierdejaarsstudente aan de HEBO (Hogere Europese Beroepen Opleiding) houd ik mij bezig met internationale- en Europese politiek. Vakken als o.a. Bestuurskunde, Internationaal Recht, European Decision Making en Volkenrecht maken deel uit van mijn specialisatie 'Internationaal Bestuur en Beleid'. Ter afsluiting van mijn Bachelor zal ik een scriptie schrijven die voldoet aan de eisen die mijn opleiding stelt: een scriptie die een recente internationale politieke ontwikkeling betreft.

Doel scriptie

Met mijn scriptie wil ik onderzoeken wat de verschillende opinies binnen de drie politieke stromingen (Socialisme, Liberalisme, Confessionarisme) van de Nederlandse politiek zijn aangaande een eventueel te vormen Europese Defensieorganisatie. Om hier achter te komen zal ik bij de verschillende politieke partijen interviews afnemen zodat mij duidelijk wordt wat de standpunten van de politieke partijen zijn en de ontwikkelingen die tot deze opinie hebben geleid.

Resultaten interviews

De uitkomsten van de interviews zal ik op twee manieren verwerken in mijn scriptie. Ten eerste zal ik de bevindingen onderzoeken met de daarbij horende literatuur. Ten tweede zal ik de resultaten van het interview voorleggen aan een hoge vertegenwoordiger van de NAVO zodat ik beter inzicht krijg in de praktische kant van deze organisatie en een eventueel daarbij te vormen Europese Defensieorganisatie. Uiteindelijk zal ik alle voor-, en nadelen afwegen om zo een conclusie te kunnen vormen. Ondanks het feit dat ik de Nederlandse visie op EU- en NAVO-beleid onderzoek zal ik mijn scriptie in het Engels vertalen zodat het internationale karakter van mijn scriptie wordt versterkt.

INTERVIEWVRAGEN

13. Waarom heeft de VVD geen standpunt over een eventuele Europese Defensieorganisatie op haar website gepubliceerd?

Dat klopt. We hebben geen heel uitgesproken standpunt. Traditioneel is de VVD primair NAVO gericht. Wat er ook besloten wordt, het mag niet aan de importantie van de NAVO mogen afdoen. Voor kleinere, minder risicovolle operaties zijn we er helemaal voor om dat in Europees verband te doen. EUFOR operatie in Kongo. EUFOR operatie in Bosnië en in Tsjaad. We zijn dus niet principieel tegen Europese militaire operaties allen wanneer het gaat om echt grote gevaarlijke operaties gaat, dan is de meer de lijn om voor NAVO back-up te zorgen.

14. Wat is het standpunt van de VVD aangaande een eventuele Europese Defensieorganisatie?

Het mag niet leiden tot decoupling, de NAVO mag niet uit elkaar gekoppeld worden. Het mag ook niet leiden tot duplicatie. We zijn in dat opzicht terughoudend in het opzetten van een aparte Europese militaire organisatie.

15. Hoe heeft dit standpunt zich binnen het VVD ontwikkeld? *Was 10 jaar geleden de opinie anders?*

Was anders, we zijn traditioneel een partij die heel veel belang hecht aan de NAVO. Eerst vanwege het grote gevaar vanuit het Oostblok. De betrouwbare NAVO was de enige oplossing, al is er nu meer speelruimte om aan andere opties te denken. Hoewel Rusland nog steeds, misschien wel meer, aan de assertieve kant lijkt te gedragen. Maar een acute dreiging van die kant is weg. Vroeger hadden we een leger van dienstplichtigen, mocht je niet inzetten in operaties ver weg. Nu zijn we ontwikkeld naar een beroepsleger.

16. Verschillen de standpunten van de fractiecommissie Defensie met de standpunten van het VVD (de partij)?

De Heer Van Baalen:	tegen een Europees leger
Mevrouw Hennis-Plasschaert:	voor een Europees leger
De Heer Maaten:	voor een Europees leger
	"We moeten van een transnationaal naar een supranationaal leger"

Er is wel duidelijke een visieverschil. In de fractiecommissie worden alle standpunten altijd voorbesproken. Defensievergaderingen doen we niet binnen de fractie. Dat gaat altijd 1x in de week in de BOD-blok: Buitenlandse Zaken – Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Defensie.

Geen van deze mensen (EP) hebben in de VVD-fractie gezeten en in de VVD fractie is dus de sterke traditie van een belang hechten aan NAVO. En dit hebben deze mensen niet meegekregen. Omdat ze niet in de fractie hebben gezeten, hebben ze een andere mening kunnen ontwikkelen. Bij Hans Van Baalen ligt het gevoel dat hij niet voor 100% gevoelsmatig naar Brussel verkast omdat hij ook de ambitie heeft om ook weer in Den Haag een rol te gaan spelen.

We hebben al te weinig mariniers, dus een Europese Defensieorganisatie is gewoon niet haalbaar voor grote missies (als Uruzgan). We hebben te weinig manschappen, een tekort bij Defensie. Je kunt wel met kleinere clubjes werk doen. Dit geldt voor alle krijgsmachtdelen, niet alleen voor de Marine, ook bij de Landmacht en Luchtmacht. We moeten ook snel weg uit Uruzgan. Het trekt mensen nu niet om zich aan te melden bij Defensie omdat er zo'n zwaar beroep op hen wordt gedaan. Er kan niet aan de vraag worden voldaan om én voor de NAVO én voor een Europese Defensieorganisatie troepen worden geleverd.

17. Vindt u dat het partijprogramma aangaande Europees Defensiebeleid op bepaalde punten moet veranderen?

Er is nog steeds een traditionele lijn. De EU is een politieke dwerg, ook als het gaat om veiligheidsbeleid. De VVD ziet dat de grotere lidstaten op het gebied over zaken als de oorlog in Irak verschillen. We hebben altijd kunnen terugvallen op de steun van de VS. Het wordt tijd dat we echter méér verantwoordelijkheid nemen bij het voorkomen en oplossen van internationale conflicten. Het buitenlandse Defensiebeleid blijft in nauwe samenwerking met de NAVO plaatsvinden. Geen militaire macht voor de EU.

18. Vindt er veel overleg met EU Defensiefracties plaats, en zo ja: is dit van invloed geweest op het huidige standpunt van de VVD Defensiefractie?

Niet echt een uitwisseling van informatie, niet echt een overleg. Wel een BOD.

19. Denkt u dat de behoefte aan een Europese Defensieorganisatie wordt gevoed door een onvolwaardige relatie tussen de EU lidstaten binnen de NAVO en de VS? *Vindt u dat er een kloof tussen de EU en de NAVO bestaat, en zo ja: hoe kan deze het beste overbrugd worden?*

Het probleem de afgelopen tijd, als er iets gedaan moet worden, hebben we de Amerikanen altijd nodig. Kijk maar naar het geklungel van ons in Bosnië tijdens het conflict met de Serven. Toen is het pas opgelost toen de VS ingreep. We probeerden met de VN diplomatiek bezig te zijn en door aanwezigheid verder onheil te voorkomen. Maar puur de aanwezigheid werkte niet.

Met NL is daar het grootste drama overkomen. Je houdt met geweren geen tanks tegen. De EU liet zien dat ze toen niet daadkrachtig waren en bij machte om een dergelijk conflict op te lossen. Er is een kloof van daadkrachtigheid en ingrijpen: het blijft altijd zo dat we de NAVO en de VS nodig hebben.

Onder Bush heerste het gevoel dat ze veel acties puur op eigen houtje (behalve met het Verenigd Koninkrijk) deden. Nu zoekt Obama meer de toenadering tot Europese partners en vindt veel meer overleg plaats.

20. Bent u van mening dat een Europese Defensieorganisatie onderdeel van de NAVO of van de EU zou moeten worden?

Het zou een ontwikkeling kunnen zijn dat er een Europese Defensieorganisatie binnen de NAVO wordt gecreëerd, maar dat zal zich eerst in de praktijk moeten bewijzen. Als je het in positieve zin ontwikkeld en het bewijst zijn waarde in de praktijk dan kan er een Europese Defensie Organisatie binnen de NAVO gaan ontwikkelen. Een Europese Defensieorganisatie naast (los van) de NAVO is de VVD compleet tegen.

21. Volgens Mevrouw Neyts-Uyttebroeck (EP, voorzitter ELDR) zal een Europese Defensieorganisatie binnen de NAVO nooit werken door het conflict tussen Turkije (lidstaat NAVO) en Cyprus (lidstaat EU). Hoe denkt u hierover?

Dit conflict is nu aan de orde. Het is een grote complicerende factor. En dit probleem zou nu echt opgelost moeten worden wil Turkije gaan toetreden tot de Europese Unie. Wij zeggen dat Turkije (hoofdvoorwaarde) alleen lidstaat kan worden met de EU als het normale contacten met Cyprus kan onderhouden en openstelt. Vrij verkeer van mensen, goederen, verkeer tussen beiden. Als Turkije geen lid is van de EU kan het ook geen onderdeel uitmaken van een Europese Defensie Organisatie. Een Europese Defensie Organisatie kan wel met één visie en één stem naar buiten toe treden binnen de NAVO omdat Turkije geen lid is.

22. Denkt u dat het hebben van twee Defensieorganisaties binnen Europa, met verschillende operationele procedures, werkbaar is?

Het jargon, procedures en doctrines moeten alle hetzelfde zijn. Er is nu goed contact tussen manschappen op de grond en bijvoorbeeld in de lucht omdat er vaste NAVO procedures zijn. Er mag geen loskoppeling zijn.

23. Kijkend naar crisissituaties, denkt u dat het beschikken over twee Defensieorganisaties de kwetsbaarheid van de EU vergroot of verkleint?

Een Europese Defensie Organisatie als onderdeel van de NAVO. Bij een werkelijke crisissituatie (grootschalig grof geweld zoals Kongo en Tsjaad) kan de EU dit stap voor stap zijn waarde bewijzen. Maar dit constant in de praktijk worden bewezen.

24. Hoe denkt u dat nationale eenheden met twee Defensieorganisaties zullen worden ingezet? *Wat betekent dit voor de Defensieleiding?*

Het is niet de bedoeling dat militairen los van elkaar worden opgeleid. Het moet universeel zijn, en als een Europese Defensieorganisatie binnen de NAVO zal worden opgericht zal dit ook niet gaan gebeuren. Het kan al wel dat nationale eenheden met twee Defensieorganisaties optreden. Kijk maar naar Landmacht en Luchtmacht in Uruzgan en de Mariniers in Tsjaad (EUFOR). Het kan wel, maar dezelfde Mariniers gaan weer over naar Uruzgan. Dan is het zeker niet de bedoeling dat er constant moet worden overgeschakeld van procedures.

25. Denkt u dat de 'Helsinki Headline Goal' al een stap in de richting van een Europese Defensieorganisatie is?

Hierbij moet men zich ook nog moeten bewijzen. Men heeft er nog lang niet die aanvulling gegeven die op papier is gezet. Het is nog niet uitgevoerd.

26. Denkt u dat het leveren van 60.000 manschappen binnen 60 dagen goed genoeg is voor de **Rapid** Reaction Force (RRF) in relatie tot civiele/militaire crisisbeheersing en conflictpreventie (Petersbergtaken) in de EU?
Zal, in het geval van calamiteiten de RRF naast de NRF (NATO Respons Force) opereren of zal de RRF onderdeel uitmaken van de NRF?

60.000 manschappen is een ambitieuze doelstelling. 60 dagen is terecht, maar een flinke termijn als het een Rapid Reaction Force moeten zijn. Voor crisisbeheersing is dit te traag. Er is niet ambitieus gedacht op dit vlak. Als het acuut nodig is moet men veel sneller mensen op de been kunnen brengen.

Appendix seven

NATO INTERVIEW

- SCRIPTIE -

**VINDEN DE PVDA, HET CDA EN DE VVD
EEN EUROPESE DEFENSIEORGANISATIE ALS AANVULLING OP
DE NAVO WAARDEVOL EN NOODZAKELIJK?**



INTERVIEW: LIEUTENANT GENERAAL VAN OSCH

Since 15 June 2007, Lieutenant General A.G.D. van Osch, MA, is the Permanent Military Representative to the NATO and EU Military Committee in Brussels, Belgium.

15.30 uur – 16.30 uur

20 april 2009

NAVO - Brussel

Door: Tamara Kipp

Studente Hogere Europese Beroepen Opleiding

Internationaal Bestuur en Beleid

Haagse Hogeschool te Den Haag

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Opleiding

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Doel scriptie

Met mijn scriptie wil ik onderzoeken wat de verschillende opinies binnen de drie politieke stromingen (Socialisme, Liberalisme, Confessionarisme) van de Nederlandse politiek zijn aangaande een eventueel te vormen Europese Defensieorganisatie. Om hier achter te komen zal ik bij de verschillende politieke partijen interviews afnemen zodat mij duidelijk wordt wat de standpunten van de politieke partijen zijn en de ontwikkelingen die tot deze opinie hebben geleid.

Resultaten interviews

De uitkomsten van de interviews zal ik op twee manieren verwerken in mijn scriptie. Ten eerste zal ik de bevindingen onderzoeken met de daarbij horende literatuur. Ten tweede zal ik de resultaten van het interview voorleggen aan een hoge vertegenwoordiger van de NAVO zodat ik beter inzicht krijg in de praktische kant van deze organisatie en een eventueel daarbij te vormen Europese Defensieorganisatie. Uiteindelijk zal ik alle voor-, en nadelen afwegen om zo een conclusie te kunnen vormen. Ondanks het feit dat ik de Nederlandse visie op EU- en NAVO-beleid onderzoek zal ik mijn scriptie in het Engels vertalen zodat het internationale karakter van mijn scriptie wordt versterkt.

INTERVIEWVRAGEN

1. De Heer Knops (CDA) vindt het ergerlijk dat binnen de NAVO de EU niet een gelijkwaardige rol ten opzichte van de VS kan innemen terwijl de EU meer militair personeel heeft dan de VS.

“De VS heeft meer macht binnen de NAVO omdat er binnen de EU verdeeldheid heerst”. (De Heer Knops – voorzitter Fractiecommissie Defensie van het CDA, 12 maart 2009)

Klopt dit?

Er is in ieder geval verdeeldheid, en dat heeft te maken met het onvermijdelijke feit dat we allemaal zelfstandige landen zijn. Iedereen probeert de nationale belangen te behartigen. Er moet veel meer materiële samenwerking zijn, maar elk land probeert natuurlijk zijn eigen industrie een graatje mee te laten pikken. Daardoor krijg je niet de meest optimale producten. Op het gebied van beleid zijn er verschillende belangen. Elk groter conflict is alleen op te lossen in breder verband dan alleen Europa – VS & Canada moet je er altijd bij betrekken. NL zit op die lijn. Frankrijk, wil echter alles in Europees verband. Op het gebied van operaties wordt het sterk beïnvloed of men daar een nationaal belang heeft of niet. Een land als Frankrijk wilde heel graag naar Tsjaad, andere landen niet. Dat is niet slecht, misschien jammer als je probeert om een sterk Europa te bouwen. Als ESDP besluitvorming met consensus vereist is dit een logische consequentie. NL wil ook zijn eigen soevereiniteit verliezen en probeert de eigen industrie te stimuleren.

2. De Heer Wessels (VVD) geeft aan dat bij de Helsinki Headline Goal waarbij 60.000 manschappen binnen 60 dagen operationeel kunnen zijn, de 60 dagen een te grote termijn is ten opzichte van acute crisisbeheersingoperaties. “De EU moet veel sneller operationele eenheden op de been kunnen brengen, er is niet ambitieus gedacht door de EU”.

Wat is uw reactie hierop?

Om te beginnen heeft de EU ervoor gekozen om als eerst te richten op de Petersbergtaken, dus meer crisisbeheersings-achtige taken. De EU heeft nog niet de ambitie geuit. Het merendeel van de EU zit al in de NAVO. Op één na zijn alle EU landen die geen NAVO lid zijn toch partner van NAVO. Voor de grote aantallen is het dus logisch dat de EU altijd voor de NAVO wordt gekozen. Bij crisisbeheersings- vredes-operaties, dan moeten er met snelle reactietijden operationele eenheden kunnen optreden. Deze hebben we: 2 Battle Groups. Binnen 5 dagen moeten er al verkenningseenheden zijn, dit tijdsbestek is vergelijkbaar reactietijd als de NAVO heeft met de NRF. Bij de NRF zijn operaties met grote aantallen ook nog niet ingezet. Dit heeft te maken met de op dit moment al veel eenheden worden ingezet.

3. Zowel het CDA, de VVD als de PvdA zijn wel positief over een Europese pijler binnen de NAVO. Toch benadrukt de Heer Wessels (VVD) dat de EU eerst zijn waarde in de praktijk zal moeten bewijzen.

Wat vindt u van een Europese Defensieorganisatie binnen de NAVO?

Ik sluit me aan bij het Nederlandse beleid. Dit is goed beleid. We zien voor de militaire veiligheid primair NATO als de organisatie waar we ons op moeten richten. Dat zorgt voor de interoperabiliteit, moderniseren, de samenwerking met de VS die we nodig hebben. In NL beleid ook: we werken zo inefficiënt binnen de EU – dat kan beter. Ook binnen de EU zouden we graag betere militaire samenwerking zien door taakspecialisatie, beter materieel samenwerking. Materieel samenwerking staat vaak bij de EU op de agenda. Er wordt vaak schande van gesproken dat sommige materieel projecten niet van de grond komen. Ook al zijn deze projecten begonnen, lopen ze weleens kapot omdat de industriebelangen worden behartigd. Europa versterken binnen de NAVO – dus geen of/of concurrentiestrijd. We zien de NAVO waarbinnen we het beste de NL belangen kunnen behartigen en we zien graag dat de Europese landen beter gaan samenwerken. Een vorm van Europese Samenwerking tussen een aantal landen.

3.2 Vind u dat het EDA meer geld moet krijgen om materieel beter te kunnen integreren. Het EDA is niet meer dan een organisatie die op dit moment niet zelf projecten doet dus wat dat betreft hoeft deze organisatie niet meer geld te krijgen. Er is wel een soort bloemkool effect; klachten van mensen en landen dat EDA veel te weinig doet. EDA zegt: ik heb te weinig capaciteiten, we moeten meer mensen hebben - als we meer mensen hebben kunnen we misschien ook zelf projecten leiden. Het is nu vooral een organisatie die organiseren dat landen met elkaar gaan praten en dat er inzichtelijker wordt gemaakt welke doctrines welke landen willen volgen om binnen die kaders vervolgens materiele projecten te beginnen waar behoefte aan is. Het is dus 'het initiëren van projecten'. Een Europese materiaalssamenwerking is zeker zinvol.

3.2. D'66 vindt dat er een Europees Leger moet komen naast de NAVO.

Lekker duur. Heel inefficiënt. Hoe meer we regelen dat eenheden voor beide organisaties kunnen worden ingezet, des te efficiënter het is. En gelukkig geldt dit ook voor de meeste landen waaronder NL: alle eenheden die we niet nationaal inzetten (territoriale eenheden) maar voor territoriale taken. Voor de 4 krijgsmachtsdelen kunnen de 3 grote krijgsmachtdelen met NAVO middelen voor de NAVO, de EU en zelfs de VN worden gebruikt. Het zou verschrikkelijk dom zijn om bepaalde eenheden alleen maar reserveren voor NAVO. Er wordt nu zo vaak in NL over gediscussieerd. Je moet nu vooral als land modules creëren die je in kan zetten na het besluit van de regering zonder dat je afhankelijk bent van derden. Tenzij dat je op een gebied zó klein wordt dat je niet anders kán. De EU (Frankrijk, Verenigd Koninkrijk) wil met een carrier battlegroup komen. Nederland is écht niet rijk genoeg om zelf een carrier met alles erop en eraan (vliegtuigen) aan te schaffen.

3.3 De PvdA wil het een groot deel van de fregatten gaan afstoten om zodat dit een grote kostenbesparing oplevert. De Kustwacht zou dan een deel van de marine-taken moeten

opvangen. Terwijl het Frans-Britse voorzitterschap initieert om een nieuwe carriergroup te vormen.

Mevr.Eijsink heeft daarin gelijk dat een aantal marinetaken met kleinere kustwachtschepen kan worden vervangen dan is het antwoord: ja. Men kan soms de vraag stellen of we als NL per sé een groot fregat nodig hebben. Een fregat kan langdurig op zee zitten en er kan een helikopter op en we hebben de fregatten nodig in het verband van een aantal NAVO taken: luchtverdediging en lange-afstandwapens.

NL is een soevereine staat en heeft afgesproken dat we 2% van ons BNP zouden besteden aan Defensie. Er is meer behoefte bij NAVO om het defensiebudget te verhogen. 'We hebben net weer op ons kop gekregen. In de politiek moeten er altijd keuzes gemaakt worden, maar ik vind dat we naar 2% zouden moeten'.

4. Volgens Mevrouw Neyts-Uyttebroeck (EP, voorzitter ELDR) zal een Europese Defensieorganisatie binnen de NAVO nooit werken door het conflict tussen Turkije (lidstaat NAVO) en Cyprus (lidstaat EU).

Hoe denkt u hierover?

Dat zijn twee totaal verschillende dingen. De vraag en de quote passen niet bij elkaar. Stel dat er geen NATO was, dan zouden we prima binnen de EU militaire samenwerking kunnen creëren en Turkije kan dit dan ook niet blokkeren. Het Turks-Cypriotisch conflict staat dus op geen enkele manier Defensiesamenwerking binnen de EU in de weg. Maar het klopt wel degelijk dat de samenwerking tussen de NATO en de EU zwaar bemoeilijkt. De meest idiote voorbeelden zijn ervan te geven. NATO en de EU zitten in Kosovo en die mogen formeel niet samenwerken en informatie uitwisselen – dat doen ze misschien in de praktijk wel – maar formeel mogen ze het niet. EUPOL de politiemissie van de EU in Afghanistan mag formeel niet beveiligd worden door ISAF omdat het wordt geblokkeerd. Cyprus is zo slim geweest om snel een stafofficier te leveren voor het hoofdkwartier in Atalanta – de EU counter piracy missie zowel op operationeel-, als tactisch niveau. Toen werd het onmogelijk voor de Turken om daaraan bij te dragen waardoor we in heel die onzin zijn gekomen dat EU en NATO niet goed samenwerken. Het is dit probleem dat roet in het eten gooit en alles verlangzaamt en gigantisch de samenwerking tussen NATO en EU blokkeert. Er is geen conflict tussen Cyprus en Turkije maar een politiek probleem: de EU heeft er zeer onverstandig aangedaan om te doen besluiten dat Cyprus lid mocht worden van de EU onder voorwaarde dat 'Cyprus dan wél het probleem met Turkije moest oplossen'. De EU had beter kunnen zeggen: 'jullie mogen lid worden zodra het probleem met Turkije is opgelost'. Want nu kan Cyprus, en dat doen ze ook, alle besluitvorming in de EU blokkeren als het gaat om samenwerking met NATO. Tot in het belachelijke toe. En omgekeerd blokkeert Turkije NATO samenwerking met de EU. Turkije erkent Cyprus namelijk niet en samenwerking met de EU inclusief Cyprus, zou indirect erkenning van Cyprus betekenen. Daarbij is Turkije verschrikkelijk boos op Cyprus omdat Cyprus o.a. de toegang van Turkije tot de EU blokkeert. Alle landen proberen op beide landen te drukken dat ze flexibeler moeten zijn. Elke week vreet dit energie. Maar, dat houdt niet goede samenwerking binnen de EU tegen. Heel veel landen zouden veel liever zien dat Berlijn-plus beter zou gaan werken. Turkije heeft dit ook getekend alleen staat er één dingetje bij: dat kan, maar 'dan mag

Cyprus niet mee doen'. Er is nu één Berlijn-plus operatie in Bosnië, werkt hardstikke goed, iedereen tevreden. Maar Cyprus blokkeert met steun van Griekenland (en misschien meer landen die zich onzichtbaar achter deze twee landen verschuilen) dat Berlijn-Plus arrangement nog een keer gebruikt kan worden – en dat kan Cyprus doen want er moet met consensus worden besloten .

Theo van Doel (2004) heeft dus ongelijk.

Als we bij de NAVO EU-vergaderingen hebben over ALTHEA (de Berlijn-Plus operatie in Bosnië), dan zitten alle NAVO en EU landen bij elkaar behalve Cyprus.

Het klopt dat een Europese Defensieorganisatie binnen de NAVO dusdanig wordt belemmerd door het politieke probleem tussen Turkije en Cyprus dat het niet zal werken. Het betekent ook dat een Europese Defensieorganisatie los van NATO heel veel overbodig geld gaat kosten. Binnen de NATO zijn al hoofdkwartieren, al materieel samenwerking, al command-controll en inlichtingensysteem. Daar doen alle partnership voor peace landen ook aan mee. Iedereen die een security agreement met NATO heeft, alle EU landen behalve Cyprus, toch kunnen we dit niet gebruiken voor een EU missie vanwege alleen Cyprus. Een Europese Defensieorganisatie binnen de NAVO is door dit conflict dus fictie.

5. Denkt u dat de Verenigde Staten de gemaakte Brussel-Berlijn (1996) afspraken zal nakomen en militaire middelen, informatie en capaciteit beschikbaar zal maken voor de EU (ESDP) tijdens crisisbeheersingsoperaties?

Ja, en we hebben al één zo'n operatie gehad: ALTHEA in Bosnië. Iedereen is zeer positief en vindt dat we dit veel vaker moeten doen, ook de Turken. Cyprus heeft aan de EU zijde steun, ook van Griekenland maar ook wel van andere landen. Cyprus brengt zelf nooit wat in voor een operatie en Turkije brengt altijd heel veel in, zelfs in EU operaties bieden ze soms aan. Dit accepteert de EU ook. Alleen wordt nu Berlijn-Plus tegengehouden door het politieke probleem Turkije-Cyprus.

De Berlijn-Plus afspraken wil niet zeggen dat de VS troepen moeten leveren en het wil ook niet zeggen dat de VS verplicht is om inlichtingen te leveren. Berlijn-Plus wil zeggen dat NAVO-middelen, ook VS middelen dus, gebruikt kunnen worden voor operaties. Bij Berlijn-Plus afspraken hebben we afgesproken dat ook voor EU missies die NAVO hoofdkwartieren gebruikt kunnen worden. Dan gebeurt dit niet onder leiding van SACEUR maar onder leiding van DSACEUR en die heeft een dubbele pet. Dit is altijd een Amerikaan, de plaatsvervanger is altijd een Europeaan. Die Europeaan is tot nu toe een Brit geweest geven we dus een dubbele pet. Die kan de operationele commandant zijn van een EU operatie met dezelfde middelen – dat is de Berlijn-Plus agreement. De VS zal in veel gevallen heel erg blij zijn dat de Europeanen zelf hun problemen gaan oplossen en dat ze de EU daarvoor NAVO-hoofdkwartieren gaat gebruiken vinden ze ook prima want ze vinden het ook maar zonde als de EU, waarvan ze toch al vinden dat het merendeel te weinig geld uitgeeft aan Defensie, ook nog geld gaat uitgeven aan verkeerde dingen (duplicatie). Ook zij zien liever dat wij dat voor andere dingen gebruiken. Ik kan me niet voorstellen dat de EU betrokken raakt bij een conflict waarbij de Amerikanen zouden vinden dat dit in strijd is met de Amerikaanse belangen. Dit gaat alleen over het gebruik van de NAVO-hoofdkwartieren.

Hoe gaat de NAVO om met de Berlijn-Brussel afspraken (ESDP als onderdeel van de NAVO) die haaks staan op de St. Målo declaratie (ESDP moet zelfstandig naast NATO kunnen opereren met eigen mensen, middelen en informatie)?

Berlijn Plus: Binnen de EU niet nog een keer meer hoofdkwartieren gaan bouwen.

St.Malo: EU eigen middelen moet hebben voor ESDP operaties.

Frankrijk wil bijvoorbeeld dat de EU een eigen operationele hoofdkwartier is. Dit wordt geblokkeerd door o.a. de UK en NL. Door St.Målo zijn we wel meer aan capability planning bezig (wat voor materieel hebben we nodig binnen EU). Dezelfde tekortkomingen worden bij de EU en NATO geconstateerd. Binnen de EU zijn we wel steeds meer militair gaan samenwerken. Daar heeft NATO formeel niets over te zeggen. Er zijn wel 21 landen die lid zijn van NATO en EU dus die 21 landen zorgen er zelf voor dat er geen dingen dubbelop worden gedaan.

6. Denkt u dat het hebben van twee 'crisismachten' de NRF (NAVO) en de RRF (EU) zal bijdragen aan het efficiënt optreden tijdens crisisbeheersingsoperaties?

Ja, ik zie niet direct een probleem. Sterker nog: het is juist een versterking van de capaciteit. Als we een NATO operatie willen doen, kunnen we de NRF gebruiken. Bij een EU operatie kunnen we de Battle Groups gebruiken. Als de nood echt aan de man is, kunnen de eenheden wisselen bij een andere operatie. Ik zie de Battle Group als verbetering van Europese capaciteit en staat niet haaks op wat we al doen binnen NAVO. Dit is ook goed dat de EU eigen reactie-eenheid heeft; stel dat de VS niet mee willen doen. Daarbij leunt de NRF leunt sterk op de Amerikanen. Dus het is goed dat er binnen de EU een ontwikkeling is begonnen dat we als Europa sommige dingen toch ook zelf kunnen doen. Het is niet goed, ook niet voor de VS, om altijd voor alles wat we doen afhankelijk te zijn van de VS. De VS had ook liever gezien dat we het conflict in Bosnië zelf hadden kunnen oplossen. Als EU hadden we in eerste instantie de wil niet, en daarnaast hadden we de middelen ook niet als we de wil wel hadden gehad. Zeker op het gebied van inlichtingen en transportcapaciteit.

7. Zijn er afspraken gemaakt wanneer er wordt gekozen voor de NRF en wanneer voor de RRF?

Het hangt af van wat voor soort crisis. Een echte militaire aanval op één van de EU landen, zal de NAVO optreden en dat zullen alle landen ook willen. Bei een terroristische aanslag zonder herkomst, zonder het weten waartegen gevochten moet worden dan is misschien het enige wat nodig is een snelle reactie omdat er heel veel slachtoffers zijn bijvoorbeeld. Bij een grote watersnoodramp geldt hetzelfde. De EU kan dan beslissen dat de EU Battle Group zal worden ingezet. Er is een heel goede samenwerking, klinkt misschien raar, tussen beiden (NRF-RRF). Informeel is er heel erg goed contact tussen beide SG NATO (Hoop Scheffer) met SG (High Representative) Solana. Op een gegeven moment spreek je op zo'n manier dat af wat het meest voor de hand ligt met wat er gebeurt, maar alles informeel. Dit werkt sneller dan formeel. Er zijn dus geen duidelijke afspraken gemaakt. Er wordt geen Battle Group gebruikt voor een niet EU land als Turkije: dan de NRF. Als er iets in Zweden gebeurt als

geen NAVO bondgenoot, dan wordt er een EU Battle Group gebruikt. Landen die lid zijn van beide: dan moet er overlegd worden.

8. Is er een afstemming tussen NRF en RRF?

Er is niet echt afstemming tussen de commandant van de NRF en de commandant van een Battle Group. De enige afstemming die ik kan bedenken is conceptueel. In principe proberen we alle militaire doctrines, procedures etc. hetzelfde te houden als binnen NATO en NATO is Leading. Een eenheid die je aanbied als Battle Group in de ene 6 maanden kan je zo de ander 6 maanden aanbieden aan de NRF want de procedures zijn hetzelfde.

Voor militaire veiligheid is NATO de basis en we proberen binnen de EU zoveel mogelijk te versterken maar niet in concurrentie met NATO: we moeten ons geld zo goed mogelijk besteden. We kunnen afhankelijk van de situatie de eenheden aan beiden aanbieden.

9. Wat zijn de voorwaarden en wie maakt de uiteindelijke beslissing?

Er zijn een heleboel verschillende voorwaarden. Bijvoorbeeld militair: waar moet een eenheid aan voldoen om geaccrediteerd te raken om deel te nemen aan de NRF. Aan de NRF zijn dat voorwaarden die gesteld worden door de SACEUR. Eenheden moeten ook door het accreditatieproces. Bij de Battle Groups zijn er geen voorwaarden. De politieke voorwaarden zijn dat de North Atlantic Council (NAC) aan de NAVO zijde en de Raad aan de EU zijde beslissen wat in te zetten.

10. Hoe denkt u dat nationale eenheden met twee Defensieorganisaties zullen worden ingezet?

11. Wat betekent dit voor de Defensieleiding en zijn er verschillende operationele procedures?

12. Denkt u dat het optreden van de EU tijdens het conflict tussen Georgië en Rusland aantoont dat de EU nog lang niet klaar is om adequaat en betekenisvol te kunnen opereren als Defensieorganisatie? (net als het EU optreden tijdens de conflicten op de Balkan en voormalig Joegoslavië)

Bent u van mening dat de EU sneller en beter had moeten/kunnen ingrijpen?

De EU heeft in het geval van Georgië verbluffend snel opgetreden. De besluitvorming ging snel. Binnen 3 weken was er een EU waarnemingsmissie. De EU en ook niet EU landen hadden dit niet sneller kunnen doen. Natuurlijk kon de EU de Russische troepen niet tegenhouden, daar heeft de EU de militaire capaciteiten ook niet voor. Daarbij wilde NATO ook niet ingrijpen omdat Georgië naar hun mening onverstandig had gehandeld en constant adviezen in de wind heeft geslagen voor dit conflict kwam. Sashvili heeft niet het advies opgevolgd.

De typische problemen binnen de EU moet de EU ook zelf kunnen oplossen. Rusland is een moeilijk onderwerp. De VS had geen last van het conflict in Bosnië maar greep toch in.

Frankrijk wil niet dat een EU Defensie Organisatie ingrijpt bij grootschalige conflicten, daarom zijn ze terug bij de NATO. Dit geeft hoop (dat er wordt afgezien van de Franse ambitie voor een eigen EU Defensie Organisatie).

Nu zijn er 2 Battle Groups, vroeger (ten tijde van Joegoslavië) waren deze er niet. Het conflict met Georgië heeft bewezen dat de daadkrachtigheid van de EU is verbeterd. "Ik ben trots". Binnen 3 weken was er een EU Monitoring Mission.