



THE INTEGRATION POLICY OF THE NETHERLANDS

A good model for South Korea



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Executive Summary

Migration for reasons of employment, education, safety and family reunification, a common thing in our present-day world. To counteract potential instability generated by the flow of migrants, host countries strive for integration of migrants into their societies. The Netherlands, considered an example of successful immigrant integration, has implemented a civic integration exam and strict rules for migrants. South Korea is a new immigration destination which has experienced severe anti-immigration sentiment because of its immigration policy. Since 2000, South Korea has implemented a multiculturalism policy that accommodates migrants and maintains migrants' cultures. This policy has resulted in many complaints among Korean nationals about welfare benefits granted to immigrants and lack of immigrant assimilation. To address this critique, in 2009 the Korean government initiated the Korea Immigration and Integration Programme (KIIP) while still holding on to the multiculturalism policy. Despite the KIIP implementation, the level of immigrant integration in Korea today remains low.

This research uses Dutch immigration and integration policies as a model to identify ways to improve the Korean immigration situation. The researcher conducted desk research and an email interview to identify deficiencies in the KIIP and possible remedies. This research recommends six improvements of the KIIP to stimulate immigrant integration in Korea. First, the government should make the KIIP compulsory. Second, the government should implement a participation declaration requiring migrants to declare their intention to integrate. Third, the government should impose a deadline for completion of the KIIP and penalties for those failing to pass the programme in the allotted time. Fourth, the government should charge migrants for the KIIP. Fifth, migrants who can speak Korean or who have started the integration process should be eligible for benefits. Sixth, the same requirements for social benefits should apply to both migrants and Korean citizens. Before adopting any changes, however, the Korean government should make its approach to immigration and immigrant integration more consistent. Currently, the government implements a multiculturalism policy as well as the KIIP. Contradictions between these two strategies confuse immigrants and hinder the ability of the Korean government to host migrants. The researcher recommends the Korean government to choose civic integration and to adopt aspects of the Dutch approach in order to help solving its current immigration issues.

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List of Abbreviations

- ATFK: Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea
- CBS: Statistics Netherlands
- DUO: Education Executive Agency of the Netherlands
- EEA: European Economic Area
- EM: Ethnic Minorities
- EPS: Employment Permit System
- EU: European Union
- IND: Immigration and Naturalisation of the Netherlands
- ITS: Industrial Trainee Scheme
- KIIP: Korea Immigration and Integration Programme
- KOSTAT(KOSIS): Statistics Korea
- MoJ: Ministry of Justice
- NIHR: Netherlands Institute for Human Rights
- NIKL: National Institute of Korean Language
- SMFA: Support for Multicultural Families Act
- Socio-Net: Immigration and Social Network of Korea
- WRR: Scientific Council of the Netherlands

Introduction

Hypermobility, the large-scale movement of people within and between countries, is common in this period of globalisation. According to the United Nations, “the number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly in recent years, reaching 258 million in 2017” (International Migration Report, 2017, p.4). There are many reasons that people move, including for education, family reunification, marriage, opportunities for children, employment, or natural disasters. No matter the reasons, the number of people moving across international borders rises every year.

When migrants move to other countries for a better life, the receiving communities face social, political, economic, and cultural issues. When a host country receives an influx of foreign nationals, the cultures of the host country and the immigrants clash. Furthermore, the host country monitors immigrants’ economic activities because anti-immigration feeling easily rises when natives from the host country feels financial burdens by paying taxes to accommodate immigrants.

Migrants prefer to move to developed countries in the current period. High-income countries hosted 64% of international migrants in 2017 (International Migration Report, 2017). Middle- and low-income countries received 32% and 4%, respectively. The countries preferred for immigration, such as Australia, New Zealand, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands, are mainly located in North America, Western Europe, and Oceania. These developed countries implement different immigration and integration policies to accommodate migrants in their societies. Although a number of high-income countries have experience with immigrant flows and have developed immigration and integration policies over many years, not every economically wealthy country has a long immigration history.

The Republic of Korea, well-known as ethnocentric, is one of the developed countries and has faced a rapid transition as an immigration destination. There are over 2 million foreigners residing in Korea (체류 외국인 현황 (Registered Foreign Nationals), 2018). In order to accommodate them in Korean society, the Korean government sees multiculturalism as an immigration goal by mirroring

the Canadian case. Canada is a successful country for multiculturalism. In aspiring to become a favourable immigration country for multiculturalism, the Korean government supports immigrants with social welfare to encourage them to stay in Korea with the multiculturalism policy. However, this approach has made migrants rely on the government and has resulted in a low level of immigrant integration and a high level of anti-immigration sentiment.

Chairman of the Overseas Koreans Foundation Wooseong Han revealed that 61.1% of 820 surveyed Koreans from seven cities disagreed to the following question: Are guest workers a part of the country? (Lee, 2018) Currently, migrants staying in Korea for employment purposes account for 31% of migrants (Korea Immigration Service Statistics, 2017). The more migrants move to Korea, the more Korean citizens are against migrants. Anti-immigration sentiments have become more serious due to many social welfare benefits granted to migrants, especially married migrants and their children. In 2012, 95% of the budget for the civic integration programme was spent on multicultural families (Kang, Park, & Seong, 2017). A large number of Korean nationals complain about welfare granted to migrants in terms of healthcare, education, employment, translation services, housing, and childcare. A researcher working in Sookmyung Women's University Yoon criticised that too many subsidies have been given to migrants while underprivileged Korean citizens have received a few subsidies (Kang et al., 2017). More scholars are emphasising the importance of migrant integration to encourage compatibility between native Koreans and migrants.

In order to promote immigrant integration, the Korean government has launched an integration programme called the Korea Immigration and Integration Programme (KIIP). The programme is based on programmes from Europe, especially the Netherlands. The KIIP aims to encourage self-independency in Korean society and proficiency in the Korean language among migrants. However, the participation rate is low, unlike in the Netherlands. In spite of the multiculturalism policy and the KIIP, the Korean government has many challenges to address issues in relation to immigration and integration.

Therefore, this thesis explores the immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands in order to guide the Korean government in developing its immigration and integration policies. The thesis writer chose the Netherlands as a model for South Korea for several reasons. First, the Netherlands has revised its immigration and integration policies because of an influx of migrant labourers and

migrants from postcolonial countries. Second, they have experience with a multiculturalist immigration policy and a welfare policy for immigrants. Third, the Netherlands guarantees the participation of migrants in Dutch society by implementing the civic integration exam. The Netherlands has similarities to Korea when it comes to the immigration and integration policies and reasons for the creations of these policies. Furthermore, the Netherlands has experienced the same issues that South Korea now faces, such as migrants' low host language proficiency, welfare, citizenship, and more.

In order to solve these problems, the Korean government should develop its integration policy to optimise migrant integration by studying the development of Dutch immigration and integration policies. This research paper addresses why the Netherlands is a good role model for South Korea. Therefore, the central question is as follows: How can South Korea develop its integration policy in order to increase migrant integration and improve compatibility of Korean citizens and migrants, based on the integration policy of the Netherlands?

The following sub-questions in order to answer the central question are:

- (1) What are the three models of immigrant integration?
- (2) What are the backgrounds of the Dutch immigration policy?
- (3) What is the current immigration situation in the Netherlands and how has the Dutch immigration policy been developed?
- (4) What is the current immigration situation in South Korea and the Korean immigration and integration policies?
- (5) What adaptations are needed in Korea?

Methodology

This research paper writer used two methods for data collection to answer the central question and sub-questions. Using desk research, the researcher collected qualitative and quantitative sources. The qualitative sources used in this paper include journals, reports published by governmental and research institutions, and books from the National Library of the Netherlands, Google Scholar, Worldcat.org, and other database search engines. The quantitative sources from Statistics Netherlands (CBS), Statistics Korea (KOSTAT, KOSIS), the United Nations, and other governmental institutions were used to describe trends in migrant demographics in Korea and the Netherlands. The other method was email interview. The email interview was conducted for a critique of the multiculturalism policy in Korea from the point of view of an inspector working in Foreign Affairs Bureau of National Police Agency of South Korea. This method was used instead of an in-person interview because the interviewer and the interviewee live in different countries and the interviewee was not able to participate in an online interview.

This research paper is structured in four distinct chapters. The first chapter addresses the background of the Dutch integration policy. This chapter investigates reasons for the large numbers of migrants hosted by the Netherlands. The historical background describes immigrant flow in historical events such as the Dutch revolt, Dutch colonisation and de-colonisation, and state reconstruction. As part of the sociocultural background, Dutch interest in learning a foreign language from the 17th century to now is illustrated. Furthermore, the freedom and equality that attract migrants to the Netherlands for a better life are explained. In order to write chapter 1, primary sources were retrieved from history articles, the Dutch constitution, a guide book for newcomers to the Netherlands published by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands. Furthermore, news articles were cited as well.

Chapter 2 describes the current migrant population and how and why the Dutch immigration and integration policies have changed to accommodate migrants. This chapter is divided into three parts. First, it describes the current migrant population by origin and generation. Second, the development of immigration and integration policies by era is elaborated. Third, the civic integration exam and strict rules on migrants in the Netherlands are described. In this chapter, quantitative data by CBS was used to indicate the migrant population in the Netherlands. For the

policy development and the Dutch integration policy, qualitative sources from a book chapter 'Destination Netherlands. History of immigration and immigration policy in the Netherlands', country reports by International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe, and news articles from the BBC and DutchNews.nl are cited. Additional sources such as online announcements from the Dutch government were also cited in chapter 2.

Chapter 3 is a comparison to chapter 2. This chapter discusses the rise of multiculturalism in South Korea and the Korean government's immigration policy and integration programme for migrants. This chapter is structured in four parts. The first part describes the migrant population in South Korea by year, nationality, and visa type. Second, the chapter reviews how South Korea became a multicultural society. In the third part, the multiculturalism policy in Korea is explained. Fourth, the Korea Immigration and Integration Programme (KIIP) is introduced. The writer conducted desk research and an email interview for this chapter. To collect data, the third immigration policy plan by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, Korea Immigration Service Statistics 2017 by the Korea Immigration Service, statistical data from KOSTAT, internet sources from Immigration and Social Integration Network of Korea (Socio-Net), and other sources were used. The writer interviewed an inspector working for the National Police Agency of South Korea. The interview was conducted in order to determine whether the multiculturalism policy in Korea ensures protection for migrants in the view of a Foreign Affairs Bureau inspector who inspects a large number of migrants in Korea.

Chapter 4 addresses adaptations needed in Korea. The adaptations were drawn by studying the Dutch civic integration exam and its procedures and regulations relating to migrant integration and social welfare benefits. For this part, online sources from the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, the Education Executive Agency, and Socio-Net were used. Furthermore, news articles and notices of the Dutch government are cited. Statistics by KOSTAT were used in order to show the KIIP participant rate. Finally, a petition asking for an amendment to the immigration policy was used.

Theoretical Framework

The Netherlands is one of the preferred immigration countries in Europe. According to Statistics Netherlands (CBS), the Netherlands hosts over 3.9 million migrants which accounts for about 23% of the total population in the Netherlands (Population; key figures, 2018). This number has been obtained through the development of the immigration and integration policies over decades. From ad hoc measure to the civic integration exam with stricter regulations on immigrants, the concepts of the policies have changed through political discourses.

In contrast to the Netherlands, South Korea does not have a long history on immigration. It is a new immigration destination in Asia. Currently, Korea implements the multiculturalism policy and the Korea Immigration & Integration Programme because of less immigrant integration and needs to resolve the public complaints and facilitate more migrants.

This theoretical framework will guide to build up the knowledge of three migrant integration models to understand this research paper in deep.

Assimilation

Assimilation is referred to as increasing likeness or similarity, not identity. The process of becoming similar, of treating someone similar, or of rendering someone similar is a straight-line convergence (Brubaker, 2003). The highlight of assimilation is on the process and controversial when states force migrants to assimilate with their policies. Therefore, the ramifications of the assimilation process are felt by the immigrant generation and are passed on to the generations that follow. Assimilation can be divided into three theories, classic assimilation models, ethnic disadvantage, and segmented assimilation models.

Through a lens of classic assimilation theory, a group of migrants become more similar over time in terms of values, manners, behaviours, and norms (Brown & Bean, 2006). Furthermore, the classic assimilation models assert that immigrants that have interacted with the host society over an extended period time have more similarities compared to groups that have been in the country a shorter period time. Gordon's study of assimilation (as cited in Williams Jr. & Ortega, 1990) discusses that there are seven types of assimilation existing (p.698). First, it is acculturation which is that newcomers adopt cultural dimensions such as language, value, norms, and dress. Second, it is structural assimilation. It is the process that migrant groups obtain access to institutions on the ground of education and jobs at the secondary level and join clubs of the major at the primary level. Next, it is large-scale intermarriage or marital assimilation. Accordingly, people tend to marry persons who are the member of the dominant society (Assimilation and Pluralism: From Immigrants to White Ethnics, 2011). Fifth, it is identificational assimilation which is a sense of peoplehood. Attitude receptional and behaviour receptional assimilation are following (Winters & DeBose, 2003). They are the absence of prejudice and that of discrimination. Last, it is civic assimilation as the absence of value and power conflict (Williams Jr. & Ortega, 1990). Gordon had a belief that his seven stages of assimilation model as a common sequence of assimilation.

Ethnic disadvantage theory argues that institutional barriers such as discrimination and lack of access to education and employment slow down the process of integration. In the assimilation perspectives, assimilation helps to illuminate human capital differences between the native-born and immigrants. Therefore, the second or descent immigrant generations are less disadvantaged and less different from the natives in theory. Aleksynska and Alesina (2010) discussed that the first generation feels discriminated because of nationality, while the second generation answer it is because of ethnic and religious discriminations in their conducted research (p.16). In addition, they could not find a correlation between language and economic outcomes, unlike the old model of ethnic disadvantage theory. The old model argues that language results in further assimilation. It does with the first-generation immigrants but does not with the second or following generations who were born and educated in a host country the same as the natives (Aleksynska & Alesina, 2010).

The recent model of assimilation that is a hybrid of ethnic disadvantage and classic assimilation theory known as the segmented assimilation model. In essence, this theory proposes a process of assimilation that is based on the socio-economic status and the race of immigrant. In this theory, the structural, cultural, and contextual aspect define various outcomes of assimilation. Therefore,

this theory includes upward and downward mobility, and optimistic and pessimistic outcomes caused by assimilation (Xie & Greenman, 2008). It criticises that a group of immigrants are put at a disadvantage by being denied access to opportunities such as employment, hence slowing their advancement.

Migrants that have assimilated should be indistinguishable from members of the majority ethnic group. Assimilation is generally considered to be an extreme form of acculturation; however, it is rare for an ethnic group to replace its original cultural values. The original assimilation theory is centred on homogeneity, but contemporary practices are centred mainly on acceptance of the plurality in cultural norms by the newcomers.

Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism is defined as a system that consists of behaviours, values, and beliefs that embrace diversity and differences between social groups, empowering those groups to positively contribute in an inclusive sociocultural context. A crucial aspect of the concept is the recognition that, in different societies, there is a rich diversity which should be respected for peaceful coexistence. Respecting the cultural values, political opinion, and beliefs of others is reinforced by treating people with dignity, safeguarding their integrity, and understanding their social worth. Another crucial contribution of multiculturalism is the acknowledgement of different cultural expressions as part of contributions by various social groups in a particular society. Multiculturalism defines the practice of giving prominence to what different cultures offer and not belittling those contributions on the basis of the majority values or beliefs in a particular society. The ultimate goal of a policy that is derived from multiculturalism is to ensure that there is some level of unity within the diversities that coexist in a particular society. However, the adoption of multiculturalism as an integration policy may give rise to fears of the dilution of the majority culture and values in a country.

Politically, multiculturalism aims to achieve some level of acceptance of differences that exist in society. However, it is difficult to implement the ideology as its theory when multiculturalism

encounters liberalism because it clashes with citizenship. According to Bauböck (as cited Castles & Miller, 1993),

as a normative concept citizenship is a set of rights, exercised by the individuals who hold the rights, equal for all citizens, and universally distributed within a political community, as well as a corresponding set of institutions guaranteeing their rights (p.38)

Liberal democracies prioritise and seek for a high degree of individual liberty and the protection of individual rights (Garner, Ferdinand, & Lawson, 2012). Therefore, immigration countries where have experienced multiculturalism granted freedom and protection to the ethnocultural minorities in order to accommodate the minorities. The civil and political rights such as suffrage and freedom of speech, religion, and more subjects relating to fundamental rights are given to the minorities. Furthermore, minorities can form and keep up associations or groups. Moreover, they are allowed to promote their opinions and culture to other groups of minorities (Kymlicka & Cohen-Almagor, Democracy and Multiculturalism, 2000). However, liberals are worried of violation of citizenship (liberal values) caused by the cultural or group rights of minorities. Pim Fortuyn, a Dutch politician, said that the Islam culture oppresses women because of patriarchal culture while gender equality is emphasised and regarded as fundamental rights (Pim Fortuyn in debate with Marcel van Dam (PvdA) - 1997, 2006). Liberals are concerned about all issues relating to feminism such as female genital mutilation, forced marriage, or restraint on women (Garner, et al., p.147). Thus, liberals tend to regard multiculturalism a threat to citizenship.

In the European context, multiculturalism was not adequate to accommodate immigrants. Multiculturalism was spread out across Western European countries between the 1970s and 1990s. In this period, immigration countries in Europe developed and implemented multiculturalism policies. There has been the fall of multiculturalism since the middle of the 1990s because the majority groups from receiving countries felt threatened in terms of common values, customs, and belief. However, this phenomenon across Europe has resulted in the rise of populism and political discourses discussing civic integration (Kymlicka, Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future, 2012).

Civic integration as a policy was initiated in the Netherlands primarily because of the shortcomings in immigration policies related to multiculturalism. It accentuates that newcomers to the Netherlands are obligated to learn the national language and national norms, values, and other components forming liberal democracy (Jansen, 2013). Civic integration has been introduced as an integration strategy by the Dutch government in the late 1990s because of the challenge emanating from the failure of multiculturalism in the 1980s. Multiculturalism led to unforeseen socio-economic problems during the implementation process. The civic integration policy is based on the need for the migrant population to be autonomous and self-sufficient.

There is a tendency that people are confused between multiculturalism and assimilation and (civic) integration, especially assimilation and integration. Multiculturalism is a concept that the various cultures more than one national culture is able to exist with other cultures. Assimilation is a one-way process that the majority community makes minorities become similar to the majority culture while the origin culture of the minority is relinquished. However, integration is that newcomers incorporate into the majority community as equal members. Jansen differentiates assimilation and civic integration as follows: Civic integration requires the host language proficiency and liberal democratic values, while old versions of assimilation were nationalistic (Jansen, 2013).

The main aim of civic integration is to reduce cases of segregation. Civic integration led to the introduction of severe restrictions on immigrants. For example, in the Netherlands, the model has an extreme outcome in which immigrants behave like Dutch natives in their public life. Notably, immigrants are able to actualise their goals of enjoying equal citizenship if they adjust to their values and behavioural expectations. The approach to civic integration in the Netherlands requires individuals that wish to settle in the Netherlands to learn the Dutch language and basic norms and values such as freedom and equality which formulate the Dutch citizenship.

The civic integration process presupposes that migrants will take full responsibility for ensuring that they are incorporated into Dutch society. Commonly, European countries adopt a dual strategy in which civic integration and anti-discrimination policies are implemented together to divide the burden between the individual and the society in achieving a shared citizenship.

Chapter 1. Background on Dutch Immigration Policy

The Dutch government admitted that the Netherlands is an immigrant country in 1998 (van Meeteren, van de Pol, Dekker, Engbersen, & Snel, 2013). However, the Netherlands has been hosting and living with internationals since the 16th century. Due to this long experience, they are able to host about 3.9 million migrants, who comprise 23.1% of the total population (Population; key figures, 2018). Before reviewing the immigration situation in the Netherlands and the development of the immigration policies, this chapter will help readers understand what led to the current immigration status in the Netherlands. This chapter describes the historical and sociocultural backgrounds resulting in the current immigration status in the Netherlands.

1.1 Historical Background

The creation of a multicultural society in the Netherlands has been long in the making. It can be said that the multicultural characteristics of the Dutch society have been forming since the 16th century. After the Dutch revolt, there was a large movement of skilled labourers and scholars to the northern provinces. In general, they emigrated from Brabant, Flanders, and Hainaut to the northern provinces such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Leiden, and Gouda (Maas, 2013). Furthermore, estimates suggest that between 1600 and 1800 about 600,000 foreigners settled in the United Province, a country whose population had been 1.5 million for most of its existence (Janssen, 2018, p.49) (Janssen, 2018). Moreover, about 40% of Amsterdam residents were born abroad. Similarly, the number of aliens in Haarlem and Leiden reached almost 55% of the total population.

This immigration boosted the Dutch economy and enriched education and science. Sailors and mapmakers were able to trade with the Far East in the 17th century. It was the step towards the Dutch golden age. The Dutch Republic established the East India and Dutch West India Companies. The companies resulted in Dutch colonies in Asia, South Africa, North and South America, and the Caribbean. After de-colonisation in those areas, migrants from the colonies immigrated to the Netherlands.

The large scale of immigration to the Netherlands occurred in earnest after the Second World War when the country needed an enormous labour force to reconstruct the country through industrialisation. The Dutch government attracted foreigners with few qualifications for short-term jobs. As a result, an influx of workers arrived from Turkey and Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the 1960s (van Meeteren, et al., 2013). In the early 1970s, the Dutch government hired Moroccans for low-skilled work vacancies under a short-term stay condition. However, the recruitment was restrained by the Dutch government and many Moroccans became unemployed. Instead of deporting them, the host country invited the workers' families to come to the Netherlands for family reunification (Bevelander & Veenman, 2006). Later, until the middle of the 1990s, the Netherlands started to accept asylum seekers escaping the wars in Yugoslavia. After that, asylum seekers with Turkish, Afghan, Iraqi, Sri Lankan, or Somali nationality arrived in the Netherlands. Lastly, enlargement of the European Union escalated the movement of EU citizens. According to the government of the Netherlands, "almost 80% of labour migrants come from the EU, and 10% come from Asia" ("The Netherlands' biggest immigrant group are workers from the EU", 2012, "The study's findings", para.1).

1.2 Sociocultural Background

The Netherlands is a small country but one of the most densely populated countries in the world. Statistics Netherlands reports that both the total population and persons with a migration background are increasing steadily. Accordingly, there were over 17 million people residing in the Netherlands in 2018 (Population; key figures, 2018). What stands out is the growth in numbers of migrants. Twenty-three percent of the total population in the Netherlands in 2018 were persons with a migration background.

These numbers and the history of immigration to the Netherlands show how international and multicultural the Netherlands is. This chapter addresses sociocultural accommodations for persons without a Dutch background in the Netherlands.

Table 1

Rate of Persons with a Migration Background by the Total Population between 2000 and 2018

	2000	2005	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total population	15,863,950	16,305,526	16,574,989	16,900,726	16,979,120	17,081,507	17,181,084
Persons with a Dutch background	13,088,648	13,182,809	13,215,386	13,235,405	13,226,829	13,218,754	13,209,225
Persons with a migration background	2,775,302	3,112,717	3,359,603	3,665,321	3,752,291	3,862,753	3,971,859
Migration background, rate	17.5%	19.2%	20.3%	21.7%	22.1%	22.6%	23.1%

Source: Statistics Netherlands, 2018

1.2.1 Learning a Foreign Language

The Dutch education system supports students in learning diverse foreign languages. Students in the Netherlands start learning their first foreign language at age 10 (Most Students in Europe Must Study Their First Foreign Language by Age 9, 2015). Figure 1 shows that 70% of Dutch students at secondary school learn two or more foreign languages (Focus on Foreign language learning, 2016). This number is 19% higher than the European Union average. In order to escalate language skills, the Dutch cabinet made a decision in 2014 to conduct 15% of lessons in English, French, or German (“Government gives go-ahead to teaching in foreign languages in primary school”, 2014, “Positive experience”, para.1). Dutch students are able to learn foreign languages that are not often taught in comparison to the main foreign languages. Nowadays, some Dutch secondary school provide Turkish, Arabic, Spanish, Russian, and Chinese courses to their students (“Chinese is now an official option in Dutch school leaving exams”, 2018, para.2). This indicates the Netherlands does consider internalisation and is open to foreign cultures.




Figure 1. Percentage of Secondary Students Learning Two or More Foreign Languages in the European Union Countries

Source: Eurostat, 2016

However, this effort towards learning foreign languages did not begin in the modern era. The Dutch education system has been supporting foreign language ability since the 17th century, when three languages were commonly used. The first was French. The successful settlement of refugees from

the southern provinces attracted numerous migrants. French Protestants from the southern area formed the largest group. They expanded their culture and made a living by founding French schools or becoming ministers in Walloon churches (Wilhelm, 2017). As a result, the French language became the most important and most commonly used foreign language in Holland. Furthermore, the rise of French culture stimulated scholars' interest in speaking French. In addition, the prosperity of the French culture significantly affected the modern secondary education of the Netherlands (Wilhelm, 2017).

The second foreign language was English. There were many English and Scottish merchants in Holland. However, it was difficult for the Dutch to learn English because the merchants stayed only temporarily, and the main attendants at English schools were English and Scottish children. However, Dutch nationals could access imported books written in English. Furthermore, they learned English for commerce.

The last language was German. The group of German speakers was smaller than other groups. German-speaking migrants searched for jobs in Holland or studied at Dutch universities. The number of German speakers was not large enough to expand knowledge of foreign languages, but it was able to do it because of reputation of German scholarship, philosophy, and literature (Wilhelm, 2017).

1.2.2 Freedom

The Netherlands is one of the most liberal countries in the world. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands defines the core values of Dutch society as freedom and equality. The word 'freedom' is one of the most heard words in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, freedom is considered as the rights to say and to do what a person wishes (Core values of Dutch society, 2014). There are two freedoms considered the most important in the Netherlands. One is faith and the other is opinions.

The Netherlands consists of people from all over the world and many religions co-exist there. Furthermore, people have the rights to freely choose what they believe. According to Article 6.1 of the constitution of the Netherlands, “everyone shall have the right to profess freely his religion or belief either individually or in community with others, without prejudice to his responsibility under the law” (“The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands”, 2008, p.5) Therefore, no one can force someone to have the same thoughts or faith as they do. Additionally, the Dutch constitution affirms that “discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex on any other grounds whatever shall not be permitted” (“The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands”, 2008, p.5).

The other freedom is opinions. The freedom of expression is essential in the Dutch society because it is related to democracy. Dutch people believe that good decisions are made when other opinions are considered. Furthermore, freedom of expression enables people to build better own circumstances by sharing and discussing ideas, concerns, needs, and views. Every person in the Netherlands is able to state their own opinion. If they would like to send a letter or a petition to the government, they have right to do under Article 5 of the constitution of the Netherlands (“The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands”, 2008, p.5).

1.2.3. Equality

Equality is vital in Dutch society. When starting a new life in the Netherlands, many hear that everyone is equal in the Netherlands. A large number of Dutch nationals think they are treated equally. The Dutch constitution starts with this statement, “all persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances” (“The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands”, 2008, p.5). Therefore, gender, age, or place of birth are not as meant as in other countries. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands underlines that the meaning of equal treatment is everyone must comply with the same rules (Core values of Dutch society, 2014).

Discrimination should be restrained in order for equality. In the Netherlands, discrimination based on belief, religion, race, and more is prohibited. This is vital because it protects identity. When it comes to gender issues, gay people are entitled to the same rights as others. Same-sex marriage is

an example of this. In 2001, the Netherlands became the first country to legalise gay marriage (Austrian Supreme Court rules in favour of same-sex marriage, 2017). In terms of employment, the Dutch government released the Equal Treatment in Employment (Age Discrimination) Act. Concerning disability or chronic illness, there is an act mandating equal treatment on the grounds of disability or chronic illness. Equality is an important element in Dutch society.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the historical and sociocultural background on immigration in the Netherlands to understand what led to the current immigration status. The open-mindedness towards foreigners in the Netherlands began in the 16th century while Dutch nationals were experiencing the Dutch revolt. The formation of the multicultural society in the Netherlands was affected in earnest by the influx of immigrants during and after World War II.

The history of socio-culture in the Netherlands formed the current multicultural characteristics of the state. Dutch nationals interacted with other nationals by learning their languages in the 17th century. Nowadays, the interests of the Netherlands in foreign language may be translated as Dutch people seeking to interact with people from other cultures.

Regarding freedom and equality, they are the main elements attracting migrants and potential migrants to the Netherlands. It is true that these two words are the most spoken by Dutch nationals. Although the constitution states that equality and freedom are fundamental rights and are given to anyone in the Netherlands, discrimination does exist in the Netherlands. For instance, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights reported that 42% of Dutch Muslims surveyed answered that they have experienced discrimination concerning housing and employment in the Netherlands because of their religion and origin while the average of the 14 other countries in the EU was 27% (Pieters, 2017). Abbing who conducted the survey said that “the figures are embarrassing but there is an explanation for the Dutch numbers. Dutch Muslims are better informed about anti-discrimination legalisation than other EU Muslims” (“Dutch Muslims don’t feel as ‘at home’ as other EU Muslims”, 2017, “Attachment”, para.4)

In order to abate religious discrimination, the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) and anti-discrimination boards in municipalities handle complaints about discrimination. The NIHR reports and advises the Dutch government on issues they have received. What is more, the Dutch law prohibits public speech inciting religious hatred and imposes a fine of up to €8,100, imprisonment for up to two years, or both (The Netherlands 2017 International Religious Freedom, 2017). Moreover, the Dutch government is involved in cooperation between local authorities and the Muslim community in order for anti-Muslim sentiment. In spite of the religious discrimination, the number of people having a Muslim background is increasing in the Netherlands. As seen in this case, the Dutch government, together with their citizens, does take initiative in order to combat discrimination.

Chapter 2. The Current Immigration Situation in the Netherlands and Development of the Dutch Integration Policies

Immigration is regarded as a lesser issue while integration is a major problem. The Dutch integration policy is formed by the emergent challenge of acculturation due to the cultural distance that exists between the destination country and countries of origin. The issue of national identity and the current challenge relating to insecurity is a profound factor that must be addressed. The conflict between the various migrant identities and the Dutch identity is a catalyst for the Netherlands to revise policies to produce more harmonisation and less anti-migrant sentiment.

This chapter explores the immigration situation in the Netherlands. The demographics of immigrants is described to understand immigration trends. Next, the development of the immigration policy from 1970s to now is explained. The policy developments illustrate the different goals of each era.

2.1 Demographics of Immigrants in the Netherlands

Classification of migrants in the Netherlands is best done by generations depending on the country of origin. Another critical distinction of migrants in the Netherlands is whether their background is western or non-western. Essentially, in modern times, the upsurge in the number of migrants entering the Netherlands to obtain citizenship is a consequence of changes in the legislation.

Statistical information on the demographics of foreigners in the Netherlands has helped the country develop immigration and integration policies. Table 2 shows that there are about 17.1 million people in the Netherlands, with 13.2 million having a Dutch background and 3.9 million having a migrant background (Population; key figures, 2018).

Table 2

Population by Migration Background in the Netherlands

		2000	2005	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018
Population by migration background								
Total Population	number	15,863,950	16,305,526	16,574,989	16,900,726	16,979,120	17,081,507	17,181,084
Persons with a Dutch background	number	13,088,648	13,182,809	13,215,386	13,235,405	13,226,829	13,218,754	13,209,225
Persons with a migration background								
Total with migration background								
With migration background	number	2,775,302	3,122,717	3,359,603	3,665,321	3,752,291	3,862,753	3,971,859
With migration background, rate	%	17.5	19.2	20.3	21.7	22.1	22.6	23.1

Source: Statistics Netherlands, 2018

Table 3 shows the population of immigrants registered in the Netherlands according to their background. There are about 2.07 million first-generation migrants and almost 1.9 million second-generation migrants (Population; key figures, 2018). The first generation is defined as a person who was born abroad and has at least one parent born abroad. The second generation means a person who was born in the Netherlands and has at least one foreign-born parent. A large percentage of persons with a migrant background are from Turkey, followed by Suriname and Morocco. There has been a notable increase of persons with a migrant background, from 17.5% in 2000 to 23.1% in 2018 (Population; key figures, 2018).

Table 3

First- and Second-Generation Population by Country of Origin in the Netherlands

		2000	2005	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018
Population by migration background								
Total Population	number	15,863,950	16,305,526	16,574,989	16,900,726	16,979,120	17,081,507	17,181,084
Persons with a Dutch background	number	13,088,648	13,182,809	13,215,386	13,235,405	13,226,829	13,218,754	13,209,225
Persons with a migration background								
Total with migration background								
With migration background	number	2,775,302	3,122,717	3,359,603	3,665,321	3,752,291	3,862,753	3,971,859
With migration background, rate	%	17.5	19.2	20.3	21.7	22.1	22.6	23.1
First generation migration background								
Total first generation	number	1,431,122	1,606,664	1,699,751	1,860,977	1,920,877	2,001,175	2,079,329
Western first generation	number	544,890	582,278	644,486	747,703	772,428	801,203	836,178
Non-western first generation								
Total non-western	number	886,232	1,024,386	1,055,265	1,113,274	1,148,449	1,199,972	1,243,151
Morocco	number	152,540	168,400	167,305	168,451	168,336	168,536	169,018
(former) Neth. Antilles and Aruba	number	69,266	82,321	81,175	82,289	82,462	82,995	84,526
Suriname	number	183,249	188,367	185,089	179,236	177,720	176,801	176,412
Turkey	number	177,754	195,678	196,385	192,311	190,621	190,331	191,513
Other non-western background	number	303,423	389,620	425,311	490,987	529,310	581,309	621,682
Second generation migration background								
Total second generation	number	1,344,180	1,516,053	1,659,852	1,804,344	1,831,414	1,861,578	1,892,530
Western second generation	number	821,645	841,397	856,823	879,109	883,271	887,827	892,838
Non-western second generation								
Total non-western	number	522,535	674,656	803,029	925,235	948,143	973,751	999,692
Morocco	number	109,681	147,421	181,700	212,304	217,425	222,552	227,521
(former) Neth. Antilles and Aruba	number	37,931	48,217	57,245	66,637	68,519	70,474	72,588
Suriname	number	119,265	141,063	157,190	169,426	171,302	173,177	175,269
Turkey	number	131,136	163,168	187,572	204,244	206,850	210,036	212,946
Other non-western background	number	124,522	174,787	219,322	272,624	284,047	297,512	311,368

Source: Statistics Netherlands, 2018




Figure 2: Immigrants in the Netherlands between 1980 and 2017

Source: Statistics Netherlands, 2018

The number of migrants coming to the Netherlands has risen continuously since 2005. Statistics Netherlands forecasted that migrants will contribute to two-thirds of the population growth by 2030 (Forecast: 18 million inhabitants in 2029, 2018). The reasons for migration have shifted over time, including for employment and family reunification. However, nowadays increasing numbers of persons with a non-western background consist of asylum seekers.

2.2 Policy Development by Era

The Netherlands has hosted migrants since the 16th century, but they admitted that they are an immigration country in 1980 (Entzinger, 2009). In spite of the late admission, they began to work on an immigration policy to accommodate migrants. From the 1970s to now, the Dutch government has made efforts to create compatibility of Dutch natives and migrants. Therefore, this chapter will review the development of the immigration policy in the Netherlands.

2.2.1 Policies in the 1970s and the Period before

The fact that the Netherlands did not admit that they were an immigrant destination resulted in ad hoc measures. The Dutch government was initially not concerned with migrant workers because they believed that guest labourers would return to their home after temporarily working in the Netherlands. Thus, the ad hoc measures were implemented and aimed to accommodate guest labourers for their time in-country and encourage migrants to return home. Van der Staay contended that the ad hoc policy was a lack of central and underlying concepts (Penninx, 1979).

The welfare policy was created in the 1970s in response to the needs of vulnerable groups such as asylum seekers, guest workers, Moluccans, and migrants from the Dutch Antilles (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garcés-Masareñas, Pennix, & Scholten, 2007). A number of private institutions were incorporated to grant the groups welfare benefits. For instance, migrant labourers were aided in terms of housing by the companies that employed them. Due to the escalation in family

reunification, municipalities stepped forward to help migrants with healthcare, housing, education, and other welfare relating to migrants' ability to live in the Netherlands.

In the early 1970s, the number of recruited migrants reached a peak. It declined in the late 1970s because of the economic crisis. The government encouraged migrants to return their country of origin by implementing a Mother Tongue and Culture programme for the second-generation children from Mediterranean countries, assisting with emigration, offering welfare benefits regarding pensions and unemployment payments, and more (Meyers, 2004). However, the plans of the Dutch government to return migrant labourers to their home countries failed, and many of them settled down instead.

Asylum seekers and migrants coming to the Netherlands through family reunification enlarged migrant communities from Turkey, Morocco, and other Northern African countries. The more migrants that arrived, the more problems the Dutch government faced. Therefore, social scientists initiated a political discourse on settlement of the immigrants for a permanent period or on temporary migration (Joppke, 2007). The Advisory Committee on Research on Minorities, an independent advisory body for government policy, was established in May 1978 by the Ministry of Culture, Recreation, and Social Work to advise the ministry by researching the position of cultural minorities in the Netherlands (Penninx, 1979). In 1979, the Scientific Council (WRR), an independent advisory body for government policy, said the government needed an articulated policy instead of ad hoc measures. They advised the government to propose and implement an ethnic minorities policy to enable migrant integration into Dutch society.

2.2.2 Ethnic Minorities Policy in 1980s

As advised by the Scientific Council (WRR), the Dutch government adopted the Ethnic Minorities (EM) policy that targeted certain ethnic or cultural minorities in the Dutch society. The policy targeted groups from the Moluccas, the Dutch Antilles, Suriname, and refugees, foreign national workers, and *woonwagenbewoners* (caravan dwellers). The government included three domains which were law and politics, socio-economics, and culture and religion. Emancipation of migrants

at the individual and group level was envisioned as a positive contributor to the overall integration of minorities in society.

The EP policy led to the introduction of legislation to protect migrants from discrimination based on religion, nationality, and race. Furthermore, reinforcement of legislation to curb discrimination was created alongside a structure to report discrimination. This structure granted migrants a voice to report issues relating to their position in Dutch society. Moreover, the rights to vote and stand for election at the local level for non-Dutch residents were introduced in 1985 (Pennix, Scholten, & Garcés-Mascreñas, 2005). Furthermore, Dutch laws were amended to enable foreign nationals and their children to obtain Dutch citizenship easier than before.

In the socio-economic domain, the Dutch government took initiatives to improve housing, education, and unemployment benefits. Migrants had previously not been allowed access to social housing, but they were granted access to housing in even large cities. Regarding education, schools offered education to migrant children in their native language. To address unemployment, labour market programmes and vocational training were provided (Vasta, 2006).

In terms of culture and religion, minority groups could prosper their own culture under the EM policy. For instance, they were allowed to build cultural and religious institutions such as language schools. With the policy, the role of the Dutch government was limited in the domain of culture and religion. They were only involved in creating opportunities for minorities so that the minorities could enrich their own culture, for instance, programmes in mother tongues of migrants in the media (Bruquetas-Callejo, et al., 2007).

Criticisms of the EM policy in the 1980s centred mainly on the failure to address problems relating to education and the labour market. The report published by WRR in 1989 stressed inequalities in education and employment between the Dutch nationals and migrants, specifically non-European migrants (Yoffe, 2014). Inequality was found in the welfare distribution. Guest migrants, people from the Dutch Antilles and Suriname, gypsies, refugees, and caravan dwellers were entitled to welfare. However, a small number of Chinese and Pakistani nationals were not able to receive subsidies because the Dutch government did not regard them as minorities (Lee H. , 2013). What

is more, the WRR argued that there was a need to make employment and education compulsory for migrants (Penninx, 1979). Last, there was a critique that migrants had to negotiate for equal rights and to attain some level of autonomy in Dutch society.

2.2.3 Integration Policy in the 1990s

A report published by the Scientific Council suggested the government should focus on migrant integration instead of a mainstream policy for minorities. In 1994 before election, the integration policy was introduced. The policy emanating from the Republicans led to the introduction of aspects of good citizenship and self-responsibility (Bruquetas-Callejo, et al., 2007). However, the victory in the 1994 elections by the Social Democrats led to an overhaul of the integration policy. The renewed policy stressed less welfare reliance and unemployment by improving individual economic integration (Vasta, 2006). However, it failed because ethnic minorities were not subject to the policy. After these political discourses and policy development, civic integration courses were introduced. The aim of the programmes was to initiate the newcomers' integration into Dutch society. Thus, the integration courses consisted of learning Dutch language and functions of Dutch institutions.

Over the years, the Netherlands has been lauded for having open policies on immigration and citizenship. In the 1990s, the political debate developed into an argument over issuance of citizenship as a strategy to encourage integration rather than the conclusion of a process towards full accommodation of foreigners. Politicians leaning to the left claimed that naturalisation should be a trophy for fully integrated persons deserving legal equality with native citizens. Conversely, right-wing politicians argued that the ease in issuance of citizenship to migrant community members raised pertinent questions on their loyalty (Uunk, 2018). The left-wing politicians' opinion prevailed and the policy makers in the Netherlands embraced dual citizenship. However, support of dual citizenship started to wane in 2000 as the government adopted the renunciation demand (Faist, Gerdes, & Rieple, 2004). The policy in the 1990s was meant to facilitate employment and citizenship and ensure equal opportunities. The integration policy was a significant change towards accommodating migrants as citizens with accompanying responsibilities and further exposing them to market forces. Essentially, civic integration was introduced in an effort to prepare migrants to fulfil their duties in Dutch society.

After 2000, the political discourse started changing, with policymakers adopting aspects of assimilation into the official immigration policy. There was an argument that commonalities would be better to maintain national values and norms, instead of compatibilities of the values and norms in the Netherlands and that in minorities' countries (Vervoort & Dagevos, 2011). The multicultural integration policy was deemed a failure and an assimilationist integration model was recommended to help revive Dutch culture, norms, and values. In the early 2000s, the radical right movement affected the immigration policy. *Het multiculturele drama (The Multicultural Drama)* written by Paul Scheffer, flamed anti-immigration sentiments in the Netherlands. Scheffer asserted that large-scale immigration in the Netherlands resulted in poverty and ignorance in Dutch society, and everyone should start taking the Dutch language, culture, and history more seriously (Scheffer, 2000).

Alongside Scheffer, the advent of Pim Fortuyn, a Dutch politician that called himself a populist, further spread anti-immigrant sentiment in the Netherlands. According to Pim Fortuyn in an interview with *de Volkskrant*, "the Netherlands is full, preferably zero immigration, all borders closed, no one enters the country without an iris scan, no Muslim immigrants, the Islam is a backward culture" ("The nationalism of Pim Fortuyn", n.d., "Pim Fortuyn before the May 2002 elections", para.6). Furthermore, he contended that there was a need to set income requirements on foreign migrants coming to the Netherlands for marriage, requiring the Dutch national partner to earn 30% more than the national minimum wage (Ay, 2017). Furthermore, he wanted to limit the age of children who could come to the Netherlands under family reunification and charge immigrants for the integration courses and require payment in advance (Ay, 2017). He highlighted his belief that Islamic culture threatens western values of liberalism.

2.2.4 Integration Policy since 2002

The integration policy since 2002 has focused on the cultural adaptation of migrants to the norms of Dutch society. During this period, the integration policy has been developed along with the immigration policy. In essence, there was an intensive reformulation of integration programmes to ensure migration control. In 2007, migrants have been told to be responsible for paying for

integration courses and up to 70% refund was given by the government after completion of the exam (Bruquetas-Callejo, et al., 2007).

After the murder of Pim Fortuyn, the approach that was applied for integration was assimilationist in nature. The programmes focusing on migrant communities were abolished. The new immigration rules require that individuals migrating to the Netherlands from a non-EU country need to meet language either nationality requirements. In terms of language, newcomers have to prove that they speak Dutch with certificate or diploma in Dutch language. Turkish or EU/EEU citizens are exempted to the programme because free movement granted to them under an Association Treaty and Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (van Ooik & Vandamme, 2013). If newcomers are not qualified, they are obligated to take integration courses. The Dutch political culture changed significantly after the murder of Fortuyn to be more confrontational. Integration programmes have been affected by the political climate.

The new laws issued under this integration policy have given the government the capacity to strip an individual of citizenship due to engagement of illegal activities such as terrorism since 2010 (de Hart & Terlouw, 2015). The political issues surrounding citizenship are directly linked to problems inherent to immigration laws and policies in the Netherlands. In the early 2000s, public opinion and perception in regard to foreigners changed because of the increase in terrorism around the world. Anti-immigration sentiment surged in the Netherlands after the Dutch media aired several cases of crimes committed by migrants (Bruquetas-Callejo, et al., 2007). In 2004, it reached a peak when Dutch film director Theo van Gogh, who directed documentaries critical of Islam, was stabbed to death by a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim extremist (Dubrule, 2013). This crime increased the number of immigration opponents. The Dutch government introduced the civic integration exam in order to make migration prescriptive and initiate some level of control.

2.3 The Civic Integration Exam and Stricter Rules on Migrants

The civic integration exam is compulsory and aims to equip migrants with the necessary language proficiency and knowledge of Dutch society. The Education Executive Agency (DUO) concerning implementation of education policies was given the mandate to enforce the Civic Integration Act

from 2013 (Integration in the Netherlands, n.d.). Migrants fulfilling these obligations are able to fluently converse in Dutch and have a deep knowledge of Dutch systems such as healthcare, education, law, and more. The practicality of the integration test is based on enhancing the capability of migrants to communicate in Dutch.

The composition of the integration exam is mainly on language comprehension, writing, and listening skills. Furthermore, a test of knowledge on Dutch society and participation declaration are included. Finally, migrants submit a portfolio proving that they are able to promote themselves and be active in a labour market. The civic integration exam is positively viewed as a necessary step that migrants undertake in order to be self-reliant in Dutch society.

The Dutch government has tightened rules with the objective of controlling the influx of foreign workers. Agreements made by the government with municipalities address curbing exploitation, improving housing, repatriating foreigners who have no meaningful employment, and promoting better registration (Stricter rules on foreign workers from Europe, n.d.). The strict measures undertaken by the government ensure that there is compliance with the established requirements for registration and publicise the obligations and rights entitled to foreigners. Migrants only qualify for social assistance after they are verified to be in the Netherlands legally and have begun their integration. Migrants who are subject to the civic integration exam must pass the test within three years from the start date of integration. Someone who is following the course must provide proof of their improvement in their Dutch language level. If they do not pass the exam within the fixed time or their command of the Dutch language does not improve, the government will cut off the social assistance.

Conclusion

This chapter has guided the readers to the immigration situation in the Netherlands and how they have addressed problems relating to immigration and integration through policies. From ad hoc measures to the civic integration exam, the concept of immigration in the Netherlands has changed. The Netherlands supported migrants with welfare in the fields of housing, education, and employment allowing migrants to keep their cultural identities with the Ethnic Minorities policy.

Later, the government has worked on initiating migrants to integrate migrants into Dutch society and preventing them from turning into socio-economically vulnerable groups.

The view and treatment of the Dutch government towards migrants drastically changed in the late 1980s and the 1990s with the economic recession and more neo-liberal perspectives. Neo-liberalism often dehumanises people so that there is a tendency to regard people as economic benefits or threats (Trifonov, 2013). Furthermore, neo-liberals see economic independence in a free market is a path leading to prosperity and peace (van Zon, 2013). What is more, they regard economic growth as the progress of an individual. According to former Director General of the World Trade Organisation Moore, “the surest way to do more to help the poor is to continue to open markets” (“Trade, Poverty and The Human Face of Globalization”, 2000, para.23). Through this point, state intervention should be minimum because suppression of free market restrains progress of the person.

The change in the concept of immigration and integration policies from multiculturalism to civic integration has been influenced by neo-liberalism perspectives. Through a neo-liberal lens, the reduced state intervention in the economic sector regarding the participation of migrants is common while the importance of the individuals’ competencies is emphasised.

Chapter 3. The Current Immigration Situation in South Korea and the Korean Multiculturalism Policy

The Korean government has admitted that Korea is no longer a homogeneous country. Since 1980, South Korea has struggled with immigrant influx. In 2017, the number of registered migrants in South Korea was over 2 million (체류 외국인 현황 (Registered Foreign Nationals), 2018). The number of migrants in South Korea has surged since 2000. Therefore, the Korean government uses its immigration policy in order to accommodate migrants and help them have a better life in South Korea. This chapter shows the rapid growth in number of migrants in South Korea and the current migrant population. It explains the main four migrant groups in South Korea as context for the development of multiculturalism in Korea. Afterwards, the Korea Immigration and Integration Programme (KIIP), the Korean government's new approach to migrant integration, is introduced.

Although the immigration history in Korea is short, the immigration policy has been developed. Before the creation of an official policy, there was an ad hoc programme which was modelled on one from Japan. After 2000, South Korea chose multiculturalism as its immigration concept. However, grievances have raised by Korean nationals over subsidies towards migrants instead of native Koreans. Many Korean citizens think that the policy gives too many benefits to migrants, especially multicultural families, while other vulnerable groups do not receive help.

3.1 Demographics of Immigrants in Korea

South Korea does not have a long immigration history, unlike the Netherlands. Korea had maintained its national identity as a single ethnicity. However, it could not pass by immigration in the global era. As seen in Table 4, the general trend indicates escalating growth in the migrant population. The number of migrants reached over 2 million in 2016 for the first time (체류 외국인 현황 (Registered Foreign Nationals), 2018). The number has increased rapidly within a decade. In 2007, the number of migrants in Korea was just over 1 million. It rapidly rose between 2010 and 2014 because of a manpower shortage in the manufacturing industry. After 2014, the number has increased steadily.

Table 4

Migrant Population and Migrant Percentage of the Total Population in Korea between 2004 and 2017

	2004	2007	2010	2014	2015	2016	2017
Migrant population	750,879	1,066,273	1,158,866	1,797,618	1,899,519	2,049,441	2,180,498
Migrants by total population (%)	1.5%	2.16%	2.49%	3.5%	3.6%	3.96%	4.21%

Source: Statistics Korea, 2018

Korea Immigration Service revealed that the total number of migrants has risen 8.5% every year for the last five years. The percent of foreign residents in comparison to the total population in Korea is 4.21% (출입국·외국인정책 통계연보 (Korea Immigration Service Statistics), 2017). Figure 3 shows migrants by nationality. Chinese migrants comprise the largest proportion, at 46.7%. Vietnamese are the second largest group after Chinese, at 7.8%. Thai and American nationals are 7.0% and 6.6%, respectively. Uzbekistanis and Filipinos follow Thais and Americans at 2.0% and 2.7%. The large number of Asian migrants is due to geography, labour migration, and marriage migration.




Figure 3. Migrants by Nationality in South Korea in 2017

Source: Korea Immigration Service

Foreigners in South Korea have different reasons for staying in Korea. Figure 4 shows the non-Korean nationals in Korea by visa type. The largest group, at 22.4%, is composed of international students, businesspeople, diplomats, trainees, government officials, foreign expatriates, and more (Korea Immigration Service Statistics, 2017). The second largest group are members of the Korean diaspora. Interestingly, they are classified as Korean due to Korean ancestry even though they have foreign nationality. Non-profession employment visa holders and working visit visa holders are at 12.8% and 11%, respectively. Next, the group consisting of short-term employees comprises 9.2%. These three groups of professional employee migrants have led to multiculturalism in South Korea. Marriage migrants are 5.6% of the migrant population and many of them obtain residence permits. The last two groups, people with tourism visas and visa exemptions, stay in Korea for a short term. Therefore, they do not influence migration effectively but do increase multiculturalism.




Figure 4. Aliens in South Korea by Visa Type in 2017

Source: Korea Immigration Service, 2017

In the next sub-chapter, the four groups responsible for increasing multiculturalism in Korea will be explained, which are migrant workers, marriage migrants, international students, and North Korean defectors. The demographics of these groups will be greatly elaborated.

3.2 Arrival of Multiculturalism in Korea

South Korea recognised it was facing multiculturalism in 2004. As previously noted, there are four groups bringing multiculturalism in Korea. First are migrant workers. South Korea was enjoying economic growth in the early 1980s brought by suppression of Korean workers. The suppression on the fundamental rights of labourers resulted in many strikes at small- and medium-sized manufacturing companies (Kelder, 2016). Therefore, those enterprises invited and hired foreign labourers to fill vacancies. Since then, the number of migrant labourers has increased. Before 2000,

migrant workers moving to South Korea were in general low-skilled. After 2000, the Korean government has been attempting to invite high-skilled migrants such as professors, experts, artists, engineers, researchers, and foreign language teachers in order to increase economic participation.




Figure 5. High-skilled and Low-skilled Migrant Workers in South Korea between 2006 and 2017

Note: There is no figure for low-skilled migrant workers in 2006

Source: Korea Immigration Service and Statistics Korea

Second, an increasing rate of marriage migration occurred in rural areas. In the 1990s, Korean agriculture faced low production and lack of employment because of industrialisation. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, some high-ranking officials from the government and matchmaking agencies insisted that promotion of international marriages of convenience might resolve a severe labour shortage and decreases in production (Kim S., 2011). In the early 1990s, the number of Chinese female migrants moving to Korea for marriage surged after diplomatic relations were established between South Korea and China. This event made the movement of Chinese nationals from their homeland to Korea easier. Furthermore, the Unification Church, founded in South Korea, began carrying out mass wedding ceremonies for international couples in 1992, when there were over 20,000 couples married in these ceremonies, consisting of about 36,000 Japanese nationals,

600 Thai nationals, and the rest from Eastern Europe, the United States, New Zealand, and Korea (세계 최대규모의 국제합동결혼식 개최 (The World's Biggest Joint Wedding Ceremony), 1992).

Table 5

International Marriage Trend in Korea between 2000 and 2017

	Number of International Marriage
2000	11,605
2005	42,356
2010	34,235
2011	29,762
2012	28,325
2013	25,963
2014	23,316
2015	21,274
2016	20,591
2017	20,835
Total	3,698,141

Source: Statistics Korea, 2018

Statistics Korea determined that international marriage has declined steadily since 2010. The number of international marriage peaked in 2005 at 42,356 (국제결혼 현황 (International Marriages), n.d.). After 2005, the number declined because of the implementation of a strict law on the marriage broker business. This law is intended to guide the marriage brokerage business, to prevent fraud, and to contribute to a sound marriage culture.

International marriage numbers dropped to under 30,000 in 2012 and was at the lowest point in 2016. Donggyum Kim, a researcher from the Korea Insurance Research Institute, argued that the decline in transnational marriage has been affected by the stricter criteria on marriage visas since 2010 (Kim D., 2017).




Figure 6. International Students at Universities in Korea between 2008 and 2017

Source: Statistics Korea, 2018

The next reason is an escalation in the number of international full-time students in higher education. The number of international students in 2008 was about 65,000 and has doubled by 2017 (유학생 현황 (International Students at Universities in Korea), 2018). The number increased steadily until 2011 and fluctuated between 2012 and 2015. In 2016, the number was over 100,000 and increased by 20,000 in 2017. Researcher from National Youth Policy Institute of Korea Hwang said that the fluctuations between 2008 and 2015 were related to stricter entry requirements and rules on international students in terms of a certificate of Korean language, residency, and study progress (Hwang, 2017). Tightening entry requirements and rules on migrants happened because many international students could not follow classes because of low Korean language proficiency. In 2016, the number increased because of lowered requirements for the Korean language test.

The last reason is North Korean defectors. This group comprises the smallest part among the four groups. The statistical data of North Korean refugees in South Korea shows the number of North

Korean defectors surged from the late 1990s to 2009. It peaked in 2009 and decreased steadily until 2018. The total number of defectors is 32,147 (최근현황 (North Korean Defectors), n.d.).

Table 6

North Korean Defectors in Korea between 1998 and 2018

Year	Persons
~1998	947
~2001	1,043
2002	1,142
2003	1,285
2004	1,898
2005	1,384
2006	2,028
2007	2,554
2008	2,803
2009	2,914
2010	2,402
2011	2,706
2012	1,502
2013	1,514
2014	1,397
2015	1,275
2016	1,418
2017	1,127
2018	808
Total	32,147

Note: the number of North Korean defectors each year means that new North Korean defectors flee to South Korea.

Source: The Ministry of Unification of South Korea

3.3 Multiculturalism Policy in South Korea

The starting point to discuss policies regarding international migrants was the Industrial Trainee Scheme (ITS), which was designed based on a Japanese programme in 1994. The need for a multiculturalism policy arose in order to solve visa issues, accommodate foreign workers, and reduce the number of irregular migrants in Korea. The Korean government began its multiculturalism policy in the early 2000s after an increase in the number of women migrating for marriage. The multiculturalism policy addressing different topics was designed. The Korean government was inspired by Canada. The multiculturalism of Canada is well known as a successful case of the multiculturalism model. The Korean government thought multiculturalism was an ideal concept for immigration in Korea.

In 2003, the ITS was abolished and the Employment Permit System (EPS) was legislated. The reasons for the programme abolition were exploitation of ITS participants and deficient measures to monitor the trainees. In 2002, a number of illegal migrants took 80% of all migrant labourer positions in South Korea (Kim M., 2015). The EPS grants work permits and ensures labour rights and working conditions for migrants under the domestic labour laws.

The Korean Nationality Act was amended in 2004. The Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea (ATFK) and the Support for Multicultural Families Act (SMFA) were enacted in 2007 and 2008, respectively. The ATFK aims to acclimate foreign nationals to Korean society and encourage Korean nationals and non-Korean nationals to integrate in order for the development of Korean society (Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea, 2007). This act elaborates the duties of the Korean government in reaching the goals of the act. According to SMFA defined by the Ministry of Government Legislation, “the purpose of the Act is to contribute to the improvement of the quality of life of multicultural family members and the unity of society by helping multicultural family members enjoy stable family living” (Support for Multicultural Families Act, 2008, p.1). Multicultural family members defined in the SMFA are entitled to support in education, language services, protection from abuses, and more. Afterwards, the KIIP was introduced in 2012 officially and became the programme for migrant integration.

In Korea, the multiculturalism policy refers to the immigration policy. The Korean government supports non-Korean nationals by giving them certain rights to be a part of Korean societies, either permanently or temporarily, in order to initiate migrant integration. There are several pillars that the Korean governmental institutions operate under, concentrating on two interesting fields. One is cultural diversity in media. The current focus in entertainment programmes is on foreigners' lives or experiences in Korea. MBC Every 1, a broadcasting company, has a program called the *Welcome, First time in Korea?* and showing international residents invite their friends to Korea and travel together. The national public broadcaster, KBS, airs a programme about the life of Korean celebrities who are married to non-Koreans or vice-versa. The actual programme concept is parenting. However, two multicultural families have joined the programme. In the show, mixed-blood children speak Korean, English, German, Japanese, or Spanish. The Korean government attempts to show more cultural and ethnic diversity.

The other field is to support Koreans residing outside of Korea. The Overseas Korean Foundation has launched the Overseas Koreans Exchange and Support Projects. They support Korean emigrants to another country to achieve suffrage and other political rights (교류지원사업 (Overseas Koreans Exchange & Support Projects), n.d.). Furthermore, they assist Korean emigrants in returning to Korea if they ask for help.




Figure 7. Nine Pillars of the 3rd Immigration Policy Plan

Source: The Ministry of Justice of South Korea, 2018

The third immigration policy plan is mainly targeted towards multicultural families and their children. Under the plan, 72 universities start special admissions for multicultural students in 2019 (Park, 2018). Childcare is granted to multicultural families as well. Single foreign parents who raise children having Korean nationality are guaranteed a housing subsidy. Moreover, multicultural families and international residents are granted access to healthcare (제 3 차 외국인정책 기본계획 (The 3rd Immigration Policy Plan), 2018).

The more immigrants come to South Korea, the more concerns from the Korean government increase. The concerns led to the creation of the KIIP. In the next sub-chapter, the KIIP will be introduced and its benefits for migrants elaborated.

3.4 Korea Immigration and Integration Programme (KIIP)

South Korea launched the pilot version of the Korea Immigration and Integration Programme (KIIP) in 2009. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) of South Korea improves and implements the official programme since 2012. Accordingly, the KIIP has been created on the basis of other countries' approaches to integration such as Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands (Zwetsloot, 2010). The MoJ of South Korea designed the programme to meet the following five aims: to help internationals obtain basic information and knowledge in regards to Korean language and culture; to initiate immigrants as independent members in Korean society; to standardise all welfare (support) policies for foreigners on the basis of KIIP; to increase the participation of immigrants by giving exemptions to the naturalisation written exam and interview; and to measure migrant integration index for improving and reflecting the support policies for non-Korean residents (도입취지 (The Purposes of KIIP), n.d.).

The MoJ of Korea assumes that the benefits from participating in the KIIP would encourage aliens to take the courses and increase the rate of participation. Furthermore, they suppose that an increase in participation would be helpful in improving the supporting policies. The KIIP is not compulsory. Currently, migrants should apply for and have an alien registration card and a certificate of residence in Korea when they move to Korea. They may be obligated to integrate depending on their visa. For instance, international students do not have obligations to take the courses. However, a group of non-Korean nationals who apply for permanent residence or naturalisation must pass the level five course, the intensive course.

3.4.1 Benefits

For participants who have completed the intensive course, this programme grants them five benefits when they apply for naturalisation or a residence permit for a permanent stay. After passing the KIIP courses for naturalisation, a person is exempted from a naturalisation interview. The participants who pass the programme for permanent residents are granted benefits similar to those given to persons who completed the programme for naturalisation.




Figure 8. Benefits from Completing the Korea Immigration and Integration Programme

Source: Immigration and Social Integration Network, 2018

Conclusion

From the 1980s to now, Korea has changed from a homogeneous to multicultural society. The current immigrant population has doubled compared to a decade ago. The Korean government has been attempting to resolve issues about immigration.

Under the immigrant-friendly policy, many Korean natives have complained about excessive subsidies and welfare given to migrants when migrants do not take the initiative to integrate into Korean society. In regard to education, multicultural children are prioritised in admission to public kindergartens. They are able to attend extra classes after school for free. Moreover, they receive discounts on tuition fees for high school and more scholarships than non-multicultural students (Park, 2018). In terms of healthcare for new-born babies and women during pregnancy, Koreans may be excluded from the subsidy depending on their living standards. However, there is not an exemption for female migrants no matter their living level (Oh, 2018). Furthermore, many foreigners enjoy healthcare and leave the country. Non-Koreans are able to apply for Korean national insurance for local residents by fulfilling the three-month residency requirement. In other words, their premiums are equivalent to ones for Koreans. However, this has resulted in insurance fraud. The deficit caused by foreign nationals and collected through September 2018 was over ₩200 billion (equivalent to €156 million) ([단독] ‘먹튀’ 많은 외국인 건강보험...부정수급 올해만 77 억원 (Fraud and Abuse of Insurance by Foreigners Resulting in 77 Hundred million won), 2018). A Chinese man came to Korea for multidrug resistant tuberculosis treatment. He received a ₩30 million bill (equivalent €23,500) but did not pay because South Korea offers free treatment of multidrug resistant tuberculosis (Lee B., 2018). The last complaint is translation services. Municipalities in Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Gwangju, and more provide translation services for free to foreign citizens. Therefore, foreign nationals can go to hospital with translators.

More subsidies that are granted to migrants, more Koreans feel the financial stress. These grievances have increased anti-immigration sentiment in Korea. Many Koreans think that the multiculturalism overprotects migrants in Korea. However, not all migrants are subject to the multiculturalism policy. According to Seo who is an inspector from Foreign Affairs Bureau of National Police Agency of South Korea,

in real life, the undocumented aliens, criminal foreigners, asylum seekers, and refugees are not subject to the policy. In the case of asylum seekers, it is because they may have a job illegally during the asylum procedure. Concerning criminal foreigners, there is a tendency that criminal foreigners flee to Korea (2019).

He criticised that there is a need to extend the subject to the policy for better immigration.

There is another critique addressed by the researcher of this paper about one of the multiculturalism policy goals. In terms of promoting cultural diversity in media, the idea behind the plan may sound desirable, but the plan does not show diversity in practice. The current programmes that involve Caucasians show western thoughts, values, and norms. However, a majority of foreign nationals in Korea are from Asian countries such as China, Vietnam, Thailand, and Japan. However, Asians from those countries are rarely seen on television. Therefore, the researcher thinks that Korean media should show foreigners who are ethnically different from Koreans such as Vietnamese, Filipinos, Thais, more Southeast Asians, instead of Americans or Europeans.

Chapter 4. Adaptations Needed in Korea

Koreans become more pessimistic about immigrants. A social sciences professor from Korea University, Injin Yoon, contended that:

the anti-immigration sentiment is rising in Korea. It is happening because the Korean government has not shown the ability to control the immigration situation in Korea. The key point to reduce this public anxiety is to succeed in the policy but the Korean government is not doing properly (Lee, 2018, para.1)

In order to reduce grievances from Koreans and increase migrant integration, South Korea needs changes in its integration programme and regulations for social benefits. This chapter will elaborate on what adaptations for the KIIP and stricter regulations for the social welfare benefits are needed in Korea.

4.1 Adaptations for the Korea Immigration Integration Programme

The Korean government is concerned of less migrant integration, anti-immigration, and anti-multiculturalism feelings in the country. For the solution, the government designed the Korea Immigration and Integration Programme (KIIP) on the basis of the Dutch civic integration exam. However, the KIIP is not as successful as the Dutch one. The rate of the KIIP participants is considerably low and migrants are over-assisted by the Korean government. In this sub-chapter, the adaptations needed in the KIIP will be explained.

4.1.1 Make the KIIP Compulsory

First, the programme must be required for all migrants. Currently, the KIIP is available to everyone but is not compulsory. Only migrants who apply for naturalisation or permanent residence are obligated to follow the course. Other migrants may voluntarily take the courses. Therefore, the participation rate is low. Table 7 shows the participants of the KIIP released by Korea Statistics. The

number of participants has increased slightly but the number is still significantly low. In 2017, only 1.9% of the total migrant population took the course (사회통합프로그램 참여 현황 (KIIP Participation Rate), n.d.). Despite the course being open to all migrants and free, the participation rate is very low.

Table 7

KIIP Participant and Participation Percent by Migration Population

	migrant number	KIIP participant	Participation per cent
2012	1,445,103	12,444	0.86%
2013	1,576,034	14,041	0.89%
2014	1,797,618	22,631	1.24%
2015	1,899,519	25,795	1.36%
2016	2,049,441	30,515	1.49%
2017	2,180,498	41,500	1.9%

Source: Statistics Korea, 2018

The low participation in integration has resulted in migrants relying on the government and becoming a financial burden to Korean nationals. A large number of migrants in Korea are not able to conduct business at public agencies, hospitals, schools, and more because of a lack of Korean language proficiency. Consequently, the Korean government provides translation services at public offices in seven metropolitan cities and nine provinces. Furthermore, multicultural families may receive extra translation services if they apply for them. This service aims to enable better communication when migrants go to hospitals and administrative, judicial, and public agencies (결혼이민자 통번역 서비스 지원 (Translation Service for Marriage Migrants), n.d.). Similarly, many university hospitals have translators for better registration and more accurate medical treatment. However, a large number of Korean nationals are against providing translation services. They say that the government should require migrants learn Korean instead of spending tax on translation services.

However, the researcher of this paper both agrees and disagrees with the objections to translation services for migrants. She thinks the translation services are needed only when migrants have business in places where the terminology in Hanja is used, such as courts and district offices. *Hanja*, Sino-Korean, is Chinese characters with Korean pronunciation. *Hanja-eo*, Sino-Korean vocabulary, uses Korean alphabets and Korean pronunciation. However, the origin of *Hanja-eo* is a combination of *Hanja* (Sino-Korean) characters. It includes 60% of the words recorded in the Standard Korean Language Dictionary published by the National Institute of Korean Language (NIKL) (Son, 2016). Therefore, the knowledge of *Hanja* is required to speak, read, write, and understand the Korean language. Although the native Koreans use *Hanja-eo* on the daily basis, many of them have problems in understanding the official documents. The NIKL reported that more Koreans have difficulties in understanding official documents containing *Hanja-eo* terms and the *Hanja-eo* in the document decreases comprehension. (Kim M., 2015). Mihyang Lee, a professor at Youngnam University, contends that the Sino-Korean terms in official documents and in words used daily are different (Lee M. , 2013). In addition, she says the Sino-Korean words should be replaced by plain vocabulary. In spite of having knowledge of Hanja, Koreans may ask for help from officials in order to understand documents. As such, it is not difficult to assume that migrants need translation services. Thus, the researcher considers the translation services at the municipalities and judicial institutions necessary. However, she thinks that the government should stop offering the services to migrants in visiting general practitioners or a bank. The assistance in these cases needs to be minimal because it directly relates to everyday life in Korea. Migrants would have difficulties in being self-reliant if the government keeps involving itself in migrants' personal life.

There is another reason that the KIIP must be mandatory to all migrants. Miscommunication and accidents at high-risk workplace are controversial problems. In 2015, 75% of medium-sized enterprises claimed that miscommunication with migrant workers regularly occurred and the Korean government should enact stricter criteria in terms of language fluency when issuing a working visa (Ko, 2015). A representative of the National Construction Labour Union said that the migrant labourers barely take safety training and their Korean language proficiency is bad so that they are placed in the high-risk positions (Kang Y., 2018).

By contrast, the Dutch civic integration exam is obligatory to any migrants applying for a permanent residence permit, a temporary residence permit, or naturalisation. There are some exemptions elaborated by Immigration and Naturalisation Service of the Netherlands (IND) and they can be

segmented in three types. The first exemption is based on nationality. Citizens from the EU/EER countries, Switzerland, or Turkey are exempted. Furthermore, family members of Turkish nationals do not have to take the civic integration exam. EU citizens are free to move to another EU country because of the free movement of persons written in the Treaty of the European Union (van Ooik & Vandamme, 2013). In the case of Turks, the Association Treaty was signed by the EU and Turkey and grants Turkish nationals free movement (Turkish citizens and their family members, n.d.). The second exemption is having a certificate or diploma in Dutch. IND elaborates different types of a diploma or certificate that relate to education in Dutch. For example, someone who has a diploma or certificate from secondary or higher education proving that she or he was taught in Dutch is exempted from the exam. Anyone who has obtained a diploma or certificate from Aruba, Belgium, Bonaire, Curacao, Saba, Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius, or Suriname and has passed the Dutch language subject are exempt from the integration exam. There are more exemption examples, such as people that have a Civic Integration Certificate under the Civic Integration Act (Integration in the Netherlands, n.d.). Lastly, persons who have lived in the Netherlands for a long term and can speak Dutch fluently are exempt. People who do not qualify for an exemption have an obligation to take the civic integration exam. These exemptions indicate that the Dutch government emphasises the importance of language ability when it comes to integration.

Unlike South Korea, the language proficiency required of migrants at high-risk workplaces is important in the Netherlands. The government of the Netherlands asks foreign labourers who work in high-risk positions such as crane operators and asbestos removal contractors speak Dutch (Stricter rules on foreign workers from Europe, n.d.). There is no exemption even for temporary workers. They believe that speaking Dutch is helpful in preventing accidents and improving safety. Thus, the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment assesses whether migrant workers speak Dutch fluently. If they lack language ability, both the employers and employees can be fined.

The Korean government should change its integration programme to be compulsory like the Dutch one. If the KIIP becomes compulsory, migrants would be more independent in Korean society. Moreover, migrant workers in high-risk jobs would work more safely.

4.1.2 Create the Participation Declaration in the KIIP

Second, the government is advised to create and enforce a participation declaration as a part of the civic integration procedure in order to ensure migrant integration. As mentioned previously, the KIIP participation rate is low, meaning that few migrants contribute towards and understand Korean society. In 2017, the IOM Migration Research and Training Centre surveyed 1,206 migrants who have visited the Immigration Office of Korea to determine the survey participants' understanding of the integration programme and Korean society. Only 29.9% of the total survey participants said that they understand Korean society sufficiently and feel comfortable in daily life (Jo, et al., 2017). More than a half of respondents answered understanding partly but having difficulties. The rest was barely understanding or not understanding.

Table 8

Understanding of Korean Society by Migrant Type in 2017

Migrant type	Answer			Number
	Understanding enough and having less difficulties	Understanding partly but having difficulties	Barely understanding or understanding nothing	
Student	29.2	46.9	23.9	113 (100.0)
Professional employment	24.4	56.1	19.5	41(100.0)
Non-professional employment	25.5	39.2	35.3	51(100.0)
Korea diaspora	50.8	40.2	9.0	122 (100.0)
Permanent residence	25.0	69.8	5.2	96 (100.0)
Marriage to Korean citizen	26.4	61.8	11.7	450 (100.0)
Working visit	35.9	56.4	7.7	78 (100.0)
Rest	26.6	52.5	20.9	139 (100.0)
% answer	29.9%	55.7%	14.5%	1090 (100.0)

Source: IOM Migration Research and Training Centre, 2017

Unlike South Korea, the Netherlands has had a participation declaration since 2017. The statement asks newcomers learn and respect the Dutch core values, which are freedom, equality, solidarity, and participation. Furthermore, it states that contributing to society and speaking Dutch are vital. Moreover, migrants must maintain themselves. They can ask for help from the government if they cannot care for themselves. After taking the course on the participation declaration, migrants acquire knowledge useful for employment, housing, education, medical care, exploitation, abuse, and other subjects related to living in the Netherlands.

The Dutch government proved this process is necessary by conducting trials in 13 provinces between March 2014 and March 2015. More than 4,000 participants joined the trials and about 1,500 of them completed the process (MPs back participation declaration to uphold Dutch values, 2017). After the trials, the Dutch government called them a success. Many Dutch parliamentarians believe this process helps migrants uphold Dutch values and find their own way to live in the Netherlands (MPs back participation declaration to uphold Dutch values, 2017).

In thinking of the trials in the Netherlands, the Korean government should create a participation declaration to enable migrants to respect Korean culture and live in Korea safely. However, this concept may not seem to be enforceable or to make sense in regard to values. According to the interview of Bas de Gaay Fortman,

What the government is talking about is not a set of values, but a set of rules, also called 'norms'. The Dutch constitution contains a set of norms which do indeed generate 'core values'. Human dignity and equality, for instance, result from the principle of equal treatment and the ban on discrimination ("Participation declaration is bombastic cocktail of norms, values and culture", 2017, "Promote", para.4).

If the Korean government implements this, first they need to deliberate on defining the Korean values and whether the values are other rules limiting the migrants or not.

4.1.3 Set the Period to Complete the KIIP and Create Penalties

Third, it is advised to limit the time period for completion of the programme and create penalties for migrants in order to facilitate integration. As previously noted, migrants in Korea currently take the integration courses voluntarily. As a result, the integration rate is affected.

In contrast, the Dutch government is strict in regard to integration of migrants. Migrants in the Netherlands are given three years to pass the exam from the start date of integration provided in a letter sent by the Education Executive Agency of the Netherlands (DUO) (An overview, n.d.). If they do not finish the programme in time, migrants are fined. The fine varies depending on the number of exams they have passed, the number of times they have attempted the exams, and the number of hours of an integration course completed (Fines, n.d.). After paying the fine, migrants are given two years to complete the integration programme. Furthermore, migrants who do not sign the participation declaration may be fined up to a maximum €340, and this fine can be repeated if migrants continue to not sign the declaration. Migrants failing to pass the civic integration exam may not qualify for Dutch nationality and may be denied a permanent residence permit (Participation statement to be mandatory part of civic integration exam, 2016).

If the Korean government tightens up the rules for migrants in regard to integration, the rate of integration would increase, and the government could use the collected fines for social assistance provided to migrants.

4.1.4 Charge Migrants for the KIIP Courses

Last, the Korean government should stop providing the KIIP courses for free and charge migrants for the courses. They aim to encourage migrant integration by offering the integration courses for free to all migrants. Migrants only pay for books and an examination fee. The integration programme is funded by a tax. The programme has brought complaints from a majority of Korean nationals as they say that the government wastes tax funds on migrants because the cost of running the KIIP comprises the largest share of the budget for migrants and the participation rate is poor. Furthermore, they feel that migrants are financial burdens. The Korea Development Institute reported that the 2017 budget for the KIIP increased to ₩9776 billion (€76.8 million) and by ₩400

-billion (approximately €31.5 million) in compared to the 2015 budget (Ra, et al., 2015). The researchers opined that the government needs to reduce the burden on Korean nationals.

In the case of the Netherlands, migrants who are subject to integration pay all associated costs themselves. Migrants who cannot afford to pay for the language course, the integration course, or the exam may apply for a loan with DUO. However, they must follow the courses at an approved school. When the request has been approved, the school sends the bill to DUO and DUO pays it. If a migrant receives a bill, the bill should be sent to DUO for payment. Six months from completion of integration, the borrower must start paying back the money. If the person is a refugee, and if his or her partner, parent, or child is an asylum seeker, he or she does not need to repay the loan. If the borrower is required to pay back the loan, the repayment must be completed within 10 years. The Netherlands considers integration fundamental in receiving migrants. They assist migrants in completing the integration exam if they need financial help, but do not provide free assistance. Therefore, the Dutch government does not burden to its citizens financially.

Charging a fee for the KIIP courses is feasible in Korea. The KIIP is directly managed by the Ministry of Justice. Therefore, the process needed for implementing this fee may require less discussion than the process to implement a loan system for integration. A loan system does not exist in Korea because the KIIP courses are offered for free. The researcher considers that a loan system is needed in order to shift financial burdens from Korean nationals to migrants. However, in order to implement this system, the Korean governmental institutions must determine the institution responsible, the method for granting loans, the requirements for a loan, and the repayment period. The researcher thinks that the Dutch loan system is reasonable because DUO controls the money flow. They do not transmit money to a borrower's account and instead contact schools directly to pay bills. This system seems to be fair for migrants and Korean citizens.

4.2 Stricter Regulations for Social Welfare Benefits

The government of Korea considers all migrants vulnerable, especially multicultural families and female immigrants arriving for marriage. Bokjiro, a welfare website is run by the Ministry of Health

and Welfare of South Korea, has admitted that multicultural families receive a higher living allowance than Korean families. Furthermore, foreign workers enjoy welfare concerning employment, housing, health care, and living. Korea Development Institute criticises that there is no fairness in welfare distribution. Thus, this sub-chapter gives two suggestions.

First, the Korean government should grant social benefits to migrants who can speak Korean. Currently, migrants in Korea are eligible for a number of social welfare programmes because of their nationality. The government considers migrants vulnerable. As mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, a large number of migrants have difficulties in daily life, and the rate of participation in the integration programme reached only 1.9% in 2017 (사회통합프로그램 참여 현황 (KIIP Participation Rate), n.d.). Despite little or no integration, they receive social welfare benefits regarding housing, education, health care, child care, housekeeping, employment, and more.

Unlike South Korea, the Netherlands has required speaking Dutch since 2016. Migrants can apply for house allowance, insurance costs, and other social welfare as soon as they begin the integration process and prove the ability to speak Dutch. If they are not able to prove their language proficiency or provide a Dutch language certificate, they have to take a Dutch class. The government of the Netherlands affirms that “those who do not make an effort to learn Dutch face benefit cuts of 20% in the first six months” (Solanki, 2017, para.3). The government cuts benefit by 40% in the following six months if the person fails to learn Dutch. After a year, benefits are denied. Tamara van Ark, the State Secretary for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, shows the importance of language proficiency in integration. In 2017, she wanted to enforce the implementation of the Dutch language requirement by a binding agreement with municipalities (Solanki, 2017). As a result, the Dutch government prioritises the contributions of migrant and grants the social welfare benefits fairly to those who integrate.

The other advice is to apply to the same requirements to migrants as to Korean nationals in order to promote fair welfare distribution and remove any bias against migrants. The Korean government grants several subsidies to migrants and provides extra benefits to multicultural families because of their nationality. It is because they categorise foreign nationals and multicultural families as vulnerable groups. Thus, migrants are able to apply for certain subsidies given to vulnerable groups. Social benefits include exemption to paying national health insurance and child care for low-income

families, single-parent families, or families with a disabled parent. Even if multicultural families and migrants can afford insurance, education, living expenses, and child care, the government still subsidizes them. However, Korean citizens who qualify can receive social welfare. As migrants enjoy many welfare programmes because of their nationality, anti-immigrant sentiments are increasing. In 2018, there were several petitions against the multiculturalism policy uploaded on the website of the Blue House of Korea, which is the South Korean head of state. The petition writers and the Korean nationals who agreed with the petitions claimed that the government discriminates against Korean citizens with the multiculturalism policy. The writer who received the most signatures asserted that, “subsidies granted towards the multicultural families should be not offered. No matter the nationality, anyone can be poor and need financial help. To grant the financial assistance because of foreign nationality discriminates the Korean nationals who need help” (“한국의 외국인 정책 여러부문에 문제점 고쳐주세요. (Petition to Amend the immigration policy)”, 2018, para.2). Furthermore, she added that the Korean government should not receive asylum seekers and refugees because they would lag behind Korean nationals in terms of economic activities.

By contrast, the Dutch government asks migrants for the same requirements as Dutch nationals when migrants apply for certain subsidies such as housing allowance, child care, and healthcare. *Belastingdienst* (Dutch tax authorities) require an EU/EER country nationality, but someone from another country can apply for benefits if they have a valid residence or work permit. Depending on the social benefits granted to migrants, applicants for the benefits should meet the other conditions, such as maximum income, which are required of Dutch nationals.

The Korean government needs to tighten the regulations for the social welfare benefits towards migrants. If they follow the Dutch model in granting social services, they will be able to distribute the benefits fairly and migrant integration will rise. Furthermore, the anti-immigration sentiment would be reduced because the resentment comes from unequal treatment between natives and migrants and benefits given to migrants.

Final Remarks

Many people move from one country to another due to political, economic, or social reasons. No matter the reasons, the movement of people over borders has resulted in host countries becoming unstable. Host countries know that immigration is unstoppable in the 21st century. Therefore, an integration policy takes an important role in the accommodation of migrants into societies, and the contributions of migrants are necessary for the harmonisation between natives and migrants.

This research paper has analysed the immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands and in South Korea to answer the following research question: How can South Korea develop its integration policy in order to increase migrant integration and improve compatibility of Korean citizens and migrants, based on the integration policy of the Netherlands?

The Dutch immigration and integration policies present solutions to the four deficiencies in the Korea Immigration and Integration Programme (KIIP). First of all, the KIIP is not compulsory. Second, there is no clear statement ensuring migrant integration in Korea. Third, there is no specific time period for completion of the KIIP or any penalties if they fail the programme. Fourth, the KIIP is funded by a tax.

The review of Dutch regulations concerning social benefits introduced solutions for needed regulations in Korea, which include efforts to increase rate of integration and reduce complaints from Korean citizens in regard to migrants. One needed strict regulation is to grant social benefits to migrants who speak Korean, in other words, who have started integration. The other is to impose the same requirements on migrants as to Koreans to ensure fair distribution.

However, there is a problem in putting these ideas into practice. South Korea does not have a clear concept of immigration. The current immigration policy concept centres on multiculturalism but implements an integration programme. If the Korean government wants migrant integration, the author recommends the government choose civic integration as an immigration concept. Two reasons why South Korea should choose civic integration are detailed below.

First, the concept of multiculturalism does not work in South Korea. South Korea has dreamt of becoming a new immigrant country like Canada, where migrants retain their culture but still harmonise with native citizens. However, Canada is a traditional immigrant country that has been built by migrants, unlike South Korea, and the multiculturalism policy works in Canada. However, South Korea and the Netherlands are different from Canada in terms of foundation. Although the Netherlands was built by Dutch nationals and migrants during the 17th century, it became in earnest an immigration country through post-colonial immigration and migrant recruitment. South Korea was formed by Korean nationals. Afterwards, it turned into a new immigration destination because of migrant recruitment. In terms of the country's foundation, South Korea has similarities with the Netherlands.

Second, the Netherlands have already experienced the immigration and integration issues that are being experienced in Korea. The issues that South Korea faces are maintaining the identity of migrants, protecting minorities by subsidising social benefits for them, increasing financial burdens on Korean nationals, and encouraging migrant integration into society. These issues are similar to those experienced by the Netherlands with their ethnic minorities policy in the 1980s and the integration policy in 1990s.

Consequently, the author believes that the Dutch case foretells what comes next in South Korea. She recommends South Korea choose civic integration and adopt the changes elaborated in chapter 4. Furthermore, she expects that the Korean government will be able to better integrate migrants and reduce anti-immigrant sentiment within a short period of time if the adaptations are adopted.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Email Interview

Interviewer: Mikhaila Kim

Interviewee: Y. Seo

Email sent by the interviewer
Date: 26/02/2019
Subject: Request for interview about the multiculturalism policy in Korea
<p>Dear Mr.Seo,</p> <p>Good morning, this is Mikhaila Kim who is a The Hague University student in the Netherlands. I am writing this email to ask for an email interview for my dissertation. My dissertation topic is the multiculturalism policy in South Korea. Currently, the government implements a multiculturalist policy. I want opinions from a person who works for a governmental institution and often or usually meet many international residents in Korea. Therefore, my questions are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. As an inspector of Foreign Affair Bureau of National Police Agency of South Korea, what are problems of the multiculturalism policy? 2. What needs to be solved? <p>I would appreciate you if you answer my questions.</p> <p>Kind regards, Mikhaila Kim</p>

Email sent by the interviewee
Date: 26/02/2019
Subject: Re: Request for interview about the multiculturalism policy in Korea
<p>The purpose of the immigration policy is to initiate migrants to integrate into Korean society. However, undocumented aliens, criminal migrants, asylum seekers are not subject to the current policy.</p>

Since 2013, South Korea implements a refugee policy according to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. There are a number of asylum seekers from Egypt living in Korea. The governmental institutions approach to them carefully because there are tendencies that they look for jobs in Korea illegally during the refugee procedure (maximum three years) either they are criminal foreigners who committed crime in their homeland have fled to Korea (since last November, visa-free travel is restrained, and entry-visa system is applied).

There have been around 500 asylum seekers from Yemen coming to Jeju island with visa-free. It was figured out that they came to Korea for livelihood so that they are able to stay in Korea for temporary period. There is a need to extend the subject to the policy.

If receiving migrants is for development in Korea, receiving refugees is helping vulnerable people as a member of an international community.

Personally, I think the government had better to support refugees and migrants to make them integrate into society if this immigration brings mutual interests for the host country and the migrants.

Appendix 2. Student Ethics Form

European Studies**Student Ethics Form****Your name:** Mikhaila Kim**Supervisor:** A.J. van den Bergh**Instructions/checklist**

Before completing this form you should read the APA Ethics Code (<http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx>). If you are planning research with human subjects you should also look at the sample consent form available in the Final Project and Dissertation Guide.

- a. Read section 3 that your supervisor will have to sign. Make sure that you cover all these issues in section 1.
- b. Complete sections 1 and, if you are using human subjects, section 2, of this form, and sign it.
- c. Ask your project supervisor to read these sections (and the draft consent form if you have one) and sign the form.
- d. Append this signed form as an appendix to your dissertation.

Section 1. Project Outline (to be completed by student)**(i) Title of Project:** The Integration Policy of the Netherlands: A good model for South Korea**(ii) Aims of project:**

The aim of the project is to guide Korean policymakers and other new immigration countries to develop a feasible integration policy. Specifically, this research aims at advising the Korean government to adopt adaptations in order to handle the immigration situation in Korea. Therefore, this research will include adaptations needed in Korea to solve complaints from Korean nationals, to increase immigrant integration, and to relieve anti-immigration feeling.

(iii) Will you involve other people in your project – e.g. via formal or informal interviews, group discussions, questionnaires, internet surveys etc. (Note: if you are using data that has already been collected by another researcher – e.g. recordings or transcripts of conversations given to you by your supervisor, you should answer ‘NO’ to this question.)

YES / NO

If no: you should now sign the statement below and return the form to your supervisor. You have completed this form.

This project is not designed to include research with human subjects. I understand that I do not have ethical clearance to interview people (formally or informally) about the topic of my research, to carry out internet research (e.g. on chat rooms or discussion boards) or in any other way to use people as subjects in my research.

Student's signature _____ - date _____

If yes: you should complete the rest of this form.

Section 2 Complete this section only if you answered YES to question (iii) above.

(i) What will the participants have to do? (v. brief outline of procedure):

An inspector from the National Police Agency of South Korea will answer my question about the current multiculturalism policy in South Korea. For this, online interview via FaceTime either email interview will be done.

(ii) What sort of people will the participants be and how will they be recruited?

A National Police Agency inspector at the Department of Foreign Affairs Bureau will be my interviewee. I already asked him for an interview when I was in South Korea.

(iii) What sort stimuli or materials will your participants be exposed to, tick the appropriate boxes and then state what they are in the space below?

Questionnaires[]; Pictures[]; Sounds []; Words[]; Other[X].

The online interview either email interview. My question will be as follows: what do you think of the current multiculturalism policy in the view of an inspector who meets and deal with immigrants in South Korea?


(iv) Consent: Informed consent must be obtained for all participants before they take part in your project. Either verbally or by means of an informed consent form you should state what participants will be doing, drawing attention to anything they could conceivably object to subsequently. You should also state how they can withdraw from the study at any time and the measures you are taking to ensure the confidentiality of data. A standard informed consent form is available in the Dissertation Manual.

(vi) What procedures will you follow in order to guarantee the confidentiality of participants' data? Personal data (name, addresses etc.) should not be stored in such a way that they can be associated with the participant's data.

Informed Consent Form will be used.

Student's signature:  date: **24.02.2019**

Supervisor's signature (if satisfied with the proposed procedures): date: 4/3/19

A handwritten signature in purple ink, consisting of several loops and a long horizontal stroke at the bottom.

Appendix 3. Informed Consent Form

Informed Consent Form

Informed Consent Form

1) Research Project Title

Integration Policy of the Netherlands: A good model for South Korea

2) Project Description (1 paragraph)

The thesis topic is the integration policy in South Korea and the Netherlands. This researcher thinks that the Netherlands is a good model for South Korea to develop its integration policy. In order to conduct this research, the researcher needs opinions from someone works in Korean governmental institutions or any organisations working on subjects about immigration.

If you agree to take part in this study please read the following statement and sign this form.

I am 16 years of age or older.

I can confirm that I have read and understood the description and aims of this research. The researcher has answered all the questions that I had to my satisfaction.

I agree to the audio recording of my interview with the researcher.

I understand that the researcher offers me the following guarantees:

All information will be treated in the strictest confidence. My name will not be used in the study unless I give permission for it.

Recordings will be accessible only by the researcher. Unless otherwise agreed, anonymity will be ensured at all times. Pseudonyms will be used in the transcriptions.

I can ask for the recording to be stopped at any time and anything to be deleted from it.

I consent to take part in the research on the basis of the guarantees outlined above.

Signed: Mikhaila Kim Date: 2019.2.24