

Figure 1: Source: (De groene Amsterdammer, 2014)

Did the Failures of the UN Peacekeeping Mission during the Bosnian War Leading to the Srebrenica Genocide Cause an Enhancement in Subsequent Peacekeeping Missions?

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Conflicts and (civil) wars are likely to occur due to different ideologies and opinions by individuals, groups and races which was the case during the Yugoslav War between 1991 and 1995. The UN attempted to restore peace in the country torn by war, but a genocide in the Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica could not be avoided by UN peacekeepers in July 1995. Various failures were made which led to the Srebrenica genocide without interference from UN peacekeepers.

The main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate whether the UN learned the lessons from the failures made during the Yugoslav War and applied these to subsequent peacekeeping missions. This is examined by a comparison of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia with the ones of in Sierra Leone (1999-2002) and South Sudan (2011-present). In order to examine the research question many secondary sources and one primary source, which was an interview with the former Dutch Minister of Defence, J.C.C. Voorhoeve, were used as research methodologies.

A UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia was needed in order to protect the civilians in various enclaves which were threatened by the Bosnian Serb army. Other duties of the UN peacekeepers were to monitor the ceasefire and demilitarisation in Yugoslavia. The mandate of this peacekeeping mission did not suffice on the actual situation on the ground as it was too restrictive. The limitations of the UNPROFOR mandate were that there was not sufficient equipment and military personnel, plus the fact of impartiality which had to be obeyed by all battalions which obstructed the demilitarisation. As a result, the main lessons of Srebrenica were that there must be a flexible mandate which allows an active defence, a rapid, efficient and English speaking communication structure must be present at each UN peacekeeping missions, more collaboration between member states participating and all possible scenarios must be investigated in order to prevent unexpected situations, including an emergency plan or a worst case scenario plan. These lessons were not fully applied to the missions in Sierra Leone and South Sudan. The mandates were less restrictive and there was more manpower and armament but again not all scenarios were prepared for and troops had forsaken its duties in protecting civilians.

It can be concluded that after the UNPROFOR mission the UN has done too little to prevent or halt war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by aggressive belligerents. Options to compensate the shortcomings of the UN are; the heavier use of air force and the deployment of green helmets rather than blue helmets in order to enforce peace. The UN created with the mission in Bosnia an illusion of safety for civilians and this was also the case in Sierra Leone and South Sudan.

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INTRODUCTION

Today, Europe is a continent without wars but it was just twenty years ago when the last war took place on European soil. The most recent war to occur on the European continent was the Yugoslav War from 1991 until 1995 between several ethnical groups. It gained a vast amount of media attention not only because it was in Europe, but also because the United Nations (UN) intervened in order to reduce the violent intensity in the region between the warring factions. Since the foundation of the UN, there were numerous peacekeeping missions across the world but not all of those missions succeeded. One of the peacekeeping missions which failed was the one during the Yugoslav War in Croatia and Bosnia where various atrocities took place. Many years after the Yugoslav War, there are still investigations and trials ongoing in order to find out who was responsible for such sinister crimes. Besides that, the UN was criticised for its slack role during the war. Both survivors and the international community are left questioning the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia because of the mistakes that had been made. Therefore, this dissertation will firstly study the need and establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia. Secondly, the mandate will be examined. Thirdly, the limitations of the mandate will be highlighted. Also, lessons of the Srebrenica genocide will be summed up and lastly, it will be investigated whether the UN learned from this mission and applied this new knowledge and expertise to further UN missions. This is investigated by comparing the UN mission in Yugoslavia with missions which were deployed after it. The two which were chosen are the mission in Sierra Leone (1999-2002) and South Sudan (2011-present) to see to what extent the lessons of Srebrenica were applied in both short and long term. In order to investigate that, the main research question of this dissertation is *Did the Failures of the UN Peacekeeping Mission during the Bosnian War Leading to the Srebrenica Genocide Cause an Enhancement in Subsequent Peacekeeping Missions?*

In order to get to an answer on that question, the following sub questions are formed:

- 1) Why was there a need for a UN mission in Bosnia?
- 2) What was the mandate of the UN peacekeepers in Bosnia?
- 3) What were the limitations of the mandate regarding the protection of civilians?
- 4) What were the lessons of the Srebrenica debacle for the UN?
- 5) Were the lessons of Srebrenica applied to subsequent UN peacekeeping missions?

Several methods will be used in order to obtain the necessary information. Secondary sources were mainly used, examples of this are, newspaper articles, political magazines, reports, legal documents, video recordings (documentaries) and reviews of books and documentaries. Furthermore, the research used in this dissertation will be more qualitative than quantitative as this dissertation is more text based than number based. Both English and Dutch sources will be used. Dutch sources will be used because The Netherlands had an important role during the war with the deployment of a Dutch battalion, which was criticised for its weak performance. The English sources are mainly sources from the UN and Western perspective. Sources in other languages will not be used as they might be subjective and because of language barriers. With regards to primary sources, one interview was conducted with an expert. This interview was semi structured as there were questions prepared beforehand but also new questions were developed during the interview. The interview is used to gain more insight into the functioning of the UN and the failures in Yugoslavia as well as to confirm the results which were found by desk research. For this dissertation J.C.C. Voorhoeve was interviewed. The qualifications of Prof.Dr.Ir J.J.C. Voorhoeve are amongst others, former director Dutch Institution for International Relations 'Clingendael' in The Hague (1 September 1990 until 22 August 1994), Dutch Minister of Defence between 22 August 1994 and 3 August 1998 (VVD), former member Raad van State (1 December until 1 October 2006) and professor International Security Studies on NLDA (Nederlandse Defensie Academie) since 1 October 2006. Voorhoeve has expertise in Foreign affairs, Political science, Public administration, International relations and International organizations (Data Achiving and Networked Services, 2016). The interview was conducted on 20 December 2016 and the transcript of this interview can be found in the appendix.

The main points are composed in five sub questions. It begins with the need of a UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, followed by the mandate which belongs to the mission. Then the mandate will be reviewed on its limitations, whereafter the lessons of Srebrenica will be summed up. Subsequently, these lessons will be used as a yardstick for the missions in Sierra Leone and South Sudan in order to see whether these lessons were also applied for these two missions. This dissertation ends with a series of concluding remarks and an interview transcript with J.C.C. Voorhoeve.

1. WHY WAS THERE A NEED FOR A UN MISSION IN BOSNIA?

This chapter will be divided into four parts in order to explain all elements which led to a UN mission in Bosnia. The four parts refer to UN missions in general, a brief history of the Yugoslav War, the decision-making process of the UN and the enclave Srebrenica.

Firstly, an explanation about UN peacekeeping missions will be given. The UN was founded after World War II in 1945 as an intergovernmental organisation which is mainly engaged with fostering international law, global security and preservation of human rights. The UN consists of many departments and one of those is the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In order to guarantee global security, this department is designed restore peace in a certain area where an armed conflict takes place. The definition of a UN peacekeeping mission is as follows according to its web page, *"A peacekeeping operation consists of military, police and civilian personnel, who work to deliver security, political and early peacebuilding support"* (United Nations, 2016). Moreover, as described on the UN peacekeeping operation web page, the peacekeeping missions are guided by three basic principles, namely consent of all concerned parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in case of self-defence and defence of the given UN mandate. These three principles contribute to the transition of a country from conflict to peace. Member states can deploy its national battalions to areas where it is needed on behalf of the UN. Battalions operating on behalf of the UN in a peacekeeping mission are equipped with distinctive blue helmets and white military vehicles with in black written UN in order to demonstrate impartiality but also authorisation. Before a peacekeeping mission will be launched, the Security Council needs give permission for it. First, a technical field research assessment has to be done by the UN secretariat which needs to assess the overall security, political, military and humanitarian situation on the ground in a conflict area. All gathered information and recommendations will be issues in a report to the Security Council. Secondly, the Security Council determines whether deploying a UN peacekeeping mission is the most appropriate step to take. If the Security Council determines so, then a resolution will be adopted which sets out the mandate and size of the mission in order to assist countries in restoring the peace.

The UN and NATO in former Yugoslavia, 1991-1996: limits to diplomacy and force addresses that the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia was established on 21 February 1992 after the war in Yugoslavia started in September 1991. The upper echelons of the UN discussed with all concerned parties the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission which should halt the fighting and create a peaceful settlement of the war. The peacekeeping mission was initially created to monitor the ceasefire and ensure demilitarisation of United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia which had to

be assured by UN battalion United Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The mandate of UNPROFOR was later on extended to Bosnia where it had to escort humanitarian aid and monitor the *no fly zones* and *safe areas* in order to protect the Muslim population. A *safe area* was meant as a humanitarian corridor which were placed under the protection of the mission of UNPROFOR. During the Yugoslav War there were several *safe areas* in Bosnia which had to protect the population in a certain territory (Leurdijk, 1996). The present section has reviewed the definition and conditions under which peacekeeping troops are deployed by the UN.

For the second part of this sub question, a brief history of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav War will be given in order to clarify what hostilities there were in the region throughout the years which led to the war itself. Therefore, it is necessary to go back in time to view all developments regarding ethnical composition in the Balkan region, in particular to the region of what Bosnia today is. As the web page of the Dutch embassy in Sarajevo confirms, in a history overview, in the 15th century the Balkan region including Bosnia, was a Christian kingdom until the Ottoman Empire took it under its reign. As a result, the majority of the Bosnian population converted to Islam, being the only country in Europe with a Muslim majority. Slightly before the outbreak of World War I, Bosnia was governed by the Austria-Hungary Empire but after the war it became part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia which was mainly populated with Serbs and Croats who were frequently in conflict with each other. When the Kingdom of Yugoslavia got occupied by Germany and Italy during the World War II, the Croatian fascist party took over the regime of the country. Josip Broz (better known as Tito) reclaimed the power with the Yugoslav communist party and he liberated the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, despite many of the Serbs and Croats who found their death (Nederlandse Ambassade in Sarajevo, Bosnië en Herzegovina, 2016). Dutch broadcasting association VPRO mentions that when Tito was inaugurated of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia he divided the country into six republics which were Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia. Furthermore, he replaced nationalistic sentiments for fraternity and unity in order to cool down the Serbian-Croatian hostilities. What used to be a turbulent and troublesome multi-ethnic country, became stable under the rule of Tito until his death in 1980. The presidential responsibilities of Tito were transferred to a state presidency with a rotating chair which built more tensions in Yugoslavia where nationalistic sentiments expanded like a wildfire. In an attempt to stabilise the situation in the country, the first elections were declared in Yugoslavia in 1990 and under the leadership of Alija Izetbegovic an uncomfortable coalition was installed between the three biggest ethnical parties SDA (Muslims), SDS (Serbs) and HDZ (Croats and non-Muslim Bosnians) (VPRO, 2015).

The third section will describe the UN decision-making process in order to see what political developments occurred prior to the establishment of the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. The UN argues in *Department of Public Information, United Nations* that after the new coalition was installed, the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic triggered more nationalistic sentiments which had dramatic consequences. The atmosphere in the Balkan region became more strained and therefore, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 713 which set up a ceasefire and a complete embargo of weapon and military equipment delivered to Yugoslavia by the end of 1991 (Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1996). As explained by Human Rights Watch in its report *The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of UN Peacekeeping*, UN negotiations proceeded after Resolution 713 was adapted and the feasibility of deploying a peace-keeping mission in Bosnia had been discussed as the country was in war. Serbia breached the ceasefire slightly after Resolution 713 was signed which was reason for the UN to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia. According to NATO on February 1992, all concerned parties (including Serbia and Milosevic) unanimously approved UN Resolution 743 which would lead to the establishment of the UN battalion UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia in order to protect the Croatian and Muslim Bosnian population and supply them basic provisions (NATO, 1992). N. Both pointed out in *From difference to entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav crisis 1990-1995* that under the circumstances of stronger nationalistic sentiments, Bosnia wanted independence as well and organised a referendum concerning possible independence of Bosnia as the country did not wish to be part of a Great Serbia where everything was regulated by Serbia according to the ideology of the Serbian president Milosevic. An overwhelming majority voted for the independence of Bosnia and the Bosnian president Izetbegovic declared it independent. Shortly after the independence declaration of Bosnia, the European Economical Community (EEC, predecessor of the EU) and the US officially recognised Bosnia as a sovereign nation which could join the UN immediately. Subsequently, Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic boycotted the outcome of the referendum and created an own sovereign region in Bosnia entitled Republika Srpska which was supported by Milosevic. On top of that, Karadzic declared war to Muslim Bosnia in March 1992 and the remaining part of Yugoslavia lurched from one war to another war after the wars in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 (Both, 2000). In addition, the Bosnian Serb army was accused of capturing, ethnical purification and mass rapes in Muslim populated areas in Bosnia which was also acknowledged by the UN Human Right Commission (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

The last part of this sub question will indicate the situation in the enclave Srebrenica from the beginning until the end as it is one of the darkest chapters of the Yugoslav War and the UN because of its slack role. In 1992 the war intensified and the Bosnian Serbian army under the

command of Ratko Mladic won more ground in the direction of the *safe areas* of Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa, which can be seen at the map in figure 1 on the next page. These enclaves were completely surrounded by Bosnian Serb militia groups and swollen with Muslim Bosnian refugees from other regions in the environment. Illustrated by T. Judah on BBC is that French UN general Phillipe Morillon decided to lead a convoy to these enclaves after reports of a disastrous situation in Srebrenica. The Muslim population claimed more protection because the whole area was frightened that the Serbian army would slaughter the entire Muslim population in the *safe areas* (Judah, 2011). Morillon conceded and UN Resolution 819 approved that the UN would send a Dutch battalion of 450 soldiers (called Dutchbat) in order to protect the Muslim population in the *safe areas* in 1994 (United Nations, 1993). In addition to that, the UN ordered The Netherlands to send only weakly armed troops in order to avoid incitement and provocation which can be seen *Srebrenica: A Town Betrayed*. The Bosnian Serb army was better armed than Dutchbat which relied on air support of the UN which could be requested in case of emergency. Counter attacks from the Bosnian side were on behalf of the military forces of Naser Oric, who was responsible for brutal murders and burglaries in Serb villages in the vicinity of Srebrenica. Dutchbat was not fully involved in the conflict as it could not enforce peace (Hebditch, 2011).

Figure 2: territories of all ethnical groups in Bosnia in 1994 marked by different colours. Purple Bosnian Serbs area, yellow Bosnian Croats area and green Bosnian Muslims area. All cities and areas in blue were UN patrolled area/*safe areas*. Source: (Purdue University, 2013).



VPRO explains in *Waarom Srebrenica moest vallen* that in April 1995, Karadzic gave Mladic and his army the orders to create an unbearable situation in the *safe areas* in order to have the Muslim population believe that there was no hope for further survival. The Bosnian Serb army surrounded Srebrenica and then it besieged one observation post of Dutchbat. Moreover, covered Bosnian Serb artillery vehicles were seen around Srebrenica and spies monitored the Dutch observation posts and peacekeepers daily. One month later, the Bosnian Serb army invaded the *safe area* of Srebrenica in the south-east. Dutch military forces which were positioned at the south-east area fled away from its observation posts. Dutchbat was unable to bring a halt to the Bosnian Serb forces. On 11 July 1995, Mladic and the Bosnian Serb army invaded Srebrenica which was already a ghost town because all habitants had fled to Potocari to seek protection around Dutchbat its compound. When the Bosnian Serb army entered the enclave, two UN F16s bombed each one on the Bosnian Serb targets in order to support Dutchbat after it requested for airstrikes multiple times. Instead of supporting Dutchbat by airstrikes, the situation worsened. Karadzic and Mladic requested that the airstrikes had to stop immediately, otherwise the 30 Dutchbat soldiers who were taken hostage would be executed. The UN and Dutch government decided to stop the airstrikes and Mladic ordered his army to move on in order to besiege Potocari (VPRO, 2015). In Potocari colonel Mladic and Dutchbat colonel Thom Karremans met each other and Mladic promised that the many thousand remaining Muslims could leave safely to Bosnian territory where no war prevailed as M.J. Faber explains in *Srebrenica; De genocide die niet werd voorkomen*. Thereafter, thousands of men were separated from women and children and were led away to be killed cruelly in concentration camps. Prior to that, other Muslims were caught and murdered when they were on their migration to safe Bosnian territory. Approximately 8,000 Muslim men were executed in a period of four days which was later known as the Srebrenica genocide and the latest genocide in Europe after the World War II. The negotiations between Serbia and the UN continued and on 21 July 1995 the UN gave Dutchbat orders to leave the Srebrenica enclave to Mladic. By then, the genocide had already taken place and no habitants were left behind in the enclave (Faber, 2002).

VPRO describes that the war advanced in the direction of Sarajevo after Srebrenica (and one month later Zepa) had fallen. When a Serbian mortar attack on a market in Sarajevo killed 37 people at the end of August 1995, the NATO executed Operation Deliberate Force which was a set of airstrikes on Serb military positions for two weeks. A combination of ground offensive, NATO's airstrikes and diplomacy led to the opening of negotiations on 1 November 1995 in Dayton, US. The participants were Izetbegovic, Milosevic and the Croatian president Franjo Tujman guided by the United States. The outcome of three weeks negotiation was; peace, the

recognition of the independent state Bosnia which would exist in two entities, namely the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska in a territorial division of 51% and 49% which can be seen next page. The outcome was called the Dayton Accords, formally known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was officially signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (VPRO, 2015). As a result, and reported in the documentary *A Cry from the Grave* of L. Woodhead that the Implementation Force (IFOR) of NATO was deployed in Bosnia in order to oversee the compliance of respecting the territorial boundaries and the withdrawal of all military forces which would lead to the maintenance of stability within the country. On top of that, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia obtained a more prominent role which has the duty to prosecute people who are responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia since January 1991. As time progressed, IFOR troops were slowly reducing starting with 60,000 at the beginning to 20,000 in 1999 to pave the way for reconciliation (Woodhead, 1999).

Figure 3: the map of the new nation Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Dayton Accords in December 1995. 51% of the country was territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (green zone), whereas 49% of the country was territory of Republika Srpska (yellow zone). Source: (Historian).



Eventually, most of the war criminals of the Yugoslavian war were convicted of crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war as it can be seen on the web page of ICTY at *The Cases*. Imprisonments varying from 2.5 years to life 40 years and from being acquitted until life imprisonment. On October 2016, 154 cases were concluded and already 56 of the convicted people have served their sentence. Besides that, 7 proceedings for accused are ongoing and 10 persons are in custody at the UN ICTY Detention Unit. In its overall history, the ICTY has indicted 161 persons, most of the convicted people are (Bosnian) Serb. The processes of the most known indicted persons of the Bosnian war in detail:

Case	Slobodan Milosevic
Role	Former President of Yugoslavia (1990-2000)
Arrested	1 April 2001
Crimes Indicted	Genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the laws or customs of war and grave breaches of the Geneva conventions
Proceedings terminated on	14 March 2006 (Milosevic died on 11 March 2006 in UN prison in Scheveningen; Milosevic was 64 years old)

Case	Radovan Karadzic
Role	President of Republika Srpska and Supreme Commander of its armed forces (1992-1996)
Arrested	21 July 2008
Trial Chamber Judgement	24 March 2016, convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war
Sentence	40 years' imprisonment

Case	Ratko Mladic
Role	Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army
Arrested	26 May 2011
Crimes Indicted	Genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of law
Closing Arguments	5 – 15 December 2016

Apart from all indicted and sentenced people, the ICTY ruled that only the tragedy of Srebrenica can be defined as a genocide and that the definition of genocide cannot be implemented for other events during the Yugoslav War. Events deemed to be a genocide must have intent to destruct the existence of a group in a violent way (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 2016). Mentioned by O. Hebditch, the Bosnian Serbs who were accused and/or convicted of having a role in the Srebrenica genocide admitted that they committed wide scale war crimes in the hills when Bosnian Muslims were fleeing from Srebrenica to Potocari and safe Bosnian territory in Tuzla, which is 100 kilometre in northern direction from the *safe area*. However, it was never admitted that it was pre meditate genocide where approximately 8,000 people were killed in four days (Hebditch, 2011).

In conclusion, UN peacekeeping missions are designed to keep peace in a certain area where an armed conflict takes place and it was needed in 1991 when the Yugoslav War started between several ethnical parties. The UN established UNPROFOR in order to keep peace in the country and one of the points in the mandate was to protect the Muslim population in the *safe areas*. There existed a threat that the Bosnian Serb army would besiege it and would start an ethnic cleansing among the Muslim population in Srebrenica and other *safe areas*, so from UN point of view, the UN had to intervene in order to prevent a violation of human rights and global security in Yugoslavia. The subsequent chapter will describe the UN mandate of UNPROFOR and Dutchbat during the Yugoslav War.

2. WHAT WAS THE MANDATE OF THE UN PEACEKEEPERS IN BOSNIA?

This chapter will define the mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission UNPROFOR in Bosnia. The mandate contains the intended purpose, capabilities, responsibilities and resources of the entire peacekeeping mission of UNPROFOR. Firstly, the establishment of the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia will be discussed. Secondly, the expansion of the mandate to Bosnia will be highlighted. Thirdly, the division of UNPROFOR into three areas will be clarified and finally, an overview of the entire UNPROFOR mandate will be given also including the mandate and sub tasks of Dutchbat in Srebrenica.

The first mandate of UNPROFOR was established for the area of Croatia during the Yugoslav War, as the war had started there earlier than it had in Bosnia. All of the UN peacekeeping missions have a mandate which have a set of guidelines during a peacekeeping mission. Each peacekeeping mission has a different mandate which is comprised of the focus points and boundaries of the concerned mission. UN member states provide its own military forces voluntarily however, it has the right to determine the duration of its troops in the peacekeeping mission. Before a UN peacekeeping mission starts, all concerned parties in the conflict area have to agree unanimously with the establishment of the mission. NATO affirms that all UN peacekeepers active in Yugoslavia between 21 February 1992 and 20 December 1995 operated under the mission of UNPROFOR had a mandate to follow during the Yugoslav War. The mandate of UNPROFOR was established after UN resolution 743 had gone into effect after the authorisation of the Security Council. The area to cover was Croatia, where it had to monitor the compliance of all elements of UN resolution 721 on which all concerned parties agreed on (NATO, 1992). Acknowledged in the report of *The UN's Role in the Former Yugoslavia: the Failure of the Middle Way* of D. Anderson, the main element was the ceasefire in Yugoslavia which should have been supported by the implementation of United Nations Protected Area's (UNPA's). The situation was still a threat for international peace and security, which was earlier determined in UN resolution 713. The four UNPA's (not to be confused with the equivalent of *safe areas* in Bosnia) were distinguished in the sectors East, West, North and South, all sectors were largely in Croatian territory and the UN mandate required that these sectors had been demilitarised in order to protect all civilians there. In addition, UNPROFOR had to secure a safe return for refugees and displaced people and provide border control. The mandate contained three components, a military, civil and police component. On top of the mandate, the so-called Rules of Engagement were made by the UN which were instructions that had to be followed up in case of violence and aggression towards the *safe area* and personnel of UNPROFOR (Anderson, 1995).

After the establishment of UNPROFOR in Croatia, the mandate expanded to Bosnia and the argumentation for this will be described in this section. As mentioned in chapter one, the ceasefire was breached by Serbian military forces and the war in Croatia broke out again. Therefore, this had the consequence that also Bosnia became enmeshed in the Yugoslavia conflict. As a result, the UN mandate needed to be expanded to Bosnia which took place by means of UN resolution 758 on 8 June 1992 according to NATO. UNPROFOR had to ensure the security of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the capital and surroundings. In September 1992, the mandate was further enlarged with the expanding of the delivery of humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia. The monitoring *no-fly zones* in Bosnia including the *safe areas* appointed by the UN and the protection of convoys with humanitarian aid and released civilian detainees. Furthermore, UNPROFOR was authorised to defend itself in case it was subject of an attack and to request air strikes of NATO in case the enemy cannot be repulsed (NATO, 1992). As explained by D. Leurdijk, in April 1993 the establishment of the term *safe area* in Bosnia became a fact in Srebrenica. The *safe areas* were areas where Muslim refugees had to be protected by UNPROFOR battalions from the Bosnian Serb army. Besides Srebrenica, the UN designed five other *safe areas*, namely Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Gorazde and Zepa (Leurdijk, 1996).

In this third section, the events before and after the division of the UNPROFOR mission will be examined. According to the UN, on March 1995, the Security council replaced UNPROFOR for three separate but interlinked peacekeeping missions because the UN mandate was expired and Croatia refused a mandate prolongation. As a consequence, the UN had to reduce the size of the UNPROFOR mission. This objection was the reason for the UN to completely re-organise the entire mission and alter the name to United Nations Peace Force (UNPF). The name of UNPROFOR was still being used for the area of Bosnia. The Security Council of the UN divided UNPF in three distinct missions which were operating in Croatia (UNCRO), Bosnia (UNPROFOR, continued under the same name) and Macedonia (UNPREDEP) with each an own commander (United Nations, 1996). D. Leurdijk points out the main modification was the split up from one headquarter in Yugoslavia (based in Zagreb) to three regional headquarters in Zagreb, Sarajevo and Skopje. This had the control of the regions which are nowadays known as the sovereign countries Croatia, Bosnia and FYROM (better known as Macedonia). General Bernard Janvier was the head of UNPF, whereas UNPROFOR was commanded by Rupert Smith. Within UNPROFOR there were three other head quarters divided in the three sectors of Sarajevo, South-West and North-East. The enclaves of Dutchbat were covered by the North-East sector. Due to the division the mandate had to be adapted to the new situation (Leurdijk, 1996).

In brief, summed up by the Dutch parliamentary inquiry commission concerning Srebrenica in *Missie zonder vrede*, these were the main elements of the UN mandate of UNPROFOR from the establishment until the end of the Bosnian war:

- Protecting all civilians in both the UNPA's and controlling the borders in these enclaves.
- Monitoring the ceasefire and demilitarisation in the environment.
- Securing a safe return for refugees and displaced people.
- Ensuring the security of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the capital and surroundings.
- Expanding of delivery of humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia.
- Monitoring and protecting the *no-fly zones* in Bosnia including the *safe areas* appointed by the UN.
- Protecting convoys with humanitarian aid and released civilian detainees.
- Self defending in case UNPROFOR troops were the subject of an attack, air support of NATO could then be requested in case the enemy could not be repelled.

According to the Dutch parliamentary inquiry concerning Srebrenica, the mandate Dutchbat received by the UN on January 1995 existed in three components, namely:

- Providing military assistance to aid organisations for humanitarian activities and the restoration to public facilities.
- Creating conditions for evacuations of wounded, protection and care for civilians, improved life circumstances and termination of hostilities.
- Enforcement of the demilitarised status of the enclave.

The UNPROFOR headquarter based in Sarajevo concretise these three components in five subtasks:

- Establishment and occupation of UN observation posts.
- Enhancement and extension of *liaison* (constructive relationships) with and between belligerents in order to prevent uncontrolled actions.
- Enhancement of the process of gathering information in both the military (intelligence) as the humanitarian (inventory of displaced people and their needs) field.
- Assistance of UNCHR.
- Participation in the reparation of public utilities.

Missie zonder vrede further argues that the headquarters of the North-East sector, based in Tuzla expressed these subtasks in *Operations Order*. An enumeration of humanitarian, military, confidential and freedom of movement duties which must be implemented by each battalion operating under UNPROFOR. On top of that, each battalion has some additional and specific duties which apply to its own enclave only. The military duties of Dutchbat in the enclave Srebrenica consisted of:

- Settlement of *liaison* with all belligerents.
- Encouragement of local ceasefires.
- Maintenance of already existing ceasefires and agreements of demilitarisation.
- Deterrence by presence in case of attacks on the *safe area*.
- Preparation on the implementation and maintenance of a *Total Exclusion Zone*.
- Monitoring of activities of belligerents at the *Confrontation Line* (area around the *safe area*).
- Organisation and occupation of observation and commando posts according to the principle of *viewing and been viewed*.
- Preparation of a possible evacuation from the *safe area* of Srebrenica in short term.

However, these are the main elements of the mandate, the mandate of UNPROFOR has been adapted or expanded in more than 60 resolutions after the onset of the war in Bosnia in December 1992. The UN mandate of UNPROFOR terminated at the day as the peace agreement was signed in Paris. UNPROFOR mandate and troops were substituted by NATO its IFOR mandate and troops (Parlementaire Enquete Commissie Srebrenica, 2003). The following chapter will highlight the limitations concerning the protection of the civilians in the enclave.

3. WHAT WERE THE LIMITATIONS OF THE MANDATE REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS?

In the previous chapter it was seen that the mandate of UNPROFOR was comprehensive. The entire mission of UNPROFOR existed of a mandate that applied to all participating battalions in all existing sectors. Dutchbat was required to adhere to the mandate and therefore, it was bound to the limitations of the mandate which meant that an efficient intervention and protection of civilians was threatened. This chapter will analyse the limitations of the mandate regarding the protection of civilians. All limitations are divided under sub chapters.

3.1 RESTRICTIVE MANDATE

A major objection mentioned in the Dutch parliamentary inquiry *Missie zonder vrede* was that aid could not be provided efficiently on behalf of the UNPROFOR battalions due to the restrictions and impartiality of the mandate which was given for the UNPROFOR mission. An example given was by a Swedish UN peacekeeper who was unable to intervene when he was witness to the rape of a woman in Yugoslavia because of given instructions that the UN had to stand above all concerned parties and therefore, could not provide any aid. Another example is a car accident between two civilian vehicles whereby the peacekeepers could not offer help, otherwise the UN could receive damage claims. Both incidents took place before the deployment of Dutchbat (Parlementaire Enquete Commissie Srebrenica, 2003). In other words, all UN battalions operating under the mandate of UNPROFOR could not provide aid in every case within the enclaves as it could affect the impartiality of the peacekeeping mission.

3.2 UNSUFFICIENT COLLABORATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

N. Both argues in *From difference to entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav crisis 1990-1995* that a report made by the Dutch Military Intelligence Service concludes from its risk analysis that the *safe areas* of Srebrenica and Zepa were indefensible, partly because of the reticence of the American intelligence services but also because the UN itself does not have an own intelligence services. The UN is always depending on the generosity of the intelligence services of UN member states for peacekeeping missions. Before Dutchbat was sent out to Srebrenica, upper Dutch defence echelons complained about the reticent conduct concerning aerial photos of the *safe area* and its vicinity, when those were requested. Various NATO member states did not cooperate in sharing aerial photos to participants of the UNPROFOR mission since numerous UN member states, which were not members of NATO, were also involved in this peacekeeping mission. As a consequence, it hampered Dutchbat in anticipating on Bosnian Serb troop

concentration in the vicinity of Srebrenica. N. Both adds that the Dutch intelligence services received word the American intelligence services – which had a spy in Belgrade – disclosed that Karadzic ordered Mladic to capture the three *safe areas* Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde in June 1995 (Both, 2000). The UN does not have its own intelligence services meaning that not all areas in the coverage of a UN peacekeeping mission could be provided with up to date information. In case of Dutchbat this was an obstruction as it could not fully prepare itself in protecting the civilians within the enclave. The mandate could not enforce UN member states to share its findings with UNPROFOR.

3.3 INAPPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT AND ARMAMENT

The Dutch parliamentary inquiry affirms that the UN decided that participating battalions in the UNPROFOR mission had to be lightly armed in order to avoid provocation in the conflict areas. Light equipment and armament were chosen to deter belligerents by the presence of UN peacekeepers. Another element in the mandate of UNPROFOR was the protection of the civilians in the *safe areas* was now possible because of UN resolution 836. This contained the ability to deter attacks from belligerents by acting in self defence including the use of force in the event of an attack on a *safe area* or UN convoy and the ability to request airstrikes. Although, Boutros-Ghali acknowledged that the first mandate did not allow the use of force, whereas in additional mandates it was required as new UN resolutions do not eliminate the previous resolutions. This jeopardised the safety and success of the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia as it became unclear if UN peacekeepers were allowed to use force (Parlementaire Enquete Commissie Srebrenica, 2003). In case of a violent and intensive attack on the enclave, UNPROFOR battalions would not be able to effectively defend its enclaves and the civilians due to inappropriate equipment and armament. In addition, beforehand it was known that the Bosnian Serb army had the disposal on heavier armament, more advanced equipment and more military personnel than UNPROFOR battalions.

3.4 UNDERSTAFFING

According to the report *The UN's role in the former Yugoslavia: the failure of the middle way*, understaffing was not only the issue in Srebrenica, it was an issue in all six Bosnian *safe areas*. UNPROFOR had 7,000 militaries to its disposal which stays far behind the 34,000 requested by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. Therefore, UNPROFOR was never given the capacity to defend the *safe areas* and halt the war in Bosnia. In addition, the UN only assigned 600 Dutch peacekeepers to Srebrenica which was not sufficient in order to keep peace around the enclave nor provide humanitarian aid to the civilians in Srebrenica. Both points of the mandate could not

be executed due to understaffing and because of that the priorities of the mandate became unclear for Dutchbat. (Anderson, 1995). On top of that, the Dutch parliamentary inquiry illustrates that one of the consequences of a lack of manpower was the siege of the observation post Echo in the South-East access of the enclave of Srebrenica. Due to understaffing at the observation post Echo, the poignant case of an attack of approximately 75 Bosnian Serb militaries against only 8 Dutchbatters occurred (Parlementaire Enquete Commissie Srebrenica, 2003). In all Bosnian *safe areas* there was an issue of understaffing which had resulted that civilians in the *safe areas* could not be protected properly.

3.5 INFLEXIBILITIES IN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT PROCEDURE

In *The UN and NATO in former Yugoslavia, 1991-1996: limits to diplomacy and force* D. Leurdijk notes that the character of the conflict in Yugoslavia was aggressive and bloody since 1991. As the time passed, the conflict converted into a war where warring factions were not sensitive to international pressure of the UN. In the earlier mentioned Rules of Engagement (chapter 2), it was stated which instructions UN battalions had to follow up in case of violence and aggression. As the character of the conflict converted in a more aggressive and bloody civil war and the Rules of Engagement needed to be modified in order to anticipate to this new and more violent situation, however this was only possible via a long, cumbersome process whereby the UN had to agree unanimously (Leurdijk, 1996). The Rules of Engagement were outdated with respect to the situation in Bosnia which converted more aggressive and violent. The Rules of Engagement which were based on the initial situation in Yugoslavia could not guarantee protection of the civilians.

3.6 FAILED DEMILITARISATION

One element of the mandate explained in the Dutch parliamentary inquiry was that all warring factions had to be disarmed during the time of UNPROFOR presence. The Bosnian Muslim military forces did not cooperate with disarmament. At that time, the Canadian battalion (Canbat), which was stationed in Srebrenica before Dutchbat, was the battalions which had to disarm the Bosnian Muslim military forces but it authorised the conduction of a house search. Only the local police had the authority to conduct a house search but by the time the local police arrived, the Bosnian Muslims already hid all weapons and it could not be found by the local police. The obstacles which were faced by Canbat were also faced by Dutchbat, in other words, disarmament of the Bosnian Muslim military forces proved impossible. Another obstacle was the noticeable equipment of the peacekeepers, which were equipped with blue helmets and white vehicles with big black letters saying 'UN'. Demilitarising of all belligerents in and around the *safe area* was

technically impossible due to a mandate which did not provide the authorisation to conduct house searches. Belligerents and in particular the Bosnian Serb army found out that it could continue with its course of actions without any obstruction of Dutchbat and earlier Canbat. The presence of UNPROFOR battalions was not taken seriously by the belligerents. This feeling was expressed by Dutchbat colonel T. Karremans as he noticed the numbers of weapons in the enclave growing (Parlementaire Enquete Commissie Srebrenica, 2003). The absence of not having the right authorisations within the enclave caused that belligerents could not be demilitarised. As a result, the warring parties never adhered to the agreements made concerning disarmament and the violence continued unabatedly which did not accrue the security of civilians within the *safe area*.

3.7 TOO FOCUSED ON THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT

The mandates for UNPROFOR and sector North-East were made by upper UN echelons in the headquarters of the UN in New York. In the Dutch parliamentary inquiry, Minister for Defence Joris Voorhoeve (serving from 1994 until 1998 in the parliament of Kok I) criticised the manner of how the mandates were drafted. One complaint of Voorhoeve was that the mandates were specialising too much on the humanitarian aspect without delving into the practical situation on the ground in Yugoslavia. Dutchbat was loaded with humanitarian duties, whereas Voorhoeve prioritised the military duties more. As a result, the military duties could often not be executed because of the many humanitarian duties of the mandate. The main complaint was the lack of heavy armament and manpower which resulted in being unable to execute all duties of the mandate. Therefore, both humanitarian as military duties could not be executed efficiently. (Parlementaire Enquete Commissie Srebrenica, 2003). It can be said that the mandate was focusing too much on the humanitarian aspects and not on the military as one did not delve into the situation on the ground in Yugoslavia.

In conclusion, the limitations of the UNPROFOR mandate were that there was not sufficient equipment and military personnel, plus the fact of impartiality which had to be obeyed by all battalions even in tragic events. House searches could not be conducted which made it impossible to demilitarise the enclave and the mandate was too focused on the humanitarian aspects. Besides that, the lack of support from other UN member states in the way of sharing aerial photos and intelligences can also be seen as a limitation for Dutchbat. These limitations in the mandate led to the humanitarian catastrophe in Srebrenica as the mandate could not guarantee the protection of civilians, therefore the next chapter will point out the lessons of the Srebrenica drama.

4. WHAT WERE THE LESSONS OF THE SREBRENICA DEBACLE FOR THE UN?

It can be said that the mandate of the UNPROFOR mission was not suitable to keep the peace and protect civilians in Bosnia, which resulted in many innocent people who were slaughtered in Bosnia, in particular in Srebrenica. This chapter will sum up the lessons of the Srebrenica genocide divided in the sections of lessons for the UN as lessons for the participating country which is in this case The Netherlands.

4.1 COMPOSING LESS RESTRICTIVE MANDATES

Due to the numerous boundaries in the mandate, UNPROFOR could never perform vigorously. According to D. Leurdijk in *The UN and NATO in former Yugoslavia, 1991-1996: limits to diplomacy and force*, Kofi Annan (under-General-Secretary of the UN during the Yugoslavia War) concluded that non-violence and impartiality were not the solution in order to restrain the aggressor (in this case the Bosnian Serb army) from systematically violating human rights and ethnic cleansing. UN General-Secretary Boutros-Ghali acknowledged in May 1992 (three months after the establishment of UNPROFOR) that the UN peacekeeping mission was impossible to attain a good outcome as the mandate was impracticable due to the many restrictions. In addition, it was dependant on the commitment of the belligerents on which there were doubts whether these factions would adhere the ceasefire. One reproach on the side of Kofi Annan was that the UN had to be against rapid recognition of the new member states which were separated from Yugoslavia because the recognition of Bosnia as an independent country invoked a lot of aggression on the Bosnian Serb side. The UN claims to be neutral and therefore, it will not provoke or use force on either party. The instruction for UNPROFOR battalions was to deter attacks on the civilian population by its presence and only act in self defence if necessary. There was no possibility of an active defence as the required resources were not available and the mandate did not allow it (Leurdijk, 1996). Due to the restrictive mandate in which impartiality and *deterrence by presence* were the main elements, it was impossible to keep peace in Bosnia. A less restrictive mandate which would allow an active defence could have helped. Furthermore, UNPROFOR was dependant on the commitment of belligerents to ceasefires which can be seen as a risk as belligerents are unpredictable in its activities.

4.2 ENHANCING THE ENTIRE COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE


M. Faber implies in *Srebrenica; De genocide die niet werd voorkomen* that during the siege of Srebrenica by the Bosnian Serb army, when all the southern observation posts of the enclave were caught off guard, Dutchbat colonel T. Karremans requested five times airstrikes and sent

several reports about the more constricting situation and encirclements of the Bosnian Serb army but all airstrike requests and alarming reports were refused or ignored by the upper UN echelons in July 1995. Airstrikes were not granted for the reason that Dutchbat was not in a situation of acute hazard. Moreover, Dutchbat did not defend the enclave when it was attacked by the Bosnian Serb army. This was between the period of 9 July 1995 and 11 July 1995 and Karremans reported to the UN and Dutch government that it is not excluded that a disaster could solemnise in the *safe area* of Srebrenica. On 11 July 1995 two hours before the fall of Srebrenica became a fact, the commander of UNPF Janvier approved the request of Karremans. This was in vain as the Bosnian Serb army neared Srebrenica on 1 kilometre and airstrikes could not repulse the siege. Afterwards, Janvier and Gobilliard reproached Dutchbat for the fact that it never repulsed the Bosnian Serb attack and relinquished the *safe area* to Mladic, although the role of Janvier was heavily criticised due to his hesitancy of granting airstrikes. The statement of the UN and NATO with regard to its reticent and hesitant attitude towards airstrikes was that it could jeopardise its own personnel on the grounds that they may be taken hostage by the Bosnian Serb army as retaliation. This situation occurred when NATO bombed several munitions depots in the vicinity of Pale (East-Bosnia, territory of Republika Srpska) and many UN peacekeepers were taken hostage on May 1995. Since this event, the UN prioritised the security of its peacekeepers which were then taken hostage and were humiliated on Serbian TV where they were handcuffed to objects, such as lamp posts. (Faber, 2002).

Furthermore, when Karadzic commanded Mladic to besiege the *safe area* of Srebrenica, rapid and smooth communication between the commander-in-chief of the enclave (colonel Karremans) and the upper UN echelons concerning airstrikes was required – the entire communication structure can be seen in figure 3 on page 25. In practice and argued by the Dutch parliamentary inquiry, the communication was a cumbersome process whereby various authorised commanders, chiefs and generals had to be consulted before airstrikes were approved. Colonel T. Karremans admitted that the communication was time-consuming, causing more difficulties and bringing Dutchbat into a more dangerous situation due to the absence of airstrikes. In order to get through the communication and consulting lines, Karremans decided to skip the consulting sector North-East frequently. When requests for airstrikes were approved on 11 July 1995, Dutch and American F16's were heading to Srebrenica to drop bombs on Bosnian Serb troops but this had limited effect due to miscommunication and poor visibility. As a result, the American F16's were unable to drop bombs. Eventually only two bombs were dropped by the Dutch F16's (one missed its target). The Dutch bombings caused a de-escalation of the situation as it elicited anger at the Bosnian Serb side. Further airstrikes were cancelled as Mladic threatened to assassinate the

Dutchbatters who were taken hostage. Another complaint of Karremans was the lack of ability to speak English with some commanders, without mentioning any names he was pointing on Hervé Gobilliard and Janvier (Parlementaire Enquete Commissie Srebrenica, 2003). The UN communication lines between the ground and the decision makers were too complex causing requests for airstrikes to not reach the upper UN echelons as there were too many sections which had to be consulted beforehand. Moreover, in the upper UN echelons there was hesitancy with regards to approve airstrikes. Also, the ability to communicate in English was not a guarantee at all posts within the communication structure. A clear and efficient communication structure and at all important post an English speaker must be present at each UN peacekeeping mission.

Figure 4: The communication structure from Dutchbat colonel to UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. In order to get approval for airstrikes, all posts had to grant authorisation up to and including General Janvier since the posts higher than Janvier would endorse airstrikes in this case as they rely on the authorised people under them who were active in Yugoslavia. It proves that the communication was a time consuming and cumbersome process due to the large number of posts which had to approve a request. Source: (Parlementaire Enquete Commissie Srebrenica, 2003)



4.3 MORE COLLABORATION AND OPERATING WITH A COLLECTIVE INTEREST

With regards to intelligence, limited information supply brought Dutchbat to a negligible position in Srebrenica according to S. De Hoop in *Niet de VN, maar de internationale gemeenschap heeft gefaald in Srebrenica*. Dutchbat was depending heavily on the goodwill of these allies and its intelligence services. Dutchbat received information sparsely which resulted in the fact that Dutchbat was never up-to-date with regards to the situation in and around its enclave. There was a communication problem and many misjudgements were made according to Annan. On top of that, the American intelligence services were unwilling to cooperate and share the gathered information regarding the developments in the Yugoslavia war with the UN, such as aerial photos of the enclave and troop concentrations in the vicinity of it (Hoop, 2000). N. Both acknowledges that after the war it, the Dutch intelligence services received messaged that the American intelligence services which had a spy in Belgrade, already knew in June 1995 that Karadzic ordered Mladic to capture the three *safe areas* Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde (Both, 2000).

Besides the little collaboration between the countries participating in UNPROFOR, it can be said that major powers, such as the UK and France only had an eye for its own enclaves which were Gorazde and Sarajevo. There was an attitude among the troop supplying countries of executing its own duties rather than helping out allies in Bosnia. In addition, commander of UNPROFOR Smith was on holiday in Croatia at the moment of the fall of Srebrenica and returned after the genocide took place (Parlementaire Enquete Commissie Srebrenica, 2003). J. Voorhoeve argues that before the fall of Srebrenica, the UNPROFOR mission was more a French and British mission as these two countries had a leading role in the mission and implemented decisions with an eye on its national interest (Voorhoeve, personal communication, 20 December 2016). It is clear that the collaboration between Dutchbat/the Dutch intelligence services and intelligence services of other participating countries in UNPROFOR was poor due to the unwillingness of sharing all found information. Collaboration between member states participating and its intelligence services in the interest of a UN peacekeeping mission must be a top priority. All member states must grant aid to member states in trouble and commanders in top brasses cannot be on furlough during critical situations.

4.4 INVESTIGATING ALL POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

According to D. Leurdijk, when the airstrike requests were refused, the moral of Dutchbat collapsed, whereas the moral of the Bosnian Serb army grew. As a result, Mladic ordered his army to besiege the entire *safe area* as they found out that the UN would not grant any form of air

support, despite its aggressive stance and previous attacks. The UN theory was that the Bosnian Serb army would not occupy other positions in the enclave than the observation post Echo as it was an important logistic hub for Republika Srpska. Therefore, UN orders were given to Dutchbat to withdraw from Echo in order to maintain the peace with the idea that Karadzic and Mladic had no plans to occupy the entire *safe area* (Leurdijk, 1996). This situation illustrates that the upper UN echelons had no idea which tensions and danger were present in the region around the *safe area*. This wrong estimation led to the seizure of Srebrenica by the Bosnian Serb army. All possible scenarios should have been investigated in order to prevent unexpected situations.

Besides the UN participating countries were responsible for the failure as well, for instance The Netherlands, which had the duty to protect the *safe area* of Srebrenica. Therefore, the following lessons are aimed to countries which are participating in UN peacekeeping.

4.5 CONSULTING OWN MILITARY ECHELONS BEFORE ACCEPTING A MISSION

The Dutch parliamentary inquiry asserts that in the beginning of 1993 when the Dutch government of Lubbers III was reigning The Netherlands, both the Dutch parliament as the Dutch public opinion allude to a more active role of The Netherlands in the international community. Presence at a mission was seen as essential and desirable in order to gain credibility which would lead to a better position of The Netherlands in global politics. Therefore, the government of Ruud Lubbers was negotiating with the UN about participation in the UNPROFOR peace keeping mission. Before the negotiations started, both military as high civil servants were consulted but there was dissension, in particular in the upper echelons of the ministry of Defence. Airmobile Brigade Chief Defensiestaf-General Arie van der Vlis and Commander in Chief lieutenant-general Hans Couzy had a lack of confidence in the deployment of Dutch troops. Van der Vlis and Couzy stated that both were sceptical concerning the deployment of Dutch troops as the chances of keeping peace in Yugoslavia were slim. Another objection was the light armament which had to be borne for the UNPROFOR mission and the unwillingness of other UN member states, in particular major powers such as the United States, to deploy its military forces to Yugoslavia. These countries did not send its military forces because of the plausible risk of failing, therefore Couzy questioned why Dutch battalions should be deployed in Yugoslavia. The two cases mentioned in the previous chapter regarding to UN militaries who could not intervene in a rape and a car accident, were reason for Van der Vlis and Couzy to decline participation in UNPROFOR as both did not want to place Dutch militaries in such situations (Parlementaire Enquete Commissie Srebrenica, 2003). It can be said that the desire of the Dutch government and public opinion in playing a more important role in global politics were obeyed, despite the scepticism

and protests in the upper echelons of the Dutch Ministry of Defence. Nonetheless, this is a lesson for all countries participating in a UN peacekeeping mission that all upper echelons of both the government as the Ministry of Defence should be consulted before accepting a mission.

4.6 DEPLOYING CAPABLE BATTALIONS WITH APPROPRIATE ARMAMENT

The main objection for Van der Vlis and Couzy, stated in the Dutch parliamentary inquiry, was that the Dutch battalion which had to be sent out to Yugoslavia (Airmobile Brigade) had to be replenished with voluntary conscripts. Moreover, the Airmobile Brigade had to function as armoured infantry, while it does not have the skills to perform as armoured infantry which would affect the credibility of the Airmobile Brigade. Minister for Defence during the government of Lubbers III, Relus ter Beek, also acknowledged that sending out Dutch battalions in May 1993 would not be possible due to the fact that it was not operable by that time. On 21 October 1993, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed The Netherlands to send out its Airmobile Brigade which would have been stationed at one of the five *safe areas* in Bosnia, the exact location was not known by that time. As time progressed, rumours about UNPROFOR wanting the Dutch Airmobile Brigade to deploy in Srebrenica became more concrete. Van der Vlis expressed, in the Dutch parliamentary inquiry, his concerns with regards to the location of the *safe area* Srebrenica as the enclave prospected logistical difficulties. In the autumn of 1993, The Netherlands sent out three reconnaissance missions to Bosnia but not to Srebrenica as the Dutch military echelons did not expect to be deployed for the *safe area* of Srebrenica. The idea was that Nordbat (Danish, Norwegian and Swedish battalions) would be deployed in Srebrenica. Before these three missions, the decision was already made that The Netherlands would deploy its Airmobile Brigade as a lightly armed infantry unit regardless of the assigned location. According to the Dutch parliamentary inquiry, this choice was based on the three following considerations:

1. The Airmobile Brigade was available to send out in a short time span, it only required a training and the maintenance of armament which would be used for the mission.
2. Light artillery which was agreed in the mandate when UNPROFOR was established. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali only allowed battalions to use its artillery in self defence in case of an attack as the artillery had the main function to deter belligerents. Because of the aggressive character of the situation in Yugoslavia, Boutros-Ghali allowed battalions to bear heavier armament than what was agreed. Participating countries could invoke UN Charter Chapter VII but The Netherlands did not as it could lead to the hostage of UN observers.

3. The higher Dutch echelons of Defence did not wish to provoke the Bosnian Serb army by bearing heavy artillery (Parlementaire Enquete Commissie Srebrenica, 2003).

After two out of three reconnaissance missions of The Netherlands, UNPROFOR decided to place the Airmobile Brigade in the *safe area* of Srebrenica under the name Dutchbat. Van der Vlis and Couzy assessed a low risk for Dutchbat concerning safety in the enclave of Srebrenica since warring factions never attacked and/or besieged a UN post. However, Canbat reported that it had faced difficulties with positioning of troops in the enclave, supply and aid to the civilians in the enclave and the protection of the status quo as the Bosnian Serb army controlled all the roads to the enclave accesses. The reason why Nordbat rejected to be in Srebrenica and Dutchbat was stationed there was due to the isolated location, the position in the valley and the large numbers of Muslim refugees from villages and towns in the vicinity. When the location of Dutchbat in Srebrenica was announced, the Dutch Second Chamber and the upper military echelons accepted it and relied on the cooperation of the Bosnian Serb army – which already encircled the entire *safe area* – since there were no incidents or obstructions at the supply roads. When access roads to the enclave were obstructed by the Bosnian Serb army which had consequences for Dutchbat and the civilians as well, living circumstances worsened and there were shortages of diesel (all equipment was running on diesel), medicines, food and water. Therefore, the mission became impracticable as there were not enough resources (Parlementaire Enquete Commissie Srebrenica, 2003). Concluded by W. Arts in *Confronting Genocide*, by sending the Airmobile Brigade to Srebrenica, Dutchbat was never capable to recognise and prevent or halt a genocide as it was not anything the Airmobile Brigade was specialised in. Moreover, battalions needed to prepare before they were deployed for a mission in order to become accustomed to its equipment and shape an appropriate strategy, this was never the case for Dutchbat (Arts, 2010). It can be said that the Airmobile Brigade was not capable of recognising and preventing a genocide, in addition, it never had sufficient time to accustomise to the equipment. Therefore, participating UN member states should always deploy a battalion with the right equipment which suits best for a certain mission.

4.7 BETTER COMMUNICATION AMONG OWN GOVERNMENT ECHELONS

N. Both addresses that The Netherlands never familiarise the UN with its proposal concerning duration and location of the mission. Minister for Defence Ter Beek assumed that the minister of Foreign Affairs would let the UN know about these two points but this was never the case. In June 1994 when Dutchbat was already settled in the Srebrenica enclave, Ter Beek contacted the UN and asked for a confirmation that the Dutchbat mission had a duration of 18 months. The UN's

response was that The Netherlands never proposed a time limit of Dutchbat, resulting in the fact that the UN assumed that Dutchbat would be deployed in Srebrenica until the end of the mission (Both, 2000). This can be seen as miscommunication within its own echelons in The Netherlands. Such inaccuracies can be indicted to the participating countries itself and should be prevented in order to avoid any misconception.

4.8 PREPARING A POSSIBLE EVACUATION

M. Faber points out that before the Bosnian Serb army besieged the *safe area* of Srebrenica, an effort was made by Mladic to capture the *safe area* of Gorazde which was protected by the British battalion Britbat – which consisted of 300 soldiers less than Dutchbat. The attack on Gorazde was repulsed by Britbat because its use of force supported by Bosnian Muslim military soldiers, although the Bosnian Serb army captured some land around Gorazde. Subsequently, the decision was made by Mladic to capture Srebrenica. The Bosnian Serb army noticed that Dutchbat did not invoke the use of force, whereupon Karadzic ordered Mladic to besiege the entire enclave on 9 July 1995. When the fall of Srebrenica became a fact, Dutchbat had three options, according to M. Faber in order to prevent the atrocity of what is nowadays known as the Srebrenica Genocide.

- 1) Invoking the use of force which was also done by Britbat in its *safe area* of Gorazde. Salient detail is that Britbat only had 300 soldiers to its disposal, which is the half of the entire Dutch battalion in Srebrenica. However, the deciding factor of not repulsing the Bosnian Serb attack was that the total ammunition of Dutchbat was insufficient to defend the enclave for longer than three days, according to Dutchbat colonel Karremans.
- 2) Allowing all refugees in the enclave to come into the compound of Dutchbat in Potocari as this was grounds of the UN where no one was permitted to go inside without authorisation. Dutchbat permitted only 4,500 refugees into the compound, while there was space for more refugees according to Dutchbat soldiers and survivors. This was not violated by the Bosnian Serb army during the siege.
- 3) Arranging busses which would transport the whole population in the *safe area* to Bosnian territory in Tuzla as proposed by Mladic. However, Dutchbat intended to arrange busses and informed the UN regarding this, the UN had the final say and did not arrange busses within one day (Faber, 2002).

Dutch parliamentary inquiry acknowledges that when the Bosnian Serb army besieged the southern observation posts of the enclave and were not deterred by Dutchbat, Karadzic gave

Mladic orders to capture the entire *safe area*. Striking was that when the Bosnian Serb army under command of Mladic reached the Dutchbat compound in Potocari, that Mladic proposed Dutchbat (and indirectly the UN) to arrange the evacuation of the civilians. Karremans assented on this proposal of Mladic but the UN could not effectuate, where after the decision was made by upper Bosnian Serb echelons that Mladic had to take initiative on 12 July 1995 one day after the fall of Srebrenica. The UN ordered Dutchbat to humanise the evacuation. The Bosnian Serb army separated all men from women and children and 'interrogated' all Bosnian Muslim men. The evacuation proceeded rapidly and chaotically causing Dutchbat to lose control of the evacuation. Dutchbat lieutenant Ron Rutten, discovered in the hills around Potocari many corpses and evidence of committed torture on these corpses. Rutten took photos of it in order to demonstrate to the UNPROFOR headquarters that there was a massacre taking place in the *safe area* but in vain (Parlementaire Enquete Commissie Srebrenica, 2003). J.C.C. Voorhoeve reproached that the UN had to intervene quicker and more active. Busses had to be prepared from Tuzla and Sarajevo in order to evacuate the civilians but the UN reacted too slow and passive. Voorhoeve does not reproach Dutchbat or colonel Karremans anything as both were not capable to arrange transport (Voorhoeve, personal communication, 20 December 2016). The three options in order to rescue the civilians of the enclave after Srebrenica had fallen were invoking the use of force, allowing all civilians to the compound or arranging busses to Tuzla from the first moment Srebrenica had fallen. None of the three options had been chosen due to slackness and hesitation on behalf of the UN and/or Dutchbat. A clear emergency plan of a situation whereby the *safe area* would be besieged by belligerents was not made, therefore Dutchbat could not start the evacuation. An emergency plan or a worst case scenario plan must always be prepared and this was not the case in Srebrenica.

4.9 OFFERING MENTAL AID AFTER THE WAR TO VETERANS IF NECESSARY

Investigated by E. Rijdsdijk, many Dutchbatters felt betrayed by the Dutch government and the UN, about 10% of the Dutchbatters suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and approximately 40% undergo psychological treatment due to the lack of given aid and the hopeless position they found themselves (Rijdsdijk, 2014). Second commander Rob Franken added in an interview with De Volkskrant on 3 December 2016 that the Dutch government "malignant and almost criminal" because of sending out Dutchbat to Srebrenica. Together with 200 other Dutchbatters, Franken filed a claim against the Dutch government because of its inaccurately acting and negligence towards the whole battalion. The claim also addresses the reputation of Dutchbat after the Yugoslavia war by the media and public opinion which was heavily damaged –

Dutchbatters were illustrated as cowards, criminals and incapable in its functioning in Srebrenica – and which was not corrected by the Dutch government and Ministry of Defence (Franken, 2016). The Netherlands did not provide mental aid to all Dutchbatters after the war. As a consequence, PTSD and psychological treatment among Dutchbatters emerged and under those circumstances 200 Dutchbatters filed a claim to the Dutch government due to the deployment of Dutchbat to Srebrenica. All veterans in each country who were active in a mission in a war zone should get the appreciation and mental aid after the war in order to reduce the number of PTSD cases and psychological issues among the veterans. It would also decrease the chance for a government to receive claims and accusations of ingratitude on the side of the government.

The Yugoslavia war claimed approximately 100,000 deaths and more than two million habitants were displaced which was observed in the documentary *Waarom Srebrenica moest vallen* by VPRO. It can be said that the nadir of the war was in July 1995 when 8,000 male Bosnian Muslims were executed in Srebrenica what was later known for the Srebrenica genocide. Many Bosnian Muslim women were subject to rape and torture (VPRO, 2015).

In summary, the lessons of the Srebrenica genocide for the UN were that there had to be a more flexible mandate which would allow an active defence. Secondly, UNPROFOR was dependant on the commitment of belligerents to ceasefires which can be seen as a risk as belligerents are unpredictable in its activities. Thirdly, a clear, rapid, efficient and English speaking communication structure must be present at each UN peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, the communication between the echelons of a participating country must be clear in order to avoid uncertainties. Besides that, collaboration between member states participating and its intelligence services in the interest of a UN peacekeeping mission must be a top priority. In addition, all possible scenarios ought to be investigated in order to prevent unexpected situations, including an emergency plan or a worst case scenario plan. Also, it is a lesson for all countries participating in a UN peacekeeping mission that all upper echelons of both the government as the Ministry of Defence must be consulted before accepting a mission. Moreover, participating UN member states have to always deploy a battalion with the right equipment which suits best for a specific mission, this also includes the sufficient number of militaries in order to avoid understaffing. Lastly, Veterans in each country who were active in a mission in war zones should get the appreciation and mental aid after the war in order to reduce the number of PTSD cases and psychological issues among the veterans.

5. WERE THE LESSONS OF SREBRENICA APPLIED TO SUBSEQUENT UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS?

After the UN peacekeeping debacle in Srebrenica, an urge to revise and adapt the methods used for peacekeeping missions became more concrete among the policy makers of the UN. It is vital that failures and shortcomings on behalf of the UN never lead to humanitarian disasters. Therefore, this chapter will analyse two UN peacekeeping missions after UNPROFOR in order to conclude whether the lessons learned from the peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia have been applied by the UN, in short term and long term, in order to remedy the shortcoming of peacekeeping missions thereafter. This chapter will be divided in the following three sections,

1. The peacekeeping mission of Sierra Leone (1999-2002).
2. The peacekeeping mission of South Sudan (2011-present).
3. A conclusion whereby an overview with all lessons from Srebrenica will be used as yardstick and to what extent those lessons of Srebrenica have been applied to Sierra Leone and South Sudan.

First an introduction on the policy reversal for UN peacekeeping missions will be given. As described in *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s* of F.H. Fleitz Jr., after the appointment of K. Annan as UN Secretary General in 1 January 1997, a different focus was set for peacekeeping missions with respect to predecessor Boutros-Ghali under whose administration the Srebrenica genocide took place. Annan called for a more robust working method during UN missions in order to address dire humanitarian situations and violent belligerents in a more efficient manner. This had to be effectuated by the allowing offensive military use of force which had to be carried out in each mandate. Light armaments and neutral mandates caused situations whereby peacekeepers stood by and were not authorised to aid while innocent civilians were raped or killed. Aggressive belligerents were not deterred by UN battalions, thus the focus of UN peacekeeping missions during the Annan administration was accented on more robustness and a heavier armament in order to oppose aggressive belligerents. The policy reversal led to four new UN peacekeeping missions were deployed in Kosovo, East-Timor, Sierra Leone and Congo in 1999 (Jr., 2002). The next section will examine the mission of Sierra Leone and until what extent the UN applied the lessons of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia to the mission in Sierra Leone. This mission is chosen to perceive the alterations of peacekeeping missions in a short term period under the administration of a new appointed UN Secretary General after the Srebrenica genocide. For the third section, the mission of South Sudan is chosen to study the developments after UNPROFOR on long term as it was established in 2011 and not terminated yet.

5.1 SIERRA LEONE (1999-2002)

Firstly, a brief introduction of the civil war in Sierra Leone and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission will be given. Examined by M. Galic, Sierra Leone is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of minerals. It is one of the most important countries in the diamond trade and in addition to that, the West African country hosts many fields of gold, platinum, iron and bauxite. Despite the richness in minerals, many years of bad governance, corruption, violations of human rights and extreme poverty created deplorable life circumstances in Sierra Leone, causing much unrest and an unstable (political) climate in 1991. A civil war was triggered by rebel leader Charles Taylor, who committed a coup in the neighbouring country, Liberia and desired to gain more control over the diamond area which is situated in both Liberia as Sierra Leone. After the coup succeeded and Taylor became president of Liberia, he decided to send Foday Sankoh to Sierra Leone in order to take control of the diamond fields. When seizing the control of the entire diamond area, Sankoh created the Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and started its own insurgency and attempt to overthrow the current Sierra Leonean government, which led to the civil war in March 1991 (Galic, 2006).

According to F.H. Fleitz Jr., in the first few year of the civil war, thousands of Sierra Leoneans were killed mainly on behalf of the RUF. The rebel group was notorious due to the committed atrocities, such as cutting off the limbs of its opponents. In order to combat the ruthlessness of the RUF, the UN peacekeeping missions of United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was deployed to implement a peace plan and halt the ruthlessness of the RUF. UNAMSIL was deployed after the RUF seized power in big parts of the country including the capital Freetown where approximately 6,000 deaths were counted and large numbers of atrocities were committed by the RUF in December 1998. After a period of three weeks, Freetown was recaptured by UN forces and peace negotiations between the RUF and the UN (where the United States under the Clinton administration had a dominant position) in the spring of 1999. The Lomé peace agreement pardoned Sankoh and offered the leader of the RUF a post in the new government where he was responsible for the entire diamond sector in Sierra Leone, despite his barbarity during the civil war. In addition, all other RUF members were given amnesty for all committed crimes. In return, the RUF had to disarm and allow the establishment of UNAMSIL which had to monitor the compliance of the ceasefire and Lomé peace agreement throughout the country including RUF held areas (Jr., 2002).

F.H. Fleitz Jr. points out that in practice, the RUF never disarmed nor allowed UNAMSIL troops to RUF territory with as result that the peace agreement could not be monitored nor adhered.

Besides that, the RUF resumed killing and maiming its opponents as Sankoh aspired more political power rather than peace. UNAMSIL efforts to keep peace in Sierra Leone became meaningless due to situations whereby UNAMSIL battalions were stripped of its weapons and/or taken hostage by the RUF. The nadir of the UNAMSIL mission was reached in May 2000 when approximately 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers were surrounded and taken hostage by RUF militaries. Intensive negotiations between the UN and the RUF (led by the Liberian president Taylor) assured the release of all UNAMSIL personnel. In the late 2001, the RUF became less violent and the UN saw an opportunity to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone. Also, UNAMSIL endorsed the RUF to replace Sankoh by the more moderate Isa Sesay who had to convert the RUF from violent rebel faction to a decent political party. Under the leadership of Sesay, the war slowly came to an end in late 2001. In order to cut the revenue flow of the RUF, the UN imposed a diamond embargo on Sierra Leone as the RUF earned plenty of money on it because of the trade with Liberia where Taylor was still president. Furthermore, the UN increased the number of peacekeepers in Sierra Leone up to nearly 18,000 when the UNAMSIL mandate was expired and had to be revised. The enlargement of 6,000 UNAMSIL peacekeepers to 18,000 made the UNAMSIL mission the biggest UN peacekeeping mission by then. The official end of the war in Sierra Leone was declared in 18 January 2002 when the government asserted control over the entire country since the war began in 1991. UNAMSIL succeeded to disarm 75,000 ex-fighters of the RUF and facilitated the return of over 500,000 displaced people (Jr., 2002).

The civil war ended and the peace was restored in Sierra Leone. During the UNAMSIL mission there were no major problems and obstructions faced as it was the case for UNPROFOR due to numerous reasons. Therefore, it can be said that the UNAMSIL mission operated more than sufficient, although there were also mistakes in Sierra Leone made by the UN. M. Berdal and S. Economides highlight in *United Nations Interventionism, 1991–2004* the miscommunication regarding the role in the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone between the UN and countries participating in the UNAMSIL mission, such as Zambia, Kenya and Jordan. These countries which were barely trained and experienced with the UN equipment and working methods. Battalions from these countries thought that they were deployed only to monitor peace instead of enforce peace and fight against the RUF. These battalions were not prepared on fighting against the RUF when it attempted to recapture Freetown. Hence, a Rapid Response Team existing of 800 British marines was sent out to support the UNAMSIL mission and repulse the attack on Freetown with heavy use of force. The heavy use of force was possible because of the foundation of a coalition which was able to undertake major enforcement actions in Sierra Leone against the RUF. One of which was able to enforce the peace agreement and maintain peace and justice in Sierra Leone

was the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The mandates of both UNAMSIL as UNPROFOR were impartial. However, the impartiality did not break up UNAMSIL as it was the case for UNPROFOR. Another critical point during the UNAMSIL mission were the hostage of UN militaries and observers by the RUF. The negotiations regarding releasing all UN personnel proceeded well but intensive. It can be said that it was a miracle that there was no peacekeeper assassinated by the RUF and that there were no big demands made by Taylor on behalf of the RUF, which could lead to a less favourable position for UNAMSIL during the negotiations. It can be said that Taylor was bounteous during the negotiations. On the contrary, successful negotiations do not mean that the warring faction fulfil the outcome of the negotiations. This can be seen after the Lomé peace agreement whereby the RUF violated the ceasefire. It is always a risk to fully trust a warring party (Economides, 2007).

5.2 SOUTH SUDAN (2011-PRESENT)

For the third section, a similar structure of the second section (brief introduction of the civil war and establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission) will be given but instead for the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan. The BBC reports that South Sudan became the youngest country in the world after it seceded from Sudan on 9 July 2011. Prior to that, several conflicts and civil wars in Sudan in the 20th century led to a six-year-peace-process, starting in January 2005. Leaders of North and South Sudan reached an agreement regarding a referendum on the independence of South Sudan which was held in 2011. An overwhelming majority of 98.83% voted for an independent South Sudan and the referendum was accepted by the president of Sudan, Omar Bashir. Thus, the nation of South Sudan was born on 9 July 2011. From this day, the UN deployed the UN peacekeeping mission United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) in the country in order to consolidate peace and security. Furthermore, the mandate of UNMISS contained that South Sudan will be endorsed in its development to a strong, efficient and democratic government which maintains good diplomatic relations with its neighbouring countries. Initially, the strength of UNMISS was 7,000 peacekeepers. At the end of 2011, the relation between Sudan and South Sudan became more hostile due to an aerial bombardment on South Sudanese territory where Sudan was blamed for an oil export dispute as Sudan claimed that South Sudan, many oil fields are located on South Sudanese territory, had to pay fees to Sudan as it contributed to the independence of South Sudan. South Sudan rejected and shut down the oil production. Together with reducing oil prices in the world, which had an economical crisis as a result in both countries, tensions arose and the fighting between the Sudanese army and South Sudanese rebel parties resumed. In September 2012, an agreement

was reached on the oil dispute but the border issues were not resolved, despite the creation of a demilitarised zone. In June 2013, a corruption scandal was revealed wherein the South Sudanese president Salva Kiir was involved. Kiir appealed on his immunity and dismissed the entire cabinet, including Vice President Riek Macher who was accused of plotting to overthrow him. A civil war between the South Sudanese government and Macher who was endorsed by rebel factions was a fact. An overwhelming part of the youngest country was affected by the civil war where UNMISS seemed to not have an adequate solution for. In May 2014, the UN reported that the civil war led to a displacement of more than one million South Sudanese refugees and the death of many innocent civilians. In addition, approximately five million civilians needed humanitarian aid. Another humanitarian catastrophe was about to occur under the UN flag but UN peace negotiations led to an agreement whereby a ceasefire would go into effect in August 2015 and Macher had to return to the position as Vice President in the cabinet of Kiir. In July 2016, Macher was dismissed after further conflict which flared up the tensions in South Sudan (BBC, 2016).

As described by United Nations, Kiir accused UNMISS for not being impartial as it was aiding anti-government movements when the violence of the civil war broke out in December 2013. As a result, the South Sudanese government launched an anti-UNMISS campaign and defame the benevolence of UNMISS. Furthermore, UNMISS was obstructed by the South Sudanese government to move freely and provide aid to civilians in certain zones. Allegations that UNMISS was not impartial were not found, however, this situation led to the death of ten thousand civilians and a hundred thousand displaced persons. One of the arguments UNMISS was accused for was that it hosted 85,000 civilians who sought protection in eight compounds spread throughout the country. However, UNMISS and collaborating humanitarian organisations faced the issue of having minimum facilities to offer proper humanitarian aid, which leads to inappropriate life circumstances on the compounds. This case led to a situation whereby the UN had to choose for either more focus on offering humanitarian aid to displaced persons or a stricter impartiality in order to restore the relation with Kiir. Eventually, the shift to a stricter impartiality was chosen in order to enable liaison and coordination activities with both the South Sudanese government as the rebel factions led by Macher. UN resolution 2155 (2014) was adopted in order to enforce this shift and to increase the UNMISS strength to 12,500. This choice had to guarantee an effective implementation of the UNMISS mission according to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon (United Nations, 2016). The mandate reversal led to an unclear mandate for UNMISS troops as it was not clear which the priorities were. This was fatal as the situation in South Sudan was unpredictable and hostile. Therefore, UNMISS was not capable to protect civilians as it could not always cope with the violence nor avert atrocities in South Sudan.

Besides that, the BBC concluded that UNMISS was understaffed as there were more than 10,000 peacekeepers needed in order to protect civilians and monitor ceasefires between the warring factions. The presence of UNMISS did not result into a solid ceasefire agreement and a peace plan for South Sudan, which proves that the UN peacekeeping mission of UNMISS can be classified as a failed peacekeeping mission up to the present day (BBC, 2016). Mentioned by J. Burke in *The Guardian*, during the presence of UNMISS, abominable atrocities on civilians were committed without UNMISS being able to intervene. From 2014 to 2016, violence and the number of people killed increased, numerous street fights between the government and rebels led to deplorable circumstances in the major cities including the capital Juba. Civilians suffered worst with many displaced and human rights were widespread violated by both parties. Allegedly, civilians died in and around UNMISS bases and many women were subject to rape, whereas men were robbed in the view of UNMISS forces. In some cases, aid workers were targeted as well by governmental soldiers only a few hundred meters away from a UNMISS compound. UNMISS forces did not provide help, despite dozens of appeals for help of aid workers who were able to escape. Another case where UNMISS forces did not intervene was on 17 February 2016, where a Protection of Civilians (PoC) site was attacked by government soldiers in front of Ethiopian, Indian and Rwandan peacekeepers in Malakal and at least 30 civilians were killed (Burke, 2016).

A report drafted by Médecins Sans Frontières argues that between 25 and 65 people were left dead, including 2 MSF personnel, 108 injured and 35% of the shelters in the PoC site were destroyed. Besides that, 29,000 refugees who found shelter in this PoC were displaced again. The findings of the MSF report concluded that UNMISS failed to protect both refugees as humanitarian aid workers in the PoC site as adequate preventive measures were not taken. Also, UNMISS has been reproached for not being prepared on a emergency case and that UNMISS is not taking steps in order to improve the protection on civilians and PoC sites (Medecines Sans Frontières, 2016). After this attack Raquel Ayora, Director of Operations with Médecins Sans Frontières commented on 22 June 2016, *"Our investigation shows that UNMISS did not fulfill its mandate to protect civilians as set by the Security Council: prior to the attack, they failed to prevent the flow of weapons entering the camp; they chose not to intervene when initial fighting broke out in the camp, and when an attack came from outside the camp they were extremely slow to repel the assault."* (Médecins Sans Frontieres, 2016). As noted by Epoch Times, the mass rape and grave human right violations in Malakal were not an incident since the attack on a hotel where humanitarian aid workers were residing in Juba. Again UNMISS (troops from China, Nepal and Ethiopia) did not intervene which led to the consequence that several people were killed and raped. Another case was when a woman was raped in front of UNMISS battalions which again did

not intervene despite her cries for help. These two crimes were committed by South Sudanese troops which were endorsed by president Kiir. These two occasions were investigated by the UN in an internal investigation which concludes that there is a lack of managerial strength, preparedness and coordination among UNMISS peacekeepers whereby many systematically forsake its duties and shun the risks of protecting civilians. As a result, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon was astonished and removed Kenian general Johnson Mogoia Kimani Ondieki from his position as UNMISS Force Commander. Moon announced that further measurements had to be taken in order to make UNMISS effective and less chaotic (Epoch Times, 2016).

The war has still not ended. On the contrary, and investigated by J. Burke and E. Pilkington on behalf of The Guardian, violence and both sexual assault are rising and half of the entire South Sudanese population is threatened with famine. Furthermore, the inflation is over 300% and the country went bankrupt within five years of being an independent nation. Concrete numbers are not published but it is estimated that ten thousands found death since UNMISS has been deployed (Pilkington, 2016). Mentioned in *International Capacity in Building Post-Conflict Peace in Sudan: Applying Peacebuilding Triangle* by O. Bakare, the small achievements which were booked in South Sudan were providing water, food, shelter and basic education to more than 265,000 refugees, educating the Police Service Officers of South Sudan and removing thousands mines throughout the country (Bakare, 2015).

UNMISS in South Sudan in short, the UNMISS mandate became unclear as it was modified after accusations that UNMISS was not impartial and free movement on South Sudanese territory was obstructed. Furthermore, UNMISS was understaffed and UNMISS troops did not intervene when civilians and aid workers were killed or subject of rape. Ten thousand have died since South Sudan seceded from Sudan and five years after its independence, it can be said that the end of the civil war is not near where UNMISS can be criticised for, despite small achievements.

5.3 LESSONS APPLIED TO SIERRA LEONE AND SOUTH SUDAN

In conclusion, the UN peacekeeping missions changed character since the appointment of K. Annan as successor B. Boutros-Ghali. Peacekeeping missions had to be more robust and equipped with heavier armament in order to prevent humanitarian disasters such as the Srebrenica genocide. In order to draw a conclusion whether the UN learned from the UNPROFOR debacle and applied these lessons to further UN peacekeeping missions, two missions were chosen. The two missions were UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (1999-2002) and UNMISS in South Sudan (2011-

present) which will illustrate the lessons learned by the UN from Srebrenica in both short term and long term. The same yardstick as the UNPROFOR mission is used for both missions.

5.3.1 COMPOSING LESS RESTRICTIVE MANDATES

UNAMSIL had more space to intervene as its mandate was less restrictive than the UNPROFOR mandate and less focused on the humanitarian aspect. However, an active use of force was not allowed according to the mandate of UNAMSIL. Nonetheless, a coalition amongst others, a British Rapid Response Team and ECOMOG – which were allowed to actively fight against the RUF – compensated the restrictive mandate of UNAMSIL. On the other hand, aggressive belligerents, such as the RUF and Bosnian Serb army, are not sensitive for international organisations and pressure. Both UNPROFOR as UNAMSIL saw its personnel taken hostage by these belligerents, which means that both missions were not sufficiently anticipated on an aggressive attitude towards the UN troops. Furthermore, peace agreements and ceasefires were not abided by some warring parties in Bosnia and Sierra Leone which demonstrates that it is a risk to trust warring parties in a war. Therefore, this lesson was applied to the UNAMSIL mission until a certain extent.

Also the UNMISS mandate was less restrictive than the UNPROFOR mandate and later on less focused on the humanitarian aspect as Kiir required a more impartial UNMISS mandate. Besides that, the limitations with regards to use of force against belligerents were less obstructing than for UNPROFOR. However, and what also applied for UNPROFOR and UNAMSIL, peace agreements and ceasefires were not abided by warring factions and various atrocities were committed. The risk to make an agreement and trust warring factions in a war has been made in the three UN peacekeeping missions which are studied in this dissertation. Therefore, this lesson has only been applied until a certain extent. The mistake that warring factions will abide peace agreements and ceasefires is a mistake which has not been learned since the Srebrenica genocide.

5.3.2 ENHANCING THE ENTIRE COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE

No problems with regards to the communication and its structure were noticed. Neither language barriers or hesitations on implementing decisions and/or requests were the case in Sierra Leone. On the contrary, it has to be said that the situation in Sierra Leone was not as complex as in Yugoslavia due to the possibility of requesting airstrikes in case of emergency. However, it can be said that this lesson has been applied to Sierra Leone as there were no issues in the communication structure.

Compared with the UNPROFOR communication structure, it can be said that the UNMISS communication structure was smoother. However, UNMISS troops did not intervene when South Sudanese military forces attacked PoC sites and raped and/or killed humanitarian aid workers, despite its close position since UNMISS compounds were only distanced one kilometre from crime scenes. Shouts for help by humanitarian aid personnel were systematically neglected by UNMISS battalions. The communication structure of UNMISS was quicker than the one of UNPROFOR but it had the same inefficiency, therefore this lesson is not applied in the UNMISS mission until today.

5.3.3 MORE COLLABORATION AND OPERATING WITH A COLLECTIVE INTEREST

The UNAMSIL mission did not face obstructions in terms of collaboration and sharing findings of intelligence services. However, the UN still does not have an own intelligence services, which makes UN peacekeeping missions dependant on the willingness of other UN member states. This lesson has been partly applied to Sierra Leone as there were no obstructions in terms of sharing findings such as in Yugoslavia but the UN still does not have an own intelligence service causing that it is still dependent on its member states.

Earlier mentioned was a conclusion of the UN that there is a lack of coordination among UNMISS troops. Furthermore, it was pointed out that UNMISS battalions systematically forsake its duties and shun the risks of protecting civilians. Therefore, it can be concluded that the application of this lesson has failed in the UNMISS mission until so far.

5.3.4 INVESTIGATING ALL POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

A more suitable and flexible mandate was given which fitted the situation on the ground. However, the hostage of UN personnel could not be avoided. Eventually, the negotiations regarding the release of the UN personnel progressed well, although this was mainly because of the bounteousness of Taylor who led the negotiations on behalf of the RUF. It can be said that this lesson has barely been applied to the UNAMSIL mission in Sierra Leone.

Scenarios whereby PoC sites were attacked and human rights were violated by South Sudanese militaries were not prepared by UNMISS seen the fact that troops did not intervene. This means that the situation in South Sudan was not sufficiently analysed in terms of danger and insecurity. On the other hand, UNMISS personnel was not taken hostage since the establishment of this mission. At the end, it can be said that this lesson was not applied by UNMISS.

5.3.5 CONSULTING OWN MILITARY ECHELONS BEFORE ACCEPTING A MISSION

There were no objections heard within the military echelons of participating countries before those accepted the UNAMSIL or UNMISS mission. In that case, this lesson has been applied to both Sierra Leone and South Sudan.

5.3.6 DEPLOYING CAPABLE BATTALIONS WITH APPROPRIATE ARMAMENT

Up to the present day, the UNAMSIL mission is one of the largest UN missions deployed with a number of approximately 18,000. Understaffing was never the issue in Sierra Leone, whereas in Bosnia it was one of the reasons for failure. Furthermore, there were no complaints heard on the side of UNAMSIL battalions concerning equipment and armament. Therefore, this lesson has been applied successfully to the mission in Sierra Leone.

UNMISS has less military resources than UNAMSIL but more than UNPROFOR. An acute understaffing issue is not the case for UNMISS, although it is obvious that there are thoughts that more military resources are needed. This is logical since the fact that there are several cases whereby UNMISS troops did not intervene. The number of UN peacekeepers and appropriate armament are sufficient in South Sudan but there is rather a lack of the right mentality which is needed to intervene and protect civilians and therefore, it can be said that several battalions are not capable. It can be said that this lesson has been applied till a certain extent, namely the appropriate armament is available but the capable battalions not.

5.3.7 BETTER COMMUNICATION AMONG OWN GOVERNMENT ECHELONS

This was the lesson for The Netherlands after the UNPROFOR mission concerning the duration of the Dutchbat deployment and guarantees concerning airstrikes. In Sierra Leone there was miscommunication in the government echelons of various countries which sent its battalions with the idea to build peace instead of enforce it and actually fight against aggressive belligerents. It can be said that the role of the mission was not well communicated between the UN, participating countries and the deployed battalions of those countries. Therefore, this lesson has not been applied to all participating countries in Sierra Leone.

The UNMISS mandate requires participating battalions to protect civilians amongst others. This has not been done by several troops. This could be because the communication and decisions between its own government echelons which prioritised its own security over the security of civilians in South Sudan. From that point of view, it cannot be concluded whether this lesson has been applied by all participating countries.

5.3.8 PREPARING A POSSIBLE EVACUATION

In both Sierra Leone as in Bosnia (in particular to the *safe area* of Srebrenica) were UN battalions deployed which were not specialised in halting a genocide nor prepared to actively use military force against the aggressive belligerent. In other words, this lesson has not been applied to the UNAMSIL mission in Sierra Leone.

Evacuations of civilians were not prepared by UNMISS which can be confirmed by the fact that nearly half of the population is displaced. Many of these refugees are hosted at PoC sites but this is not a guarantee that the refugees are free from violence as it was the case when a PoC site in Malakal was attacked and the refugees had to flee again. Thus, this lesson has not been applied to the UNMISS mission up to the present day.

5.3.9 OFFERING MENTAL AID AFTER THE WAR TO VETERANS IF NECESSARY

Not applicable for participating countries in Sierra Leone nor South Sudan, although it must be said that the mission in South Sudan is still not over. Mental aid after the war to UNMISS veterans might be needed for those who were involved in mass rape, robbery or beatings or in case a genocide will happen, such as in Srebrenica. Thus, it cannot be said whether this lesson has been applied to Sierra Leone and South Sudan because in Sierra Leone it was not necessary and because in South Sudan the UN peacekeeping mission has not ended yet.

After using the same yardstick for UNPROFOR as UNAMSIL and UNMISS, it is concluded that the lessons of Srebrenica have not been fully applied to both missions. Besides that, it can be said that the lessons were more successfully applied to UNAMSIL than to UNMISS, although the UNMISS mission has not been terminated yet. For both missions the mandates were less restrictive and less focused on the humanitarian aspect. Also, there were evidently more military resources and appropriate equipment available and the UN peacekeeping mission structure was more efficient. On the other hand, many lessons were not or partly applied among which the risk of trusting warring factions, having an own intelligence service, investing all possible scenarios including evacuations and enhancing the communication among government echelons. A point where UNMISS can be reproached for is that battalions systematically forsake its duties and shun the risks of protecting civilian. UNMISS did not always intervene nor protect the civilians in South Sudan. J. Voorhoeve adds that for all UN peacekeeping missions after UNPROFOR applies that the mandates have to be clearer and that there needs to be more manpower (green helmets instead of blue helmets) air force due to the more complicated and violent situation in current war zones (Voorhoeve, personal communication, 20 December 2016).

CONCLUSION

When an ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia converted into a bloody war in the early 90s, the UN established UNPROFOR in order to restore peace in a country which was afflicted with war. The UNPROFOR mission consisted of UN member states which deployed peacekeepers to Yugoslavia and a mandate which functioned as impartial guidelines for the peacekeepers. The main elements of the UNPROFOR mandate were protecting all civilians, providing humanitarian aid and monitoring both the ceasefire as demilitarisation in the environment.

In practice, the mandate was inefficient as there were many limitations faced by UNPROFOR battalions. The UNPROFOR mandate was too restrictive causing that there was a shortage of peacekeepers, sufficient equipment and appropriate armament. As a result, the demilitarisation could not be accomplished, also due to not having the authority to intervene. Furthermore, the mandate was too focused on the humanitarian aspect.

Due to the restrictive mandate and other failures made by the UN, a humanitarian catastrophe took place where 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were executed by the Bosnian Serb army. Therefore, it was vital to study the failures made during the Bosnian war which led to the Srebrenica genocide. The failures can be seen as lessons which had to be applied to subsequent UN peacekeeping missions. The lessons of Srebrenica were that, there had to be a more flexible mandate which would allow an active use of force, and a clear, rapid and English speaking communication structure must be at the disposal of each UN peacekeeping mission. Besides that, an efficient collaboration among the government echelons of participating countries. This efficient collaboration is also vital for a well functioning peacekeeping mission where all possible scenarios, including evacuation, are prepared for. Furthermore, the UN ought to have its own intelligence services since member states can decline to share its findings with other member states. On top of that, each peacekeeping mission must be provided with sufficient manpower with appropriate equipment and armament, including air force.

The Srebrenica debacle led to a policy reversal for UN peacekeeping missions which had to be more robust. The lessons of Srebrenica had to be applied for subsequent missions but this was not always successfully as it can be seen in Sierra Leone and in particular South Sudan. The mandates for both missions were clearer and there were more peacekeepers equipped with appropriate armament but mass killings and rapes could not be halted despite the presence of UNAMSIL and UNMISS. Worst case scenarios and evacuations were not prepared for, nor implemented by the peacekeepers.

After the UNPROFOR mission the UN has done too little in order to prevent or halt war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the aggressive belligerent. This is also the case for UNAMSIL and in particular UNMISS. A response to, perhaps, the biggest failure of the UN and on how to enhance UN peacekeeping missions, has not been given in tangible results since civilians still suffer despite the presence of UN peacekeepers. Human rights cannot be protected when the UN is confronted with the lack of consistency and courage. Use of force and adequate reaction on aggression in order to protect civilians has been avoided routinely. Heavy presence of UN peacekeepers bearing heavy armament do not matter if the UN peacekeepers do not intervene. UNMISS is an example that the UN did not learn the lessons of the UNPROFOR mission, whereas UNAMSIL demonstrates that there are possibilities of restoring peace in a country, despite the fact that not all lessons were applied in Sierra Leone.

The UN is always depending on member states which are willing to deploy troops and share intelligence services findings, likewise on the warring faction whether these will abide ceasefires and peace agreements which makes the UN peacekeeping missions vulnerable. Peacekeeping intervention will only achieve its objectives and fulfilment of mandates if all concerned parties are collaborating with the UN and this has not been the case for UNPROFOR, UNAMSIL and UNMISS. Options to compensate the shortcomings of the UN are the heavier use of air force and the deployment of green helmets rather than blue helmets in order to enforce peace. The character of UN peacekeeping missions should be more robust than was proposed by K. Annan since his appointment as UN Secretary General in 1999. Without robustness, UN peacekeepers will be overrun by belligerents causing an efficient protection of civilians cannot therefore be guaranteed. The UN created with UNPROFOR an illusion of safety for civilians and this is still the case in UN peacekeeping after UNPROFOR.

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APPENDICES

Interview with Prof.Dr.Ir J.J.C. Voorhoeve, former director Dutch Institution for International Relations "Clingendael" in The Hague (1 September 1990 until 22 August 1994), Dutch Minister of Defence between 22 August 1994 and 3 August 1998 (VVD), former member Raad van State (1 December until 1 October 2006) and professor International Security Studies on NLDA (Nederlandse Defensie Academie) since 1 October 2006.



Voorhoeve has expertise in Foreign affairs, Political science, Public administration, International relations and International organizations (Data Archiving and Networked Services, 2016).

Figure 5: Prof.Dr.Ir. J.J.C. Voorhoeve in EenVandaag on 18 November 2016. Source: (EenVandaag, 2016).

Why was the battalion of Dutchbat sent out if upper echelons at the Dutch Defence Ministry (Van der Vlis en Couzy) were against it? Initially, Both Van der Vlis as Couzy agreed on deployment to Bosnia, concerns were made after the mission was accepted. Both pros as cons were consulted but my predecessor (Relus Ter Beek) concluded that it was a difficult but honourable and executable mission.

For what reason Van der Vlis and Couzy changed their minds? Van der Vlis never told me why he changed his mind, despite the moment when I discussed with him all ongoing activities where he told me that the UNPROFOR mission a well functioning mission was, this was in July 1994. Also Couzy agreed with the proposal of government Lubbers III which decided the deployment to Bosnia ,where I was not involved in by the way, although Couzy still had some concerns.

Was it not better if The Netherlands chose for sending out a Airmobile Brigade which had no experience with this type of missions? The Dutch Army (Koninklijke Landmacht) wanted to use this mission as flagship to promote itself.

So, it was only about the reputation of the Koninklijke Landmacht? It was a consideration but not the only one.

What were the other considerations? The other considerations were that the government of that period wanted to say yes to the UN in order to supply troops to UNPROFOR.

Why did The Netherlands not send a battalion which was suited for this type of mission with the right experience? I do not have the knowledge on what the Ministry of Defence discussed

about this before my period of Minister of Defence but there is a supposition in your question that the lack of experience contributed to the failure of this mission. That is not the case. The mission failed due to other factors. The lack of experience of Dutchbat was not decisive in this.

Why did Dutchbat not deter the Bosnian Serb army by heavy use of force like Britbat did for its safe area Gorazde when it was attacked one month before Srebrenica? The UNPROFOR mandate consisted of series of UN Security Council Resolutions, most of them were unclear. There was one powerful one which was UN Resolution 836 which gave the UN Secretary General the authorisation to make use of the forces of the NATO Air Force. However, this option was never used which led to the fall of Srebrenica. So the mandate was not existing in only weak and unclear points because of the resolution 836, which was not used by the UN Secretary General unfortunately.

What were the major restrictions of the mandate? The mission was wrongly designed. A neutral blue helmet mission, so a police mission, was assigned to a mission in an ongoing war which was not suited for blue helmets. It was not a blue helmet mission and NAVO Air Force had to be used vigorously.

In June 1995 when the British *safe area* of Gorazde was attacked, Britbat chose to defend itself with heavy use of force with as result that the Bosnian Serb attack was repulsed. Why did Dutchbat not defend itself with heavy use of force? Britbat drove away with extinguished lights during the night in order to prevent the fall of its enclave as Britbat did not want to suffer the same fate. Something else prevented the fall of Gorazde, namely the US which did not act according to the UN procedures. President Clinton concluded that the absence of the US in UNPROFOR and the approach of UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was not efficient. Therefore, the US decided to make use of heavy Air Force against Bosnian Serb targets. Subsequently, British, French and Dutch Air Forces attacked Bosnian Serb targets as well including important targets near Pale and Sarajevo.

All this happened after the fall of Srebrenica? The fall of Srebrenica was the turning point which let the US participate in the war. Before the fall of Srebrenica, the US was almost completely absence, after it, the US took initiative.

So, the story about Britbat and the use of force against the Bosnian Serb army around Gorazde is not true? The heavy use of force was executed by the NATO and not by Britbat. The most crucial point was when Bosnian Serb targets were bombed in the vicinity of Gorazde, Pale and Sarajevo.

Did France and the UK operate more from a national interest instead of a collective interest?

Yes, France and the UK operated more from a national interest in the way of many interventions in the chain of command and communication of UNPROFOR .

Was Dutcbat neglected by France and the UK because of its national interest? The crucial points were when the NATO Air Force was not enabled on time and the passivity of both the French as the British commander (B. Janvier and R. Smith). Janvier approved the request for airstrikes too late, namely at the moment Srebrenica had fallen and a Serbian flag was hoisted in the enclave. Furthermore, the bombs which were dropped by the NATO Air Force were ineffective because the American F16's could not find a target, whereas the Dutch F16's bombings barely hit its targets. Smith was during the fall of Srebrenica on holiday in Croatia and returned back when the massacre already took place.

Could the Srebrenica genocide have been prevented? If so, how? Yes if the three enclave were under surveillance of the NATO Air Force, which I proposed to the UN in February 1995. Besides that, powerful deterrence had to be used in order to demonstrate to the Bosnian Serb army that the UN was more powerful than the Bosnian Serb army . If one of the enclaves would have been attacked, then the NATO would bomb Bosnian Serb targets in order to demonstrate that the opponent would get more damage than benefit from attacking the enclaves.

That sounds contradictory due to the fact that after NATO bombings at a ammunition depot near Pale, many UN observers were taken hostage in May 1995. Approximately 350 French and British UN peacekeepers were taken hostage which led to an agreement between the French president and the British prime minister with president Clinton on stopping airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs. This instruction was further given to UNPROFOR, including the fixation made by Janvier that no use of force was allowed against the Bosnian Serb army, only negotiating were allowed. The French and British commander disagreed on this point but Smith was inferior to Janvier, so he was not able to implement the things he wanted to implement. The disagreement between both was solved when Srebrenica had fallen when the US decided to intervene. In August 1995, Janvier went on furlough as he returned to France for the wedding of his son, causing that Smith was in charge during that period. The US commanded admiral L. Smith of the Navy Seals department Mediterranean Sea opted to attack Bosnian Serb targets. R. Smith and L. Smith agreed on the new instruction to attack Bosnian Serb targets which led Karadzic and Mladic to the negotiations. However, this was too late for the 8,000 men who were executed in Srebrenica.

Which were the major mistakes made by The Netherlands in both The Hague and the enclave itself? The biggest mistake was made in The Hague when the UN asked The Netherlands to supply troops for UNPROFOR. Subsequently, a reconnaissance mission was deployed in the former Yugoslavia followed by a report about this reconnaissance mission. This report argues that it was a difficult but honourable and executable mission. After this conclusion the following mistake is made, namely when a part of the government Lubbers III was discussing with Kofi Annan about the consequences of a possible Bosnian Serb attack and Annan assured that NATO Air Force would be deployed in order to support the ground troops. This was confirmed by Annan via a press conference and a letter to the Dutch government and UN Security Council. The promise concerning NATO Air Force was broken by the UN. At that moment, the Dutch government had to point out the indefensible position of Srebrenica, deep in the territory of Republika Srpska and that UN Security Council members had to support Dutchbat by means of deploying ground troops as well since The Netherlands a small country is in the UN. This is the reason why Sweden rejected Srebrenica. Furthermore, clear agreements had to be made concerning the use of NATO Air Force. These were the two most important elements but the Dutch Second Chamber did not consider these. It can be concluded that one did not explore the geographical position of Srebrenica and the way how the UNPROFOR had been designed by the UN. Dutchbat cannot be blamed for this but rather the upper military echelons of the Ministry of Defence as it had the duty to make clear agreements concerning NATO Air Force. Besides that, Dutchbat was not able to modify the mandate.

When Srebrenica had fallen, Mladic asked if Dutchbat/the UN would arrange the evacuation. This didn't happen and the day after Mladic arranged the 'evacuation' himself, why did the UN not arrange the evacuation? Janvier told Chief Defence staff Van den Breemen that he would contact Mladic directly after the fall and Gobilliard prioritised the protection and evacuation of the civilians in the enclave. This did not happen because the UN did not take sufficient initiative and the slow response on the fall of Srebrenica. The UN had to react quicker in order to arrange the evacuation itself instead of leaving it to Mladic. Karremans was not able to arrange the evacuation as he had no transportation for the civilians. The transportation had to be arranged from Tuzla and Sarajevo before Mladic arranged the transport but the UN was too slow and passive. Therefore, the massacres could not be prevented or halted.

What were the main reasons why airstrikes were not granted when the attacks on the *safe area* of Srebrenica had begun on 9 and 10 July 1995? There were instructions given by the UN upper echelons to avoid situations which could obstruct the negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs. Therefore, the requests were declined and not taken serious by the UN.

What were the major lessons of the entire UNPROFOR mission? The biggest mistake made by the UN was deploying blue helmets with a peacekeeping duty in a warzone where there was no peace. The UN had to deploy green helmets instead, which were able to enforce peace. Secondly, the UN had to deter the belligerents. Thirdly, the UN should not have placed peacekeepers in a indefensible position as Srebrenica as it was impossible to defend in a ground battle. Only deterrence by NATO Air Force could prevent the fall of Srebrenica, and that is the reason why Srebrenica and Zepa had fallen and Gorazde did not.

Have these lessons been applied to subsequent UN peacekeeping missions (such as in Sierra Leone and South Sudan)? Until a certain extent, the mandates were more flexible and there were more and stronger military resources provided, so some lessons have been applied in subsequent missions. I cannot say whether all lessons of UNPROFOR and Srebrenica have been applied but the debacle definitely had its influences on UN peacekeeping missions.

Should the UN modify the working method for peacekeeping missions, if so what should be modified? There is always room to improve. Most of the peacekeeping missions did not provide sufficient military resources, although it is better than in Bosnia. Apart from that, the situations in the countries where peacekeeping missions are deployed in are in a much more tense, violent and complicated situation. Therefore, in those situations the UN needs to deploy more troops on the ground. There has to be stronger mandates, more manpower, military resources and, in particular, more air forces as it can be decisive in a battle on the ground (Voorhoeve, personal communication, 20 December 2016).