

# Why has the implementation of UNSCR 1325(2000) on taking a stand for Women, Peace, and Security by the Netherlands and Italy failed to provide the desired results?



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## Executive Summary

The purpose of this paper is to research why the implementation of UNSCR (2000) on taking a stand for Women, Peace, and Security by the Netherlands and Italy has failed to provide the desired results. In order to address this question, different research methods were chosen. The choice has been to only use qualitative data for this research: in particular, peer-reviewed works of scholars and an interview with Prof. Dr A.M. O'Malley. Additionally, all three national action plans (NAPs) of the Netherlands and Italy were researched using the theoretical framework that came out of the qualitative research on the shortcomings of the resolution and NAPs. In the discussion, there was a focus on the last NAPs of the two states. The research showed essential aspects that were often missing in NAPs. From the research, it has been concluded that many factors are needed to be well executed in the national action plan for it to have effective implementation. The research indicated that the most important factors are the following: having gender perspectives in national military organisations and meaningful objectives for both local women as women in peacekeeping missions; having an attitudinal and structural change in the culture of the state; using clear objectives, strong language, and monitoring mechanisms; creating financial commitments for every objective; and having clear consultation structures between various partners formed, including military organisations. For the Netherlands and Italy, it is recommended that special attention be focused on creating high-impact NAPs. These are NAPs that have meaningful participation of women in peace and security processes, in which women's contribution to peace and security is affirmed, and where women's human security is achieved. In addition, a closer look needs to be taken at national military organisations. In this context, attitudinal and structural change from within is essential. This change should be shown in the promotion of gender perspective, gender mainstreaming, and gender equality. To reach the desired results, these should not only include an increase in the number of women in the army but also education of genders on these topics to increase the success of peace-making missions and the position of women worldwide as the armies of Italy and the Netherlands spread these ideals to every state in which the local population needs help. This will result in maximised operational effectiveness and adequate support of the Women, Peace, and Security agendas in peacekeeping. In the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian response, and in post-conflict reconstruction, both genders should be present and treated equally to protect, prevent, relieve, and recover. All states working together with the same vision and motivation can greatly improve the state of the world.

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## 1. Introduction

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) formally acknowledged through the creation of resolution 1325 the changing nature of warfare, in which civilians are increasingly targeted and women continue to be excluded from participation in peace processes. In the resolution, special attention is paid to how women and girls are differentially impacted by conflict and war. The resolution recognises the critical role that women can and already do play in peacebuilding efforts. The United Nations affirms with this resolution that when wanting to achieve lasting peace and security, women should be treated as equal to a man in the prevention of conflict and relief and recovery efforts. The desired outcome of the resolution is universal gender equality. However, this resolution focusses on peace and security efforts. The picture on the coversheet of this dissertation was taken during an International Women's Day celebration at Kabul International Airport in 2013. Here, women from the Afghan Air Force and International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan are listening to presentations. The celebration highlighted the contributions Afghan women make towards building a better and stronger Afghan Air Force. This picture is relevant to the dissertation because it shows empowered women in the military. These women are taken seriously while doing their job, which is a great accomplishment (The United States Institute of Peace, n. d.; Perez, 2013).

UNSCR 1325 was adopted due to the hard work of both civil society and the member states of the United Nations. Promoting women's and girls' rights has been important for the UN and the member states before the adoption of 1325. The importance can be seen in 1975, when the UN organised world conferences to promote gender equality, or when in 1995 the conference on women was held in Beijing, and the declaration contained vital objectives to promote the role of women in peace-making. However, these were still not as effective as the United Nations had hoped they would be. Therefore, the Coalition on Women and International Peace and Security was formed in response and became the main lobbying force for the creation of UNSCR 1325. The efforts of the Coalition on Women and International Peace and Security eventually lead to the passage of the UNSCR 1325 (The United States Institute of Peace, n. d.).

Resolution 1325 addresses two major points: the inordinate impact of violent conflict and war on women and girls as well as the crucial role that women should and do already play in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peace-making, and peacebuilding. Each of its mandates falls into one of UNSCR 1325's four fundamental pillars: participation, protection, prevention, and relief and recovery. These four pillars will be further elaborated on in the paper (United Nations Security Council, 2000).

Since 2005, UN Member States have put the tenets of the resolution into action through the development of government-led national action plans (NAPs) or other national-level strategies. The NAPs are in relation to UNSCR 1325. These are a set of national objectives, strategies, and assessments developed by the UN Member States to implement the goals of UNSCR 1325; a 1325 NAP is an official government document. In this paper, the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy are researched. The Netherlands has launched three NAPs: the first in 2007, second in 2012 and third in 2016. Italy has also launched three NAPs: the first in 2010, the second in 2014 and the third in 2016 (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014; PeaceWomen, n. d.).

This dissertation focuses on the main criticisms of scholars of the resolution and the NAPs to implement 1325 and the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy during the last 20 years of the resolution. There will also be one interview conducted with Prof. O'Malley. Prof. O'Malley is a historian focusing on the United Nations, decolonisation, Congo, and the Cold War and is Chair of United Nations Studies in Peace and Justice, a newly created position at Leiden University's Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs. This dissertation will not focus on every article criticising the resolution and the NAPs. A few have been chosen as being the most significant to address the central question of the paper. It has been chosen to only research two states and their NAPs. This research will also not focus on how the objectives made by the Netherlands and Italy were implemented. The study focusses on improving the creation of the NAPs according to research on how to improve the implementation (A. O'Malley, personal communication, January 30, 2020).

Three key gender terms need some explanation before the reading of the dissertation because they are often used during the explanation of the criticisms of the resolution 1325 NAPs and are used in NAPs themselves. These are gender perspective, gender mainstreaming, and gender equality. Below are the terms as described by Sahana Dharmapuri (Dharmapuri, 2013). Firstly, gender perspective is defined by Dharmapuri as follows:

“A gender perspective is an analytical tool used to understand the power relationships between men/boys and women/girls, power relations among women/girls, and power relations among men/boys. A gender perspective sheds light on who has access to and control of resources, who participates fully in decision-making in a society, what the legal status of men and women is, and what the beliefs and expectations are of how men and women live their daily lives” (Dharmapuri, 2013, p. 22).

Secondly, gender mainstreaming is described as follows:

“The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as of men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic, and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality. Mainstreaming is not achieved by adding a “women/gender equality component” to an existing activity, or by simply increasing women’s participation. It means bringing the experience, knowledge and interests of women and men to bear on the development of an agenda or program” (Dharmapuri, 2013, p. 22–23).

Thirdly, gender equality is described as follows:

“refers to equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for women and men as well as according to equal consideration to the interests, needs, and priorities of women and men. Gender equality does not imply a goal of non-differentiation between the sexes but rather the elimination of adverse discrimination based on sex (e.g. lower remuneration for women doing the same work as men). Gender equality exists when both sexes are able to share equally in the distribution of power and influence; have equal opportunities for financial independence; enjoy equal access to education and the opportunity to develop personal ambitions, interest, and talents; share domestic responsibilities and are free from coercion, intimidation, and gender based violence at work and at home” (Dharmapuri, 2013, p. 22).

To conclude, these terms will often appear in the paper because they are very important to answer the research question.

This research would be beneficial for the creators of the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy as it will provide valuable insights into improving their latest NAP to encourage the desired implementation. The creators of the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy are government officials (e.g., ministers, members of parliament, security sector representatives, managers, technical or subject-matter experts, and provincial and local government officials), Civil society leaders (e.g., directors, managers, and technical or subject-matter experts) and the international community (e.g., directors, managers, and technical or subject-matter experts from the diplomatic community or multilateral organisations, such as the UN, African Union, OSCE, or NATO). This research could also be beneficial to future researchers of this topic since it will provide some information that might be needed in future research (Lippai & Young, 2017).

The central research question this paper sets out to address is why the implementation of UNSCR 1325(2000) on taking a stand for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) by the Netherlands and Italy has failed to provide the desired results. This question is essential to ask as gender equality is fundamental but by no means present everywhere in the world. With the NAPs, states aim to support the resolution, but this is a challenging process. By asking and researching this question, it is hoped to be able to find some answers to this question and thereby create a better world for girls and women in states where this is needed.

In order to adequately achieve this, this paper explains the resolution and the NAPs. This was started by researching what the resolution 1325 and the NAPs entail. After that, research on what the resolution and the NAPs aim to achieve is described. This is followed by different sources that explain the shortcomings of the resolution and the NAPs. For this, an interview was also conducted with Prof. Dr A.M. O'Malley.

Furthermore, the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy are examined, with special focus on the last two NAPs. Here, the theoretical framework from the literature review and findings is applied. With the combination of the shortcomings found from the research and the analysis done of the cases, the paper concludes by addressing the research question and looking for ways in which the Netherlands and Italy can improve in implementing UNSCR 1325(2000) on taking a stand for WPS. Some recommendations are made for future research and the creation of high-impact NAPs.




## 2. Literature Review

In this review, the most relevant and significant publications regarding resolution 1325 and the NAPs will be discussed. This will be done in order to provide a comprehensive look at what has been said on the topic and by whom. From the literature read on the resolution itself and the NAPs, the problems the authors were addressing are organised in seven themes:

- Monitoring and evaluation (ME);
- Clear objectives;
- Weak or strong language regarding soft versus hard law;
- Attitudinal and structural change;
- Financial commitments;
- Clear consultation structure between various partners.

### 2.1 Monitoring and evaluation

The first shortcoming that will be discussed in relation to resolution 1325 and the NAPs is the lack of ME. Zsuzsanna Lippai and Angelic Young created a guide for the creation of NAPs. It is a resource for “policymakers and civil society leaders as they seek to develop, implement, and track progress of national strategies aimed at advancing women’s inclusion” (Lippai & Young, 2017, p 7). In this guide, Lippai and Young discuss eight steps to a high-impact NAP. The steps are shown in the infographic below.



*Figure 1. Eight steps for a high-impact NAP. Adapted from Lippai and Young (2017, p. 7)*

Steps 5 to 8 are based on ME. Therefore, these scholars indicate that these steps are important to create a high-impact NAP. High-impact NAPs, according to Lippai and Young, are

- designed to fit the local context and priorities;
- created in partnership with civil society;
- well-organised with clearly identified roles, responsibilities, and timelines;
- and supported by an ME plan

(Lippai & Young, 2017, p. 4).

Monitoring and evaluation are vital tools to make UNSCR a reality. The NAPs should be supported by an ME plan. A plan and tools and systems should be “in place for collecting, analysing, and reporting on data; this information is used to improve results further and educate stakeholders about NAP progress and impact” (Lippai & Young, 2017, p. 8). The paper by Barbara Miller, Milad Pournik, and Aisling Swaine on “Women in Peace and Security through United Nations Security resolution 1325” shows that an important step indicated for the success of a NAP is having proper ME mechanisms. They mention that ME in NAPs should consist of three elements:

1. Whether a NAP has specific indicators on which evaluation can be based;
2. The existence or non-existence of a specific body to lead ME;
3. Information on the role of civil society in monitoring.

(Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014, p. 25–26).

The paper by Miller, Pournik, and Swaine also consists of a content analysis of NAPs and the implementation by many states around the world, for example the Netherlands. Here, there are specific factors that Miller, Pournik, and Swaine consider when analysing the NAPs. The subcategories are “drafting”, “implementation”, and “monitoring and evaluation”, which means that ME is indeed essential to consider. In this paper, ME is also divided into sub-subcategories. These are “indicators”, “reporting”, and “civil society monitoring”. When looking at the Dutch NAP of 2007, it is seen that the indicators and reporting were not specified in the paper. However, it mentions that “Dutch NGOs and women’s organisations will work together at the international level to establish monitoring systems which will keep track of progress on implementing 1325”. This is an excellent example of how to analyse NAPs (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014, p. 116–117).

Furthermore, according to Aisling Swaine in a piece about assessing the potential of NAPs to advance implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, the “effective implementation of any action plan depends on the integration of adequate monitoring, reporting and review mechanisms” (Swaine, 2010, p. 423). In this paper, Swaine mentions that it is widely

acknowledged that the weakness of the resolution itself is the lack of monitoring and reporting mechanisms. This could be the same for NAPs in which a lack of ME mechanisms results in states and the designated people, NGOs, government agencies, and other relevant actors, failing to take the resolution serious enough to execute their tasks well (Swaine, 2010).

To summarise the first shortcoming, to address the important question “why has the implementation of UNSCR 1325(2000) on taking a stand for WPS by the Netherlands and Italy failed to provide the desired results?”, it will be essential to look at whether ME mechanisms are in place in the NAPs to make the NAP more successful. If they are not in place, this could be a good recommendation for the next NAP.

## 2.2 Clear objectives

The second shortcoming of the resolution 1325 and NAPs is the lack of clear objectives. Objectives are the mileposts in the resolution and the NAPs that will guide the United Nations or the state to achieving their goal. Briefly, these are the following:

- Increased participation of women at all levels of decision-making;
- Protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence;
- Improving intervention strategies in the prevention of violence against women and the advancement of relief and recovery measures to address international crises through a gendered lens.

Some goals in the NAPs will be different, still these are the end goals of the resolution in summarised form (United States Institute of Peace, n. d.).

For this shortcoming, the paper of Lippai and Young will be discussed in relation to how to create successful NAPs. In this paper, Lippai and Young mention developing indicators that a NAP needs in order to measure progress towards the intended change. These indicators will reveal whether the implementation is going well or not. From the indicators, data will inform the decision-making progress and aid in evaluating the programme or project effectively. Creating these indicators can be very time-intensive; however, it will ensure that the NAP is more meaningful and relevant. This will also be important for the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy and could explain why they did not have the desired outcome. For the objectives, the authors mention that these should be well-organised, with clearly identified roles, responsibilities, and timelines. NAP frameworks should include indicators that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time bound. These indicators should also both be quantitative and qualitative, and the indicators should verify whether the intended change is being achieved. Figure 2 explains what kind of indicators quantitative and what kind of indicators are qualitative (Lippai & Young, 2017).

| QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS  | QUALITATIVE INDICATORS   |
|--|--|
| Measures of quantity<br>Number<br>Percentage<br>Ratio  | Perception<br>Opinion<br>Judgments about something   |
| EXAMPLES   |  |
| # of women in decision-making positions<br>Employment levels<br>Wage rates<br>Education levels<br>Literacy rates | Women's perception of empowerment<br>Satisfaction with employment or school<br>Quality of life<br>Degree of demonstrated self-confidence in basic literacy |
| SOURCES OF INFORMATION   |  |
| Formal surveys or questionnaires   | Public hearings, testimonials, focus groups, attitude surveys, and participant observation   |

Figure 2. Quantitative and Qualitative Indicators. Adapted from Lippai and Young (2017, p. 24)

Quantitative and qualitative indicators are an integral part of the article Lippai and Young wrote about how to create a so-called “high-impact” NAP. In the analysis of the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy, this would also be important to research. Indicators are also crucial for ME as for proper ME to happen, there need to be indicators that are clear and relatively easy to monitor. It is noted that this is easier with quantitative indicators than with qualitative ones (Lippai & Young, 2017).

To summarise the second shortcoming, to address the important question “why has the implementation of UNSCR 1325(2000) on taking a stand for WPS by the Netherlands and Italy failed to provide the desired results?”, it will be essential to look at whether the state itself has indicated clear objectives, which are very important for achieving the desired result.

### 2.3 Weak or strong language regarding soft versus hard law

The third shortcoming of resolution 1325 and the NAPs is that it is not clear if it is soft or hard law. Many scholars discuss the language to determine this. The language is arguably soft or hard, which also results in a dispute about whether the UN resolution is binding for the member states.

To make this determination, an interview was conducted with Prof. O'Malley. O'Malley is a historian focusing on the United Nations, decolonisation, Congo, and the Cold War. O'Malley is also the Chair of United Nations Studies in Peace and Justice, a newly created position at Leiden University's Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs. In the interview, Prof. O'Malley argues that the wording of 1325, much like the wording of all UN resolutions, is very open. It allows for excessive scope in terms of how the resolution could be implemented. That is not a problem just for 1325, however; O'Malley argues that it tends to be the case for most Security Council

resolutions, since in order to reach an agreement to get through the Security Council votes the resolution is formulated with clear diplomatic language that allows states some room to manoeuvre and implement them. Therefore, it is difficult for the United Nations to control the implementation of the member states. The UN does not have the authority to impose; all they can do is to urge states to comment on regulations. The problem seen with 1325 in particular is that only some member states implement a national implementation strategy; others have not even thought to pass such a strategy. The strategies have not been rolled out effectively or are quite limited in application. Alternatively, they do not receive the required funding and resources. Thus, O'Malley explains that this is really where the problem of 1325 lies. It is difficult for the United Nations to urge the states to implement the resolution since the member states have to implement the goals. This means that the resolution is a soft law (A. O'Malley, personal communication, January 30, 2020).

When researching this question further, an argument from Appiagyei-Atua, a legal scholar, was found. He considers UNSCR 1325 to be binding for several reasons, including its intent and grounding in the UN Charter, in several significant treaties, and in international law. According to Appiagyei-Atua, UNSCR 1325 uses a combination of weak and persuasive language: strong language includes "call upon" and "call on", while weak language includes "recommend". The mix of weak and strong language could be the reason why member states have not taken the resolution seriously enough to create comprehensive NAPs and should be further researched to determine why the resolution did not achieve the desired results (Appiagyei-Atua, 2011).

Boehme argues that the resolution is not binding. However, issue is not trivial: Boehme states that UNSCR 1325 is not binding as long as it is not covered by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Boehme notes that its implementation cannot be enforced, even though it is international law. This is in sharp contrast to what Appiagyei-Atua argued. This is an important topic and can be viewed from multiple sides and will therefore be difficult to find an answer to. Still, it's important to look into when examining the implementation of the resolution among member states (Boehme, 2011).

In addition, Swaine discusses this in her assessment of the potential of NAPs. According to Swaine "The resolution has been contrasted unfavourably to other Security Council resolutions" (Swaine, 2010, p. 410). This is as a result of it using weak language. Likewise, opposed to "hard" issues such as counterterrorism. According to Swaine, in topics such as counterterrorism strong language is used. This is discussed in other work by Swaine. This resolution uses terminology such as "decides", "directs", and "declares", while UNSCR 1325 uses terms such as "express", "emphasises", and

“request”. Therefore, it has been argued by scholars that as a result of the language appearing weak, it has not been taken seriously (Swaine, 2010).

Furthermore, Feminist scholar Dianne Otto also researched the topic of the resolution being a soft or hard law. In her study, she highlights that “because the resolution was not adopted under the Security Council’s Chapter VII mandate, it has been relegated to the realm of ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ law” (Otto, 2009, p. 11). As Otto suggests, the Security Council’s enforcement powers are therefore insulated from the (feminising) influence of resolution 1325. In addition, Fujio argues that the barrier of significant change comes from the text itself. Considering there is a lack of accountability mechanisms, monitoring measures, and disciplinary cautions, resolution 1325 is considered a “soft law” (Otto, 2009) (Fujio, 2008).

To conclude this topic, Donald Steinberg, the former Vice-President for Multilateral Affairs, has also expressed his opinion on this discussion. He mentions in his chapter of the book “Women and War: Power and Protection” that resolution 1325 was a product of its time. The Security Council in 2000 was clearly cautious in admitting that these issues constituted a threat to international peace and security. Therefore, the language is “weak” instead of a directive. Terms such as “urges,” “encourages,” “requests,” and “invites” were used rather than “demands” or “instructs” (Steinberg, 2010). In conclusion, many scholars argue that the text from resolution 1325 contains weak language or at least contains a combination of weak and strong language. In all cases, it could be a significant problem regarding the implementation of the objectives by the state into their own NAPs, even to the point that some states do not take the NAPs sufficiently seriously. Therefore, it would be informative to check the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy in relation to language that could potentially be the cause of an undesirable outcome.

#### 2.4 Attitudinal and structural change

The fourth shortcoming of resolution 1325 and NAPs is the need for attitudinal and structural change. It came to light from the research that there could also be an additional or structural roadblock in a way that could hinder the implementation of the WPS agenda in a state. This often matched how women are viewed as a part of the community and what role they are meant to play in a given society. This does not always align with the more “western” idea of women.

To explain this, it is crucial to start with getting women involved at all levels of decision-making where the change can happen despite the fact that, culturally, women would not be the first choice for these jobs. Firstly, Mertus agrees with this statement and therefore with the resolution. According to Mertus, the resolution mentions that there needs to be a change on “all levels of decision-making” (United Nations Security Council, 2000, p. 2). This was added to make it clear that

only increasing the numbers of women who participate without making sure that there are women involved at the top where decisions are made is insufficient to make the desired change. Accordingly, Renee Black mentions in her paper that most references to women still focus on women as victims rather than as positive agents of change after using a research monitor to analyse adoption pattern over 8 years (2000–2008) (Mertus, 2003) (Black, 2009).

In addition, because the field of NAPs is relatively new, and many states are having to experiment with their first plan, most plans will not be perfect in one try. According to Lippai and Young:

“as with any cross-sectoral, national public policy, there are challenges. Some plans are not properly resourced, lack political support, or emphasise priorities that are not customised to the local context. Others are great on paper but lack effective coordination or accountability mechanisms. Still, there is progress” (Lippai & Young, 2017, p. 4).

If the state aims to move from low- to high-impact NAPs, the NAP should be designed to fit the local context and priorities (Lippai & Young, 2017, p. 4). Furthermore, this is only a small part of the literature on states’ culture, and the difficulties in the culture of states to implement the WPS agenda, and, therefore, this will be further elaborated on in the findings. For the research question, the desired outcome could not be met as a result of the culture in the Netherlands or Italy. This must be researched by reading the NAPs and looking for signs that would implicate a difficult implementation due to the need for attitudinal and structural change. This could be as small as a NAP describing women as vulnerable and not equal to men (Lippai & Young, 2017).

## 2.5 Financial commitments

The fifth shortcoming of the resolution 1325 and NAPs is the lack of financial commitments. Financial commitments are essential in the process of implementing the objectives set out by the member states.

For this shortcoming, the OECD DAC has analysed different NAPs. From their research, the OECD DAC Network on Gender Equality argues:

“the adoption of national action plans has had a positive impact overall in mobilising resources in support of UNSCR 1325. However, while some action plans do contain vague commitments to increase financial and staff resources in support of the implementation of the WPS agenda, almost none commit to dedicated budget allocations” (OECD DAC Network on Gender Equality, 2015, p. 4).

On the 23rd of April 2019, UN Women, Germany and the United Kingdom co-hosted high-level WPS commitments pledging side event. Here 65 member states, regional organisation, UN entities, and

civil society organisation provided oral statements. They shared previously submitted written commitments to accelerate the WPS agenda. During this event, the financial commitments were also a significant part of the discussion. When something is a significant part of the discussion, it means that much there needs to be improved. Therefore, from this statement, it is evident that the member states have good intentions. However, there is a problem with allocating funds for this issue. This could have many different explanations that need to be further researched. For example, the member states do not take the resolution seriously, or there are simply no funds to spend on successfully implementing the NAPs (OECD DAC Network on Gender Equality, 2015).

Financial commitments, in both the paper from Lippai and Young and Miller, Pournik, and Swaine, are a vital part of creating impactful NAPs. Firstly, regarding the paper by Lippai and Young, in the foreword, the actions needed to address are mentioned. One of the obstacles that stands in the way of the resolution's full implementation, according to Lippai and Young, is "the shortage of financial support for national action plans" (Lippai & Young, 2017). This already shows that this is important for a NAP to have. Lippai and Young also claim that "The NAP ME plan will remain nothing but a piece of paper unless there are financial resources allocated and disbursed. Monitoring might not take place at all or will, at best, be opportunistic without any funds behind it" (Lippai & Young, 2017, p. 27). Later in the paper, Lippai and Young state that one of the six pillars for "high-impact" NAPs is that the NAP is accompanied by a budget addressing financial, human, and technical resources necessary to implement all activities outlined in the strategy (Lippai & Young, 2017).

When looking at the paper from Miller, Pournik, and Swaine, the need for efficient and transparent funds has again been made clear. First, it is mentioned in the text itself that both creating and implementing a 1325 NAP requires government financial commitment. It is also a part of their analysis of the NAPs. When looking through the different analyses of the different states, it can be seen that financial allocation is often not specified or else very minimal. When looking at Italy in 2010, the authors state that there is only a brief mentioning of funding of projects and programmes (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014, p. 110).

To conclude this shortcoming, financial commitments in NAPs is an issue that is already highly discussed. To address the research question, this could be one of the reasons for the Netherlands and Italy did not get the desired outcome. To determine this, it is essential to look at the financial commitments made in the NAPs.

## 2.6 No clear consultation structure between various partners formed

The sixth shortcoming of resolution 1325 and NAPs is that there is no clear consultation structure between various partners formed. These partners are the government, civil society, and the



international community. These are important to look for in the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy to see if a consultation structure is formed. For examples of these partners, the paper by Lippai and Young mentions the following:


- Government officials (e.g., ministers, members of parliament, security sector representatives, managers, technical or subject-matter experts, provincial and/or local government officials)
- Civil society leaders (e.g., directors, managers, technical or subject-matter experts)
- The international community (e.g., directors, managers, technical or subject-matter experts from the diplomatic community or multilateral organizations, such as the UN, African Union, OSCE, or NATO)

(Lippai & Young, 2017, p. 12).

In addition, according to the department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet of the office for women, this is important in the creation, implementation, and evaluation of a NAP. They have brought out a review of the NAPs on the WPS agenda. In this review, the global study made ten recommendations, of which one asks for all key actors to play a role. “Member states, regional organisations, media, civil society and youth must all do their part to promote and implement the Women, Peace, and Security agenda” (Coffey International Development, 2018, p. 84). In addition, according to the paper from Lippai and Young, this is a large part of the creation of a high-impact NAP. Therefore, Lippai and Young agree with this statement. They argue that NAPs should be created in partnership with civil society. Roles and responsibilities should be “clearly delegated within a NAP coordinating body; members of the body share a mission-driven commitment to long-term objectives, and the body includes a mechanism for holding implementers accountable” (Lippai & Young, 2017, p. 8). This is, for example, an oversight function. The figure below shows the essential phases of a result-based NAP design process. In the figure, Lippai and Young mention:

“The phases should build upon each other, repeating as necessary, reinforcing successful implementation. Each phase should be planned through broad consultation with partners and beneficiaries to ensure that monitoring the NAP results in the collection of meaningful and relevant information. Inclusive planning results in a stronger system and increases the transparency of the process” (Lippai & Young, 2017, p. 6).

This should be a part of the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy to create a high-impact NAP.



The essential phases of a results-based NAP design process are:

(a) design, (b) implementation, (c) monitoring, and (d) managing and using evaluation.

*Figure 3. The essential phases of a results-based NAP design process. Adapted from Lippai and Young (2017, p. 6)*

To conclude all the shortcomings, to address the research question, more research must be done on the six shortcomings mentioned in this literature review. These are ME, clear objectives, clear soft or hard law, attitudinal and structural change, financial commitments, and a lack of clear consultation structure between partners formed. Furthermore, the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy will be analysed to see if these shortcomings could be the reason for the undesirable outcome. Hence, this paper will further explore these shortcomings to understand how these shortcomings could have impacted the outcome of the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy.

### 3. Research Methods

In this paper, the NAP for the implementation of UNSCR 1325(2000) on taking a stand for WPS by the Netherlands and Italy have been researched, alongside the reason why these NAPs failed to provide the desired results and how the NAPs of both states can be improved for the next three years. The sub-questions that have been answered in this paper are what the resolution entails, and what it aims to achieve. From the research, it was concluded that there are seven main themes

of shortcomings. The NAPs of Italy and the Netherlands were tested on these shortcomings to analyse what targets made in the NAPs were not satisfactorily implemented and where these states could improve in the making of their NAPs.

It was chosen to address the question with this method since there was much criticism of the resolution and the NAPs. However, there was not much criticism in particular of the NAPs of Italy and the Netherlands. These NAPs were interesting to research to find out why they are claimed to be unsuccessful. From the analysis, it can be concluded what the strengths and weaknesses of the NAPs are and in what ways these states can improve. A NAP that has not been correctly written can be challenging to implement, and, therefore, the expected outcome may not be achieved. Italy and the Netherlands have been chosen as these are two influential states in the European Union. When these two states establish an effective NAP, this can be an example for the rest of the European Union or even the entirety of UN Member States. More states would have been chosen with more time; however, this was unrealistic given the duration of the research.

It was not easy to find excellent sources. This year marks the 20th anniversary of the resolution. It would have been great for the research to use significant resources examining the implementation for the years between 2010 and 2020, though they may have already been written and will be released this year or next year. Unfortunately, these types of sources were not found. Therefore, such resources would be informative for a future study on this topic. Although the sources are often from a decade ago, this does not mean that the NAPs have taken all the criticisms into account. There are certainly still some points for attention.

The choice has been to only use qualitative data for this research. This has been in reference to the existing research of the NAPs by Miller, Pournik, and Swaine. This report has been the example of the theoretical framework for the examination of the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy. Furthermore, the report of Lippai and Young has been an example for writing this paper (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014; Lippai & Young, 2017; Kumar, 2014).

Quantitative research has not been chosen since, for example, surveys would only have been done with scholars, politicians, or other people who have an excellent understanding of the subject. This is not realistic considering the short time in which this paper was written. An interview with one person who has an excellent understanding of the subject was more realistic. Furthermore, the paper consists of many reviews of literature. This was the most helpful way to conclude how NAPs could be improved. Many scholars have been studying this subject thoroughly. These reports have been informative and great for answering the research question and have been done by some noteworthy scholars as can be seen in this paper.

The last part of collecting data for this paper was to do an in-depth study of all three NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy using the theoretical framework that emerged from the research done by the scholars. The Netherlands and Italy were chosen since both states already created three NAP revisions. Every plan shows what they have learned from previous revisions, so these plans would give insight into what the other EU members can improve in their NAPs. Both Italy and the Netherlands are influential states in the European Union and therefore influence other NAPs. They both have a problem with having no specific references to how the NAPs will be funded. They are both internally and externally oriented, and they include several stakeholders, including civil society. Their plans could be more realistic to recreate for the other EU member states compared to France and Germany, who have more funds. From the research of all six NAPs, it was concluded where the improvements are and where the NAPs were not created in a way that would provide the desired result. This desired result is ultimately gender equality (Kumar, 2014).

In order to gain a better insight into the accuracy of the research outcomes and get new insights into the subject, an interview was conducted with Prof. Dr A.M. O'Malley. O'Malley had been selected because she is the Chair of United Nations Studies in Peace and Justice, a newly created position at Leiden University's Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs. This Chair, in honour of the former Dutch Foreign Minister and Mayor of The Hague Jozias Van Aartsen, is shared with The Hague University of Applied Sciences. The focus of the Chair will be to create a new interdisciplinary research group on United Nations Studies and to organise a series of academic and public events to mark the 75th anniversary of the UN in 2020. Furthermore, O'Malley is a historian focusing on the United Nations and has (co) written books on the United Nations. The interview was structured. However, there was room for additional questions. The interview consisted of four broad, open questions and was recorded by mobile phone in Leiden University, where Prof. Dr A.M. O'Malley works part-time. O'Malley has been given information about how her data will be used. She also signed an informed consent form accordingly to the guidelines of the five principles for research ethics. She was voluntarily participating in the research with full knowledge of the risks and benefits (A. O'Malley, personal communication, January 30, 2020; Smith, 2003; Kumar, 2014).

The papers of the scholars were chosen since they provide an examination of resolution 1325 or an examination of the NAPs. All the papers of the scholars were peer-reviewed. This was a complicated process because there is room for improvement regarding literature considering UNSCR 1325 or the NAPs. It was challenging to find high quality literature, and only a few scholars have been examining this subject. This paper does not consist of much literature. However, the literature that has been used is of very noteworthy scholars and is of high quality. For the case study, all three NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy were examined. All three NAPs have been chosen

since it also shows improvement or deterioration of the NAPs over time. When implementing the theoretical framework and looking at what scholars have argued needs to be in a NAP for the NAP to be successfully implemented, it was understood how the Netherlands and Italy did not get their desired result (Kumar, 2014).

This research reflects honesty in reporting data, results, methods, and procedures. Attempts were made to avoid bias in data analysis and data interpretation. The manuscript has been written with respect and only to educate decision-making on the creating of NAPs (Smith, 2003; Kumar, 2014).

## 4. Findings

The findings section will be split into four chapters. First, the paper will look at what scholars find to be the most prominent issues with the implementation of Resolution UNSCR 1325 itself. The second part will be the criticisms of the implementation of the NAPs by the member states. This will be followed by an examination of the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy as case studies on these issues.

### 4.1 Main arguments regarding the shortcomings of the resolution

The findings section will start by looking at the main arguments regarding the shortcomings of the resolution. The resolution is about identifying and enhancing the role of women in pre-conflict scenarios. It is essential to research what the role of women is during pre, intra, and post conflict scenarios. Here, it is asked whether the women were active in maintaining the family units, in protecting the civilians and their family, in the creation of intelligence gatherers and centres for community building while the men were engaged in fighting (A. O'Malley, personal communication, January 30, 2020).

Firstly, peace processes tend to be more successful when women are involved. A study investigating 82 peace agreements in 42 armed conflicts between 1989 and 2011 found that peace agreements with women signatories are associated with durable peace. The same study also found that peace agreements signed by women show a higher number of agreement provisions aimed at political reform and a higher implementation rate of these provisions (A. O'Malley, personal communication, January 30, 2020; Krause, Krause, & Piia, 2018).

Secondly, the resolution urges all the members of the United Nations to do everything possible to enhance the role of women. That applies to all the member states and not only those where there is violent conflict, according to O'Malley (United Nations Security Council, 2000; A. O'Malley, personal communication, January 30, 2020).

Although the resolution is revolutionary in its time, implementing the objectives has been difficult. According to Pratt and Richter-Devroe, since its passing in 2000, the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) Working Group on WPS and international, governmental, and local organisations has attempted to develop successful strategies to implement 1325. The NGO Working Group on WPS is a "consensus-based coalition of 19 international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working to advance the Women, Peace, and Security agenda at the United Nations and around the world" (NGO Working Group on WPS, n. d., para. 1). The working group

serves as a bridge between women's human rights defenders and peacebuilders working in conflict-affected situations and senior policymakers at UN headquarters (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011; NGO Working Group on WPS, n. d.).

Furthermore, Pratt and Richter-Devroe state that for several empirical studies were prepared by independent experts and the United Nations. In 2008, the UN drafted a systemwide action plan (UNSG 2008), and a Peace Commission was established in 2005, raising hope it could support 1325. In the year's subsequent resolutions, dealing with gender and conflict were drafted (UNSCR 1820 [2008], 1888 [2009], 1889 [2009]) (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011).

Nevertheless, evaluations have widely criticised slow advances in the implementation of 1325 at the member states and UN levels. For such critical evaluations, see, for example, the global civil society survey undertaken as a contribution to the global study on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 by UN women. Half of the respondents indicated that the UN works excessively with larger organisations and insufficiently with grassroots organisations and that processes are overly slow and bureaucratic. 1325 makes a promise to change women's lives in many ways. Therefore, this paper will consider grassroots to non-governmental, governmental, and supra-national actors, as well as different geographical areas (UN Women, 2015).

In the next section, an explanation will be given of the criticisms chosen as the theoretical framework to research the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy with research that support these claims, followed by a more in-depth look into the creation of the NAPs by the Netherlands and Italy as comparative cases. It is vital to first research the resolution to understand how the resolution did not provide the right starting point for the Netherlands and Italy to create NAPs that provide the desired results (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011).

#### 4.1.1 Criticism 1 of resolution 1325: lack of clear monitoring and evaluation or benchmarks

The first criticism of the resolution is that it is not clear how the objectives set out by the member states will be monitored or how an evaluation process will take place, according to Swaine (Swaine, 2010). Monitoring and evaluation is used to assess the performance of projects, institutions, and programmes set up by governments, international organisations, and NGOs. Its goal is to improve current and future management of outputs, outcomes, and impact. Swaine states that the lack of monitoring and reporting mechanisms and the absence of clearly identified targets that would need to be attained within pre-determined time frames is problematic. The resolution has been contrasted unfavourably to other Security Council resolutions such as SCR 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict which established Security Council Working Group, monitoring and reporting mechanisms, and the post of a special representative. It has been contrasted unfavourably by the

reason that there are no components that compel states to act, such as monitoring and reporting mechanisms that other Security Council resolutions have (Swaine, 2010).

According to Appiagyei-Atua, resolution 1325 is binding since “it authorizes acts that are intra vires the UN Charter and other international laws” (Appiagyei-Atua, 2011, p. 6). Appiagyei-Atua argues that this is because:

“It is possible to infer the intent of the Security Council by relying on the language used, the discussions informing the formulation of a resolution, reference to Charter provisions, and international laws invoked and relied upon. resolution 1325 contains strong language in many of its provisions. The resolution seeks to support women’s roles in promoting peace and security, objectives shared by the UN Charter. Additionally, resolution 1325 is firmly grounded in, and reflects, several major treaties, customary law and jus cogens norms that regulate peace, security, the conduct of the war, and women and children’s rights” (Appiagyei Atua, 2011, p. 6).

This is important to acknowledge because the resolution not being binding could be a part of the answer to the research question.

O’Malley states that this is the critical difference between the Security Council and the General Assembly. Binding resolutions mean that members of the Security Council and all members of the UN are bound to abide by the terms of the resolution. In the interview, O’Malley argues that 1325 can be implemented in all cases, even in states that are not at war. In order to reach an agreement to pass Security Council votes, the resolution is formulated with clear diplomatic language to allow states some room to manoeuvre in implementing them. This is constructive ambiguity, which means the deliberate use of ambiguous language in negotiations in order to avoid disagreement or deadlock (A. O’Malley, personal communication, January 30, 2020; *Constructive Ambiguity*, n. d.).

According to O’Malley, the problem is that regarding implementation, it is difficult for the United Nations to make the member states implement the objectives. The UN can request and urge states to commend regulation, but the responsibility is lies with the member states. This can be seen in the examples where some member states have implemented a national implementation strategy; others may have not even thought to pass such a strategy, or efforts have been rolled out ineffectively or not extensively enough. It does not receive the funding or resources that it deserves. This can be seen in the analysis of the implementation of the NAPs by Miller, Pournik, and Swaine (A. O’Malley, personal communication, January 30, 2020) (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014).



Fujio argues that the barrier of significant change comes from the text itself. As there is a lack of accountability mechanisms, monitoring measures, and disciplinary cautions, resolution 1325 is considered a “soft law”. However, the resolution should be binding from the Security Council. Without any punishments, evaluation of progress, or even a call for these to be created, it acts as little more than a strong message for governments to include a gender perspective in peacebuilding. In the article, Fujio argues that moving resolution 1325 in the direction of becoming a hard law will improve the implementation by the member states, but she also mentions that this is not easy. Many NGOs and activists have been very influential in making this happen, and there needs to be more awareness and consensus of 1325 to make a change (Fujio, 2008).

Overall, Barrow states that given that the plans were designed to better coordinate national-level responses to the implementation of SCR 1325, a lack of benchmarks echoes the lack of ME processes within the resolution itself. Although designed as ‘living ‘instruments, without any timeline and indication of an endpoint, it is challenging for civil society organisations to monitor the objectives made in the resolution, measure the success of activities, or hold governments to account. The development of subsequent, second-generation NAPs by European states gives some indication of the shortfalls of first-generation NAPs (Barrow, 2016).

To conclude, the lack of transparent ME or benchmarks makes resolution 1325 a soft law. Firstly, O’Malley argues that for the implementation of resolution 1325, it is difficult for the United Nations to make the member states implement the objectives. The UN can only request and urge states to commend regulation. However, the rest of the ME is the responsibility of the Member States. Secondly, Fujio argues that there is a lack of accountability mechanisms, monitoring measures, and disciplinary cautions. Barrow agrees with this statement and supports it with mentioning that it is tough for civil society organisations to monitor the objectives made in the resolution, measure the success of activities, or hold governments to account because there are no monitoring or evaluation tools in place and no benchmarks made. The next part will further discuss the resolution, and why it can be challenging to implement as the objectives are not clear enough (A. O’Malley, personal communication, January 30, 2020; Fujio, 2008; Barrow, 2016).

#### 4.1.2 Criticism 2 of resolution 1325: lack of clearly defined objectives

The second criticism of resolution 1325 is the lack of clearly defined objectives. When the objectives of a resolution are not clearly defined, this can cause the member states and the UN itself to not effectively implement the resolution into their NAPs and objectives. As Sahana Dharmapuri argues, one problem with the resolution is the lack of understanding about the resolution by its member states. She argues that the UN is “unlikely to reach its goals for gender equality in peacekeeping

missions because it is not fully implementing its own two-pronged approach: increase the number of women in peacekeeping operations and integrate a gender perspective within these missions” (Dharmapuri, 2013, p. 1). The goals have gone unmet due to three core issues, argues Dharmapuri. These are, first, “the lack of understanding among the member states about resolution 1325 and the UN policy on gender equality in peace operations”; second, a “gap in data and analysis about women’s participation in national security institutions globally and in UN peacekeeping in particular”; and last, “the prevalence of social norms and biases that perpetuate gender inequality within the security sector”. She argues that the UN and the Member States focus on increasing the numbers of female uniformed personnel who have obscured the equally important goal of integrating a gender perspective into the work of peace operations. Dharmapuri ends with stating:

“the likelihood of achieving the UN’s goals for gender equality in the composition of peacekeeping operations would significantly improve if there were a clear strategy to effectively operationalize the UN’s existing policy and generate greater political support for it among governments of key member states” (Dharmapuri, 2013).

In Fujio’s paper, she provides the reader with an example of when the objectives are not clear: when the resolution strongly focusses on the increase in representation of women at all levels of decision-making and requests the member states to provide lists of female candidates to the secretary-general for inclusion in a centralised roster and requests the secretary-general to appoint more women as special envoys and representatives. According to Fujio:

“the call for more women in UN operations and local conflict management and peace processes provides opportunities for women and places a certain degree of pressure on the UN and the Member States to proactively bring them into the fold. However, the absence of benchmarks, quotas, timelines, and monitoring mechanisms in resolution 1325 is problematic” (Fujio, 2008, pp. 221–222).

Amy Barrow agrees with this statement. In the journal article, she mentions that the resolution is designed as a “living” instrument. However, without “any timeline and an indication of an endpoint, it is very difficult for civil society organizations to monitor the resolution, measure the success of activities or hold governments to account” (Barrow, 2016, p. 261).

In addition, Mertus provides an example of when the objectives are well-meant. However, when they are not clear, they are easily not being implemented by some of the member states. In her paper, she mentions the Kosovo Women’s Network to the UN Security Council Delegation in

Kosovo. This was one year after the implementation of resolution 1325. With keeping this case in mind, she argues that

“while some organizations have examined their own management practices, most of the changes have been focused on overseas activities. And despite well-honed gender policy statements at headquarters and the pronounced desire for programmatic changes, overseas activities continue to approach gender unevenly and largely without the valuing of local expertise” (Mertus, 2003, p. 552).

She mentions that some of the reasons for this failure are “gender-related and others are endemic to the humanitarian field: (1) lack of agency coordination; (2) a paucity of information in relevant languages; and (3) a lack of transparency in funding” (Mertus, 2003, p. 552).

Moreover, an opinion piece from the NATO review written by Lieutenant Colonel Rachel Grimes, who is an advisory board member of the Centre for Women, Peace, and Security, also expresses why she thinks member states fail to implement resolution 1325 in an interview with the resolution. These reasons accompany the statement that the resolution is not as understandable for some or not specific enough. In this interview, Grimes argues that some are not aware of what 1325 is trying to achieve, some may not completely understand what 1325 does, and some may already think that 1325 is implemented but do not see the aims and objectives in connection to their approach to security dilemmas (Grimes, 2019).

As a result, this could be one of the reasons the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy did not have the desired outcome. These shortcomings are focused on the resolution itself. However, NAPs, as has been discussed before, are based on the objectives set out by the resolution. This means that when the resolution is not clear, it will become more difficult for the member states to set out objectives that meet the expectations. The next part will discuss another shortcoming of the resolution that came out from the literature review.

#### 4.1.3 Criticism 3 of resolution 1325: insufficient resources

From the paper of Fisher, Harland, Ilich, and McGown, insufficient resources also came to attention. This had also been a part of what was found by the research for the literature review. The literature review mentions in particular the lack of funding in the NAPs. However, this report focusses on the lack of funding from the United Nations for gender mainstreaming (Fisher, Harland, & Illich, 2016).

According to Fisher, Harland, Ilich, and McGown the “key challenge to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is resourcing” (Fisher, Harland, & Illich, 2016, p. 14). They argue that this is as a result of “the general misunderstanding related to gender, programming and policies intended to

promote gender mainstreaming do not receive adequate funding” (Fisher, Harland, & Illich, 2016, p. 14). Fisher, Harland, Illich, and McGown continue by explaining that adequate funding for gender work was made in numerous articles and UN documents, as will also be made clear in this paper (Fisher, Harland, & Illich, 2016).

Funding is important regarding gender mainstreaming in military organisations. To ensure that there is funding for gender mainstreaming, the Secretary-General on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding created a report in 2010 that asks for each UN entity to ensure that 15% of peacebuilding funds are dedicated to projects whose aim is to address women’s needs or advancing gender equality (The Secretary-General on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding, 2010, p. 1). However, even though this seems clear, a UN Women respondent explains that “DPKO field operations opted out of the 15% rule on the basis that its funds cannot be considered programming funds” (Fisher, Harland, & Illich, 2016, p. 15). Most funds for peacekeeping operations are spent on military, police, and civilian staff; the remainder is spent on a range of services and operational requirements, such as food, equipment, and utilities. The 15% would be more beneficial in investing in gender equality. Funds could be spent on “better family or leave arrangements, gender mindful uniforms, or programs designed to help protect and empower local women” (Fisher, Harland, & Illich, 2016, p. 15).

The report suggests that the DPKO field mission should apply the 15% rule. This could also be something to keep in mind for the field mission by the Netherlands and Italy. Another option is to offer a higher reimbursement rate to UN troop-contributing states for female troops, police, and military advisers, preferably highly educated to encourage a gender balance. “Other criteria for premiums could also be included, for example, if the contingent has more high-ranking female officers, or has undergone specialized training on gender issues” (Fisher, Harland, & Illich, 2016, p. 16).

Hence, funding should be assigned for gender mainstreaming for military organisations in the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy. Both states are troop-contributing. This makes it important to hire women for female troops, police, and military advisers that will serve in the United Nations peacekeeping operations. It is also important to stress the importance of educating both genders in gender mainstreaming. This should be a part of the resolution and any NAP. The next part will examine the shortcomings of the NAPs that came from the research for the literature review.

#### 4.2 Main arguments regarding the shortcomings of the national action plans

The criticisms of the resolution will be followed by the criticisms of the NAPs. For the NAPs, there are many arguments. These arguments will be discussed under different themes that came from

the literature review to make it more transparent. However, there are some extra interesting arguments that do not fit into these themes. These are mentioned below.

Firstly, according to Swaine, the segregation of women's issues from mainstream security issues with the creation of NAPs could hinder the achievement of UNSCR 1325 goals. This is due to the fact that the creation of a 1325 NAP risks placing women's issues into the security arena rather than mainstreaming them. This point is consistent with the mainstreaming argument advanced by states such as Germany, which chose not to develop a 1325 NAP when other West European states were doing so. In response to the criticism directed at Germany for not adopting a UNSCR 1325 NAP, Chancellor Angela Merkel stated in 2006:

“many of the concerns of SCR 1325 have already been integrated into various federal government action plans. The new federal government has expressed its will to continue to implement the principle of gender mainstreaming in all government activities. In my opinion, this provides better chances of reaching these objectives than a further separate action plan, as a mainstreaming approach in all relevant policy areas allows us to react much more flexibly to current problems in crisis-ridden regions” (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014, p. 16).

Nonetheless, Germany changed its position on this issue and adopted a 1325 NAP in 2012 (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014).

A 1325 NAP is not an end in itself; states may see the production and launch of a NAP as an end in itself. While these concerns are merited, the reporting 17 mechanisms included in a NAP should help to hold governments accountable to their commitments made in the NAP. Relatedly, the national nature of 1325 NAPs may limit the decentralisation of objectives within a state. There is also a small part of the report of Fisher, Harland, Ilich, and McGown in which the authors mention that NAPs have been created by 60 out of 193 UN Member States as a way to fulfil their obligation to implement UNSCR 1325 into national legal frameworks and policies. However,

“NAPs do not exist for many of the major UN troop-contributing countries, including those states that are major contributors to our case study missions. Where NAPs do exist, they are poorly implemented, monitored, and funded. This led us to conclude that any influence the NAPs currently have on peacekeeping missions is tangential at best” (Fisher, Harland, & Illich, 2016, p. 5).

#### 4.2.1 Criticism 1 of national action plans: objectives should be meaningful for local women and women on the ground

From the criticisms of the Resolution itself, it was found that there is a lack of accountability mechanisms and a lack of ability to translate into meaningful changes for women on the ground. This should be done by providing clear targets and benchmarks that make the states implement the WPS agenda. The analysis of the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy will look at whether NAPs do compensate for this lack. Starting with the objectives in the NAPs. As mentioned before, many people have criticised the NAPs to be “tangential at best” (Fisher, Harland, & Illich, 2016, p. 5). These paragraphs will look at cases in which NAPs could provide clear and meaningful changes for women on the ground and local women. Firstly, the case of the Italian provincial reconstruction team(PRT) in Herat. The training for the PRT before the mission did not contain models on resolution 1325. However, the interviewed PRT personnel “were positive to the idea of introducing it” (Olsson & Valenius, 2009b, p. 65). This could be an essential part of a NAP to ensure that military personnel receive the right training, and something every state could easily implement into their NAP. Ollson and Valenius also mentioned some other suggestions to increase operational effectiveness. These are the following:

1. Create guidelines to implement resolution 1325, especially in the CIMIC unit. There already exists a willingness to adopt a gender perspective. This should be supported by official documents and guidelines.
2. Consider the need for a gender adviser who could help in the implementation of resolution 1325.
3. Create modules for resolution 1325 in regular training and for mission-specific
4. Pre-deployment training.
5. Install manning and personal policies to have and retain more women in the Italian Armed Forces, for instance, a campaign directed to women and family policies for maternity and paternity leaves.
6. When recruiting female soldiers prioritise CIMIC, which is in urgent need to have female personnel

(Olsson & Valenius, 2009).

The analysis of the case of the Dutch PRT in Tarin Kowt also resulted in many suggestions. Some are in line with the suggestions from the Italian case. This should also be included in the NAPs for their cooperation with the national military organisation. These are the following:

1. The responsibility to implementing resolution 1325 should be specified in the instructions for operational PRT commanders (military and civilian), ensuring the continuator of efforts and a resolution 1325 reporting mechanism.
2. Checklists need to be developed for the PRT's civilian component.
3. The deployment of at least one woman in every mission team, preferably in leadership positions, besides deploying female staff in PRT management functions (military and civilian), is needed.
4. The deployment of female interpreters for both military and civilian PRT staff is needed. Making sure required separated accommodation and sanitary facilities are available at the camp is preferable.
5. The deployment of women in support units, such as the Battlegroup, and the personal protection service for civilian personnel is needed.
6. Deploy female trainers in police mentoring team to train and mentor local female recruits
7. Gender expertise should be available before and during the mission (at the ISA HQ, Task Force Uruzgan, and embassy levels), and these should be fulltime jobs.
8. Both military and civilian PRT staff should be provided with training on resolution 1325 matters prior to the mission. The training should foster gender awareness, involve role-play scenarios with context-specific true-to-life situations and provide useful tips and instructions (ideally, through briefings by colleagues with experience from the mission area)
9. The PRT leadership should make sure that civilian members of the PRT participate actively in preparations for the mission and, once the mission begins, ensure smooth coordination of resolution 1325-related tasks carried out by military and civilian staff.
10. The setting up of a special PRT fund to finance, e.g. ad hoc resolution 1325-related projects/activities is preferable.
11. The PRT should support and focus more on women as public actors rather than view them as housebound individuals.
12. The focus should not be exclusively on women as a target group for implementing resolution 1325: efforts through men have an emancipatory effect

(Kesselaar & Hoenen, 2009, p. 55–56).

Thus, to achieve the desired outcome of gender equality for all, the WPS agenda should be supported adequately during peacekeeping missions. In this paragraph, the suggestions from the report are mentioned. The government, civil society organisations, and other relevant signatories of the NAPs could help the PRT to achieve these goals, not only with funds but also by sharing

knowledge, the promotion of women in the army, helping to create guidelines, and through other ways to achieve these goals (Kesselaar & Hoenen, 2009).

#### 4.2.2 Criticism 2 of national action plans: need for attitudinal and structural change

The second criticism of the NAPs is that there is a need for long-term attitudinal and structural change. The UN and the numerous member states progressively perceive that peace and stability rely upon inclusivity and gender equality. The NAPs need to acknowledge and realise this with gender mainstreaming at all levels. However, for many cultures, this would mean long-term attitudinal and structural change. This is important to realise, as not realising the desired outcome within the first 20 years of the resolution, and fewer years of having made NAPs, could very well be a result of the need for attitudinal and structural change in the state for these “more western” ideas of women being fully equal to man. It is not fair to treat every case in the same manner. These paragraphs will show some examples of institutions, people, and states that need structural and attitudinal change. Eventually, the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy will be tested according to their willingness to gender mainstream in the state.

This analysis will start by looking at military organisations and the ways in which they can create worldwide gender equality. Military organisations have a reputation of being very conservative. In many NAPs, the idea of integrating women and gender perspectives in military organisations is one of the main objectives, according to Robert Egnell, who wrote an article about implementing UNSCR 1325 and the NAP on WPS. However, although it seems to be “the rights thing to do”, the idea of increased women’s participation and empowerment is often ignored within military organisations. Egnell argues:

“the functional imperative of fighting and winning wars in defence of the nation remains too strong, and while military leaders might very well support the general notion of increasing gender equality in their society, the subject is simply not perceived as having anything to do with military operations.” (Egnell, 2016, p. 82)

However, military organisations are protectors of women and civilians but also described as “the problem”. Not only are military organisations “often the perpetrators of some of the worst atrocities conducted in the midst of conflict” (Egnell, 2016, p. 83). This can also be read in “Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War?”, a book by Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern about how in conflict situations rape is referred to as a “weapon of war”. This is one of the objectives resolution 1325 aims to prevent. Therefore, this could not be a part of strategies from military organisations. Also, military organisations have more gender problems highlighted by the high occurrence of sexual harassment and assault within and around military garrisons in peacetime. This is highlighted



in the work of David S. Cloud in “Military is on the spot over sexual assaults”, written for the Long Angeles Times (Cloud, 2013). To solve this problem, Egnell promotes the inside strategy, which means working together with the organisation and its leaders to create change from within (Egnell, 2016; Eriksson & Stern, 2013).

Change from within the military organisations is essential. Therefore, Egnell also provides the reader with some recommendations. He believes that NAPs should not only be created for the promotion of women’s rights and gender equality but for the military organisations to “maximise their operational effectiveness in a strategic context that demands local cultural understanding and great organisational diversity to tackle the often-complex tasks involved in stabilisation” (Egnell, 2016, p. 87). Therefore, “the implementation process should be on the organisation’s core task—fighting—rather than on human resources issues of recruitment, career paths, and women’s rights” (Egnell, 2016, p. 87). National action plans are often focused on increasing the number of women in the army, as seen in this paper. However, according to Egnell, this is not the most efficient way to achieve gender mainstreaming. The NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy should be researched on this issue, the way these two states intend to realise gender mainstreaming in a conservative organisation, such as the military, could show how they did not achieve the desired outcome (Egnell, 2016).

Gender mainstreaming is challenging but can be achieved with the right mindset. This is not easy, but with the right training and belief in the WPS agenda it can be achieved, as seen in an example of what happened on the Dutch PRT in Tarin Kowt. Here, female soldiers tried through “internal discussions to change the mindset of some not yet convinced male soldiers in terms of gender-awareness” (Kesselaar & Hoenen, 2009, p. 54). In an interview with a member of CIMIC Support Element/Gender Focal Point, it came to light that in the beginning, especially, the military engineers were considered to have been sceptical about women’s issues as a tool for enhanced effectiveness of the mission. Nevertheless, the female soldiers tried to convey their perspective by entering discussions. It was not easy, however, “the military Gender Focal Point believed that as a result of these discussions, everybody in the PRT realised that gender-issues must not be overlooked” (Kesselaar & Hoenen, 2009, p. 54).

In addition, structural and attitudinal change is also important in the cultures of states. This topic will be further discussed by looking at some cases that explain the difficulty of gender mainstreaming. Giannini, Lima, and Pereira discuss this topic in their journal article on the “progress and challenges of the implementation process” (Giannini, Lima, & Pereira, 2016). Until now, there have been three editions of the Brazilian NAP “Policies for Women”. However, they all do not have

significant measures in the field of peace and security or women in peacekeeping. They argue that “a primary challenge to implementing UNSCR 1325 is the construction of masculinity itself within Brazilian society” (Giannini, Lima, & Pereira, 2016, p. 194). In fact, women’s image is commonly associated with vulnerability and thus the need for protection. “Having women in combatant positions is an inversion of this logic and entails certain challenges for its overall acceptance.” (Giannini, Lima, & Pereira, 2016, p. 194). Addressing the issue that the NAP is to create gender equality requires a long-term process of cultural change (Giannini, Lima, & Pereira, 2016).

There is a requirement for a general reconstruction of the job that women can play socially so that, from one perspective, more women view themselves as a completely crucial piece of the peace and security forms and the defence sector, and, then again, more men perceive the significance of women’s association with accomplishing enduring peace and representative defence policy. Notwithstanding which specific procedures are received, it is foremost that the development of this plan and its strategies become dynamically autonomous of specific decision-makers and be fortified as a remote and barrier strategy need for maintainable universal peace (Giannini, Lima, & Pereira, 2016).

Additionally, in Japan, there is a difficulty with implementing the resolution through NAPs since it is not in alignment with Japanese culture and history. Hisako Motoyama criticises the limited framework of the WPS agenda due to the fact that it:

“does not challenge militarism and assigns developed states ‘not in conflict’ a role in supporting women in conflict zones, without holding them accountable within their own borders, makes it something that the Japanese state could safely use as a measure of its ‘pro-women’ diplomacy, imagining itself as an innocent supporter of women around the world.” (Motoyama, 2018, p. 49)

In addition, Motoyama argues that celebratory talk about dynamic universal gender balance standards and their dispersion will, in general, disregard the worldwide force relations that make and standardise these standards. As she has contended, the system of the WPS plan itself reflects inconsistent force relations inside the current universal security request, in which the powerful liberal popular governments that are invulnerable from historical colonial responsibilities practice force and competent authority over the rest. Without addressing whether these liberal thoughts are in agreement with the culture of the member states and what approach to make gender equality is ideal for executing the WPS agenda (Motoyama, 2018).

In passing the resolution 1325 on WPS, it was stressed that there is a need to integrate a gender perspective into “the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, including through peacekeeping operations” according to Sahana Dharmapuri, who wrote a report on the need for the increase of women’s participation in UN peacekeeping (Dharmapuri, 2013, p. 1). Attention in the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy on the participation of women in peacekeeping missions is essential since it is one of the most important ways to implement the WPS agenda according to Dharmapuri (Dharmapuri, 2013).

#### 4.2.3 Criticism 3 of national action plans: need for financial commitments

The third criticism of 1325 is the lack of financial commitments. A financial commitment is a commitment to an expense at a future date. Several studies have shown that one factor that prompts the development and adoption of a 1325 NAP is the harnessing of resources. This means that for both creating and implementing 1325 NAP financial commitments are required. Although this is clear, financial allocations are rarely specified, as can be seen in the study from Miller, Pournik and Swaine, and other sources in the literature review (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014).

Financial commitments being critical to the development of NAPs but being rarely specified is a trend in NAPs. This also can be seen in the analysis done by Miller, Pournik, and Swaine (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014). To give an example of what will be analysed later in this dissertation, in the NAP of the Netherlands in 2007, financial allocations were not specified (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014, p. 117). However, in 2011, the Netherlands created a detailed table of financial and human resource commitment from involved parties (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014, p. 118). In the NAP of Italy in 2010, there is only a brief mentioning of funding of projects and programmes (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014, p. 110). The other NAPs were not analysed in their report (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014).

However, how financial commitment provides the desired change is unclear. This next part will show some examples of the fact that, without the right funds, it would not have been possible to make a change for women at the grassroots. Furthermore, it will discuss what is needed to have more representation of women in peace-making missions. In the cases from the practices and lessons from Afghanistan, some ways are described how proper financial commitments were helping to make a change for the local women. It is noticeable that in this paper, this part only shows examples of cases in Afghanistan. By this, the dissertation assumes that the way these cases are treated is the same for most cases in the military, especially in the next part that talks about equipment, knowledge of resolution 1325, and the layout of camps. What is needed to have more women at all levels in peace-making missions financially. This is written in a report about the

“Operational Effectiveness and UN resolution 1325 – Practices and Lessons from Afghanistan” by Louise Olsson, Johan Tejpar, Birgith Andreassen, Joseph Hoenen, Synne Holan, Sophie Kesselaar, Bjorg Skotnes, and Johanna Valenius. According to this report, for this to happen there needs to be funding for developing training material for resolution 1325. All mission personnel must have knowledge of the content of the resolution but also of more practical matters on site. For example, there should be separate toilets and showers in the camp, allowing for privacy for the personnel. There should also be separate sleeping accommodations and equipment, uniforms, and body armour must be in suitable sizes. This was the case at some camps, as explained in the report, but not all, for example, in the Swedish and Norwegian PRTs, which are provincial reconstruction teams. Here, “the most fundamental aspects of having mixed personnel were lacking” as written by Olsson and Tejpar (Olsson & Tejpar, 2009, p. 119). The camps should be a safe place for both men and women and ensure that they can perform at their highest level. These are only a few examples; more examples are written in the report. However, this explains the importance of funds to achieve the desired outcome (Olsson et al., 2009).

#### 4.2.4 Criticism 4 of national action plans: clear consultation structure between various partners formed

Problems in many NAPs are the large numbers of sub-objectives and specific activities that did not all have a transparent allocation of responsibilities regarding who was expected to implement, report on, and follow up the activities. This part focusses on civil society organisations as monitors of implementation (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership, 2015).

Odanović mentions in her report on the “role of CSOs in monitoring and evaluating national action plan (NAP) for implementation of UNSCR 1325” (Odanović, 2013) that “to ensure that monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are effective, it is necessary to include involvement and ideally, oversight, from civil society organisations (CSOs)” (Odanović, 2013, p. 1). Unfortunately:

“cooperation between government institutions and CSOs in implementing, monitoring and evaluating the NAP on 1325 is often reduced to a single CSO consultation and only in a formal and limited context. Consequently, meaningful dialogue and cooperation between state institutions and CSOs in NAP implementation, monitoring, and evaluation are either missing altogether or limited to the point of ineffectiveness. As a result, the intended positive effect of improving considerations of gender and security through the development and implementation of the NAP on 1325 is marginal” (Odanović, 2013, p. 1).

In Serbia, an effort was launched with the goals of establishing a channel for regular communication on the topic of gender and security between CSOs and security institutions. Here, they formulated the requirements for a government institution to meet in order to “create the conditions necessary

for greater inclusion of CSOs in the implementation and monitoring of the NAP” (Odanović, 2013, p. 9). These are the following:

- All institutions and authorities responsible for NAP implementation and monitoring should ensure that annual plans and reports on the implementation of NAP activities are publicly available on their websites;
- To ensure greater transparency concerning the process of NAP implementation, a unified website on the implementation of this document should be set up as soon as possible;
- The multi-sectoral coordinating body (MSCB) should, at least annually, organise a joint meeting with all interested representatives of civil society to discuss NAP implementation;
- and it would also be desirable for the MSCB to organise annual consultations with CSOs, namely thematic discussions in relations to the topics under the NAP

(Odanović, 2013, p. 9).

In conclusion, the literature review has already shown ways in which the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy can be tested on having transparent consultations between various partners involved in the creation, implementation, and evaluations of NAPs, especially the CSOs. The report from Odanović strengthens the argument that CSOs are very important in the creation of a high-impact NAP has been discussed before and shows different recommendations for future NAPs (Odanović, 2013).

#### 4.2.5 Criticism 5 of national action plans: monitoring and evaluation

The last criticism of the NAPs is that it is not clear how the objectives set out by the member states will be monitored or how an evaluation process will take place. “Efforts to implement resolution 1325 have been disappointing with supporters bemoaning the lack of progress made at both international and domestic levels”, according to Swaine (Swaine, 2010, p. 409). Although the resolution has been translated into more than 100 languages, there is insufficient evidence that it has been used to revive the international policy. “This is compounded by the absence of any means for measuring how or whether implementation has been progressing” according to Swaine (Swaine, 2010, p. 409). Therefore, it is important to see if there are monitor and evaluation mechanisms in place in the NAPs to analyse the process (Swaine, 2010).

The practical implementation of any action plan depends on the integration of adequate monitoring, reporting, and review mechanisms. The current debate at the international level is dominated by how best to promote the inclusion of substantive indicators in action plans to monitor progress. Not all action plans contain control frameworks or provisions for review and

evaluation. We will see this later in the case studies. However, a control framework is absent and, as with most other action plans, it will prove challenging to measure progress or hold governments accountable for the fulfilment of the stated commitments. Additionally, apart from quantitative and qualitative monitoring indicators, it is generally accepted that there is a need for periodic evaluation and clearly defined deadlines within which progress can be assessed. Without periodic review, it is clearly impossible to say what progress has been made and what revisions are needed to improve it (Swaine, 2010).

In September 2007, the secretary-general acknowledged that although progress had been made, significant organisational challenges remained. A lack of policy standards for ME prevented a precise determination of how effective the intended results of the system-wide action plan had been, and the report recognised the need to design a results-oriented framework to achieve the results (Barrow, 2016).

Furthermore, Miller, Pournik, and Swaine argue in their paper that “if states are to fulfil their commitments, procedural approaches to implementation will be required to map onto states own existing procedural ways of doing business” (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014, p. 53). In the future, it is essential that the accountability mechanisms are designed and used in a manner that contributes to fully achieving the aspirations for equality of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325. In this way, the 1325 NAP will advance the global agenda rather than reflect it (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014).

To summarise, the effective implementation of any action plan depends on the integration of adequate monitoring, reporting, and review mechanisms. In the next part of the dissertation, the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy will be tested on these shortcomings and criticisms. These results will be then discussed in the discussion to conclude what could have been the reason behind the undesired result of the implementation of the WPS agenda.

#### 4.3 The role of national action plans

National action plans were adopted as one mechanism to reinforce UNSCR 1325's operationalisation. These plans provide an opportunity for countrywide stakeholders to become aware of priorities, decide responsibilities, allocate resources, and initiate strategic moves within a defined period. However, consultations in all regions indicated that this thought of a movement plan was occasionally based on an idealistic premise. Likewise, bringing all businesses below "one umbrella, regardless of divergent agendas, could lead to unrealistic and unachievable action plans, particularly while resources have been limited" (Barrow, 2016). Denmark was the first member state to introduce a NAP in 2005, and soon after that the United Kingdom followed with its first

NAP in 2006. Meanwhile, 83 states developed their own NAPs. Member states are encouraged in these NAPs to establish national programmes to support UNSCR 1325 implementation. In addition to national policies to promote the overall macro-level implementation of UNSCR 1325, a UN system-wide action plan was implemented in 2005 to facilitate a more unified strategy across the different bodies and agencies of the UN. Under the leadership of an Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, Peace, and Security, led by a special advisor on gender issues and women's advancement, the system-wide action plan brought together various UN agencies with observers from International NGOs and civil society (Barrow, 2016).

## 5. Examination of the national action plans

This is an examination done of the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy in the same manner as Miller, Swaine, and Pournik have done their analysis. This is brief to only show the most important parts of the NAPs and where there could be improvements. The discussion will further explore the findings of the last NAPs. These are the most relevant to address the research question.

### 5.1.1 National action plan of the Netherlands 2008–2011

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Priority areas                                       | <p>The first Dutch NAP priority areas were the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. International legal framework</li> <li>2. Conflict prevention, mediation and reconstruction</li> <li>3. International cooperation</li> <li>4. Peace missions</li> <li>5. Harmonisation and coordination</li> </ol> |
| Clear objectives                                     | The Dutch Action Plan for 2008–2011 consisted of 19 goals and 72 activities to be accomplished by 2011. The objectives are specific and mentioned clearly in the paper in the Action Points Matrix.  |
| Timeline   | Not specified.   |
| Strong language needs to be used to encourage action | Yes, for most of the NAP.  |
| Attitudinal and structural change                    | Attitudinal and structural change is generally promoted in this NAP.   |
| Financial allocations                                | In some activities' investigation, a possible allocation of resources is described; however, no specific numbers are discussed.  |
| Clear construction between various partners formed   | The demarcation of all the described assignments is made by an action point matrix. Here, the division is made between the Dutch government divisions and NGOs. However, no one agency was specified at taking a leading role. These parties are the relevant ministries, different NGOs, committees, and universities.    |



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|                          |   |
| Civil society monitoring | Dutch NGOs and women's organisations will work together at international level to establish monitoring systems that will keep track of progress on implementing 1325. |
| Monitoring & evaluations | Indicators and reporting not specified.   |

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2007).

#### 5.1.2 National action plan of the Netherlands 2011–2015

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Priority areas                                       | <p>The second Dutch NAP priority areas were the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Increase women's representation at all decision-making levels in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict in fragile states</li> <li>2. Integrate gender and 1325 into all policies and actions</li> <li>3. Increase national and international awareness of gender issues and increase public support for 1325 implementation</li> <li>4. Promote cooperation for worldwide implementation of UNSCR 1325</li> </ol> |
| Clear objectives                                     | In the revised NAP there are just four very comprehensible objectives. These four objectives are made specific by describing which results should be achieved for the objective to be accomplished.  |
| Timeline   | Not specified.   |
| Strong language needs to be used to encourage action | Contains strong language to encourage action.  |

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| Attitudinal and structural change                  | The objectives in the Dutch NAP are very focused on attitudinal and structural change, in both domestic and international areas.  |
| Financial allocations                              | Detailed table of financial and human resource commitments from involved parties including NGOs.<br><br>€4 million annual budget from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  |
| Clear construction between various partners formed | The NAP includes a detailed table of financial and resource allocation from involved parties, both governmental and civil. The leading agents are still not specified. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does provide an institutional umbrella for the NAP.   |
| Civil society monitoring                           | Not specified.  |
| Monitoring and evaluation                          | Indicators are non-specific.<br><br>ME needs to be present at two levels:<br><br>(1) Collaborative efforts will be evaluated first - monitoring matrix will be measured annually in all the focus states.<br><br>(2) The impact of the activities will be measured once every two years - using innovative participatory techniques, such as the most significant change technique. |

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2011).

## 5.1.3 National action plan of the Netherlands 2016–2019

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Priority areas                                       | <p>The third Dutch NAPs priority areas are the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Better protect women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations from violence and violations of their rights</li> <li>2. Subvert harmful underlying gender norms, which are obstacles to sustainable peace</li> <li>3. Ensure that women have equal leverage in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief, and recovery at all levels and that their efforts are acknowledged and supported</li> </ol> |
| Clear objectives                                     | <p>The overall objective has furthermore been broken down into three specific objectives, which have corresponding activities in ensuring their implementation.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Enhanced participation</li> <li>2. Decrease of harmful gender roles</li> <li>3. Equal leverage in conflict prevention, resolution, peacebuilding, relief, and recovery</li> </ol>  |
| Timeline   | Not specified.   |
| Strong language needs to be used to encourage action | The objectives are written in direct language and it uses strong words such as “subvert” and “ensure”.   |
| Attitudinal and structural change                    | The NAP mentions promoting attitudinal and structural change. For example, “subvert harmful underlying gender norms, which are obstacles to sustainable peace”. Not only women are involved, there is additional focus on increased involvement of men and boys in the implementation of laws and regulations that contribute to gender equality.  |
| Financial allocations                                | The third NAP states that The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will allocate an annual budget for the implementation of the third NAP but does not further specify the allocation of funds for the NAP implementation.  |

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| Clear construction between various partners formed                      | Describes the signatories from civil society as 'development, peace, human rights and diaspora organisations that operate at local, regional, national, and international levels. The signatories and external actors will meet at every two months in context-specific forums where the signatories share perspectives on the country situation while working with partner networks, embassies and staff in the region to develop a strategic plan with specific, quantifiable activities. |
| Civil society monitoring  | Not specified.  |
| Attention for supporting gender mainstreaming in military organisations | One of the outputs of the Dutch NAP mentions as an activity to "encourage the inclusion of gender expertise in Dutch civilian and military contributions to international missions". This is an activity relevant for all signatories, which means the Dutch government, over 50 Dutch civil society organisations, and knowledge institutions. The Dutch military organisation is not mentioned in this NAP.   |
| Monitoring & evaluations  | <p>The last NAP of the Netherlands does not have indicators.</p> <p>"The Action Plan's two coordinating partners, the Dutch Gender Platform WO=MEN and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will design a functioning ME system based on the country strategies and theory of change." (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership, 2015)</p> <p>They will develop a context-specific ME system based on specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and timely (SMART) indicators.</p>                         |

(1325 Dutch NAP Partnership , 2015).

## 5.1.4 National action plan of Italy 2010–2013

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Priority areas                                       | <p>The priority areas are the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Increase the number of women in the national police, armed forces, and in peace operations and the decision-making bodies of peace operations</li> <li>2. Promote the inclusion of a gender perspective in all peacekeeping operations</li> <li>3. Provide gender-specific training for personnel on peace missions</li> <li>4. Protect the human rights of women, children, and other vulnerable groups and strengthen women's participation in peace processes</li> <li>5. Support civil society's commitment to the implementation of UNSCR 1325</li> <li>6. Conduct monitoring and follow-up activities</li> </ol> |
| Clear objectives                                     | The objectives are specific and mentioned clearly in the paper.   |
| Timeline   | Not specified   |
| Strong language needs to be used to encourage action | The first NAP of Italy did not have a lot of weak language in its objectives. Examples of strong language in the NAP are “women are an essential component of both the Italian police and armed forces”.  |
| Attitudinal and structural change                    | The NAP mentions many objectives that will benefit the attitudinal and structural change in Italy.  |
| Financial allocations                                | Briefly mentions funding of projects and programmes.  |
| Clear construction between various partners formed   | There was not specific consultation structure between the various partners formed. The involvement of the civil society was not specific. The leading agent of the making of the NAP was the Ministry of  |

|                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
|                          | Foreign Affairs – Human Rights Unit, and many other relevant ministries were involved.  |
| Civil society monitoring | There were some communications with the civil society; however, no defined monitoring roles were chosen   |
| Monitoring & evaluations | For the first NAP in 2010, Italy did not have indicators for ME. It did have a means of reporting; this was by the Inter-ministerial Committee on Human Rights. |

(Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).

#### 5.1.5 National action plan of Italy 2014–2016

|                  |  |
|------------------|--|
| Priority areas   | <p>The priority areas are the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Enhance women's presence in the national armed forces as well as within national police forces, by strengthening their role in decision-making processes related to peace missions</li> <li>2. Promoting a gender perspective in peace-support operations</li> <li>3. Ensuring specific training on the various aspects of UNSCR 1325, in particular personnel taking part in peace operations</li> <li>4. The protection of human rights of women, children, and the most vulnerable groups fleeing from conflict areas and/or living in post-conflict zones</li> <li>5. Strengthening the role of women in peace processes and in all decision-making processes</li> <li>6. The Contribution of Civil Society to the enforcement of UNSCR 1325</li> <li>7. Monitoring activities and follow-up on operations</li> </ol> |
| Clear objectives | The objectives made in the NAP are clear.  |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Timeline   | Not specified  |
| Strong language needs to be used to encourage action | The second NAP of Italy did not have much weak language in its objectives. Examples of strong language in this NAP are “ensuring specific training on the various aspect of UNSCR 1325”.   |
| Attitudinal and structural change                    | The goal of this NAP is to increase female involvement in the national armed forces and police forces and to achieve more involvement on a political level. Still, women are described as vulnerable groups, such as children. This is not in alliance with the notion of gender equality.   |
| Financial allocations                                | No detailed future financial commitments are described in the NAP.   |
| Clear construction between various partners formed   | The government works together with civil society and the parliament. It will do its best to support initiatives that the civil society would like to develop for the WPS agenda. The Interministerial Committee for Human Rights (CIDU) shall promote regular meetings, with involved institutions, relevant NGOs, and academia, as a specific forum for regular consultations and exchanges of information concerning implementation efforts conducted at various levels. The CIDU commits to establishing specific relations with international organisations. |
| Civil society monitoring                             | Civil society will monitor the implementation.   |
| Monitoring & evaluations                             | Italy aims to submit an updated and revised report at the end of the first year, identifying the areas that need to be strengthened, especially the following consultation with both the civil society and the parliament.   |

(Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).

#### 5.1.6 National action plan of Italy 2016–2019

|                |   |
|----------------|---|
| Priority areas | For the third NAP these were the following: |
|----------------|---|

|  |  |
|--|--|
|  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthen the role of women in peace processes and in all decision-making processes</li> <li>2. Continue to promote a gender perspective in peace operations</li> <li>3. Continue to ensure specific training on the various and cross-cutting aspects of UNSCR 1325(2000), in particular to personnel taking part in peace operations</li> <li>4. Further enhance women's presence in the national armed forces and within national police forces by strengthening their role in decision-making processes related to peace missions</li> <li>5. Protect human rights of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict areas</li> <li>6. Increase synergies with civil society, to implement UNSCR1325</li> <li>7. Strategic communication and result-oriented advocacy</li> </ol> |
| Clear objectives                                     | The objectives are clear, and the actions to reach the goals are clearly described in a table. All actors involved are shown in the table.   |
| Timeline   | Not specified  |
| Strong language needs to be used to encourage action | The objectives are written in strong language.   |
| Attitudinal and structural change                    | The NAP mentions promoting attitudinal and structural change: for example, promoting a gender perspective in peace operations and further enhance women's presence in the national armed forces.   |
| Financial allocations                                | The third Italian NAP does not allocate a dedicated budget for each objective or action point. The NAP notes that there are several government-funded projects for peace operations, fragile states, and   |



|   |   |
|---|---|
|   | conflict situations that integrate the needs and capacities of women and girls.   |
| Clear construction between various partners formed                      | In the third NAP, Italy is committed to implementing the objectives through a close collaboration between the working group, civil society, and the most relevant actors, in a multi-stakeholder fashion. This multi-stakeholder mechanism will oversee the implementation of the current NAP with progress reports conducted with relevant CSOs in order to guarantee operational effectiveness. Administrations will assess progress and performance. There will be an annual progress report prepared by the Interministerial Committee for Human Rights: this is in consultation with the civil society and the parliament. The open-ended Working Group (OEWG), led by CIDU, will be responsible for the implementation of this plan, including application and monitoring, and they will meet at least every 4 months. Accordingly, to that, the OEWG will annually revise existing goals, commitments, actions, and indicators, considering lessons learned. |
| Civil society monitoring  | Italy is committed to implementing the NAP through a close collaboration between the working group, civil society, and the most relevant actors, in a multi-stakeholder fashion. Accordingly, this multi-stakeholder mechanism will oversee the implementation of the present national plan, including by progress reporting to be conducted with relevant CSOs, in order to guarantee operational effectiveness and a more holistic and synergic approach.<br><br>This mechanism is not further explained in the NAP: the working group should have created this mechanism with the relevant CSOs and actors.  |
| Attention for supporting gender mainstreaming in military organisations | The NAP of Italy commits to:<br><br>1. "Increasing the representation and participation of women in police and defence sectors, including at the senior decision-making and leadership levels;  |

|                            |  |  |
|----------------------------|--|--|
|                            |  | <p>2. Incorporating further the WPS agenda as a key theme of engagement;</p> <p>3. Support engagement of men in advancing gender equality and other initiatives, which promote the principles of Women, Peace, and Security.”</p> <p>(Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016)</p>   |
| Monitoring and evaluations |  | <p>The Italian NAP has indicators for each action point and actors concerned.</p> <p>Administrations will assess progress and performance. There will be an annual progress report prepared by the Interministerial Committee for Human Rights, this is in consultation with the civil society and the parliament. The OEWG, led by CIDU, will be responsible for the implementation of this plan, including application and monitoring, and they will meet at least every 4 months. Accordingly, the OEWG will annually revise existing goals, commitments, actions, and indicators, considering lessons learned.</p> |

(Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

## 6. Discussion

This chapter will discuss the questions raised in the objectives of this paper and interpret the findings in their relation to these questions.

The central research question this paper sets out to address was “why has the implementation of UNSCR 1325(2000) on taking a stand for WPS by the Netherlands and Italy failed to provide the desired results”? In order to adequately address this, the paper has explained the resolution, starting with what the resolution entails. After that, research was shown on what the resolutions aim to achieve. Many scholars have criticised the implementation of the resolution and the NAPs. These reports were researched. Furthermore, the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy were examined. The paper will conclude if the criticism of the scholars can be found back in the NAPs. Lastly, how the Netherlands and Italy can improve their NAPs to have a more effective implementation will be discussed.

### 6.1 What does the UNSCR 1325 resolution entail, and what does it want to achieve?

Resolution 1325 is significant because this was the first time that women have been recognised by the United Nations for their essential contribution regarding the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response, and in post-conflict reconstruction, and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security (United Nations Security Council, 2000).

The four pillars that each of the resolution’s mandates is related to are the following:

1. Participation: This point calls for increased participation of women at all levels of decision-making, including in national, regional, and international institutions; in mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict; in peace negotiations; in peace operations, as soldiers, police, and civilians; and as special representatives of the UN secretary-general.
2. Protection: This point calls specifically for the protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, including in emergency and humanitarian situations, such as in refugee camps.
3. Prevention: This point calls for improving intervention strategies in the prevention of violence against women, including by prosecuting those responsible for violations of international law; strengthening women’s rights under national law; and supporting local women’s peace initiatives and conflict resolution processes.

4. Relief and recovery: This point calls for the advancement of relief and recovery measures to address international crises through a gendered lens, including by respecting the civilian and humanitarian nature of refugee camps and considering the needs of women and girls in the design of refugee camps and settlements

(United Nations Security Council, 2000).

To reinforce UNSCR 1325 operationalisation, member states adopt NAPs. These plans provide an opportunity for countrywide stakeholders to become aware of the priorities, demarcate responsibilities, allocate resources, and initiate strategic moves within a defined period.

## 6.2 What can be concluded from the results and how can the Netherlands and Italy improve in implementing UNSCR 1325(2000) on taking a stand for Women, Peace, and Security?

This chapter will be discussed under different themes. Some themes will be discussed together because of the correlations between the two themes. Both the criticisms of the NAPs and the criticisms of the resolution itself will be discussed since there are many criticisms of the resolution, and it is essential to see if the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy are confirming to support these shortcomings. Only the latest NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy will be examined. These were both created for the period from 2016 to 2019. Neither country has yet finished their NAP for 2020, so it is assumed that the objectives mentioned in the third NAP are still being pursued this year. It was chosen to only look at the last NAP as this is the most essential NAP, and the analysis of the NAPs has already shown improvements from the first to the last. Not only will the NAPs be discussed but also research on the implementation of the WPS agenda in real cases. This was in 2009. Unfortunately, no new sources of this sort were found in the research. In summary, this section will show how the implementation of the Netherlands and Italy could have failed to provide the desired result using the research found. Not all criticisms have been used due to some already being heavily discussed in the findings and not being as relevant as the other criticisms to addressing the research question.

### 6.2.1 Need for gender perspectives in military and long-term attitudinal and structural change

Starting with the need for emphasis in the NAPs for having gender perspectives in military organisations and the need for long-term attitudinal and structural change, from the research, it is concluded that the NAPs should highlight cooperation with the national military organisation in their objectives. Change from within military organisations is fundamental, and there should be a focus on how applying women in the military could be a tool for the enhanced effectiveness of missions. It is also the case that in some states there is a need for long-term attitudinal and structural change as exemplified by the cases of Brazil and Japan. The results from analysing the

NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy indicate that in both NAPs there is a focus on increasing the participation of women at all levels of decision-making in mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict; in peace negotiations; and in peace operations, especially as soldiers. This means that both states are aware of what resolution 1325 aims to achieve and are searching for ways to implement the four pillars. What the results of the literature study do not show is whether these objectives are implemented in real-life cases in 2020. One case study of PRTs in Afghanistan from both states showed the need for more gender perspectives and attitudinal and structural change. This is what this research paper was unable to address for peacekeeping missions around the time span of the Resolution (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership, 2015; Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

#### 6.2.2 The lack of clear objectives, monitoring, or benchmarks

In addition, the lack of clear objectives, monitoring, or benchmarks was discussed for both the resolution itself and the NAPs. For the most part, the objectives written in the NAPs were clear. Surprisingly, the latest NAP of the Netherlands did not have indicators for ME, which would be expected since the rest of the NAP looked promising. The last NAP of Italy did have indicators for every objective. The NAP of the Netherlands explains that it will develop a context-specific ME system based on specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and timely (SMART) indicators. In Italy, the ME will be done by administrators that assess progress and performance with a committee that will often meet and discuss the implementation. This supports the statement that the NAPs do not have proper ME mechanisms in place, as was suggested in the research for the literature review. Therefore, this could be a point of improvement for both NAPs. It does demonstrate that there is an attempt to monitor and evaluate. However, this cannot be shown only by researching the NAPs. Therefore, it is again difficult to say whether ME is being done correctly or not, and this matter will have to be thoroughly investigated in future research (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership, 2015; Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

#### 6.2.3 The need for financial commitments

Furthermore, the need for financial commitments have been discussed for both the resolution and NAPs. From the research, it became clear that funding is needed to properly hire and train female troops, police, and military advisers that can serve in the United Nations peacekeeping operations. These missions are where protection, prevention, relief, and recovery occurs, as discussed in the explanation of the resolution. It is therefore essential to have highly skilled women attending these missions to make a change as well as to educate all military personal on the WPS agenda, gender equality, gender mainstreaming, and gender perspectives. The last NAP of the Netherlands

recognises the significance of women and the NAP calls for a gender perspective in conflict prevention, peace negotiations, refugee camp design, peacekeeping operations, security sector reform, and the reconstruction of war-torn societies. There was no annual budget for the implementation of the NAP allocated from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the research, a NAP ME plan will remain little more than a piece of paper unless there are financial resources allocated and disbursed. It is known that the objectives are eventually supported by funds, but it would be better to put this in the NAP to increase project transparency. Most objectives do have responsible organisations behind them, and here the creators of the NAPs could have mentioned the funds. The second NAP of the Netherlands mentions an annual budget of €4 million from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This does not seem sufficient, especially when aiming to, for example, support the military with extra training and have personnel at every level of decision-making to ensure that a gender perspective has been added. Unfortunately, no sources were found describing how to properly budget a NAP in terms of how much can be expected to be spent. So, this could be interesting for further research. In the last NAP of Italy, there is no allocated or dedicated budget for each objective or action point. The NAP notes that there are several government-funded projects for peace operations, fragile states, and conflict situations that integrate the needs and capacities of women and girls. This is very vague. It is recommended to show more transparency in the NAPs. Funds should support each objective. This will increase the transparency of the NAP and therefore, support the implementation (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership, 2015; Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

Thus, it is not easy to see if the budgets that have been dedicated to the implementation of the NAP are used in the most efficient way to support the WPS agenda. In the research done, it is often mentioned that there is no pre-set funding behind the objectives in the NAPs. This is also the case for both the Netherlands and Italy. This may be due to the government not wanting to be tied to a budget. This was not explained in the NAPs. The limitation of this research is that no sources have looked at the budgeting of the Netherlands and Italy and at how these budgets are spent rather than only be described on paper (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership, 2015; Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

#### 6.2.4 Clear consultation structure between various partners formed

Also, a clear consultation structure between various partners should be formed. Engagement and partnerships are critical regarding strengthening the efforts of the implementation of the WPS agenda. In the third NAP, Italy is committed to implementing the objectives through a close collaboration. This multi-stakeholder mechanism will oversee the implementation of the current NAP with progress reports conducted with relevant CSOs in order to guarantee operational

effectiveness. In the last NAP of the Netherlands, activities are highlighted, and the relevant signatories are mentioned with every objective. The signatories are the government and over 50 Dutch civil-society organisations and knowledge institutions. The help of many different signatories sounds very promising in implementing the WPS agenda. However, these activities represent a significant time commitment with respect to almost all or all signatories. This could be a problem because then there needs to be cooperation between all these signatories on one activity. This seems to be difficult and it is not explained how the signatories are going to manage this task. From the analysis of the NAPs, it cannot be concluded whether this succeeded. Therefore, further research into every signatory and how they have contributed to the implementation of the activities set out in the NAPs is required. For this paper, it can be concluded that clear consultation structures have been formed in the NAPs (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership, 2015; Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

#### 6.2.5 Literature on the NAPs by the Netherlands and Italy

Unfortunately, almost no literature was found addressing the implementation of the NAPs by the Netherlands or Italy, with the exception of the analysis by Miller, Pournik, and Swaine. However, this was also very brief. The country analysis done in this report was used for some parts of the analysis of the NAPs in this dissertation. The lack of literature on the implementation by the Netherlands and Italy could be because it is not a popular item to research among scholars in these two states. The need for gender equality may not yet be seen. What happens during peacekeeping missions is also not very transparent. It is not something people will often see on the news. Further research on this topic will improve the peacekeeping missions in these states.

Overall, neither NAP was as weak as expected after reading the literature on the NAPs. Positive reactions to the NAPs are scarce, and that is why it was pleasantly surprising. Both states understand how to implement the WPS agenda and have reasonable ideas on how to implement the objectives. Notably, the Dutch NAP shows how they have improved and where they have made a change for women around the world. The objectives were also, for the most part, written in strong language. It must be pointed out that some factors will have to be introduced in order to be truly meaningful for all women in the world. These factors have already been discussed above. Even without the NAP, much useful work is done by both the Netherlands and Italy to help women in their own and other states. However, when the NAPs are improved, further significant work should be possible. It would be interesting to see what the next NAP will look like and whether it has been improved again according to the guidelines of a high-impact NAP. Furthermore, it is also interesting to see whether the army will also become more involved in the next action plans, since they will have to deliver a large part of the objectives described in the resolution. Moreover, gender

mainstreaming in military organisations will have a significant impact on gender equality in the world. For this, time, and further research, will tell (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership, 2015; Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

To conclude, when addressing the research question “Why has the implementation of UNSCR 1325(2000) on taking a stand for WPS by the Netherlands and Italy failed to provide the desired results?” there are many different possibilities that need to be further researched. This could be due to UNSCR 1325 simply not dictating a timeframe. Alternatively, this could be due to the structure of the NAPs themselves. From the analysis, it was clear that neither has performed all points of a high-impact NAP correctly according to the framework provided by Lippai and Young: for example, for the NAPs to include useful tools to measure progress and include quantitative and qualitative indicators or a description of the link between monitor and evaluation planning and government budgeting. This could be one explanation. The other explanation could lie in the lack of gender mainstreaming in military organisations. Not only can the content of the NAPs be a way that the WPS agenda had failed to achieve the desired results, military organisations could also play a significant role. In the missions by the national army or by the UN peacekeepers, it is essential to have highly educated personal (equally women and men) on gender issues to maximise their operational effectiveness and adequately support the WPS agenda. There could also be truth in both conclusions. To correctly see which one is true, or both, a high-impact NAP needs to be created with the guide created by Lippai and Young, and military organisations should be researched on the promotion of gender equality, gender mainstreaming, and having gender perspectives (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership, 2015; Italy Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

## 7. Conclusion

It is undeniable that UNSCR 1325 represents a milestone in the fight for women’s fundamental human rights. The resolution made people aware of gender issues and provided the international community with a viable framework that can be adapted and used. It has pushed states and organisations to implement 1325 into already existing and new practices. However, efforts to implement resolution 1325 have been disappointing, with supporters bemoaning the lack of progress made at both international and domestic levels. This lack is also the case for the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy. The states that have developed NAPs since the adoption of resolution 1325 have, for the most part, tried to implement all four pillars of the resolution. From the research, it has been concluded that many factors are needed to be well executed in the NAP for it to have a practical implementation. The research indicated that the most important factors are having gender perspectives in national military organisations and meaningful objectives for both local



women as women in peacekeeping missions; having attitudinal and structural change in the culture of the state; using clear objectives, strong language, and monitoring mechanisms; creating financial commitments for every objective; and having clear consultation structures between various partners formed including military organisations. For the Netherlands and Italy, special attention should be directed towards creating high-impact NAPs. Furthermore, there should be a focus on promoting women in the army and ensuring that military personnel is (highly) educated on gender mainstreaming, gender equality, and gender perspectives. These improvements will result in maximised operational effectiveness and adequately support the WPS agenda in peacekeeping. It has been 20 years since the resolution was adopted. The hard work and campaigning of women at the grassroots level has resulted in the creation of resolution 1325. With the creation, they wanted to radically change the policies, programmes, and systems that continue to oppress women and that maintain gender inequality. Whether the NAPs will eventually realise gender equality remains to be seen. Though the NAPs of the Netherlands and Italy still have their flaws, there is no doubt that they will be used as tools to compel states to act. Hopefully, in the next 20 years, the recommendations will be considered when creating new NAPs, and this will increase the empowerment of women and girls to eventually result in universal gender equality.

## 8. Recommendations

Upon drawing conclusions from the findings of this paper, the following recommendations are made:

- Further research is needed to establish if the national military organisations have been successful in implementing a gender perspective in all peacekeeping missions during the time that the last NAPs were implemented and during the time that the future NAP is implemented.
- For the creation of future NAPs, the Netherlands and Italy should consider the guide to implementing resolution 1325 by Zsuzsanna Lippai and Angelic Young.
- Future research could evaluate the achievements of states at the end of the term of the NAP and whether improving the NAPs affects the results.
- In the future, it is recommended that states preparing NAPs consider the other NAPs when developing their NAP. Such NAPs from, for example, neighbouring states can be a source of inspiration for creating a high-impact NAP.

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## Appendices

## Appendix 1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325(2000)

**Resolution 1325 (2000)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on  
31 October 2000**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its President, and *recalling also* the statement of its President to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women's Rights and International Peace (International Women's Day) of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816),

*Recalling also* the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century" (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,

*Bearing in mind* the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Expressing* concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and *recognizing* the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,

*Reaffirming* the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and *stressing* the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

*Reaffirming also* the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,

S/RES/1325 (2000)

*Emphasizing* the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls,

*Recognizing* the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard *noting* the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

*Recognizing also* the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,

*Recognizing* that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,

*Noting* the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,

1. *Urges* Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;

2. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;

3. *Urges* the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard *calls on* Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;

4. *Further urges* the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;

5. *Expresses* its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and *urges* the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures, *invites* Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;

7. *Urges* Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;



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8. *Calls on* all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia:

(a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;

(b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;

(c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;

9. *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

10. *Calls on* all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;

11. *Emphasizes* the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard *stresses* the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;

12. *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;

13. *Encourages* all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;

14. *Reaffirms* its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

15. *Expresses* its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women's groups;

16. *Invites* the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and *further invites* him to

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submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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[Appendix 2. Interview Transcript Prof. Dr. A.M. O'Malley](#)

Interview with Prof. Dr. A.M. O'Malley, 30.01.2020, Leiden University, The Hague, The Netherlands.

MW: 1. Hello Ms. O'Malley, thank you for taking the time to answer my questions for this interview. As I said, the topic of my bachelor thesis, for which this interview will be used, is the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on taking stand for Women, Peace and Security by the Netherlands and Italy failed to provide the desired results. What do you think about UNSCR 1325, and what do you think are important aspects to keep in mind when researching this subject?

O'Malley: "well obviously the resolution is very important because it was not really outlined sources that women have a specific role, a special role when it comes to process of peace and the way that the resolution has been broken down it's about identifying and enhancing the role of women in pre-conflict scenarios, so places where conflict may erupt, and during violent conflicts, so what is the role of women in maintaining the family units, in protection of civilians and protection of their family and children and intelligence gatherers and centres for community building when men are engaged in fighting. And of course, women as peacekeepers and women as builders at a community level. And of course, conflict is much more about the role of women in society after conflict. How to protect their human rights and enhance their position. And in rule 1325 and what is important is it says that in the first-place women have a very important agency in peace. Peace processes tend to be more successful when women are involved, that's a fact. And then secondly it urges all the members of the UN to do everything they can to enhance the role of women. That applies to all the Member States and not only those where there is violent conflict and I think that is also very important."

MW: 2. Many scholars have indicated issues with the resolution. These are in summarized form: Not clear how the objectives set out on how the Member States will be monitored or how an evaluation process will take place, therefore it could be considered rather a soft law than a hard law. And that the resolution is written in weak language and that that causes it not being taken seriously enough.

O'Malley: "so this is the hard part of 1325. So, all the resolutions from the security council are supposed to be binding. That's the key difference between the security council and the general assembly. So binding resolutions mean that members of the security council and all members of the UN bound to abide by the terms of the resolution. So, this is good because this means we can draw states to make commitments and the public forum of the UN issues like 1325 which obviously goes beyond an emergency resolution for addressing an ongoing conflict. 1325 can be implemented

all the time even in sides that are not at war. The problem that the wording of 1325 much like the wording of all UN resolutions is very open. It allows for too much scope in terms how the resolution could be implemented. And that is not a problem just for 1325 but it tends go for most security council resolutions. In order to reach an agreement to get through the security council votes the resolution is formulated with this open diplomatic language to allow states some room manoeuvring and implementing them. The problem is that when it comes to implementation then the UN has this liege role so they can request, and they can do anything they can do verbally to urge states to commend regulations. But really this is up to the Member States. The problem that we see especially with 1325 is that only some Member States implemented a national implementation strategy, others have not then even tough to pass such a strategy well it has not been rolled out effectively or is quite limited in its application. It doesn't get the funding or resources that it deserves etc. So, this is really where the problem of 1325 lies and this is the difficulty for the UN because the they put it out to Member States but they really now relying to save the expenses and there is where this discrepancy comes in."

MW: do you believe this can be different and improved upon?

O'Malley: "I think that the main thing and what we can see particularity in the Netherlands and in Ireland and in the UK actually, is that the important thing is that the resolution is not just to address conflicts that happen very far away. It's supposed to be to also be about mainstreaming the role of women at the ministerial level within these foreign ministries as actors within international affairs. And I think that some States like the one I mentioned are putting an emphasis on enhancing the role of women in a very prolific way that's very good. It also makes the position of women stronger within the internal national structures, which of course is an implementation of 1325, but it also attracts more women and that is extremely important when you want to send more women overseas to assist in the implementation of 1325."

MW: 3. Many scholars have also indicated issues with the National Action Plans itself. These are in summarized form: No clear monitoring or evaluation processes made by the Member States, no national financing commitments, the lack of clearly defined objectives, the goals or not time bound and no clear consultation structure between the various partners formed. Both between government and NGO

O'Malley: "I think you captured the problems pretty well, that's most of the criticisms. The other thing I would say is that I think more countries need to link it to mainstreaming of gender in other areas. Because gender isn't just the question that's relevant in peace but its relevant in all

the work of foreign ministries. So that's the other criticism I would add I think that link needs to be made more explicit and stronger."

MW: 4. What are for you the desired outcomes of the resolution in the Netherlands and (maybe) Italy?

O'Malley: "It's hard for me to assess that because I'm not an expert in what the Netherlands have done in this, but to me you know they have appointed gender advisors for some of their peace keeping missions that's a very good step. They are trying to as I said more peacekeepers involved in the defence forces. And they focus kind of public on women in a big way: so last year when we a thing with the foreign ministry about peace keeping and we focused on women peacekeepers. And I think there is a great interest and emphasis here and that's very good."

MW: Thank you for doing this interview.

## Informed Consent Form

### Informed Consent Form

- 1) Research Project Title: *Why has the implementation of UNSCR 1325(2000) on taking a stand for Woman, Peace and Security by the Netherlands and Italy failed to provide the desired results.*
- 2) Project Description (1 paragraph)

The resolution emphasizes, among other things, the importance of representing women in all decision-making processes related to conflict prevention, management and resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction. My research question is how the implementation of this resolution can be improved in the Netherlands and Italy through the National Action Plans. From the preliminary research I have found that the implementation can be improved. For my research I would like some insight from scholars on this subject

If you agree to take part in this study please read the following statement and sign this form.

I am 16 years of age or older.

I can confirm that I have read and understood the description and aims of this research. The researcher has answered all the questions that I had to my satisfaction.

I agree to the audio recording of my interview with the researcher.

I understand that the researcher offers me the following guarantees:

All information will be treated in the strictest confidence. My name will not be used in the study unless I give permission for it.

Recordings will be accessible only by the researcher. Unless otherwise agreed, anonymity will be ensured at all times. Pseudonyms will be used in the transcriptions.

I can ask for the recording to be stopped at any time and anything to be deleted from it.

I consent to take part in the research on the basis of the guarantees outlined above.

Name: *Alanna O'Malley*

Signature:

*Alanna O'Malley*

Date:

*30 Jan 2020*

## Appendix 3. European Studies Student Ethics Form

**Your name:** *Manon Wiersema*

**Supervisor:** *Dr. M. Anghel*

**Instructions:**

Before completing this form you should read the APA Ethics Code

(<http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx>). If you are planning research with human subjects, you should also look at the sample consent form available in the Final Project and Dissertation Guide.

- a. Read section 2 that your supervisor will have to sign. Make sure that you cover all these issues in section 1.
- b. Complete section 1 and, if you are using human subjects, section 2, of this form, and sign it.
- c. Ask your project supervisor to read these sections (and the draft consent form if you have one) and ask him/her to sign the form.
- d. Always append this signed form as an appendix to your dissertation. This is a knock-out criterium; if not included the Final Project/Dissertation is awarded an NVD.

**Section 1. Project Outline (to be completed by student)**

**(i) Title of Project:** *Why has the implementation of UNSCR 1325(2000) on taking a stand for Women, Peace and Security by the Netherlands and Italy failed to provide the desired results?*

**Aims of project:** *The paper will research why the implementation of UNSCR did not provide the desired results by the Netherlands and Italy. This will be done by answering the four sub questions:*

- *What does the Resolution 1325 entail, what does it want to achieve?*
- *Why do scholars think it has failed to provide the desired results?*
- *What are the National Action Plans? Using the NAPs of Italy and the Netherlands as case studies.*
- *What are the targets made in the last NAPs that are not being satisfactorily implemented?*

*After the research there will be concluded what the shortcomings were in the NAPs of the*

*Netherlands and Italy and a recommendation for the next NAP will be given.*

**(ii) Will you involve other people in your project – e.g. via formal or informal interviews, group discussions, questionnaires, internet surveys etc. (Note: if you are using data that has already been collected by another researcher – e.g. recordings or transcripts of conversations given to you by your supervisor, you should answer ‘NO’ to this question.)**

*Yes*

**If yes: you should complete the section 2 of this form.**

**If no: you should now sign the statement below and return the form to your supervisor. You have completed this form.**

This project is not designed to include research with human subjects. I understand that I do not have ethical clearance to interview people (formally or informally) about the topic of my research, to carry out internet research (e.g. on chat rooms or discussion boards) or in any other way to use people as subjects in my research.

Student's signature \_\_\_\_\_

Date 19-5-2020

**Section 2 Complete this section only if you answered YES to question (iii) above.**

**(i) What will the participants have to do? (v. brief outline of procedure):**

*The participants will answer questions in a short interview. Each participant has a professional background connected to the topic of the dissertation and will provide insight from his/her perspective and experience.*

**(ii) What sort of people will the participants be and how will they be recruited?**

*The participant is a:*

*1. historian focusing on the United Nations, decolonization, Congo and the Cold War. Chair of United Nations Studies in Peace and Justice, a newly created position at Leiden University's Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs.*

*The participant was recruited through email-correspondence after research into suitable candidates for an interview.*



**(iii) What sort of stimuli or materials will your participants be exposed to? Tick the appropriate boxes and then state what they are in the space below**

**Questionnaires**

**Pictures**

**Sounds**

**Words X**

*The participant received an outline of the aims and contents of the dissertation and was then asked a series of questions regarding the topic.*

**(iv) Consent:** *Informed consent must be obtained for all participants before they take part in your project. By means of an informed consent form you should state what participants will be doing, drawing **attention** to anything they could conceivably object to subsequently. You should also state how they can withdraw from the study at any time and the measures you are taking to ensure the confidentiality of data. A standard informed consent form is available in the Dissertation Manual. Appendix the Informed Consent Form to your Final Project/Dissertation as well.*

**(v) What procedures will you follow in order to guarantee the confidentiality of participants' data?**

*I will treat the interviews and their recordings and transcript confidentially and only include them in the thesis after explicit consent of the participant has been granted. I will not circulate the results to any third parties in written or verbal form. I will not disclose the interview contents in any professional or private setting unless explicitly authorized to do so, or store it in a publicly accessible location, guaranteeing confidentiality.*

**Student's signature:**



**Date**

19-5-2020

**Supervisor's signature:**



**Date**

20-5-2020

(if satisfied with the proposed procedures)