Final Dissertation

Analysing the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor in the post-Lisbon era: a case study assessment of the capability-expectations gap applied to the Ukraine crisis

Name: Marijn van Rees

Student number: 12047813

Supervisor: Magnús Árni Skjöld Magnússon

Date of Completion: 26 May, 2016

The Hague University of Applied Sciences

Faculty of Management and Organisation

European Studies

Executive Summary

This research examines the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor in the post-Lisbon era. In doing so, an assessment is made of the capability-expectations gap applied to the crisis in Ukraine, thereby building upon the work of Hill (1993) and that of Ginsberg (1999). This research argues that in order to examine EU crisis management effectiveness, an adaptation is needed of the capability-expectations gap (CEG) as a concept. This research has tried to bring together aspects of the capability-expectations gap with additional tools to make this concept more applicable and thus suitable for measuring the actual outcomes or effectiveness of EU crisis management. This research discusses that to some extent there has been a discrepancy between Ukraine's expectations and the EU's response during the crisis. Although the policies and policy-instruments at the EU's disposal are firmly in place, the EU continues to suffer from insufficient resources to adopt a truly comprehensive approach, and institutional incoherence in terms of its foreign policy. Furthermore, the EU has suffered from a certain degree of policy incoherence both prior and during the crisis, and from reliability on a legitimated and multilateral approach. The OSCE turned out to be the most appropriate framework for crisis management. However, in terms of overall policy outcomes, the crisis has not been resolved and Ukraine still shows signs of insecurity and instability. Furthermore, although it could be argued that the crisis has been addressed in a peaceful and consensual way, the wider goal towards the eastern neighbourhood of security, stability and prosperity has clearly not been brought about. This research therefore concludes that there still appears to be a considerable gap between EU capabilities and external expectations. In relation to this, the EU has been relatively incoherent and ineffective in both its broader approach towards the neighbourhood, as well as to the crisis in Ukraine in particular. Yet, the overall effectiveness of EU crisis management requires the study of multiple cases over time, whereas in terms of long-term effectiveness in Ukraine, it might be too soon to come to any definitive conclusions.

Acknowledgement

Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Magnús Árni Skjöld Magnússon and Paul Shotton for their motivation, advice, enthusiasm and knowledge. Their guidance has helped me throughout the research and writing of the final dissertation.

Besides my supervisors, I would like to thank Paul van Amelsvoort, friend and student at the Leiden University, for his contribution to this research in helping me obtaining the various academic articles and for proofreading this research.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents for supporting me throughout life and in particular throughout the course of my study which has proved invaluable.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

AA	Association Agreement
CCM	Civilian Crisis Management
CEG	Capability-Expectations Gap
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS-FTA	Commonwealth of Independent States – Free Trade Area
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIB	European Investment Bank
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUAM	European Union Advisory Mission
HG	Headline Goal
HHG	Helsinki Headline Goal
HRMMU	Human Rights Monitoring Mission to Ukraine
HR-VP	High Representative – Vice President
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OM	Observer Mission
OSCE	Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe
P4M	Partnership for Modernisation
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PFCA	Political Framework for Crisis Approach
RI-ESS	Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy
RSC	Regional Security Complex
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
SMM	Special Monitoring Mission
TCG	Trilateral Contact Group
ToL	Treaty of Lisbon
ToM	Treaty of Maastricht
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States

1. Introduction

With the advent of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht (ToM), European Political Cooperation (EPC), which had been at the basis of EU external action since the 1970's, had been replaced. In 1993, Christopher Hill expressed his concern as to the expectations this would raise in relation to the ability of the member states to shape the necessary capabilities in order to live up to these expectations. Both Hill's assessment and subsequent analyses have focussed on this theoretical concept, known as the capability-expectations gap (CEG), and how the EU's role and performance have developed. From 1998, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) gradually added a new dimension to this concept. Together with the formation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, both now form the two underlying policies of the CFSP. In particular, the ESDP initiated the start of EU crisis management as a whole new area of EU external action. This research builds upon the work by Hill (1993) and to some extent on that of Ginsberg (1999) in an attempt to take the analysis of the EU to the outcomes or effectiveness of EU external action, in particular to that of crisis management. Thus, the aim of this research is to analyse the effectiveness of EU crisis management and to assess to what extent this can be explained through the capability-expectations gap as a theoretical concept. In order to do so, an in-depth case study is conducted with regard to the recent crisis in Ukraine, for this presents one of the most pressing issues for the EU in terms of its external security environment.

As such, this research addresses the question of how the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor can be explained through the capability-expectations gap as a theoretical concept in the post-Lisbon era, applied to the crisis in Ukraine. Following a literature review on the theoretical concept of the capability-expectations gap, the development of EU crisis management over time and theoretical frameworks with regard to the EU as a regional crisis management actor, this research successively outlines the methodological approach for examining the effectiveness of EU crisis management through an adaptation of the capability-expectations gap. Building on the methodology, a case study is then conducted, examining the approaches taken by both the EU and other crisis management actors during the Ukraine crisis. This is further examined against the goals and objectives of the EU, Ukraine's expectations and EU policy coherence. Although the main focus is from an EU perspective, it is essential to briefly discuss some of the pivotal issues with regard to the internal political situation in Ukraine. Furthermore, for contextual purposes this research will touch upon EU-Ukraine and EU-Russia relations. The case study covers the period from the Maidan Revolution of November 2013 until the final Minsk

Agreement of February 2015. The analysis section subsequently analyses the capability-expectations gap in explaining the approximate effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor during the crisis in Ukraine. In doing so, both the approaches taken by the EU and other crisis management actors are taken into account. This is put in perspective in relation to the EU's goals and objectives, Ukraine's expectations, as well as EU policy coherence, and where applicable to the findings presented in the literature review. Finally, this is concluded by the main outcomes of this research, thereby providing an answer to the central research question.

2. Literature Review

The main goal of this research is to address the question as to how the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor can be explained through the capability-expectations gap (CEG) in the post-Lisbon era. In order to reach this goal, it is essential to review and discuss the development of the EU as a crisis management actor in relation to the CEG. This way, the current status of this gap can be established. Although the main focus lies on security and defence, the foreign and security policy (CFSP) is also taken into consideration as it is the overarching foreign policy of the EU. Moreover, it has been at the basis of this very concept. The literature review consists of three sections. The first section will discuss Christopher Hill's capability-expectations gap, its subsequent development and assessments and how this concept relates to the notions of actorness, coherence and effectiveness. The second section reviews the development of EU crisis management, which is put in perspective by discussing some of the main critiques. The final section outlines the broader theoretical framework in which the EU as a regional crisis management actor sits. In doing so, it discusses the EU under regional security complex theory and addresses cooperation between regional organisations and the notion of institutional overlap. Finally, this literature review briefly outlines the EU as a contemporary crisis management actor followed by the main conclusions, thereby establishing likely methodological difficulties for the remainder of this research.

2.1.   Concept of the Capability-Expectations Gap (CEG)

An early contribution to the EU's role and performance was made by Christopher Hill's seminal discussion of the capability-expectations gap in 1993. According to Hill, the presence of a gap can be seen as an indicator of the EU's actorness, effectiveness and coherence on the international stage. Furthermore, Hill stressed that the capability-expectations gap is thus not a theory in itself, but rather a concept by which the process of change in EU foreign policy can be monitored (Hill, 1993, p. 306). With the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1992, European Political Cooperation (EPC) had been replaced. This predominantly normative change, according to Hill, caused a gap between the expectations among external actors in relation to the capabilities of the member states to live up to these expectations (Hill, 1993, pp. 308-309). Hill argued that the functions the CFSP now implicated, posed serious challenges to the actual capabilities of the EU in terms of coherence, its resources and the instruments at its disposal, as well as the expectations this would raise (Hill, 1993, pp. 310-318). It should be noted, however, that capabilities provide the opportunity to be effective and coherent, yet say very little about the actual policy

outcomes or policy coherence and thus about the effectiveness of EU external action more generally.

2.1.1.   Actorness, coherence and effectiveness: some definitions

Before this research discusses the development of the CEG, it is important to look more closely at some definitions associated with this concept. Niemann & Bretherton (2013) discussed the main contributions as to how the concepts of actorness, coherence and effectiveness can be defined. In doing so, the authors pointed out that Sjöstedt (1977) defined actorness as the ability to function in relation to other actors with the central criteria being the capacity for autonomous action.[1] Furthermore, the authors (2013) showed that Jupille & Caporaso (1998) employed recognition, authority and cohesion as criteria for ascertaining actorness,[2] whereas Bretherton and Vogler (2006) focussed on opportunity, presence and capability.[3] In terms of effectiveness, two frequently used categories are effectiveness in terms of goal attainment and of problem-solving (Niemann & Bretherton, 2013, p. 265). However, recent analyses have focussed more on the concept of coherence. Marangoni offered a clear definition of coherence and emphasised that coherence refers to the perceived absence of contradictions between policies, instruments, institutions and levels of decision. Furthermore, coherence requires the overall impact of a set of policies to be more than the sum of the impact of each policy (Marangoni, 2012, p. 5). Niemann & Bretherton (2013) continued that, given the complexity of the EU's policy system, coherence is inevitably multidimensional and uncertain. As such, a minimal level of coherence must be present to enable the EU to act. Hence, actorness logically precedes effectiveness, yet there is no clear defined relationship between increased coherence and greater effectiveness (Niemann & Bretherton, 2013, pp. 266-7).

2.1.2.   Development of the capability-expectations gap

The somewhat negative assessment by Hill was challenged by Ginsberg's innovative study in 1999. The author argued that by the end of the 1990's the capability-expectations gap had begun to narrow, most notably because the EU had lowered its expectations to meet more modest capabilities and because it had made improvements to the CFSP decision-making procedures (Ginsberg, 1999, pp. 430-33). Although the claims made by Ginsberg can be assessed as overly optimistic, Niemann & Bretherton state that Ginsberg's overall aim had been to take analysis of the EU to the outcomes of external policies, rather than depending on fixed theoretical concepts (Niemann & Bretherton, 2013, p. 267). Asle Toje (2008) referred to

---

[1] Sjöstedt, 1977: The External Role of the European Community
[2] Jupille & Caporaso *in* Rhodes, 1998: The European Union in the World Community
[3] Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: The European Union as a Global Actor

a consensus-expectations gap, a gap between what the member states are expected to agree on and what they are able to consent to, assuming capabilities had reached a sufficient level. This underlined the need to develop a unifying vision of what the EU should achieve in the international system (Toje, 2008, pp. 122, 139). According to Krotz, whereas in a wide range of economic and other regulatory policy areas EU actorness is fully instituted, it is in policy areas of traditional high politics that the EU's capacity to act has remained the least developed (Krotz, 2009, pp. 569-71). Wright emphasised that the EU's power is reflected by the realities of its internal politics, and crucially, the impact of the integration process. The EU's ability to act is thus directly related to the level and degree of integration achieved in the policy area in question (Wright, 2011, pp. 9, 27-8). To that end, it is important to note that the EU has been confronted with a range of far-reaching challenges, including the financial crisis, the process of establishing the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the start of the Arab Spring in 2011. As a result, the EU's inward-looking focus severely crippled its external actions, especially in relation to its neighbourhood (Whitman & Juncos, 2012, p. 147). Mayer & Zielonka point out that the EU's self-perception as a 'normative' power, as well as the way it was perceived in other parts of the world has been damaged (Mayer & Zielonka, 2012). As such, Bretherton & Vogler argue that the EU continues to be an international actor, yet its influence, coherence and effectiveness has declined (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013, pp. 385-6).

2.2.   The Development of EU Crisis Management

The St. Malo Declaration of 4 December 1998 initiated a new political process and a substantial new policy area for the European Union and stated that, "*the EU should have the capacity for autonomous action in security and defence matters*" (Howorth, 2014, p. 7). As a result, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP[4]) was established at the Cologne European Council in June 1999 (Conclusions Cologne European Council, Annex III, 1999). According to the 1999 Helsinki Council conclusions, the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) was meant to shape military capabilities for carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks[5] (Conclusions Helsinki European Council, Annex IV, 1999). Together with the introduction of Civilian Crisis Management (CCM), the distinctiveness of the CSDP lies in its effort to synergise its military and civilian instruments, known as the comprehensive approach (Howorth, 2014, pp. 70-1). According to Menon, however, during the 2003 Iraq crisis, disagreements between the member states undermined its progress and exacerbated the

---

[4] Hereafter named Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as established after the Treaty of Lisbon
[5] The Petersberg tasks were established in 1992 and consisted of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making. The ToL extended the Petersberg tasks to include *joint disarmament operations*, *military advice and assistance*, *conflict prevention*, and *post-conflict stabilisation* ('new' tasks in *italics*) (Howorth, 2014, pp. 80-1).

tensions concerning the EU's future as a security actor. Still, the author also emphasised that it provided a basis for continued cooperation and coordination (Menon A. , 2004, pp. 631-32). As a result, the June 2004 Council adopted a new Headline Goal for 2010 (HG 2010) which called for the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the creation of civilian capabilities (June 2004 European Council Conclusions, VII, 2004). However, the most important development came with the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) stated the EU's intention, "*to share in the responsibility for global security*", and called specifically for, "*the development of a strategic culture which fosters early, rapid and robust intervention*" (A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 2003, p. 1). However, according to Biscop, the ESS outlined an holistic approach, rather than specific objectives, integrating the full range of instruments for a permanent policy of stabilisation and prevention through partnerships and multilateral organisations (Biscop, 2009, pp. 367-69). Under the 2008 French Council presidency, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (RI-ESS) stated that, "*Europe faced increasingly complex threats and challenges*", and that, "*the EU still needs to be more capable, more coherent and more active*" (Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008, pp. 1-2). However, Biscop et al. argued that the RI-ESS offered little in terms of concrete recommendations (Biscop, Howorth, & Giegerich, 2009, p. 6). In addition, Toje indicated that the RI-ESS underlined the lack of a strategic culture (Toje, 2010, pp. 188-9). However, according to Biava et al., an EU strategic culture is based on a comprehensive, multilateral and legitimated approach to threats, implying the use of both military and civilian instruments in an integrated manner (Biava, Drent, & Herd, 2011, p. 18). Yet, McDonagh emphasised that the CSDP distinctly serves the purpose of building the EU's international identity which is constitutive of how it identifies its interests (McDonagh, 2015, pp. 627-8). To some extent, this would explain the ad-hoc selection of and commitment to various operations and missions. To that end, the strategic vision the EU articulated is difficult to trace in the actual security practices it has engaged in (McDonagh, 2015, pp. 637-8).

2.2.1. *Taking stock and adaptation by 'muddling through'*

The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) introduced two innovations, namely, the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy–Vice-President of the Commission (HR-VP) and the development of the CSDP in order to increase the effectiveness, coherence and impact of the EU (Howorth, 2014, p. 49).

The HR-VP is charged with coordinating the CFSP, assisted by the EEAS as the diplomatic body, responsible for consistent and effective EU external action. According to Marangoni, this double-hatted position embodied the inter-institutional dimension of coherence, between the Commission and the Council (Marangoni, 2012, p. 8). However, Howorth pointed out that this did not help foster coherence or effectiveness and was further complicated by the HR-VP's inexperience in the field of diplomacy and security (Howorth, Catherine Ashton's Five-Year Term: A Difficult Assesment, 2014, p. 18). Smith argued that the creation of the EEAS represented a 'muddling through' as to improve EU foreign policy, highly dominated by inter-institutional conflicts. Furthermore, no attempt was made to institute a training programme to create a solid diplomatic corps among the External Action Service (Smith M. E., 2013, pp. 1310-12). The PESCO framework, or Permanent Structured Cooperation, tried to improve the CSDP and was implemented through the Ghent Framework. According to Howorth, it called for rationalising and maximising EU capacity in which the member states agreed to categorise their defence assets into those which could be pooled and those which lend themselves to role and task sharing (Howorth, 2014, p. 87). However, Voss et al. argued that a bottom-up approach to improving capabilities has not proven successful. Moreover, a framework of bi- and multilateral cooperation undermines the objective of a commonly EU framed security and defence policy (Voss, Major, & Mölling, 2013, pp. 7-12).

Since 2003, the EU has launched 32 operations and missions in total. According to Bickerton et al., some argued that the EU has developed into a credible and important partner in international crisis management. Critics, on the other hand, have stressed the limited scale of operations and the many cases where the EU failed to intervene (Bickerton, Irondelle, & Menon, 2011, p. 5).[6] Menon argued that the limited nature and lack of ambition of the CSDP has partly been due to the ad-hoc way of EU decision-making, which reflected the EU's reactive instead of preventive approach to crises. Secondly, the variety of capability initiatives has failed to deliver much practical progress and has had a direct impact upon the EU's operational effectiveness (Menon A. , 2009, pp. 233-35). Furthermore, Drent and Zandee point out that, from the start of the CSDP project, the focus lay on shaping military capabilities and, although adding the civilian dimension, the EU has failed to establish a truly comprehensive approach (Drent & Zandee, 2010, p. 2). According to Tardy, CSDP still suffers from structural defects, in terms of coherence, effectiveness, and host state buy-in. Thus, operations reflect what the member states, the EU as an institution and the host-state are

---

[6] See, for example, Re-energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy (Witney 2008), Can the EU rebuild Failing States? (Korski & Gowan 2009) and European Security and Defence Policy; the first ten years (Grevi & Keohane 2009)

ready to provide or accept at a given moment (Tardy, 2015, pp. 41-8). Gross & Menon stated that efforts are therefore needed at improving the inter-institutional framework of EU foreign policy. Furthermore, the authors called for a sense of what CSDP is, and where the policy ought to be headed in the context of the EU's security interests (Gross & Menon, 2013, pp. 6-10).

2.3.   The EU as a Regional Crisis Management Actor: Theoretical Framework

In the final section, the theoretical framework under which the various policies operate will be discussed in more detail. First, however, it is important to note what crisis management is. According to Blockmans, the word crisis is understood as an acute situation in which armed force is (likely to be) used. Crisis management then refers to the organisation, regulation, procedural frameworks and arrangements to contain a crisis and shape its future course while resolution is sought (Blockmans, 2008, pp. 8-11). This includes the set of Petersberg Tasks as outlined above. The most important regional security policies consist of the CFSP, complemented by the CSDP and the ENP. Importantly, when analysing the effectiveness of EU crisis management, security related policies can thus not be assessed in isolation from one another. Combined, these various types of foreign policy aim at conflict prevention, crisis management, peace-building and the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. According to Keukeleire & Delreux, however, the binding effect of CFSP is highly conditional and depends on the degree to which specific policies have been developed, to which EU interests have been specified, and to which the EU is acting effectively on a specific matter. This indicates a distinction between declaratory and operational foreign policy (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, pp. 156-169). The ENP serves as the overarching framework for EU foreign policy towards the wider neighbourhood and is complemented by bilateral relations and agreements, additional regional frameworks such as the Eastern Partnership (EaP), and initiatives in the framework of CFSP and CSDP. However, the actual effect of the ENP was and is very uneven, across countries, sectors and over time. On the whole, it is widely agreed that the ENP has not induced the expected structural political and economic reforms in the countries under review (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, pp. 250-51). With that in mind, the next subsections will focus on regionalism, inter-regionalism and institutional overlap, as well as some of the critiques associated with the EU as a crisis management actor.

2.3.1.   Regionalism and Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

As this research is primarily interested in regionalism in relation to security, the most obvious conceptualisation is that of regional security complexes. Before this theory will be discussed in more detail, it is important to look closer at the concept of regionalism.

According to Best & Christiansen, regionalism produces interdependence between a group of states and is associated with regional cooperation and integration. These are not mutually exclusive, as much as options that may be pursued for different sectors and dimensions of regional relations. Regional integration refers to processes by which states go beyond the removal of obstacles to interaction between their member states and create a regional space subject to some distinct common rules. In terms of crisis management, functional and political cooperation is of particular importance (Best & Christiansen, 2011, pp. 430-31). This especially constitutes cooperation between regional organisations and will be further discussed in the next subsection. For now, it is important to point out that regional organisations are playing an ever increasing role. Tavares argues that the empowerment of regional actors has taken place on the assumption that the UN retains primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and that regional organisations may offer some comparative advantages where the UN is either unable or unwilling to take action (Tavares, 2010, pp. 12-17).

The focus on regional security can be traced back to Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). According to Buzan & Waever, a Regional Security Complex (RSC) is a functionally defined type of region consisting of multiple states that possess a certain degree of security interdependence, sufficient to differentiate them from surrounding security regions. It is argued that the EU can be approached as an institutionally centred RSC, a region integrated by institutions rather than by a single power. However, an RSC must contain dynamics of securitisation, yet the development of a security community is characterised by processes of de-securitisation. Still, there are signs of securitisation within the EU, especially in terms of intelligence and diplomacy. To Buzan & Waever it also raises the question as to what extent an integration process has replaced an RSC with that of full actorness. Furthermore, the authors point out that the concept of an RSC is reinforced by the notion of small power (Buzan & Waever, 2003, pp. 56-58). According to Toje (2008), the differences in European integration fit within the definition of a small power (Toje, 2008, p. 202). In a similar article, Toje (2011) pointed out that a small power is captured by the strong interest in an international system that it perceives to be full of threats and the limited ability to address these threats (Toje, 2011, pp. 56-57). Furthermore, characteristics consist of limited resource allocation, moderate level of autonomy, strength in a particular sector, dependence on other actors and the minimisation of foreign policy costs through multilateralism (Toje, 2008, p. 202).

For the purpose of this research, the EU will be approached as a small power in accordance with the concept of RSC and with a limited degree of actorness in the field of foreign policy. In

this context, considering its inherent limitations and in relation to geographical proximity, the EU is first and foremost responsible for stability in its immediate neighbourhood (see figure 1).

Figure 1: The European Neighbourhood (European External Action Service (EEAS), 2014)

As such, a particular characteristic of the EU as a regional crisis management actor is worth noting. According to Börzel & Risse, a central aspect to the EU's strategy is the link between regional integration and conflict transformation. The reason for engaging in this strategy can be found in the idea to foster security, stability and prosperity in the EU's neighbourhood (Börzel & Risse, 2009, p. 5). The promotion of regional integration has thus been characterised as the core of EU normative power. Normative power generally refers to norm diffusion as the most important factor shaping the international role of the European Union. By triggering processes of institutionalisation through norm diffusion, regional integration processes may lead to security and conflict transformation (Manners, 2006, pp. 183-84). In the next subsection, the notions of inter-regionalism and institutional overlap are briefly discussed as these considerably affect the EU's approach to a truly effective form of crisis management.

2.3.2.   Inter-regionalism and institutional overlap

European security is provided by an array of institutions, including the EU, the UN, NATO, and the OSCE, that provide a full range of tools to meet common goals. Interaction with other

regions or regional organisations is thus an important factor as to how crises are approached. According to Doidge, inter-regionalism can affect regionalism while at the same time inter-regionalism is itself shaped by the constellation of regional actors. While the goal of the EU is to develop inter-regional relationships, it is also clearly the case that this is limited by the nature of its dialogue partner (Doidge, 2007, pp. 244-45). In fact, considerable levels of institutional overlap consist between the various actors. According to Hofmann, overlap can be understood in terms of membership, mandate and resources, impacting both the strategies as well as the development of international institutions occupying the same policy field. First, disagreements over policy can be played out differently as member states can forum shop as to the preferred institution. Secondly, dissatisfaction over a certain approach can lead to vetoing international cooperation. Member states can thus politicise the resources and mandate dimensions of overlap to make their voice heard, play out their interests and potentially block CSDP operations (Hofmann, 2011, pp. 102-111). From this derives the notion that security policies cannot be studied in isolation from their institutional environment when analysing the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor.

According to Gowan, cooperation between the EU and UN has not always been translated into effective operations. The EU's commitment to the UN risks creating false expectations and can limit the EU's choices (Gowan, 2009, pp. 117-19). The EU-NATO relationship is of particular importance because of the strategic weight of the transatlantic relationship, not least because NATO remains the guarantor of European security. This has made the EU's relationship with NATO a much more strategic and political challenge (Keohane, 2009, p. 127). In particular, Hoffman points out that since the political, formal relationship has remained dysfunctional, both organisations had to find informal alternatives which essentially meant cooperation through 'muddling through' (Hofmann, 2009, pp. 45-47). As to the OSCE, Lynch argues that it has become a contested actor and the theatre where wider divergences between states are played out. The EU often punches below its weight, leaving much of the political initiative within the OSCE to the US and Russia. At the same time, the OSCE is becoming more important for the EU as an actor for crisis management due to internal differences (Lynch, 2009, pp. 141-42). Finally, according to Hofmann, the overall lack of inter-institutional coordination has created inefficiencies in the crisis management interventions of each institution, impeding their ability to intervene and fostering a lack of strategic guidance. Combined operations are not working properly and national governments, taking advantage of the institutional options open to them, have impeded the development of an efficient division of labour between institutions (Hofmann, 2011, p. 114).

2.3.3.   *The EU as a contemporary crisis management actor*

In this final subsection, some critiques are discussed with regard to the EU as a contemporary crisis management actor. According to Hadfield & Fiott, the goal of establishing policy coherence remains elusive and in terms of strategic actorness, the picture is mixed. Whereas the Iran deal shows that the EU is thinking strategically, the crisis in Ukraine has highlighted the continued divisions between member states (Hadfield & Fiott, 2014, pp. 182-83). Whitman & Juncos add that the EU has struggled to develop a coherent response to the war in Syria and was a largely irrelevant actor in the post-Arab Spring transitions (Whitman & Juncos, 2014, pp. 167-68). The authors also emphasised that the regional context is now characterised by dislocation and instability, a challenge to which the EU has not yet created a strategy (Juncos & Whitman, 2015, pp. 212-13). Börzel & van Hüllen argue that the implementation of external policies suffers from a democratisation-stabilisation dilemma that stems from conflicting goals, ineffective use of conditionality and capacity-building and the absence of membership perspective, thereby limiting external effectiveness (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014, pp. 1034-45). With the instability on the EU's borders, the future shape of the EU's security architecture is thus at risk. The crisis in Ukraine clearly indicated that territorial defence continues to matter, and that in the area of diplomacy and security, the tone is still set by the member states, while in the area of defence it is the US that remains the predominant actor (Pomorska & Vanhoonacker, 2015, pp. 226-27). Still, Shepherd argues that EU has the means to carve out a distinctive, comprehensive role for the EU. Yet, the obstacles to institutional and capability coordination mean this ambition is still far from being realised and, more profoundly, the notion of the EU's distinctiveness as a normative power is in danger of being seriously undermined, if not already the case (Shepherd, 2015, pp. 173-74).

2.4.   Conclusions

It has been discussed that the capability-expectations gap (CEG) should be approached as a concept rather than a theory and can be considered an important indicator for EU actorness and presence. However, in terms of effectiveness, the concept says little about actual policy outcomes. In addition to the CFSP, the CSDP gave the EU the capacity for autonomous action in security and defence matters. It was to synergise both its military and civilian instruments, known as the comprehensive approach, in order to perform the Petersberg Tasks. The year 2003 saw the advent of the ESS, calling for a strategic culture which fosters early, rapid and robust intervention. At least on paper, this strategic culture is based on a comprehensive, multilateral and legitimated approach to crises. The first decade of EU crisis management

(2003-2013) has been characterised by capability- and institutional capacity-building, alongside the start of various operations and missions. However, of the 32 operations and missions launched, the results have been mixed. The ToL attempted to increase the EU's coherence and effectiveness by introducing the position of HR-VP, the establishment of the EEAS and improvements made to the CSDP, yet the actual effects have been disappointing. Although alternative explanations such as the consensus-expectations gap have emerged with regard to EU external action, the many capability initiatives have failed to deliver much practical progress, thereby failing to establish a truly comprehensive approach. Moreover, the EU's inward-looking focus has further crippled its external actions, thereby undermining its normative distinctiveness. Due to the decline in expectations this would have caused, it could be argued that there is now a status-quo in the balance between expectations and capabilities, assuming that capabilities have increased less than expectations have declined.

With regard to the EU as a regional crisis management actor, a number of points can be made out. When analysing the effectiveness of EU crisis management, security related policies such as the CFSP, CSDP and ENP cannot be assessed in isolation, nor can it be studied in isolation from its institutional environment. Regional organisations are playing an ever increasing role, providing a range of comparative advantages to the UN. The EU can be approached as a small power in accordance with a regional security complex, having a limited degree of actorness in the field of foreign, security and defence. A central aspect of the EU's strategy in this is the link between regional integration and conflict transformation, thus fostering security, stability and prosperity in the EU's neighbourhood. However, its relationship with other crisis management actors such as NATO and the OSCE has mainly been ambiguous, characterised by mutual dependence and high levels of institutional overlap. Moreover, the EU has increasingly been confronted with a neighbourhood characterised by dislocation and instability, to some extent due to its own inaction, ineffectiveness and incoherence. Particular emphasis should therefore be put on analysing the EU in its approach to its immediate neighbourhood. This research builds upon the work by Hill (1993) and Ginsberg (1999) in an attempt to take the analysis of the EU to the outcomes or effectiveness of EU external action and in particular to that of crisis management. However, this poses the methodological difficulty of having to take into account multiple policy options and the different forms of policy instruments at the EU's disposal, as well as the interplay between international actors involved in crisis management. In the methodology section, an adaptation of the capability-expectations gap is outlined and presented which will allow the concept to include some indicators for measuring the outcomes or effectiveness of EU crisis management more closely.

3. Methodology

In the following section, the methodology is discussed as to the approach this research takes to provide an answer to the central research question: How can the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor be explained through the capability-expectations gap in the post-Lisbon era. As to the analysis of the capability- and consensus-expectations gap, it has been established that the appearance of a gap is an indicator for EU actorness and presence and less for the actual policy outcomes or effectiveness of the EU. In terms of effectiveness, it merely indicates whether there is a basis for the ability to be effective in the international system. This basis depends to a large extent on capabilities in terms of resource availability, policies and policy instruments, institutional and policy coherence, and the capacity to make decisions. In order to assess effectiveness, this then needs to be compared with the EU's goals and objectives, Ukraine's expectations and approaches taken by other crisis management actors. Moreover, particular emphasis should be put on policy coherence (see table 1).

Capability-Expectations Gap

Dependent variable	Actorness and Effectiveness
Independent variable 1	EU Capabilities
	1. Resources
	2. Policies (CFSP, CSDP, ENP)
	3. Policy Instruments
	4. Institutional / Policy Coherence
	5. Decision-Making Procedure
Independent variable 2	EU Goals and Objectives
Independent variable 3	External Expectations
Independent variable 4	Overall Policy Outcomes / Impact
Intervening variable 1	Alternative Security Actors (UN, NATO, OSCE)

Table 1: Variables of the capability-expectations gap

First, with regard to capability and institutional developments, it is fair to assume that the availability of resources has remained the same since its most recent analysis. Furthermore, the overall decision-making procedure is still dictated by unanimity. In addition, it can be expected that the degree of inter-institutional coherence has not improved significantly. Secondly, effectiveness depends on whether the EU pursues a specific goal or adopts an holistic problem-solving approach. Specific goals may be reached, yet depending on what can reasonably be expected of the EU in relation to its security strategy, the EU may not be

effective. Finally, it has been discussed that the CSDP cannot be assessed in isolation from other EU security policies and its institutional environment with regard to other crisis management actors. This leaves the availability of policy instruments and policy coherence as important indicators for approaching the case study. These aspects relate to questions as to what policy instruments the EU has used, whether there are any significant contradictions between policies or policy-instruments and what the overall policy outcomes or impacts have been.

The research will have a qualitative character in that both primary and secondary data is gathered by means of institutional documents, academic articles and interviews that are subsequently analysed and discussed. Furthermore, it is case driven in that a case study will be conducted focussing on the crisis in Ukraine. In doing so, the complexity and particular nature of this case can be studied, thereby providing a detailed and intensive analysis of the capability-expectations gap in explaining the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor. This case has been chosen because it represents one of the most pressing issues for the EU in terms of its external security environment. The particular timeframe that this research will focus on covers the period from November 2013 with the start of the Maidan Revolution until the final Minsk Agreement of February 2015. With regard to research ethics, during the conduct of this research, both direct and indirect participants will not be harmed in any way. The data will be carefully respected and presented in no other way than as the views of the various contributors. In approaching the case study, a number of questions need to be asked. First, what have been the goals and objectives of the EU? Secondly, what have been the expectations of the Ukrainian government? Thirdly, what policy instruments did the EU use? According to Börzel & Risse, policy instruments consist of CSDP operations and missions, conditionality under the ENP, and sanctions, diplomacy, and financial as well as technical assistance under the CFSP.[7] Furthermore, have there been any contradictions between policies or policy instruments? Additionally, what have been the approaches adopted by other crisis management actors involved, such as the UN, NATO and OSCE? Finally, what have been the overall outcomes or policy impact of the measures taken by the EU?

In order to provide an answer to the above questions, this research will start with collecting secondary data. This data will be retrieved, first and foremost, from the relevant European institutions and research centres. As such, the official positions of the EU can be established with regard to its regional position and responses to the crisis in Ukraine. Furthermore, some

---

[7] Borrowed from Börzel & Risse – Responses to the 'Arabellions': The EU in Comparative Perspective in Journal of European Integration, vol. 37 No. 1 (pp. 6-7, 2015)

academic articles will be consulted. After analysing the secondary data, and in relation to the findings as presented in the literature review, ambiguities will remain and hence, will form the rationale for the interview questions. Primary data will thus consist of interviews and are qualitative and semi-structured in nature. This research aims to consult one official from the European External Action Service (EEAS), one research expert from the Clingendael Institute and the Secretary for Political Affairs at the Ukrainian Embassy. This way, both sides of the crisis are taken into consideration, complemented by an impartial point of view. An interview guide will consist of a number of predetermined questions, yet the interviewee(s) are allowed a great deal of freedom in how to reply. The primary data will be captured by means of audio-recording and converted into a transcript. In relation to research ethics, the interviewee(s) will be asked permission for participation in this research by means of an informed consent form, thereby carefully respecting the privacy of the interviewee(s). The interviewee(s) can withdraw from the research at any possible moment and his or her name will not be mentioned if so required. Importantly, the data will be treated with utmost confidentiality and only be available to the researcher. Finally, in order to thoroughly analyse the results, both secondary and primary data will be categorised or coded into a number of predetermined topics and themes corresponding with the above mentioned set of questions. The codes will then be used to thematically identify similar segments within and between data in order to systematically compare and contrast the findings. Subsequently, the findings will be discussed in the analysis chapter of this research, followed by a chapter with the most relevant conclusions.

4. Case Study: Ukraine

The crisis in Ukraine presents one of the most pressing issues for the European Union (EU) in terms of its external security environment. In the following chapter, the complexity and particular nature of the Ukraine crisis is studied, thereby providing a detailed and intensive narrative of the EU's responses to the crisis. It covers the period from November 2013 with the start of the Maidan Revolution until the final Minsk Agreement of February 2015. The first section provides some historical context in discussing the EU's relations with both Ukraine and Russia since the 2004 Orange Revolution. The second section focusses on the EU's responses to the Ukraine crisis. First, it starts by shaping the anatomy of the crisis. Secondly, a short overview is provided as to the measures undertaken by the EU towards Ukraine, including the reinvigoration of the Association Agreement (AA) and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), as well as financial and technical assistance. Thirdly, a more in-depth view is presented as to the most important responses, consisting of diplomatic and economic sanctions, the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine and diplomatic efforts that have resulted in the Geneva Joint Statement, the Berlin Declaration, the Minsk Protocol and the Minsk Agreement. Finally, the main responses and actions taken by other international crisis management actors are examined, such as the UN, OSCE and NATO.

4.1. The pre-crisis situation in Ukraine

Following the 2004 Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian government under President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime-Minister Yulia Tymoshenko raised expectations, yet would prove to be a disappointment. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko turned out to be a disastrous duo, destroying the unity that sustained the revolution. Moreover, the country had to deal with high levels of corruption and struggled with economic reform (Menon & Rumer, 2015, pp. 33-40). The EU's enlargement turned Ukraine into the EU's most important neighbour and brought distant conflicts and authoritarian regimes closer to home. According to Popescu & Wilson, the eastern neighbourhood has been characterised by a crisis of weak statehood, Russia's attempts to rebuild its sphere of influence and the damage caused by the global financial crisis (Popescu & Wilson, 2009, p. 2). Sasse indicates that in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, a roadmap was formulated on the implementation of the ENP Action Plan, following the EU Commission's Country Report of 2004 (Sasse, 2012, pp. 183-85). However, according to Fischer, domestic politics in Ukraine became dominated by conflicts between the main political forces. Several times during that period, the country was left without a functioning government. As a result, Ukraine came close to state failure in 2009.

Although the new government had set out to quickly integrate Ukraine into the EU's political and security structures, the negative dynamics of domestic politics undermined effective foreign policy-making (Fischer, 2010, p. 2). Keukeleire & Delreux state that the ENP had sought to assuage the aspirations of Ukraine, but without the major incentive of accession. However, Ukraine saw membership as a strategic priority and the ENP as a tool to achieve this goal (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 257). Zakharchuk stated that "*we would have wanted the AA to have some clauses on membership in order to provide some light at the end of the tunnel, but it is simply not there*" (Interview 1, appendices). Negotiations with regard to the Association Agreement started in March 2007 and those of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area followed in February 2008. Still, according to Solonenko, the EU failed to make any real commitments. At the same time, it should also be noted that domestic conditions in Ukraine have precluded any serious influence on the part of the EU (Solonenko, 2009, pp. 721-22).

With the AA/DCFTA negotiations under way, in Bucharest in April 2008, the Ukrainian government tried to push for NATO membership. However, Sasse emphasised that the war in Georgia highlighted both the divisions within the Ukrainian government as well as within the EU, in particular with regard to the member states' relations with Russia and a shared concern about the security implications of Ukrainian NATO membership. Still, at the EU-Ukraine summit of September 2008, Ukraine's NATO aspirations were recognised (Sasse, 2012, pp. 186-88). At the same time, Sasse continues that dissatisfaction with the ENP's non-committal end-point had gradually led to a more pragmatic approach by the Ukrainian government. By projecting its expectations clearly and consistently, Ukraine's foreign policy elite actively shaped the negotiations about an AA/DCFTA. Overall, there was thus a broad consensus on closer relations with the EU, although differences remained in the emphasis, priorities and desired speed of change in these relations. However, the institutional rivalry and dysfunctional relations between the government and the parliament have undermined the implementation of the action plan (Sasse, 2012, pp. 188-89). According to Keukeleire & Delreux, due to the Russian-Georgian war and the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis, the EU realised that the stability and prosperity in the eastern neighbourhood was also essential for its own interests and that strengthening relations with these countries was important to counter the growing influence of Russia in this region. This resulted in the launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009 (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 258). However, MacFarlane & Menon argue that not only the ENP, but also the EaP avoided the question of potential enlargement. Instead, the EU offered association: closer political ties, deep and comprehensive free trade, and the possibility of visa liberalisation. Furthermore, the EU

assumed that the Kremlin would not react to what Russia perceived as an unacceptable level of interference in its 'near abroad'. The EU was equally naïve in its failure to take account of the economic and geopolitical dilemmas confronted by Kiev (MacFarlane & Menon, 2014, pp. 96-8).

As the January 2010 presidential election approached, Yushchenko and his party had lost their credibility. The economy was in a bad state, the parliament was dysfunctional, and corruption kept on thriving. According to Menon & Rumer, the new president, Viktor Yanukovych, had a long favoured alignment with Russia and relied on the Russia orientated part of Ukraine for political support. Under Yanukovych, the parliament signed a non-alignment agreement, thus effectively ruling Ukraine out as a possible future NATO member. Moreover, a law was signed, permitting regional authorities to declare Russian the official language. The law's effect, in short, was a further division between Ukraine's ethno-linguistic groups. In the meanwhile, corruption continued to remain a pervasive problem and no real progress was made in terms of political and economic reforms. Corruption explains in part why Yanukovych eventually shelved the AA/DCFTA with the EU. As such, Yanukovych turn was essentially an act of system-preservation partly due to Russian pressure. However, it ended up provoking yet another revolution that brought him and his government down and that revived Ukraine's alignment with the EU to the discomfort of Russia (Menon & Rumer, 2015, pp. 41-52).

4.1.1.   EU-Russia relations

According to Haukkala, the narrative of EU-Russia relations has been the EU's repeated attempts at constructive engagement with a view to binding Russia into the EU's key institutions. At least initially, Russia also subscribed to this agenda. However, at no point has Russia been deemed a serious candidate for full accession to either the European Union or NATO (Haukkala, 2015, p. 36). Keukeleire & Delreux write that the EU's relations with Russia were structured through the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), but were extended through the Common Spaces since 2003. However, the Common Spaces concealed quite separate visions in terms of economic and security related issues. The difficulty to find a convergence of views was also observed in the negotiations that started in 2008 on a new EU-Russia Treaty, as well as in 2010 on the Partnership for Modernisation (P4M) that should have replaced the PCA (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, pp. 279-80). David & Romanova emphasise that despite the potential positives of the Common Spaces and the P4M, ongoing negotiations for a replacement to the PCA have so far not been terribly productive. Above all,

relations have experienced a steady worsening since 2014 due to the situation in Ukraine (David & Romanova, 2015, pp. 2-3).

According to Smith, the altering geopolitical environment, generated after EU enlargement in 2004 as well as Russia's own regional ambitions, placed Ukraine as a vulnerable in-between state and made competing and conflicting regime preferences more likely. Furthermore, the author argues that this has contributed greatly to the destabilisation of Ukraine. Although the EU presented itself as being driven by normative aims, its regime preference was also driven by perceived economic and security benefits of having a closely aligned and cooperative Ukraine. Russia attempted to compete through offering its own regional integration project known as the Eurasian Union. This competition was further exacerbated by Ukraine's domestic setting (Smith N. R., 2015, pp. 525-26, 536). Keukeleire & Delreux emphasise that the EU and Russia increasingly saw each other as direct competitors in what Russia called its 'near abroad' and the EU its 'neighbourhood', and has been increasingly characterised by zero-sum calculations (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 281). According to Popescu & Wilson, Russia has been working to draw the countries of the region into its sphere of influence while the EU has continued to pursue a strategy of '*enlargement-light*', offering the neighbourhood states the prospect of alignment while dampening down hopes of actual accession. Above all, the EU's responses to crises in the neighbourhood have been largely sluggish and ineffectual, showing a tendency to stick to one-size-fits-all policies (Popescu & Wilson, 2009, pp. 1-5). In terms of outcomes, Delcour & Wolczuk argue that the Orange and Maidan revolutions were not so much the result of the efforts of the EU, but rather bottom-up pressures to oust the incumbent regimes. The biggest paradox is perhaps that, from a Russian perspective, its policies have provided the EU with disproportionate levels of influence (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 473).

4.2.   The Crisis in Ukraine (2013-2015)

The crisis can be divided into several stages: the Euromaidan protests following the rejection of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, a constitutional crisis, annexation of the Crimea, military action in eastern Ukraine and the shooting down of flight MH17, the negotiation and failure of the Minsk Protocol, and escalation of the conflict and negotiation of the final Minsk Agreement (Robertshaw, 2015, p. 2). At the Vilnius EaP Summit, that took place in November 2013, the EU expected to sign the AA/DCFTA with Ukraine. However, already in late summer, Russia had started to apply economic sanctions including bans on Ukrainian products and disruption of customs operations on the Ukrainian-Russian border. Furthermore, Russia had offered Ukraine a significant discount in gas prices, as well as additional loans and other

trade concessions in exchange for deferring the signing of the AA (Haukkala, 2015, pp. 33-34). The domestic unrest that followed in Ukraine, known as the Euromaidan Revolution, resulted not only in the collapse of the Yanukovych regime in February 2014, but also in a steadily escalating conflict between Ukraine and Russia. The Russian response to the collapse of the Yanukovych regime consisted of the swift takeover of the Crimean peninsula, taking full military control of the area. After a referendum on 16 March 2014, Crimea was incorporated into the Russian Federation. This was coupled with a series of separatist uprisings in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine in the months that followed and that have resulted in the on-going destabilisation of the country (Haukkala, 2015, p. 34). According to Zakharchuk, first secretary for political affairs at the Embassy of Ukraine in the Netherlands, the Ukrainian government expected, in general political terms and in response to the crisis, solidarity and coherence within the EU. Furthermore, he emphasised the necessity of a unifying response, showing the willingness and readiness to take decisions, thereby drawing clear red-lines for Russia and providing certainty for Ukraine (Interview 1, appendices).

Figure 2: Overview of the crisis in Ukraine (Bentzen & Sabbati, 2015, p. 1)

According to Pridham, the EU was criticised for its slowness and lack of boldness in responding to events in Ukraine. Initially, this was justified despite an acceleration of diplomatic activity. The mediation of the 21 February agreement between Yanukovych and opposition leaders by the foreign ministers of Poland, Germany and France was a decisive move, but was overtaken by Yanukovych's flight to Moscow and the turbulence that followed. As such, it was Putin who held the initiative both before and after the annexation of Crimea (Pridham, 2014, pp. 55-6). Nicoll & Delaney argue that Moscow's statements and decisions

suggest that Russia's actions were a reaction to the change in power in Ukraine and the perceived threat to Russian interests that it represented, most notably the securing of the Black Sea Fleet as well as Russia's broader economic interests in Ukraine (Nicoll & Delaney, 2014). The EU's first response was to impose diplomatic sanctions on Russia. Furthermore, EU officials made several statements, urging restraint and dialogue, showing a pro-Kiev narrative. The economic sanctions were initially calculated to minimise the damage to EU economies. Haukkala wrote that it was not until the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 on 17 July that the EU was forced to take a tougher stand. The EU agreed to shift sanctions from individuals to key sectors of the economy (Haukkala, 2015, p. 35). Yet, Robertshaw notes that although the economic sanctions have considerably impacted the Russian economy, the steep fall in global oil prices and the failure of Russia to diversify its economy have been significant factors explaining Russia's weakened position (Robertshaw, 2015, p. 5). Another aspect of the EU's response has been to embrace the new government under President Petro Poroshenko and to speed up the signing of the AA. On 21 March, only a few days after the annexation, the political chapters were signed followed by the economic parts on 27 June. Both the Ukrainian and the European parliament ratified the AA on 16 September. In addition, the EU has also tried to damp down Russian concerns regarding the DCFTA through trilateral consultations with Russia and Ukraine (Haukkala, 2015, pp. 35-36).

4.2.1.   *EU responses to the Ukraine crisis*

In the following subsection, more in-depth results are presented as to the EU's responses. According to the team leader for Ukraine at the EEAS, in reaction to the Maidan Revolution the EU stressed the right to peaceful demonstrations and strongly condemned the abuse of human rights, most notably by police forces. As to the Russian aggression, the EU strongly condemned the aggression. It involved a "double track" approach consisting of assuring that communication channels remained open, restrictive measures in the form of sanctions and support for Ukraine reforms. This approach was to be in line with respecting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Overall, the goal has thus been to solve the political crisis peacefully and consensually (Interview 2, appendices). Furthermore, the EEAS official website states that the European Council of 20 March condemned the illegal annexation of the Crimea. From the outset, the EU supported Ukraine's territorial integrity, condemning the violations of Ukrainian sovereignty. The EU's approach has been to combine pressure through restrictive measures with diplomatic efforts and continuing dialogue. Diplomatic restrictions started on 6 March and were gradually increased, starting on 17 March. The political and economic sections of the AA, including a DCFTA, were signed on 21 March and 27 June respectively. The required domestic reforms are supported by €12.8 billion for the

next few years, including €3.4 billion in loans as macro-financial assistance, €8.9 billion by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and €500 million in aid. At the same time, the EU participated in negotiating the Geneva Joint Statement of 17 April which paved the road for the agreements reached in Minsk. In view of the destabilising situation in eastern Ukraine, significant economic sanctions were announced on 29 July. Furthermore, the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform (EUAM) has been providing strategic advice for the development of sustainable and efficient security services (EU-Ukraine Relations Factsheet, 2015, pp. 1-4).

Diplomatic and economic sanctions

According to Gebert, sanctions are coercive measures designed to cause damage to the targeted party in order to force it to undertake, or prevent it from undertaking, certain behaviour. It is, however, very hard to tell how effective sanctions are for they can refer to a range of policy instruments. Moreover, they are often badly monitored. It is thus not clear as to what degree they are implemented, or whether they contribute to reaching the desired objectives (Gebert, 2013, p. 2). The restrictive measures imposed on Russia by the EU aim primarily to push Moscow to renounce its territorial claims on Crimea and suspend its support to the separatists in eastern Ukraine. On 6 March 2014, the European Council agreed the first diplomatic measures. Instead of the G8 summit in Sochi, a G7 meeting was held in Brussels on 4-5 June. Furthermore, the EU-Russia summit was cancelled and EU member states decided to suspend their bilateral summits with Russia. In the absence of de-escalatory steps by the Russian Federation, on 17 March the EU imposed the first travel bans and asset freezes against individuals involved in actions against Ukraine's territorial integrity. In view of the destabilising situation in Ukraine, the EU imposed additional economic sanctions on 29 July and reinforced them on 11 September 2014. These consisted of economic restrictions and measures targeting sectors of the Russian economy. Furthermore, the EIB was requested to suspend the financing of new operations in Russia. Finally, the implementation of EU-Russia bilateral and regional cooperation programmes were suspended. In March 2015, the European Council linked the duration of restrictions to the complete implementation of the final Minsk Agreement of 12 February 2015 (EU Newsroom: Special Coverage: EU Sanctions, 2015).

Giumelli argues that the EU's restrictive measures have provided the EU with some leverage when negotiating with Moscow over Ukraine. The price paid by the EU has been relatively small compared to the pressure and costs imposed on the Russian state-system and sanctions have been limited enough to ensure that diplomatic channels with Moscow remained open.

Date	Event
21 November – 2 December 2013	First round of demonstrations on Independence Square in Kiev (Maidan revolution)
18-23 February 2014	Second round of demonstrations on Independence Square in Kiev (Maidan revolution)
21 February	Agreement between Yanukovych and opposition by foreign ministers of Poland, Germany and France
22 February	Viktor Yanukovych flees to Russia
23 February	Pro-Russian demonstrations in the Crimean city of Sevastopol
27 February	Russian Troops capture strategic sites across Crimea
6 March	EU starts diplomatic restrictions against Russian Federation
15 March	UN establishes the Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU)
16 March	Referendum in Crimea about independence
17 March	EU increases restrictive measures against Russian Federation
18 March	Crimea annexed by the Russian Federation following the referendum results
21 March	EU and Ukraine sign the political chapters of the AA. OSCE decision on the deployment of a Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine
5 – 8 April	NATO advisory support team works on critical infrastructure protection in Ukraine
17 April	Deal brokered in Geneva by US, EU, Ukraine and Russia to de-escalate the conflict in eastern-Ukraine (Geneva Joint Statement)
25 May	Presidential elections resulting in Petro Poroshenko being elected as the new President of Ukraine (formation of Trilateral Contact Group, TCG)
27 June	EU and Ukraine sign the economic chapters of the AA
2 July	Berlin Declaration by foreign ministers of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia reaffirming their commitment to de-escalate the conflict in eastern-Ukraine. TCG should resume to reach a ceasefire
17 July	Downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in Donetsk region
22 July	EU Council decides on CSDP Advisory Mission (EUAM) to Ukraine for civilian security sector reform
24 July	OSCE decision on the deployment of an Observer Mission (OM) to two checkpoints at the Ukrainian-Russian border
29 July	EU initiates significant economic sanctions against Russian Federation
31 July – 5 September	Meetings by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine
4 – 5 September	NATO Summit in Wales: NATO and Ukraine agree on a comprehensive package of security measures for Ukraine
5 September	Minsk Protocol signed by Ukrainian government, Russian Federation, Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR)
11 September	EU reinforces economic sanctions against Russian Federation in the absence of de-escalatory steps
September 2014 – January 2015	Ongoing tensions and further escalation of the conflict in eastern-Ukraine, resulting in the collapse of the Minsk Protocol
12 February 2015	Final Minsk Agreement signed by Ukraine, Germany, France and the Russian Federation after renewed talks under the supervision of the OSCE

Table 2: Timeline of dates and events during the Ukraine crisis (adapted from various sources used in this research)

Although sanctions did not convince Russia to drastically alter its stance on Ukraine, they did to some extent constrain Russian decision-makers and probably prevented more aggressive actions in the Donbas (Giumelli, 2015, pp. 1-2). According to Dreyer & Luengo-Cabrera, ultimate goals are viewed through the lens of full compliance, but targets rarely comply fully within short time-frames. Were that to be the case, sanctions against Russia would only be effective if the Kremlin decided to pull out of eastern Ukraine. Therefore, it is argued that sanctions have had an approximate impact in limiting Russia's actions in eastern Ukraine. The sanctions reduced the capacity of targets to continue pursuing policies or actions deemed to spread insecurity within their territory and beyond (Dreyer & Luengo-Cabrera, 2015, pp. 75-6). The team leader for Ukraine at the EEAS provided its own assessment and states that economic sanctions were something that the EU had hoped not to resort to, in the first place because of the strong economic ties of some member states with Russia. However, the downing of flight MH17 left the EU with no other alternative than to strengthen its sanctions. This also resulted in some harm on the EU side, yet that is the political cost of preventing further escalation. These sanctions were further strengthened after renewed Russian interference in late August 2014. As to the actual effects, however, it is probable that falling energy prices were the main factor in undermining Russia's economy, more so than the economic sanctions. On the political side, the EU can only speculate since there are no proper monitoring instruments. Finally, the threat of sanctions way heavier than the actual sanctions and probably limited further Russian actions in Ukraine (Interview 2, appendices).

EU Advisory Mission (EUAM)

The EU Advisory Mission (EUAM), which was invited by the Ukrainian authorities, is another action carried out by the EU in response to the crisis in Ukraine. In a Council Decision of 22 July 2014, the Council reaffirmed its readiness to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform and to elaborate a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA). Furthermore, it underlined the importance of coordination and complementarity with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Within its initial mandate, the mission was to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform, including police, the rule of law (judiciary, prosecution) and law enforcement. Furthermore, EUAM Ukraine was to operate in accordance with the parameters set out in the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) (Council Decision 2014/486/CFSP, 2014). However, EUAM Ukraine would not be launched until 1 December 2014. According to the team leader for Ukraine, the mission has so far focussed on rebuilding the police force and the resilience of the state against foreign threats. A new law on national police has also been implemented. These are the most visible elements of reform in Ukraine. Overall, the mission consists of strategic advise (since the US

was already providing equipment), training and maintaining regional presence. However, whereas the police is now most advanced in terms of security reforms, the judiciary and prosecution lack behind substantially (Interview 2, appendices). Kostiantyn Yelisieiev, Ukraine's Ambassador to the EU, told Euractiv that since the annexation of the Crimea, "*Ukraine proposed that maximum efforts be made to avoid further escalation*". This included the proposal of an EU-led military CSDP operation on the territory of eastern Ukraine, particularly in the Donbas region, in order to implement the Minsk Protocol (Yelisieiev: The EU should send a CSDP Mission to Ukraine, 2015, p. 3). According to Zakharchuk, however, outside military involvement in eastern Ukraine could have resulted in a huge catastrophe, further escalating the situation. From the Ukrainian point of view, an EU-led military CSDP operation would have been good for deterrence, yet this is simply unrealistic (Interview 1, appendices).

In an analysis of the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine by Novaky, the author argued that first and foremost, the EU attempted to compel Russia to de-escalate the conflict in Ukraine through diplomatic and economic sanctions. The EU also found it difficult to consider more robust measures such as the deployment of a CSDP operation because the EU did not want to get directly involved in the conflict. Particularly interesting is the fact that, at the time when Russia was obstructing the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, the EU's Nordic and Baltic states proposed their own monitoring mission. However, after Russia dropped its initial objections to an OSCE mission, the deployment of a CSDP civilian mission was proposed by Poland, Sweden and the UK with the aim of reforming Ukraine's civilian security sector. The EUAM thus entered the EU's agenda due to the efforts of the member states. The EEAS played only a supporting role and the PFCA was, as a result, biased towards a CSDP mission. Finally, it was argued by the author that the EUAM's success in strengthening the resilience of the Ukrainian state is likely to be determined by two factors. First, EUAM's ability to push through reforms depends on Ukraine's willingness to cooperate with it. Secondly, EUAM's success also depends on EU member states' willingness to maintain their support for the Ukrainian government (Novaky, 2015, pp. 261-63). In terms of outcomes, Zakharchuk states that, "*the police reforms under the EUAM have so far been successful and have contributed to strengthening the rule of law in Ukraine through expertise sharing*" (Interview 1, appendices).

Diplomatic efforts

The main diplomatic efforts can generally be divided into the Geneva meeting on 17 April 2014 resulting in the Geneva Joint Statement, the Berlin meeting on 2 July resulting in the Berlin Declaration, the Minsk Protocol of 5 September and the final Minsk Agreement of 12 February 2015. According to the US State Department, the Geneva meeting on the situation in

Ukraine agreed on initial concrete steps to de-escalate tensions and restore security for all citizens. It was agreed that the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission should play a leading role in assisting Ukrainian authorities and local communities in the immediate implementation of these de-escalation measures (US Department of State, 2014). Furthermore, after the 25 May elections, Poroshenko proposed a 15-point peace plan to de-escalate the conflict in Ukraine. Around the same time, the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) on Ukraine was formed as means to facilitate a diplomatic resolution to the war, consisting of representatives from Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the OSCE (Luxmoore, 2014). In the Berlin Declaration, as published by the German government, the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine strongly reconfirmed their commitment to peace and stability in Ukraine and urged that the TCG should resume no later than 5 July, with the goal of reaching an unconditional and mutually agreed cease-fire. Furthermore, the ministers invited the OSCE to deploy as soon as possible OSCE-observers in response to the Russian invitation at the Russian checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk now that a cease-fire was in place (Auswärtiges Amt, 2014). The team leader for Ukraine at the EEAS states that the diplomatic format, being the TCG consisting of Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE, was chosen by Ukraine on the request of Russia. Together with the involvement of Germany and France this would allow for more flexible negotiations as to effectively resolve the crisis in eastern Ukraine (Interview 2, appendices).

The TCG is not to be mistaken with the trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and the Russian Federation with regard to Russian concerns surrounding the implementation of the AA/DCFTA. On 12 September 2014, all three participants agreed that both the AA/DCFTA and the Commonwealth of Independent States-Free Trade Area (CIS-FTA) need to contribute to a more integrated economic region. On this basis it was decided, for now, that both Russia and Ukraine continue to apply the CIS-FTA preferential regime (Joint Ministerial Statement on the Implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA , 2014). As to the continued peace talks, the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014 was signed by the TCG. However, according to the European Parliament Research Service (EPRS), the terms of the Protocol were soon violated, leading to an escalation of violence. On 12 February 2015, after negotiations in Minsk, the leaders of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement to end the fighting in eastern Ukraine. Following the talks, a set of measures to implement the Minsk Agreement were adopted. These measures included a ceasefire starting on 15 February, withdrawal of heavy weapons completed within two weeks, withdrawal of all foreign-armed formations from Ukrainian territory, as well as a constitutional reform to enable decentralisation of the rebel regions by the end of 2015 and restoration of Ukrainian border controls with Russia

(Bentzen & Anosovs, 2015, pp. 1-2). In an early follow-up briefing by the EPRS of 16 March 2015, however, it was stated that the results of this agreement have been mixed at best. Hostilities have continued, there have been violations of the ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons have had disputed results, and the OSCE observers have had only limited access. Above all, the humanitarian crisis has steadily deteriorated with a total death toll of some 6000 and over 1.000.000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) (Bentzen & Sabbati, 2015, pp. 2-4).

4.2.2.   Approaches by the UN, NATO and OSCE

United Nations (UN)

In addressing an emergency meeting on 1 March 2014, Ukraine's permanent representative to the UN called on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to do everything possible to prevent military intervention by the Russian Federation (Ukraine Calls on Security Council to Stop Military Intervention by Russian Federation, 2014). On 15 March, the UNSC recalled the obligation of all states under Article 2 of the UN Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Furthermore, no territorial acquisition shall be recognised as legal. Particularly, the referendum can have no validity and cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of Crimea. This resolution was vetoed by Russia (UNSC Report S/2014/189, 2014). In the light of the events in Crimea, the OHCHR established a UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) (UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission Deployed to Crimea amid Crisis between Russian Federation and Ukraine, 2014). On 27 March, the General Assembly (GA) called in Resolution 68/262 upon all states to respect their obligations under Article 2 of the UN Charter. It also called upon all states and international organisations not to recognise any alteration of the status of Crimea on the basis of the referendum (Resolution 68/262 Adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014, 2014). After the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, the UNSC strongly condemned the downing and stressed the need for a full and independent international investigation (UNSC Report: Resolution 2166/2014, 2014). On 15 August, the UN presented a Preliminary Response Plan, which laid the foundation for humanitarian response based on technical support to Ukraine and monitoring of the humanitarian situation (Preliminary Response Plan: Situation in Ukraine, 2014). Finally, on 12 February 2015, the UNSC endorsed the Package of measures for the Implementation of the final Minsk Agreements. In relation to this, the UNSC called upon all parties to fully implement the package of measures, including a sustainable ceasefire (UNSC Report: Resolution 2202/2015, 2015).

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

At the request of the Ukrainian government on 3 March 2014, the OSCE decided to deploy a Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine on 21 March (OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine - The Facts, 2015). The main aim of the OSCE SMM was to reduce tensions and foster peace, stability and security. In doing so, the mandate of the OSCE SMM was to gather information and report on the security situation, establish and report facts, monitor and support respect for human rights, establish contact with local, regional and national authorities, facilitate dialogue on the ground as to reduce tensions and to cooperate with other international organisations (Deployment of an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 2014). In addition, the OSCE decided to deploy an OSCE Observer Mission (OM) to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border on 24 July. The main aim of the mission was to monitor and report on the situation at the checkpoints of Donetsk (not to be mistaken with the city) and Gukovo, as well as on the movements across the border (Deployment of OSCE Observers to Russian-Ukrainian Border, 2014). Furthermore, the mandate was to facilitate contacts between parties to maintain inclusive dialogue and provide accurate information about the security situation on the ground. The decision followed-up on the Berlin Declaration of 2 July and in response to a Russian invitation in which the OSCE was invited to deploy observers (OSCE Observer Mission: The Facts, 2014).

Lamberto Zannier, Secretary-General of the OSCE, told Euractiv that over time, however, and due to its broad mandate, the SMM has taken the role of a peacekeeping operation. It is involved in monitoring the ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons, as well as engaging in humanitarian assistance. At the same time, OSCE personnel are frequently halted at checkpoints, are taken hostage or are involved in firefights. Importantly, the Ukrainian people are suffering and the overall situation is getting close to a humanitarian catastrophe. The Observer Mission, on the other hand, has a too narrow mandate. This is particularly the case after the Mariupol offensive in South-Ukraine which left additional gaps in the Ukraine-Russian border apart from those at Donetsk and Gukovo (Zannier: In Ukraine, the OSCE is Practically a Peacekeeping Operation, 2016, pp. 2-4). According to Lehne, however, the organisation turned out to be the most appropriate framework to manage the crisis and prevent further escalation. While political crisis management has been left mainly to a few countries working with the parties involved in the conflict, the OSCE's monitoring mission in Ukraine has become an essential factor of stability. Yet, violence has not stopped and the mission's work remains hampered by insufficient cooperation. Furthermore, although the OSCE has also assumed an important role in facilitating negotiations on implementing the Minsk Agreement, little progress has been made (Lehne, 2015, pp. 1-2). Zakharchuk stated

that the OSCE has been criticised because of Russian involvement, Russia being a member of the OSCE, and the fact that OSCE personnel have no means to protect themselves and are restricted in both their movement and observation. Although the OSCE missions can as such be considered insufficient or ineffective, according to Zakharchuk it is hard to imagine how the OSCE's contribution could have been better in this particular framework (Interview 1, appendices).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Following Russia's military escalation in Crimea and with Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity under threat, NATO foreign ministers decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia, but to maintain political contacts at diplomatic level. Shortly before, Ukraine had established the Commission for NATO-Ukraine cooperation chaired by the vice Prime-Minister of Ukraine, Arseniy Yatsenyuk. In April 2014, following a request from Ukraine, NATO deployed an advisory support team of civil experts to Kiev from 5-8 April to advise the authorities on crisis-management and other security related measures (NATO: Relations with Ukraine, 2015). More specifically, civil contingency plans and crisis management measures related to critical energy infrastructure and civil protection risks were developed (NATO Advisory Support Team on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2014). In parallel, NATO helped coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance in support of Ukrainian IDP's. Furthermore, at the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, NATO and Ukraine agreed a comprehensive package of measures to help Ukraine better provide for its security. The focus of NATO support focusses on four areas namely rehabilitation for injured troops, cyber defense, logistics, command and control, and communications (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2014). Existing cooperation in the defence and security sector was reinforced through capability-development and capacity-building programmes backed with financial assistance. For NATO, helping Ukraine achieve a far-reaching transformation of the defence and security sector is deemed a priority (NATO: Relations with Ukraine, 2015).

5. Analysis

This research addresses the question of how the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor can be explained through the capability-expectations gap as a theoretical concept in the post-Lisbon era, applied to the crisis in Ukraine. It has been concluded in the literature review that this theoretical concept can be considered an important indicator for actorness, yet says little about the actual effectiveness or policy outcomes. Taking into consideration that the CSDP, as the driver of EU crisis management, cannot be assessed in isolation from other security policies or from its institutional environment, the capability-expectations gap has been adapted to include a variety of indicators in order to determine the effectiveness of EU crisis management. This concept has subsequently been applied to the crisis in Ukraine. Thus, the case study has looked at a variety of policy instruments under various EU security policies, its outcomes and the approaches taken by other international crisis management actors, assuming that the availability of resources and inter-institutional coherence at EU-level have not changed significantly. From a methodological point of view this has proved difficult because of the broad scope this adaptation now implies. This chapter analyses and discusses the approaches taken by the EU during the crisis. This is put in perspective with regard to other crisis management actors and is weighed against Ukraine's expectations. The first section briefly analyses the EU's approach towards the eastern neighbourhood, thereby discussing some perspectives on the pre-crisis situation. The second section analyses EU crisis management during the crisis in which it works towards the conclusion of this research. In doing so, it first analyses the EU's goals and objectives in relation to Ukraine's expectations, followed by a discussion of the various approaches taken by the EU with particular emphasis on policy coherence. Finally, the approaches taken by other crisis management actors are discussed, in particular the interaction between the EU and OSCE.

5.1.   Perspectives on the pre-crisis situation

This section briefly analyses the EU's approach towards Ukraine since 2004 and prior to the crisis. A central aspect to the EU's strategy is the link between regional integration and conflict transformation that can be found in the idea to foster security, stability and prosperity in the EU's neighbourhood. This is put into implementation through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). From 2004, Ukraine aspired to become integrated into the EU's political and economic structures and saw the ENP as a tool to achieve the strategic priority of membership. However, the domestic situation in Ukraine has been characterised by institutional rivalry and dysfunctional inter-institutional relations. This has undermined the

adequate implementation of the ENP action plans and has rendered Ukraine's foreign policy ineffective. With regard to the EU, although it could be criticised for pursuing a policy of '*enlargement light*' without the incentive of accession, the impossibility of membership must have been clear to the Ukrainian government. At the same time, Ukraine's domestic situation has probably been an undermining factor as to what the EU could reasonably have done in order to support Ukraine. Furthermore, it is indeed likely that the EU, considering its goal of security, stability and prosperity, acted both out of normative aims as well as out of self-interest in terms of the perceived economic and security benefits this would bring. This in itself is not entirely illogical. However, some critiques could be made as to the EU's approach towards the eastern neighbourhood. It could be argued that the Eastern Partnership (EaP) further politicised the already existing competing and conflicting regime preferences towards the region, between the EU and Russia. It has proved difficult to find a convergence of views and attempts at renegotiating EU-Russia relations have not been very productive. More importantly, the EaP was in terms of policy goals not fundamentally different from the ENP. Therefore, looking at the overall situation, it is doubtful what added value this could have brought. Equally, the recognition of Ukraine's NATO membership aspirations might have further exacerbated the situation vis-à-vis Russia. Even as a reaction to the Russian intervention in Georgia in the summer of 2008, on the part of the EU this somewhat shows a lack of strategic thinking and an inability to understand its counterpart from both a political and cultural perspective. To some extent, this has shaped the basis for the crisis that has erupted in Ukraine.

5.2.   EU crisis management during the Ukraine crisis

The following section analyses the capability-expectations gap (CEG) from which an approximation of EU crisis management effectiveness can be derived. In doing so, this section first revisits the notion of effectiveness and the overall goals and objectives of the EU, as can be found in the EU's Security Strategy (ESS), in relation to crisis management. Effectiveness depends first and foremost on whether the EU pursues a specific goal or adopts an holistic problem-solving approach. In relation to crisis management, this then refers to the organisation, regulation, procedural frameworks and arrangements to contain a crisis and shape its future course while seeking resolution. It is important to note, that in order to determine effectiveness, both general and more specific objectives and goals must be weighed against external expectations, policy coherence and approaches taken by other crisis management actors. In general terms, the goal of the EU is to foster early, rapid and robust intervention based on a comprehensive, multilateral and legitimated approach to crises, implying the use of both military and civilian instruments in an integrated manner.

However, although the EU's broader strategy of early, rapid and robust intervention in crisis management situations would raise expectations, it contains a number of contradictions undermining such an approach from the beginning. First, an important aspect of the ESS is to reduce foreign policy costs through multilateralism which implies cooperation with other international actors. Secondly, a legitimated approach implies the EU's commitment to the rules set out by the UN for maintaining international peace and security. Finally, a truly comprehensive approach is far from fully developed, partly due to insufficient military and civilian capabilities. This indicates that the EU is limited in what it can reasonably undertake in a crisis.

5.2.1   Goals, objectives and expectations

The crisis can generally be divided into three phases: the first phase involves the period from the Maidan Revolution until the annexation of Crimea, the second phase involves the time after the annexation until the downing of the MH17 and the third phase subsequently ran from the downing of MH17 until the final Minsk Agreement. The overall goal of the EU during these phases has been to solve the political crisis peacefully and consensually. During the first phase, the EU stressed the right to peaceful demonstrations and strongly condemned the abuse of human rights. Furthermore, the EU's reaction was characterised by an acceleration of diplomatic activity and declaratory statements. In retrospect, it could be argued that if the EU had taken a more pro-active stance, the subsequent crisis in Crimea could have been averted, yet the question then remains what the EU could have done differently during these crucial months. The change in power and the subsequent annexation of Crimea can be seen as the start of the second phase and, instead, proved to be a turning point which led to a worsening of the crisis. During this phase, the EU wanted to assure that communication channels remained open to maintain continuing dialogue, apply restrictive measures and support Ukraine reforms. Although the EU was quick to sign the political and economic sections of the AA/DCFTA, it could be argued that the EU reacted too cautiously throughout this phase. Its reaction consisted, in the first place, of declaratory acts backed-up by both diplomatic and individual economic sanctions. However, it was not until the start of the third phase, with the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in July, that the EU took a tougher stand, initiating economic sanctions targeting key sectors of the Russian economy. In addition, the EU decided on an Advisory Mission to Ukraine for civilian security sector reform, although the mission was not launched until December 2014, presumably due to planning.

In general political terms and in response to the crisis, the Ukrainian government expected solidarity and coherence within the EU and a unifying response, showing the willingness and readiness to take decisions, thereby drawing clear red-lines for Russia and thus providing certainty for Ukraine. Furthermore, there are indications that the Ukrainian government had hoped for a military-led CSDP operation in the contested territory of the Donbas in eastern Ukraine. In relation to the EU's goals and objectives, a number of points can be made. Solidarity is well known to be a contentious issue, especially in the field of foreign, security and defence policy or in areas of high politics more generally. In the initial phase, there appears to have been a unifying response of some sort, yet the willingness and readiness to take decisive action was mostly absent and might have contributed to a steady worsening of the crisis. The slowness to react appears to have continued until the downing of the MH17 despite the implementation of diplomatic and individual economic sanctions. However, these measures do not seem to reflect the severity of the situation. Moreover, it is questionable whether they drew the clear red-lines for Russia as expected by the Ukrainian government. Only after the shooting down of the MH17 gained the EU more leverage in its stance towards Russia and probably strengthened the position of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) in reaching an agreement. In relation to the above, it could be argued that caution often goes hand in hand with adopting a multilateral and legitimated approach to a certain crisis, searching for the appropriate steps to take and in cooperation with the parties involved. As such, this might be an explanation for how the EU responded. However, this naturally raises the question of whether this can be deemed effective and how this influenced the crisis more generally. In the next subsection, this analysis discusses more closely the level of EU policy coherence.

5.2.2.   Policy coherence?

Coherence refers to the absence of contradictions between policies, policy instruments, institutions and levels of decision. Furthermore, coherence requires the overall impact of a set of policies or policy instruments to be more than the sum of the impact of each policy. In order to assess the level of coherence, this subsection puts the EU's policy goals in perspective with regard to policy outcomes. During the crisis, it could be argued that the EU's use of policy instruments were to a large extent in line with the EU's goals.[8] However, there do seem to be some contradictions. First, the EU's goal of solving the political crisis peacefully and consensually contradicts the EU's strategy in crisis situations of early, rapid and robust intervention. Secondly, the EU's policy goal concerning diplomatic efforts and continuing

---

[8] Assuring that communication channels remained open to maintain continuing dialogue, apply restrictive measures in the form of diplomatic and economic sanctions and support Ukraine reforms

dialogue is contradictory in terms of the institutions who implemented this policy. The EEAS and the HR-VP played only a marginal role, relying on the OSCE and individual member states. However, the diplomatic format, in the form of the TCG, was requested by Russia while at the same time the OSCE proved to be the most impartial actor in this context. With regard to the implementation of sanctions and the support for Ukraine reforms, there seem to be no major contradictions. The EU's approach to put gradual pressure on Russia while attempting to strengthen the resilience of Ukraine as a state underlines a certain logic. However, the impact of each policy (instrument) adopted by the EU have been relatively disappointing. First, the effects of the sanctions imposed on Russia are difficult to assess and it remains to be seen what the outcome will be in the long-term. Secondly, the outcomes of the EU Advisory Mission have been only moderately successful. Thirdly, while diplomacy did result in two agreements, the Minsk Protocol failed to be implemented, whereas the results of the final Minsk Agreement have so far been mixed. When the sum of these policy impacts is assessed, it could be argued that to some extent there has been no serious escalation and that the crisis has been contained in a peaceful and consensual manner. Yet, in terms of the overall impact of policy outcomes, the EU has not been able to intervene in an early, rapid and robust fashion. Furthermore, the crisis has not been resolved, with Ukraine still showing clear signs of instability and insecurity. As such, the EU's broader goal towards the neighbourhood, being security, stability and prosperity, has clearly not been brought about in Ukraine. The following parts discuss more closely the set of approaches taken by the EU during the crisis.

Sanctions

As has been discussed, it is hard to tell how effective sanctions are for they are often badly monitored. It is thus unclear as to what degree they are implemented or whether they contribute to the desired objectives. The overall goal has been to push Moscow to renounce its territorial claims on Crimea and suspend its support to the separatists in eastern Ukraine. In absolute terms this goal has not been met and is probably unrealistic to expect in the short- to medium-term. The fact that the EU had hoped not to resort to economic sanctions could explain why the EU initially resorted to moderate diplomatic sanctions in the form of excluding Russia from the G8 summit, cancelling EU-Russia and bilateral summits and imposing travel bans and asset freezes. The most important reason for this seems to have been the strong economic ties between some of the member states with Russia. However, this raises the question whether the diplomatic sanctions have had a profound effect on altering the crisis situation. It was not until 29 July that the EU took a tougher stand through the adoption of economic sanctions targeting sectors of the Russian economy. In relation to

this, two issues need to be pointed out. First, it is hard to assess whether the economic sanctions have contributed much to containing and de-escalating the crisis. It seems that global falling energy prices and the failure of Russia to diversify its economy have been the most important factors explaining Russia's weakened position. Secondly, there are no proper monitoring instruments in order to assess the actual effects of the economic sanctions. It does seem probable that sanctions were limited enough to ensure that diplomatic channels remained open which is in line with the EU's goal. However, due to the absence of proper monitoring instruments, it is difficult to indicate whether sanctions have had a threatening effect and actually constrained Russian policy-makers. As such, the most likely outcome of the sanctions in the short- to medium-term can be explained as having an approximate effect.

EUAM

The EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) was meant to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform, including police, the rule of law (comprising the judiciary and prosecution) and law enforcement. This seems to be in line with the goal of supporting reforms in Ukraine. However, the mission entered the EU's agenda first and foremost due to the efforts of the member states, and it seems as a result of Russia's initial obstruction of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission. The EEAS only played a supporting role. In other words, if the OSCE mission had not been obstructed, it is conceivable that there would not have been any EU involvement. At the same time, it could be argued that there was at least some pressure to initiate a CSDP mission of some sort. However, the EU found it difficult to consider more robust measures, such as the deployment of a CSDP military operation, due to the unwillingness of getting directly involved. Although such an operation would have been unrealistic to begin with, it seems to be in line with adopting a legitimated approach to the crisis, thereby respecting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, to some extent there also seems to be a geopolitical logic behind the mission in that the support for security reforms were meant to strengthen Ukraine against foreign threats, so as to counter Russia, while maintaining a regional presence. In terms of outcomes, the mission has focussed on police reform and strengthening the resilience of the state against foreign threats. It consisted of strategic advice, training and maintaining a regional presence, yet both the judiciary and prosecution lack behind substantially, indicating only moderate success. Success will thus ultimately depend on the willingness of both Ukraine and the EU member states.

Diplomacy

With regard to diplomacy, the EU as a collective body has played a marginal role. The EU was actively involved in the Geneva meeting resulting in the Geneva Joint Statement and the trilateral ministerial talks as to reassure Russia with regard to the AA/DCFTA. Arguably, the trilateral talks underline a mostly self-interested logic on the part of the EU and were as such not a part of the peace talks. As to the Geneva meeting, it is difficult to assess what role the EU played during the negotiations. Given the inexperience of the then HR-VP Catherine Ashton, it is possible that the EU played a minor role in comparison to the US. However, the overall diplomatic format, the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) made up of Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE, was chosen by Ukraine on the request of Russia. Together with France and Germany this has allowed for more flexible negotiations as to effectively resolving the crisis in Ukraine. Still, another explanation could be found in the relative ineffectiveness of the EEAS, with no effective diplomatic corps and a lack of willingness on the part of the member states to share intelligence. It was the TCG, reconfirmed in the Berlin Declaration, that worked towards the Minsk agreements. It was only after the violation of the Minsk Protocol that Germany and France started to play a more prominent role which led to the final Minsk Agreement. However, this combined effort did shape the conditions that ensured that communication channels remained open for continuing dialogue, especially because of the impartiality of the OSCE. Yet, the fact remains that such an effort could have reasonably been expected to be performed by the EEAS if this is to be considered an end goal of why the EEAS came into being.

5.2.3. Crisis management actors in comparative perspective

Both the UN and NATO played a relatively marginal role during the crisis in Ukraine. The complicated nature of the crisis, and particularly the involvement of Russia, prevented both organisations to get actively involved. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO and Russia have had a complicated relationship and it would have deteriorated the crisis considerably (with unthinkable consequences) if NATO would have undertaken steps to intervene. From the part of the UN, a peacekeeping mission would have been equally unthinkable. Russia is one of the five permanent members of the UN and certainly would have vetoed such a mission. Moreover, the UN has a long standing record of not acting against its veto members. The responses have thus been relatively modest, with the UN initiating a number of resolutions aimed at encouraging states to undertake, or refrain from undertaking, certain behaviour. In relation to this, the EU decided to respect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity while attempting to resolve the crisis. While this is legitimate, it seriously undermines what the EU can reasonably undertake in a crisis situation. Moreover, it goes directly against the

logic of early, rapid and robust intervention. NATO, on the other hand, while playing a more active and deterrent role outside Ukraine, has been confined to providing advice. Still, some commitments have been made with regard to capability-development and capacity-building.

The relationship between the EU and the OSCE has been of greater importance, characterised by mutual dependence. The OSCE's Special Monitoring and Observer missions have taken place in the contested areas of the Donbas in eastern Ukraine with the aim of reducing tensions and foster peace, stability and security. The SMM officially started on 21 March, although initially it was obstructed by Russia. This ultimately led to the EU Advisory Mission as a complement to the OSCE mission, a decision that was further reinforced by the downing of flight MH17. The Observer Mission started on 24 July with the objective of monitoring the borders at Donetsk and Gukovo, a mission that was started at the request of Russia. With regard to the EUAM, the EU underlined the importance and complementarity with the OSCE. As has been discussed above, the EUAM focussed on reforming the civilian security sector with respect to the rule of law and law enforcement. As such, there seems to be no overlap in the missions conducted by both the EU and the OSCE, implying a degree of complementarity in line with the EU's multilateral approach to crises. It has also been discussed that the OSCE, as part of the Trilateral Contact Group, has been the most important actor in negotiating an agreement together with the parties involved, as well as Germany and France. To some extent it could thus be argued that the OSCE turned out to be the most appropriate framework to manage the crisis. However, the mandate of the SMM proved to be too broad, turning it into a peacekeeping mission, whereas the mandate of the Observer Mission proved to be too narrow. Above all, the implementation of the Minsk Agreement has resulted in little progress so far. Finally, the outcomes of the EU Advisory Mission have only been partially successful, mainly with regard to police reforms. In terms of crisis management, it could thus be argued that the goal of solving the crisis peacefully and consensually was mainly left to the OSCE, with the EU playing a complementary role. This might be in line with a legitimated and multilateral approach to crises, yet it still remains somewhat questionable whether this is effective.

5.3.   The capability-expectations gap

In the final section, this research analyses what the above implies for the capability-expectations gap and EU crisis management effectiveness. The analysis showed that the expectation on the part of Ukraine consisted of solidarity, coherence and a unifying response showing a willingness and readiness to take decisions as to draw clear red-lines. However, especially in the first two phases of the crisis, the willingness and readiness to take decisive

action was mostly absent. The measures taken do not seem to reflect the severity of the crisis and arguably did not draw any clear red-lines for Russia. The EU's goal of solving the crisis peacefully and consensually might be in line with a multilateral and legitimated approach, yet is highly contradictory in relation to early, rapid and robust intervention. Therefore, to some extent expectations must have been unclear. Overall, it can be said that there has been a discrepancy between Ukraine's expectations and the EU's response. First, resources are not yet sufficient to adopt a truly comprehensive approach. Secondly, whereas the policies and policy-instruments are firmly in place, the EU still suffers from underdeveloped institutional coherence. Thirdly, the EU has showed only moderate policy coherence both prior and during the crisis. Although the EU's use of policy instruments seem to be in line with its goals adopted to tackle the crisis, there have been some contradictions and the overall policy impact is far from satisfactory. First, prior to the crisis, some of the EU's decisions might have undermined its wider goal of security, stability and prosperity, thereby possibly contributing to the onset of the crisis. Secondly, during the crisis, the EU played a relatively marginal role and had to rely heavily on the OSCE which turned out to be the most appropriate framework for crisis management. Although the EU has not been able to intervene in any significant way, its multilateral and legitimated approach did prevent serious escalation and managed to contain the crisis in a peaceful and consensual manner. However, in terms of overall policy impact, the crisis has not been resolved and Ukraine still shows signs of instability and insecurity. Moreover, security, stability and prosperity have clearly not been brought about in Ukraine. Based on this case, this indicates that there is still a considerable gap between EU capabilities on the one hand and external expectations on the other and which has arguably undermined a truly effective approach to either preventing or resolving the crisis in Ukraine.

6. Conclusions

This research has addressed the question of how the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor can be explained through the capability-expectations gap as a theoretical concept in the post-Lisbon era, applied to the crisis in Ukraine. The research has built upon the work by C. Hill (1993) and on that of R. Ginsberg (1999) in an attempt to take the analysis of the EU to the outcomes and effectiveness of EU external action. The literature review showed that the capability-expectations gap (CEG) is in itself a useful tool to monitor the process of change in EU foreign policy. However, it is especially an important indicator for the level of EU actorness and presence on the international stage. Furthermore, it shows whether there is a basis for the ability to be effective, yet says little about the actual policy outcomes of EU external action. In particular, this research has focussed on the effectiveness of EU crisis management. First, the CEG has been re-assessed to include the development over time of the CSDP, for this policy is the main driver behind EU crisis management. Furthermore, in order to analyse effectiveness, it proved necessary to adapt the concept to include a variety of indicators. As such, this research has tried to bring together various aspects of the CEG with additional tools to make this concept more applicable and thus suitable for measuring EU crisis management effectiveness. This adaptation has subsequently been applied to the case study. From this, the research has attempted to indicate what the current status of the CEG is, as well as to approximate the level of effectiveness during the crisis in Ukraine. The research has shown that there still appears to be a considerable gap between EU capabilities and external expectations, which seems to have contributed to the undermining of an effective approach to either preventing or resolving the crisis. This is mainly due to the EU's insufficient resources which have undermined the adoption of a truly comprehensive approach to crises, continued underdeveloped institutional coherence, a certain degree of policy incoherence and the EU's reliability on a legitimated and multilateral approach.

With regard to effectiveness, the analysis showed that the EU has pursued a mostly holistic problem-solving approach in which it has tried to solve the political crisis peacefully and consensually. This is also reflected by the EU's policy goals adopted to tackle the crisis. An underlying goal has been to approach the crisis in a multilateral and legitimated way. However, as a result, the first two phases of the crisis have been characterised by caution in which the EU searched for the appropriate steps to take and in cooperation with the parties involved. This coincided with a certain level of unwillingness to take decisive action and thus a slowness to react. The EU only adopted a tougher stand at the start of the third phase of the crisis. As such, a multilateral and legitimated approach, as well as solving a crisis peacefully

and consensually not only contradict with an early, rapid and robust intervention, but also undermine what the EU can reasonably undertake. At the same time, the relationship between the EU and the OSCE has been characterised by a level of complementarity and with little institutional overlap. This has arguably contributed to a peaceful and consensual resolution of the crisis. However, the OSCE proved to be the most appropriate framework for crisis management and in terms of the overall policy impact the crisis has not been resolved. Furthermore, in the years preceding the crisis, the EU has arguably made some decisions that have undermined its broader goal towards the eastern neighbourhood in the long-term and that might have contributed to the onset of the crisis. Moreover, Ukraine still shows signs of insecurity and instability and relations with Russia have deteriorated considerably, thereby undermining any rapprochement for the foreseeable future. As a result, the goal of security, stability and prosperity in the eastern neighbourhood has thus not been reached. It must therefore be concluded that in this particular case the EU has been relatively incoherent and ineffective. However, two issues need to be pointed out. First, it is important to note that this conclusion is not definitive with regard to EU crisis management as a whole. This ultimately requires the examination of multiple cases over time, analysed in a comparative way, thereby allowing a more accurate assessment of overall effectiveness. Secondly, in relation to long-term effectiveness in Ukraine itself, it is perhaps too early to come to any final conclusions as well.

References

Auswärtiges Amt. (2014, July 2). *Joint Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany*. Retrieved February 20, 2016, from Auswärtiges Amt: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2014/140702_Statement.html

Bentzen, A., & Anosovs, E. (2015, February 12). *Minsk Peace Agreement: Still to Be Consolidated on the Ground.* Retrieved February 20, 2016, from European Parliament Research Service (EPRS): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/548991/EPRS_BRI(2015)548991_EN.pdf

Bentzen, N., & Sabbati, G. (2015, March 16). *Ukraine after Minsk II: The Next Level Hybrid Responses to Hybrid Threats?* Retrieved February 23, 2016, from European Parliament Research Service (EPRS): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/551328/EPRS_BRI(2015)551328_EN.pdf

Best, E., & Christiansen, T. (2011). Regionalism and International Affairs. In J. Baylis, S. Smith, & P. Owens, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (5 ed., pp. 430-442). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Biava, A., Drent, M., & Herd, G. (2011). Characterizing the European Union's Strategic Culture: An Analytical Framework. *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 49, No. 6), pp. 1227-1248.

Bickerton, C., Irondelle, B., & Menon, A. (2011). Security Cooperation beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 49, No. 1), pp. 1-21.

Biscop, S. (2009). Odd Couple or Dynamic Duo? The EU and Strategy in Times of Crisis. *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Vol. 14, No. 3), pp. 367-384.

Biscop, S., Howorth, J., & Giegerich, B. (2009). *Europe: A Time for Strategy.* Brussels: Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Paper No. 27.

Blockmans, S. (2008). An introduction to the Role of the EU in Crisis Management. In S. Blockmans, *The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects* (pp. 1-13). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Institute.

Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2009). *Diffusing (Inter-) Regionalism: The EU as a Model of Regional Integration.* Berlin: KFG - Freie Universität Berlin.

Börzel, T. A., & van Hüllen, T. (2014). One Voice, One Message, but Conflicting Goals: Cohesiveness and Consistency in the European Neighbourhood Policy. *Journal of European Public Policy* (Vol. 21, No. 7), pp. 1033-1049.

Börzel, T., & Risse, T. (2015). Responses to the 'Arabellions': The EU in Comparative Perspective - Introduction. *Journal of European Integration* (Vol. 37, No. 1), pp. 1-17.

Bretherton, C., & Vogler, J. (2013). A Global Actor Past its Peak? *Journal of International Relations* (Vol. 27, No. 3), pp. 375-390.

Buzan, B., & Waever, O. (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (1 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

David, M., & Romanova, T. (2015). Modernisation in EU-Russian Relations: Past, Present and Future. *European Politics and Society* (Vol. 16, No. 1), pp. 1-10.

Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2015). Spoiler or Facilitator of Democratization?: Russia's Role in Georgia and Ukraine. *Democratization* (Vol. 22, No. 3), pp. 459-478.

Doidge, M. (2007). Joined at the Hip: Regionalism and Inter-Regionalism. *Journal of European Integration* (Vol. 29, No. 2), pp. 229-248.

Drent, M., & Zandee, D. (2010). *Breaking Pillars: Towards a Civil-Military Security Approach for the European Union.* Retrieved October 22, 2015, from The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20100211_breaking_pillars.pdf

Dreyer, I., & Luengo-Cabrera, J. (2015). *On Target? EU Sanctions as Security Policy Tools.* Retrieved February 18, 2016, from Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS): http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_25_EU_Sanctions.pdf

Europe Council. (2004, July 19). *June 2004 European Council Conclusions, VII.* Retrieved October 2, 2015, from Europe Council: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/81742.pdf

European Commission Press Release Database. (2014, September 12). *Joint Ministerial Statement on the Implementation of the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA* . Retrieved February 23, 2016, from

European Commission Press Release Database: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-276_en.htm

European Council. (1999, June 3-4). *Conclusions Cologne European Council, Annex III.* Retrieved November 24, 2015, from European Council: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/

European Council. (1999, December 11). *Conclusions Helsinki European Council, Annex IV.* Retrieved October 2, 2015, from European Council: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/1993-2003/

European Council. (2003, December 12). *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.* Retrieved October 4, 2015, from European Council: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsupload/78367.pdf

European Council. (2008, December 11). *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy.* Retrieved October 4, 2015, from European Council: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf

European External Action Service (EEAS). (2014, March 27). *Neighbourhood at the crossroads: Taking Stock of a Year of Challenges*. Retrieved November 7, 2015, from European External Action Service (EEAS): http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/2014_03_27_02_en.htm

European External Action Service (EEAS). (2015, December). *EU-Ukraine Relations Factsheet.* Retrieved February 19, 2016, from European External Action Service (EEAS): http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/151109_factsheet_eu_ukraine_relations.pdf

European Union Newsroom. (2015, December 21). *EU Newsroom: Special Coverage: EU Sanctions*. Retrieved February 19, 2016, from European Union Newsroom: http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm

Fischer, S. (2010). *Has the EU Lost Ukraine?* Retrieved February 26, 2016, from Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUIIS): http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Has_the_EU_lost_Ukraine.pdf

Gebert, K. (2013). *Shooting in the Dark? EU Sanctions Policies.* Retrieved March 3, 2016, from
Brussels: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR): http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR71_SANCTIONS_BRIEF_AW.pdf

Ginsberg, R. H. (1999). Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing
the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap. *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 37,
No. 3), pp. 429-459.

Giumelli, F. (2015). *Sanctioning Russia: The Right Questions.* Retrieved March 3, 2016, from Paris:
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS):
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_10_sanctions.pdf

Gotev, G. (2015, March 10). *Yelisieiev: The EU should send a CSDP Mission to Ukraine*. Retrieved
February 21, 2016, from EurActiv: EU News and Policy Debates:
http://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/interview/yelisieiev-the-eu-should-
send-a-csdp-mission-to-ukraine/

Gotev, G. (2016, January 28). *Zannier: In Ukraine, the OSCE is Practically a Peacekeeping
Operation*. Retrieved February 21, 2016, from EurActiv: EU News and Policy Debates:
http://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/interview/zannier-in-ukraine-the-osce-
is-practically-a-peacekeeping-operation/

Gowan, R. (2009). ESDP and the United Nations. In G. Grevi, D. Helly, & D. Keohane, *European
Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years* (pp. 117-128). Retrieved November 26,
2015, from Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS):
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf

Gross, E., & Menon, A. (2013). *CSDP between Internal Constraints and External Challenges.*
Retrieved November 26, 2015, from Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies
(EUISS): http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_17.pdf

Hadfield, A., & Fiott, D. (2014). Relations with the Rest of the World: From Chaos to
Consolidation? *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 52, Annual Review), pp. 170-185.

Haukkala, H. (2015). From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a
Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU-Russia Relations. *Journal of Contemporary
European Studies* (Vol. 23, No. 1), pp. 25-40.

Hill, C. (1993). The Capabilities-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role. *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 31, No. 3), pp. 305-328.

Hofmann, S. (2009). Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP. *Perspectives on Politics* (Vol. 7, No. 1), pp. 45-52.

Hofmann, S. (2011). Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture. *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 49, No. 1), pp. 101-120.

Howorth, J. (2014). Catherine Ashton's Five-Year Term: A Difficult Assesment. *Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Politique* (Vol. 3, Paper No. 4), pp. 1-21.

Howorth, J. (2014). *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (2 ed.). Hamphire: Palgrave MacMillan.

Juncos, A. E., & Whitman, R. G. (2015). Europe as a Regional Actor: Neighbourhood Lost? *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 53, Annual Review), pp. 200-215.

Keohane, D. (2009). ESDP and NATO. In G. Grevi, D. Helly, & D. Keohane, *European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years* (pp. 127-138). Retrieved November 26, 2015, from Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS): http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf

Keukeleire, S., & Delreux, T. (2014). *The Foreign Policy of the European Union* (2 ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Krotz, U. (2009). Momentum and Impediments: Why Europe Won't Emerge as a Full Political Actor on the World Stage Soon. *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 47, No. 3), pp. 555-578.

Lehne, S. (2015). *Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis.* Retrieved April 3, 2016, from Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Carnegie Europe: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_249_Lehne_OSCE.pdf

Luxmoore, M. (2014, June 20). *Poroshenko unveils peace plan during visit to Ukraine's restive east*. Retrieved February 23, 2016, from KyivPost: Independence, Community & Trust: http://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine/petro-poroshenko-unveils-peace-plan-during-visit-to-east-352786.html

Lynch, D. (2009). ESDP and OSCE. In G. Grevi, D. Helly, & D. Keohane, *European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years* (pp. 139-146). Retrieved November 26, 2015, from Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS): http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf

MacFarlane, N., & Menon, A. (2014). The EU and Ukraine. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* (Vol. 56, No. 3), pp. 95-101.

Manners, I. (2006). Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads. *Journal of European Public Policy* (Vol. 13, No. 2), pp. 182-199.

Marangoni, A. (2012, July). One Hat Too Many for the High Representative - Vice President? The Coherence of EU's External Policies after Lisbon. *EU External Affairs Review*, pp. 4-17.

Mayer, H., & Zielonka, J. (2012). Europe as a Global Power: Views from the Outside. *Review of International Affairs* (Vol. 20, No. 2), pp. 5-6.

McDonagh, K. (2015). 'Talking the Talk or Walking the Walk': Understanding the EU's Security Identity. *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 53, No. 3), pp. 627-641.

Menon, A. (2004). From Crisis to Catharis: ESDP after Iraq. *Journal of International Affairs* (Vol. 80, No. 4), pp. 631-649.

Menon, A. (2009). Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten. *Journal of International Affairs* (Vol. 85, No. 2), pp. 227-246.

Menon, R., & Rumer, E. (2015). *Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order.* Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Mission of Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2014, April 10). *NATO Advisory Support Team on Critical Infrastructure Protection*. Retrieved February 23, 2016, from Mission of Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: http://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/news/21464-z-5-po-8-kvitnya-2014-r-v-ukrajini-pracyuvala-grupa-konsulytativnoji-pidtrimki-nato-z-pitany-zahistu-kritichnoji-infrastrukturi

Nicoll, A., & Delaney, J. (2014). Russia's Motives in Ukraine. International Institute for Security Studies (IISS), *Strategic Comments* (Vol. 20, No. 19).

Niemann, A., & Bretherton, C. (2013). EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of
    Actorness and Effectiveness. *Journal of International Relations* (Vol. 27, No. 3), pp. 261-
    275.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2014, September 4). *NATO leaders pledge support to
    Ukraine at Wales Summit*. Retrieved February 23, 2016, from North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO): http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112459.htm

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2015, December 8). *NATO: Relations with Ukraine.*
    Retrieved February 18, 2016, from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):
    http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm

Novaky, N. I. (2015). Why so Soft? The European Union in Ukraine. *Contemporary Security Policy*
    (Vol. 36, No. 2), pp. 244-266.

Official Journal of the European Union. (2014, July 22). *Council Decision 2014/486/CFSP.* Retrieved
    February 19, 2016, from EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law: http://eur-
    lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0486&from=EN

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (2014, August 1). *OSCE Observer
    Mission: The Facts.* Retrieved February 18, 2016, from Organisation for Security and
    Cooperation in Europe (OSCE): http://www.osce.org/om/122174

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (2014, March 21). *Permanent Council
    Decision No. 1117.* Retrieved February 18, 2016, from Organisation for Security and
    Cooperation in Europe (OSCE): http://www.osce.org/pc/116747

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (2014, July 24). *Permanent Council
    Decision No. 1130.* Retrieved February 18, 2016, from Organisation for Security and
    Cooperation in Europe (OSCE): http://www.osce.org/pc/121826

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (2015, October 9). *OSCE Special
    Monitoring Mission to Ukraine - The Facts.* Retrieved February 18, 2016, from
    Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE):
    http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/116879

Pomorska, K., & Vanhoonacker, S. (2015). Europe as a Global Actor: The (Un)Holy Trinity of
    Economy, Diplomacy and Security. *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 53, Annual
    Review), pp. 216-229.

Popescu, N., & Wilson, A. (2009). *The Limits of Enlargement-Light: European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood.* Retrieved March 15, 2016, from Brussels: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR): http://ecfr.3cdn.net/befa70d12114c3c2b0_hrm6bv2ek.pdf

Pridham, G. (2014). EU/Ukraine Relations and the Crisis with Russia, 2013-14: A Turning Point. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs* (Vol. 49, No. 4), pp. 53-61.

Robertshaw, S. (2015). Why the EU got the Ukrainian Crisis Wrong. *Global Affairs* (Special Issue), pp. 1-9.

Sasse, G. (2012). The ENP and the EU's Eastern Neighbours. In R. G. Whitman, & S. Wolff, *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact* (pp. 181-205). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Shepherd, A. J. (2015). The European Security Continuum and the EU as an International Security Provider. *Global Society* (Vol. 29, No. 2), pp. 156-174.

Smith, M. E. (2013). The European External Action Service and the Security-Development Nexus: Organizing for Effectiveness or Incoherence? *Journal of European Public Policy* (Vol. 20, No. 9), pp. 1299-1315.

Smith, N. R. (2015). The EU and Russia's Conflicting Regime Preferences in Ukraine: Assessing Regime Promotion Strategies in the Scope of the Ukrainian Crisis. *European Security* (Vol. 24, No. 4), pp. 525-540.

Solonenko, I. (2009). External Democracy Promotion in Ukraine: The Role of the European Union. *Democratization* (Vol. 16, No. 4), pp. 709-731.

Tardy, T. (2015). *CSDP in Action: What Contribution to International Security.* Retrieved December 7, 2015, from Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Chaillot_134_CSDP_missions.pdf

Tavares, R. (2010). *Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organisations* (1 ed.). London and New York: Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group.

Toje, A. (2008). The Consensus-Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe's Ineffective Foreign Policy. *Journal of Security Dialogue* (Vol. 39, No. 1), pp. 121-141.

Toje, A. (2008). The European Union as a Small Power, or Conceptualizing Europe's Strategic

      Actorness. *Journal of European Integration* (Vol. 30, No. 2), pp. 199-215.

Toje, A. (2010). The EU Security Strategy Revised: Europe Hedging its Bets. *European Foreign

      Affairs Review* (Vol. 15, No. 2), pp. 171-190.

Toje, A. (2011). The European Union as a Small Power. *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol.

      49, No. 2), pp. 43-60.

United Nations (UN) - OCHA. (2014). *Preliminary Response Plan: Situation in Ukraine.* Geneva:

      Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Retrieved from

      http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ENG_Ukraine%20Preliminary%20

      Reponse%20plan%20-%20final%2018.08.14.pdf

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (2014, March 27). *Resolution 68/262 Adopted by the

      General Assembly on 27 March 2014.* Retrieved february 18, 2016, from United Nations

      Security Council (UNSC): http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-

      6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_res_68_262.pdf

United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (2014, March 1). *Ukraine Calls on Security Council to Stop

      Military Intervention by Russian Federation.* Retrieved February 18, 2016, from United

      Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases:

      http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11302.doc.htm

United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (2014, March 19). *UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission

      Deployed to Crimea amid Crisis between Russian Federation and Ukraine.* Retrieved

      February 18, 2016, from United Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases:

      http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11328.doc.htm

United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (2014, March 15). *UNSC Report S/2014/189.* Retrieved

      February 18, 2016, from Unietd Nations Security Council (UNSC):

      http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-

      CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_189.pdf

United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (2014, July 21). *UNSC Report: Resolution 2166/2014.*

      Retrieved February 18, 2016, from United Nations Security Council (UNSC):

      http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-

      CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2166.pdf

United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (2015, February 17). *UNSC Report: Resolution 2202/2015.* Retrieved February 18, 2016, from United Nations Security Council (UNSC): http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2202.pdf

US Department of State. (2014, April 17). *Geneva Statement on Ukraine by the United States, the European Union, Ukraine and Russia*. Retrieved February 20, 2016, from US Department of State: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/224957.htm

Voss, A., Major, C., & Mölling, C. (2013). *The State of Defence Cooperation in Europe.* Paper No. 3. Retrieved October 15, 2015, from Berlin: SWP - German Institute for International and Security Affairs: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/WP_DefenceCooperationEurope_Voss_Major__Moelling_Dez_2013.pdf

Whitman, R. G., & Juncos, A. E. (2014). Challenging Events, Diminishing Influence? Relations with the Wider Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 52, Annual Review), pp. 157-169.

Whitman, R., & Juncos, A. (2012). The Arab Spring, the Eurozone Crisis and the Neighbourhood: A Region in Flux. *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 50, Annual Review), pp. 147-161.

Wright, N. (2011). The European Union: What Kind of International Actor? *Journal of Political Perspectives* (Vol. 5, No. 2), pp. 8-32.

Appendices

Appendix A: Email to the First Secretary for Political Affairs at the Embassy of Ukraine in the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Dear Mr. Zakharchuk,

You may recall that I am conducting research on the effectiveness of EU external action towards Ukraine, specifically during the crisis period between Maidan and the final Minsk Agreement of 2015.

I would like to ask you the following questions:

- What have been the overall expectations of the Ukrainian government of the EU during the crisis?
- What is the view of your government towards the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine? Has it brought any significant results in terms of strengthening the rule of law and law enforcement in Ukraine?
- What is the view of your government towards the contribution made by the OSCE in terms of the Special Monitoring Mission and the Observer Mission? Was this considered a sufficient and/or effective response?
- How helpful has been the EU financial assistance from the Commission, EIB and EBRD in implementing the reforms as outlined in the Association Agreement of 2014?

With regard to the above, I would like to ask you if we could plan an interview for around mid-March. In case that you would be willing to receive me, you will be asked for consent by means of a form before the interview is recorded. If necessary, you can withdraw from the research at any time. Finally, the results will be treated confidentially and if so required, your name will not be mentioned in the final thesis.

Awaiting your reply,

Yours sincerely,

Marijn van Rees
Student European Studies
The Hague University of Applied Sciences
(+31)-618709235

Appendix B: Informed Consent Form (Embassy of Ukraine)

Informed Consent Form

Informed Consent Form

1) **Research Title**: Analysing the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor in the post-Lisbon era: a case study assessment of the capability-expectations gap applied to the Ukraine crisis.

2) **Research Description**: For this research I am analysing the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor. In order to find an answer to this question, I am conducting a case study in which I research the crisis in Ukraine from the Maidan revolution of November 2013 until the final Minsk Agreement of February 2015. More specifically, I look at the various approaches taken by the EU since the start of the crisis as well as the expectations on the side of the Ukrainian government.

If you agree to take part in this study please read the following statement and sign this form.

I am 16 years of age or older.

I can confirm that I have read and understood the description and aims of this research. The researcher has answered all the questions that I had to my satisfaction.

I agree to the audio recording of my interview with the researcher.

I understand that the researcher offers me the following guarantees:

> All information will be treated in the strictest confidence. My name will not be used in the study unless I give permission for it.

> Recordings will be accessible only by the researcher. Unless otherwise agreed, anonymity will be ensured at all times. Pseudonyms will be used in the transcriptions.

> I can ask for the recording to be stopped at any time and anything to be deleted from it.

I consent to take part in the research on the basis of the guarantees outlined above.

Signed: _Yurii Zakharchuk_   Date: _16.03 2016_

Appendix C: Transcript Interview 1

<u>Location</u>: Embassy of Ukraine in the Kingdom of the Netherlands
<u>Interviewee</u>: First Secretary for Political Affairs, Y. Zakharchuk
<u>Date</u>: March 17th, 2016
<u>Time of Interview</u>: 12:15 – 13:00

R: Researcher, **I**: Interviewee

R: What have been the overall expectations of the Ukrainian government of the EU during the crisis?

I: In general political terms, solidarity and coherence within the EU because it is very important for the member states and the EU as a whole to have a coherent policy towards Russia, say it more explicitly for some member states than others (for example the Baltic States), given the fact that Russia is the source of the current conflict in Ukraine and the most destabilising factor. Everybody now knows that there is essentially a civil conflict in Ukraine. The EU has to be consistent and coherent in applying standards. Some countries have been more forward with understanding the importance of having coherence than others as well as with having policies to address this crisis. If you don't have this coherence than, basically, Russia has won.

R: So, the main expectation has been solidarity and a unifying response and the willingness to respond on the part of the EU?

I: Yes, willingness and readiness to take the decisions that might not seem that beneficial in the short-term, but eventually turn out to be beneficial in the strategic-term, first of all, to determine and draw clear red-lines for Russia. This certainty and clear red-lines have always been an important expectation for Ukraine. This comes down to the willingness to create economic benefits for the security of tomorrow.

R: Are the "red-lines" you are referring to also a determining factor in implementing reforms in Ukraine, to cooperate with the EU?

I: Reforms are somewhat connected to the conflict in Ukraine because the conflict extracts resources from the Ukrainian government and does not allow things to be done the way they should be done, but this has never been an excuse for not implementing reforms. It is called an excuse for why reforms are taking so long. Reforms are also parallel to the conflict because their success or failure is not determined by the gravity of the conflict in Ukraine itself. Of course the economy fell dramatically as a result of the crisis, but Ukraine has been adapting to restore its economy. The absence of control or economic production in eastern Ukraine does not hurt reforms directly.

R: Is that perhaps also because of the financial assistance Ukraine has been receiving from the EIB, the EBRD and the Commission?

I: The financial assistance is an important factor, but this is not an integral part of the Association Agreement. The agreement does not mention this in any specific way with the exception of some small parts.

R: Is it more related to the crisis itself that the EU started financial assistance?

I: Yes and no. There are many programmes between the EU and Ukraine in different formats. For example, with regard to the EU Advisory Mission, there is an EU aid programme dealing with reforms in relation to law enforcement, such as police and the judiciary. At the same time, there are separate medium-sized programmes which are not restricted to this particular mission. Furthermore, the Association Agreement facilitates cooperation with the EIB and the EBRD, but nothing specific is said about this in the agreement.

R: If the EU Advisory Mission as well as the financial assistance the EU provides is not connected to the Association Agreement, what has then been the rationale for these actions?

I: It is connected, but it is not in the Agreement itself. Ukraine is an important country for the EU or we would not have had the support we are receiving right now. Ukraine has to be made a stable and reliable partner on the eastern border of the EU. The EU is in need of a stable and reliable "buffer" as it were. That is where the bigger picture comes in, being the creation of a belt of stable countries at the EU's borders. The Association Agreement is just an element of EU policy towards Ukraine. The EU Advisory Mission is also just a part of the whole policy of the EU towards Ukraine as well as the financial assistance which is provided by various and different means. This is also good for us because we want the same thing.

R: Do you think Ukraine receives more support in general now than before the crisis, meaning from 2004 onwards?

I: Yes, it does receive more support but, again, this is largely due to the crisis.

R: Did the EU see the crisis as an opportunity to draw Ukraine closer to the EU?

I: It is vice versa. The crisis was brought about by Russia, seeing that Ukraine slipped away. It also puzzles me in a way. Everybody seems to think that Ukraine was and is an in-between state left to the EU and Russia, but this is incorrect. There is no competition between the EU and Russia because it is already decided for Ukraine which direction it is going to take. Before 2004, Ukraine was in limbo, but now both Ukraine and the EU carry the opinion that Ukraine can have constructive relations with both Russia and the EU. In fact, this was also perpetuated by Russia itself. The Association Agreement was initially no problem for Russia as long as Ukraine would not enter NATO. Then there was a sudden change in course on the part of Russia.

R: Has the EU Advisory Mission resulted in any actual progress on the ground?

I: The mission has been very important from all sides that have taken part in this mission. Especially the police reforms have been, in terms of public support and understanding, the most successful so far.

R: Would you say that despite the fact that it is a small part in a bigger picture, it has contributed to strengthening the rule of law in Ukraine?

I: Of course it did. However, in relation to the Association Agreement, it is not the financial assistance Ukraine is looking after. Taking a look at the problem of corruption, the EIB and the EBRD provide assistance for particular projects; it is not like the assistance Ukraine receives from the IMF. The main problem has always been that power is abused in terms of distributing money. The EU not only gives money, but they have the means and tools to monitor and make sure that the money gets to where it is supposed to be. It is the same with the Association Agreement. It provides more tools and means for Ukraine to make sure that the money obtained is going to the already existing programmes. The same thing counts for the EU Advisory Mission. They are there to share their experience and expertise. It is mostly the experience that is important to us and not the money per se… It is, but on a lesser footing in comparison with experience.

R: Did Ukraine expect some sort of CSDP military mission in response to the actions in eastern Ukraine?

I: You have to be realistic, also relating to the OSCE missions. Of course Ukraine wished that there was some involvement. However, outside military involvement in eastern Ukraine could have resulted in a huge catastrophe. From our point of view it would have been good, because it would be a deterrent factor, yet this is unrealistic. The OSCE has been criticised a lot for both internal and external reasons. The internal reason is that, Russia being part of the OSCE, has not been banned from taking part in the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM). The external reason is that the OSCE mission is unarmed; they have no means to protect themselves. Furthermore, most personnel do not want to put their life on the line for the sake of what they are doing. They are also restricted in both their movement and in their observation by the occupation government. So there is criticism, but it is understandable.

R: So, the response by the OSCE with the special monitoring and observer mission has perhaps not been sufficient or effective, but given the circumstances it is all they can do?

I: Yes, that is the main idea. I don't see how it could have been better in this particular framework. There have been talks about an EU operation, but I don't think it is realistic to think that the EU will send a CSDP military operation to Ukraine any time soon.

R: So, an EU military operation would have been good for deterrence, but in the long-term it would only have further escalated the situation?

I: Yes.

R: Do you have some final remarks?

I: The Association Agreement is important for Ukraine not in terms of some practical benefit but in terms of this opportunity to really build Europe into Ukraine once and for all and to get rid of the Soviet past. It is not about membership of Ukraine. We would have wanted the Association Agreement to have some clauses about membership and Ukrainian diplomacy has actively worked on this in order to provide some light at the end of the tunnel, but it is simply not there. Now we have to stick to what we have. Perhaps it is a step towards membership, but right now the best thing is the Association Agreement and cooperation with the EU in the framework of the Eastern Partnership to finally make something of Ukraine which is good to live in.

Appendix D: Email to the Team Leader for Ukraine at the Eastern Partnership Bilateral Division, European External Action Service (EEAS)

Dear Mr. Gertruda,

My name is Marijn van Rees and I am a European Studies student at The Hague University of Applied Sciences. I have received an email from your colleague, Mr. G. Evans, who informed me that you are working on Ukraine within the EEAS. The reason for mailing you concerns the following; I am conducting research on the effectiveness of EU external action towards Ukraine, specifically during the period starting with the Maidan Revolution until the final Minsk Agreement.

As it concerns an analysis of the effectiveness, I am mostly interested in the actual outcomes of EU policy towards Ukraine. For this I am looking at the Association Agreement, the sanctions imposed on Russia, the Advisory Mission (EUAM) under the CSDP and diplomatic efforts. Below, I listed some preliminary questions:

- What have been the objectives and goals of the EU in its approach to the crisis in Ukraine and to Ukraine more generally?
- How effective have been the diplomatic and economic sanctions directed at Russia? Did it have a direct effect on the crisis in eastern Ukraine? Did it alter the outcome of events in any way?
- What have been the effects of the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) so far on reforms with regard to the rule of law and law enforcement in Ukraine? Have there been any actual improvements regarding Ukraine's internal security?

With regard to the above, I would like to ask you if you are willing and able to cooperate on an interview at a date and time to be specified. Naturally, I am willing to agree the conditions applicable from the part of the EEAS. As from my part, before the interview is recorded, you will be asked for consent by means of a form that I will ask you to fill in. If necessary, you can withdraw from the research at any time. Finally, the results will be treated confidentially and if so required, your name will not be mentioned in the final thesis.

Awaiting your reply,

Your sincerely,

Marijn van Rees
Student European Studies
The Hague University of Applied Sciences
(+31)-618709235

Appendix E: Informed Consent Form (European External Action Service)

Informed Consent Form

Informed Consent Form

1) Research Title: Analysing the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor in the post-Lisbon era: a case study assessment of the capability-expectations gap applied to the Ukraine crisis.

2) Research Description: For this research I am analysing the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor. In order to find an answer to this question, I am conducting a case study in which I research the crisis in Ukraine from the Maidan revolution of November 2013 until the final Minsk Agreement of February 2015. More specifically, I look at the various approaches taken by the EU since the start of the crisis as well as the expectations on the side of the Ukrainian government.

If you agree to take part in this study please read the following statement and sign this form.

I am 16 years of age or older.

I can confirm that I have read and understood the description and aims of this research. The researcher has answered all the questions that I had to my satisfaction.

I do not agree to the audio recording of my interview with the researcher. Interview will be conducted by written note taking

I understand that the researcher offers me the following guarantees:

> All information will be treated in the strictest confidence. My name will not be used in the study unless I give permission for it.

> ~~Recordings~~ Written notes will be accessible only by the researcher. Unless otherwise agreed, anonymity will be ensured at all times. Pseudonyms will be used in the transcriptions.

> I ~~can ask for the~~ do not agree recording ~~to be stopped at any time and anything to be deleted from it.~~

I consent to take part in the research on the basis of the guarantees outlined above.

Signed: _Bogusław Gątowski_   Date: _1.04.2016_

Appendix F: Transcript Interview 2

<u>Location</u>: European External Action Service (EEAS): Eastern Partnership Bilateral Division
<u>Interviewee</u>: Team leader for Ukraine, B. Gertruda
<u>Date</u>: April 14th, 2016
<u>Time of Interview</u>: 13:40 – 14:15

R: Researcher, **I**: Interviewee

R: What have been the objectives and goals of the EU in its approach to the crisis in Ukraine, that is between the start of the Maidan Revolution and the final Minsk Agreement?

I: We need to differentiate between Maidan and the subsequent Russian aggression. In reaction to the Maidan revolution, the EU stressed the right to peaceful demonstrations and strongly condemned the abuse of human rights, most notably by police forces. In relation to this, the EU supported both the Council of Europe and the OSCE. As to the Russian aggression, the EU strongly condemned the aggression as can be found in the Council conclusions. Particularly, it involved a "double track" approach consisting of assuring that communication channels remained open, restrictive measures in the form of sanctions and support for Ukraine reforms. This approach was to be in line with respecting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Overall, the goal has thus been to solve the political crisis peacefully and consensually.

R: The negotiations leading up to the Minsk protocol of September 2014 and thereafter the Minsk Agreement of February 2015 were initiated and led, for the most part, by the OSCE and Germany and France. I would have expected that such an initiative would have come at EU level from the EEAS or otherwise the HR-VP. Could you explain this?

I: The EU actively contributed to the Geneva negotiations in April 2014. At that time, that was done by Catherine Ashton, together with Russia, Ukraine and the US. This was followed by a peace plan initiated by the newly elected President of Ukraine in order to implement the Geneva Joint Statement. Furthermore, the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) was established between Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE. This format was chosen by Ukraine on the request of Russia. Together with the involvement of Germany and France this would allow for more flexible negotiations as to resolving the crisis.

R: How effective have been the diplomatic and economic sanctions directed at Russia? Did it have a direct effect on the crisis in Ukraine? Did it alter the outcome of events in any way?

I: Diplomatic and individual sanctions were mostly initiated after the Crimea annexation. Economic sanctions were something that the EU had hoped not to resort to, in the first place because of the strong economic ties of some member states with Russia. However, the downing of flight MH17 left the EU with no other alternative than to strengthen its sanctions. This also resulted in some harm on the EU side. Most notably it had an effect on the bigger member states and specific branches of the economy. Yet, that is the political cost of preventing further aggression. These sanctions were further

strengthened after Russian ground troops entered Ukraine in late August 2014 as a result of Ukraine gaining momentum against the rebels. As to the actual effects, however, overall it is probable that the falling global oil prices were the main factor in undermining Russia's economy, more so than the sanctions. On the political side, we can only speculate since there are no proper monitoring instruments; the mechanism of the threat of sanctions way heavier than the actual sanctions and probably limited further Russian actions.

R: What have been the effects of the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) so far on reforms with regard to the rule of law and law enforcement in Ukraine since the start of this mission in December 2014? Have there been any actual improvements regarding Ukraine's internal security?

I: The goal of this mission has been to reform the civilian security sector. As we saw during the revolution, Ukraine's police forces were not working properly, confronted with high levels of corruption and essentially had a monopoly of force. So far, the mission has focussed on rebuilding the police force and to rebuild the resilience of the state against foreign threats. A new law on national police has also been implemented. These are the most visible elements of reform in Ukraine. Overall, the mission consists of strategic advise (since the US was already providing equipment), training and maintaining regional presence. However, whereas the police is now most advanced in terms of security reforms, the judiciary and prosecution lack behind substantially.

Appendix G: Student Ethics Form

Student Ethics Form

European Studies
Student Ethics Form

Your name: *Marijn van Rees (12047813)*

Supervisor: *Magnús Árni Skjöld Magnússon*

Instructions/checklist
Before completing this form you should read the APA Ethics Code
(http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx). If you are planning research with human subjects you should also look at the sample consent form available in the Final Project and Dissertation Guide.

    a. Read section 3 that your supervisor will have to sign. Make sure that you cover all these issues in section 1.
    b. Complete sections 1 and, if you are using human subjects, section 2, of this form, and sign it.
    c. Ask your project supervisor to read these sections (and the draft consent form if you have one) and sign the form.
    d. Append this signed form as an appendix to your dissertation.

Section 1: Project Outline (to be completed by student)

(i) Title of Project: *Analysing the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor in the post-Lisbon era: a case-study assessment of the capability-expectations gap applied to the Ukraine crisis.*

(ii) **Aims of project:** *For this research, I am analysing the effectiveness of the EU as a regional crisis management actor. In order to find an answer to this question, I start with an assessment of the current status of the capability-expectation gap. If necessary, I will adapt this concept in such a way that it is applicable to the study of analysing EU crisis management effectiveness. This will then be applied to a case-study in which I research the crisis in Ukraine from the Maidan revolution of November 2013 until the final Minsk agreement of February 2015. More specifically, I look at the various approaches taken by the EU since the start of the crisis as well as the expectations on the side of the Ukrainian government.*

(iii) **Will you involve other people in your project – e.g. via formal or informal interviews, group discussions, questionnaires, internet surveys etc. (Note: if you are using data that has already been collected by another researcher – e.g. recordings or transcripts of conversations given to you by your supervisor, you should answer 'NO' to this question.)**

    YES / **NO**

If no: you should now sign the statement below and return the form to your supervisor. You have completed this form.

This project is not designed to include research with human subjects. I understand that I do not have ethical clearance to interview people (formally or informally) about the topic of my research,

to carry out internet research or in any other way to use people as subjects in my research.

Student's signature ...not applicable..........   -   **date** ...not applicable..........

If yes: you should complete the rest of this form.

Section 2: Complete this section only if you answered YES to question (iii) above.

(i) What will the participants have to do? (Brief outline of procedure):

The participants will have to answer a number of questions during the course of an interview.

(ii) What sort of people will the participants be and how will they be recruited?

The participants are government officials and will be recruited by means of email or, if necessary, by phone.

(iii) What sort of stimuli or materials will your participants be exposed to? Tick the appropriate boxes and then state what they are in the space below.

~~Questionnaires~~ / ~~Pictures~~ / ~~Sounds~~ / Words / Other, namely emails

Contact will be sought by means of email and if necessary by phone. Once an appointment has been made, the participant will be interviewed in line with the appropriate conditions. The participant will thus be exposed to written and spoken words.

(iv) Consent: Informed consent must be obtained for all participants before they take part in your project. Either verbally or by means of an informed consent form you should state what participants will be doing, drawing attention to anything they could conceivably object to subsequently. You should also state how they can withdraw from the study at any time and the measures you are taking to ensure the confidentiality of data. A standard informed consent form is available in the Dissertation Manual.

The necessary steps will be taken in order to protect the integrity and privacy of the participants. This will be done by means of informed consent forms and by stating, before an interview takes place, that the participant can withdraw from the study at any time if so required.

(v) What procedures will you follow in order to guarantee the confidentiality of participants' data? Personal data (name, addresses etc.) should not be stored in such a way that they can be associated with the participant's data.

The participant's name will not be used unless otherwise indicated as is in line with the statements that can be found in the informed consent form. Furthermore, data will be strictly confined to the researchers own media devices. This media will not be shared in any way, except with The Hague University of Applied Sciences by means of the handing-in of the final product.

Student's signature: .....*[signature]*..... **date:** ..21./4./.'16

Supervisor's signature: ....*[signature]*.... **date:** ....21/4 '16