

# Security Sector Reform

**The impact of SFIR policy on security sector reform from 2003-2011 on the present state security providers in Iraq**



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**Cover photo:**

“ U.S. Soldiers assigned to Alpha Troop, 5th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, assist Iraqi soldiers assigned to the 73rd Brigade, 16th Division, with M224 60 mm mortar systems at Camp Taji, Iraq” (Vandiver, 2015)

## Executive summary

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The deep political and security crisis in Iraq can only be described as a failed SSR effort. Since the U.S. led invasion of 2003, became the Stabilization Force in Iraq (SFIR) responsible for the reformation of the Iraqi SS. The present Iraqi security circumstances show that since the last U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011, the security situation deteriorated in which several parts of the country have been occupied by the IS. The aim of this research is to examine *how the SFIR policy on security sector reform from 2003-2011 impacted the present state security providers in Iraq.*

The research was carried out with a combination of different methods based on extensive desk research and qualitative interviewing. Desk research served to present an insight into the concept of SSR, the implemented SFIR policy on SSR and its impact on the present SSP of Iraq. The qualitative interview with Professor Joris Voorhoeve provided additional information.

SSR is a project established to rebuild post-conflict states in order for them to meet the needs of their citizens. SSR can be defined as a collective term that includes activities in support of defence, armed forces, intelligence reform, demobilization, reintegration, and the reduction of armed violence.

The reforming programmes provided minimal training carried out with poor knowledge of the Iraqi nation. After the transfer of authority to the IIG, the Iraqi SSP were unable to provide public security. The security situation deteriorated in which it counteracted the reconstruction process. Since the U.S. withdrew from Iraq, former Prime Minister Nour al-Maliki rearranged the SS to gain power in which Sunni Muslims have been completely removed from the government. These events resulted in an increase in insurgent groups over the last few years.

In conclusion, this research shows that the impact of the SFIR policy on SSR from 2003-2011 on the present SSP was caused by multiple factors. Firstly, the expectations of the coalition pre-war planners appeared to be incorrect. Proper preparation would have to be carried out to provide insight into the political situation. Secondly, disagreements related to the occupation caused an increase in disunity. The Iraqi nation should have been involved in the process of designing, managing and implementing the security policies. Thirdly, the removal of the Baath party and ISF caused an increase in insurgency and violence. The coalition should have understood the political construction before the removal of the Baath party and ISF. Fourthly, the programmes provided minimal training and therefore did not respond to the needs and interests of the Iraqi nation. The coalition should have involved the Iraqi nation in the reform programmes in order to suits its needs and gain its support. Finally, the transfer of the authority deadline caused a shortage in time. A more stable reconstruction structure would have been essential in order to reach long-term success.

## List of abbreviations

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<b>CPA</b>	Coalition Provisional Authority
<b>CPATT</b>	Civilian Police Assistance Training Team
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development
<b>HCDC</b>	House of Commons Defence Committee
<b>IAF</b>	Iraqi Armed Forces
<b>ICDC</b>	Iraqi Civil Defence Corps
<b>IGC</b>	Iraqi Governing Council
<b>IIG</b>	Iraqi Interim Government
<b>IIS</b>	Iraqi Intelligence Services
<b>ING</b>	Iraqi National Guard
<b>INIS</b>	Iraqi National Intelligence Services
<b>IPA</b>	International Police Advisor
<b>IPT</b>	International Police Trainer
<b>IS</b>	Islamic State
<b>ISF</b>	Iraqi Security Force
<b>ISSAT</b>	The International Security Sector Advisory Team
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>NIA</b>	New Iraqi Army
<b>NIP</b>	New Iraqi Police
<b>MoD</b>	Ministry of Defence
<b>MoI</b>	Ministry of Interior
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>SFIR</b>	Stabilization Force in Iraq
<b>SJP</b>	Justice Providers
<b>SS</b>	Security Sector
<b>SSPR</b>	State Security Providers Reform
<b>SSR</b>	Security Sector Reform
<b>SSP</b>	State Security Providers
<b>U.K.</b>	United Kingdom
<b>U.S.A</b>	United States of America



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## 1. Introduction

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March 13, 2003, is the day that the U.S. decided to initiate a war in which combined force troops, called the Stabilization Force in Iraq (SFIR), invaded Iraq. SFIR was a coalition of several countries led by the U.S. with the aim to end the regime of Saddam Hussein and to ensure a future of peace and democracy. Assumptions that the coalition would receive assistance from the ISF in order to ensure stability appeared to be incorrect. Disunity among the Iraqi community was increasing, as they disagreed with the intervention. A major part of the ISF left their duties in April 2003, and returned to their homes (Rathmell, Oliker, & Terrence, 2005, p. 14).

During the first stage of the occupation, the coalition decided to remove the Arab Baath party (also referred to as the de-Ba'athification) to avoid them recovering their power position in Iraq. The Baath regime were the parties that governed Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein. After the removal process, the coalition decided to disband the remaining personnel of the security forces and the security institutions. The main goal of the removal process was the reconstruction of the ISF and institutions. These forces and institutions aimed to accomplish different goals compared to the Saddam regime. After the introduction of the removal process, the security situation in Iraq became unstable, because a major part of the Iraqi community was opposed to the occupation that resulted in an increase of criminality and political violence. The coalition was challenged to reconstruct the destroyed infrastructure, create a unity among the Iraqi population, eliminate insurgents, fight terrorism and reconstruct the SS. This required a massive security reconstruction project. However, minimum preparation was carried out to provide reform processes for Iraqi security institutions and forces and insufficient attempts were undertaken to adjust reform programs in response to the security situation. As part of the coalition plan to bring peace and democracy, Iraq had to be transformed into a new nation (Sissons & Al-Saiedi, 2013, p. 9).

The current situation in Iraq remains harmful, because of the occupation of several parts of the country by the Islamic State (IS). The quick and brutal rise of the IS has shown that the terrorist group is well organized, with both military and communicative sources. IS provides an image of a deep political and security crisis in Iraq (Van Veen & Grinstead, 2014, p. 7). This leads to the central question of this research:

*How has the SFIR policy on security sector reform from 2003-2011 impacted the present state security providers in Iraq?*

This research will provide an insight in the effects of SSR in Iraq. Subsequently, an analysis will be performed on the shortages of the implementation process of SFIR policy on security sector reform in Iraq during 2003-2011. This research will focus on answering to following sub-questions:

- *What is security sector reform?*
- *What kind of policy on state security provider's reform was implemented by the SFIR in Iraq?*
- *What are the positive and negative outcomes of the SFIR policy on state security provider's reform in Iraq?*
- *Under what kind of security circumstances are the present security providers currently operating?*

### **1.1 Research structure**

This research is focused on the reform effects of SSR in Iraq from 2003 until 2011 led by the SFIR. The interference from 2003 in Iraq seems to have had serious consequences on the SS that led to an emergency situation in which parts of Iraq have been occupied by IS. SSR will be discussed in the first chapter, highlighting the important aspects that have had a crucial effect on the results of the reform process. A demarcated analysis will be provided on the manners in which SSR has to be implemented. The second chapter provides an insight into the policy on the SSPR, which was conducted under the guidance of the SFIR. Subsequently, an insight will be given into the formation of the SSP shortly after the SFIR troops left Iraq in 2011. Finally, an overview will be given of the effects of SSPR, which will lead to a conclusion, on how SFIR policy on SSR from 2003-2011 has impacted the present SSP in Iraq.

## 2. Material and methodology

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The profound subject of this research and the required flexibility were the reason for the usage of extensive desk research. Desk research consists mainly of secondary qualitative information. Academic publications of several professors, such as Hebert Wulf, Donald Stoker, Andrew Ratmell and Yves Tiberghien have established the framework for this research. Furthermore, secondary qualitative information has been supplemented with a primary source: an interview carried out with the former Dutch Minister of Defence, Professor Joris Voorhoeve. Qualitative interviewing served as a means to create more insight into the SSR in Iraq, the positive and negative outcomes, and the present SSP sector.

### *Ethics*

While doing research one can be obliged to take moral principles into account, such as victim empathy and in this case religious sensitivity. Due to the sensitivity of the subject, to the numerous victims and due to the large refugee flow to Europe, it was important to sympathise with the people that were involved in this conflict. Statements were therefore carefully made in this research. "Researchers always have to take account of the effects of their actions upon those subjects and act in such a way to preserve their rights and integrity as human beings" (Gilbert, 2008, p. 145). Religious sensitivity was also taken into account during this research. It was necessary to leave out individual religious preferences, while analysing the present unstable Iraqi security circumstances that were partly caused by the conflicts between Sunni and Shia Muslims.

### *Limitations*

This research faced some important limitations which had to be followed. It was essential to narrow down the research question and focus on the SFIR policy on SSR from 2003-2011 and its impact on the SSP in Iraq. This research did not provide the opportunity to discuss all the interlinked factors of SSR in Iraq. It could for example not deal with the conflict between the U.S. government and former president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, which led to the invasion of 2003. It was, furthermore, impossible to address the invasion that started in 2003. Neither could it deal with the impact of SFIR policy on all the SS in Iraq. Due to the scope of this research, some related issues could not be addressed to answer the research question.

### 3. Security Sector Reform

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In order to understand the SFIR policy on SSR in Iraq, the concept of SSR has to be defined and the most important principles of SSR have to be examined. Over the last decade, SSR has become an important part of international assistance to countries affected by conflicts. Professor Tiberghien states, that ‘peace building has become one of the dominant issues in current world politics’ (Tiberghien, 2013, p. 170). SSR plays an important role in peacekeeping operations and is considered a key player in peace building operations. SSR is a process that tries to rebuild post-conflict states in order to meet the needs of their citizens and eventually become a member of the international system. SSR can be defined as ‘the set of policies, plans, programs and activities that a government can undertake to improve the way it provides safety, security and justice’ (USAID, DoC, & DoS, 2009, p. 3).

SSR made its public attention publicity the first time it was offered in 1998 during a speech in London by Clare Short, the former United Kingdom Minister for International Development. SSR helps to prevent conflicts and tries to rebuild confidence between the state and its civilians to ensure stable peace and development as in Afghanistan, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. The process can serve as a method for many states to reduce internal and external threats or pressures. SSR is a collective term that includes activities in support of defence and armed forces reform, intelligence reform, demobilization and reintegration, and reduction of armed violence (United Nations, 2014, p. 13). The reform process is a development activity that is conducted by agencies of the U.S. government, non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), international organizations, multinational partners and the host country (Wulf, 2004, p. 2). The designers of SSR policies, laws and structures need to have sufficient knowledge related to the history, culture, legal framework and security concerning the host nation in order to result in success. In order to realize long-term SSR, several principles need to be carried out during the implementation of SSR. As displayed in figure 1, the following principles can be distinguished: local ownership, effectiveness, accountability, political understanding, broad vision and technical understanding.

## Security Sector Reform



Source: ISSAT, 2012

Local ownership can be defined as the right of the host population to have a share in the reform process of their country. According to professor Brzoska, ‘national leadership, or at least partnership by some select and relevant groups, is crucial for successful development projects’ (Brzoska, 2002, p. 39). Therefore, it is important for the host nation to design, manage and implement their security policies, institutions and activities approach focused on social emancipation, equality, human rights, norms and values (ISSAT, 2012, p. 7).

Effectiveness is one of the main principles of SSR. Improving security and justice with the ultimate goal to improve the quality of life for the host population, is an excellent example of effectiveness. This could be accomplished through a better cooperation between security and justice providers. Furthermore, well-developed training programs are important for security and justice officials, together with good quality guidance for the reform of security and justice institutions. Accountability is also an extremely important principle of SSR. Providing security in order to serve the interests of the population can be achieved through accountability and transparency. Professor Brzoska states, that ‘in order to reform insecurity, the priority must therefore be the improvement of accountability’ (Brzoska, 2002, p. 30).

The third aspect of SSR can be divided into three principles: political understanding, broad vision and technical understanding of security and justice institutions. First of all, it is important during an SSR project to understand the political constructions of the host nation, because they are very complex and affect the authority of the state, polity and principles, such as security, human rights and freedom. Secondly, a broad view on the overall reform process is necessary. It is important to have a clear view of the responsibility division. To create a broad holistic vision of SSR, it is important to understand the relations between the actors in the security and justice sector. Finally, it is required to have technical understanding of the SSR process. SSR requires a combination of different approaches and several skills such as, substantive knowledge and experience in defence and local government, programme management skills in planning and coordination and experience in leadership and communication skills (ISSAT, 2012, p. 11).

### **3.1 Security Sectors**

In order to further understand SSR, it is important to gain more knowledge about the concepts of SS. Security is very important for the development and for the reduction of poverty. According to professors Bryden and Hänggi, SS can “be considered as dysfunctional if it does not provide security to the state and its people in an efficient and effect way or, even worse, if it is the cause of insecurity” (Bryden & Hänggi, 2004, p. 8). Usually, SS was defined as a collective term for security agencies that were responsible for internal and external security. Currently, SS can be defined as a broader collection of state and non-state security and justice actors. The report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations states, that “the security sector is the definition of a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country” (United Nations, 2014, p. 2). As figure 2 shows, the categories of actors with an important role in the services of security and justice include: state security and justice providers, state governance and oversight bodies, justice and law enforcement bodies and non-state security and justice providers (ISSAT, 2012, p. 5).

## Security and justice providers



Source: (ISSAT, 2012)

### *State security and state justice providers*

‘State Security Providers’ (SSP) is a collective term for units that are allowed to hold and use arms authorized by the state. This includes: armed forces, police, military forces, intelligence services, secret services, coast guards, border guards, custom authorities and local security units. State Justice Providers (SJP) are responsible for the oversight and assistance of the activities of the SSP. These include the judiciary institutions: prosecution services, ministries of justice, penitentiary institutions and criminal investigations units (USAID, DoC, & DoS, 2009, p. 3)

### *State governance and oversight bodies*

State governance and oversight bodies are responsible for the creation of the legal framework, which provides guidance to the operation within the boundaries of the law. These include: presidential and prime ministerial offices, ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs, finance ministries and civil society organizations.

*Justice and law enforcement bodies*

Justice and law enforcement bodies are responsible for law enforcement and maintaining order and safety. These services need to be provided within the boundaries of the rule of law. These include: judiciary and justice ministries, prisons, justice systems, ombudsmen, human rights commissions, prosecution services and criminal investigation services.

*Non-State security and justice providers*

This category includes a broad group of actors with different degrees of legal status. They can be defined as the non-statutory security and justice providers that are professional organizations with power and influence. These include: special interest groups, private body guard units, political parties, private security company's justice systems and community watch groups (Hendrickson & Karkoszka, 2002, p. 179).

**3.2 Programme of SSR**

Understanding the programme in which SSR needs to be carried out is important to ensure a successful SSR process. According to professors England and Boucher, "SSR programs in stabilization environments should have realistic expectations, and planners should understand categories of activities and their implementation" (England & Boucher, 2009, p. 24). As figure 3 shows, the programme cycle can be defined as the path in which all the steps are described from beginning to end. This process includes: assessment and identification, design and planning, implementation, monitoring and review, evaluation and lessons learned. Both internal and external actors must properly follow these steps in order to reach success.

**SSR programme**

Source: ISSAT, 2012

### *Assessment and identification*

Assessment can be defined as a process of collecting relevant data and analysing information. Analysis should be the basis for programming decisions. The results of the assessment will provide an insight into the political and economic situation of the host nation. It will also provide a classification of the security and justice importance and the identification of a particular group, sector or country. Assessment is essential for the design, planning and implementation of SSR programme in which results and effects could be estimated (ISSAT, 2012, p. 26).

### *Design and planning*

After the completion of the assessment and identification process, the process of design and planning starts. Professors Rathmell, Olikier and Terrence state, that “both in the run up to war and during the occupation, too often failure occurred to conduct-worst case (or even other-case) analysis” (Rathmell, Olikier, & Terrence, 2005, p. 6). Coordinated planning is required for the development of the SS. During the process of design and planning, it is important to ensure involvement of accountability and local ownership.

### *Programme implementation*

Programme implementation of SSR can be defined as substantive formation of a state. It is important that well-functioning government institutions and agencies are constructed in order to serve the interest of the state and its population. This results in a collaboration of agencies that work together in order to profit from each other’s advantages. All plans for stabilization reform should be implemented with flexibility. During the process of implementation attention must be paid to the cooperation between the host nation and other actors.

### *Monitoring, review and evaluation*

Monitoring can be defined as the control process on the sustainable results in which difficulties can be estimated in advance. In order to improve sustainable results and usage of recourses review is an essential. Evaluation is important in order to understand the value and efficiency of an activity, policy or programme. Professors England and Boucher state that effective SSR can be realized when evaluation and monitoring of the process is subjected to a sufficient level (England & Boucher, 2009, p. 100). The process of monitoring, review and evaluation needs to be carried out during the implementation and after the concluding part in order to assess the outcome of the SSR process.

*Lessons learned*

The 'lessons learned' process provides a clear overview of the challenges during an SSR process for both national and international actors. Lessons can be learned and feedback can be given to create specific solutions for the future. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) clarified that security sector institutions often operate individually rather than as a collective system. Furthermore, in too many countries there is a shortage in financial, human and institutional resources support (ISSAT, 2012, p. 30).

#### 4. State security provider's reform in Iraq

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Analysing the positive and negative outcomes of the SFIR policy on SSR necessitates looking at the implemented SSR project in order to reconstruct the Iraqi SSP. During the first stage of the implementation process the coalition decided on the 1st of May 2003, to remove all the officials that operated during the Ba'ath regime which consisted of competent bureaucrats, engineers, scholars and administrators (Van Veen & Grinstead, 2014, p. 13). As part of the coalition plan to bring peace and democracy, Iraq had to be completely rebuilt. This required a massive security reconstruction project in order to reform the SS (Isenberg, 2006, p. 152). During the reform process a number of institutions were responsible for the planning and implementation of SSR. The main actors were: the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF-7), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CPA and CJTF-7 were part of the final decision-making mechanism along with the Secretary of Defence and the President of the United States. CJTF-7 was empowered to lead security operations, but the responsibility for the development of the Iraqi SS was divided. The CPA provided oversight for institutional development and reform. CJTF-7 was also largely responsible for the reconstruction of the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) and the Iraqi police. USCENTCOM was responsible for the reconstruction of the military chain of command. After the invasion the third main actor was the CIA. The CIA carried out responsibility for the reconstruction of the Iraqi intelligence services (Rathmell, Olikier, & Terrence, 2005, p. 15).

##### *The Ministry of Defence*

In order to get a better understanding of the reform process of the IAF, it is important to create a good insight on the reform programme of the MoD. After the breakdown of the Iraqi army the CPA decided to end the existence of the former MoD and rebuild it under the guidance of the coalition. The MoD came into existence in March 2004 and had to be reconstructed before the transfer of authority to the Iraqi government on the 28<sup>th</sup> of June 2004 (CPA Order 2, 2003). However, the construction of the MoD was postponed until the creation of the units and the Iraqi political authorities in order to monitor the construction of the MoD. The House of Commons Defence Committee states, that "the coalition had planned only for a small Iraqi Ministry of Defence and expected to have several years in which to build it up" (HCDC, 2005, p. 48). The intention was to allow Iraqi political structures and parties to further develop, so they would be qualified to decide which actors would be responsible for the construction of the defence sector in which the Iraqi population would not be oppressed.

The construction of the ministry consisted also of the recruitment and the training of employees. The major aspects were recruitments, contracting and budgeting (CASUSS, 2007, p. 51). During the construction poor local ownership was offered to the Iraqis to involve in the process, except when the CPA needed specific information based on experiences from former militaries. Some Iraqis from the former Security Committee of the Governing Council were involved in human resources. The recruitments of MoD employees proved to be a difficult task. The coalition established a program based on interviews with candidates from various districts all over Iraq. Support was provided from various political leaders. All activities during the construction of the MoD had different results. During the recruitment process the CPA was confronted with different complications based on the understanding of social structures and it had also to do with the assessing candidates on trust and carefulness (CPA Order 67, 2004). The recruitment process was liable for the assessment of thousands of candidates and hundreds of interviews. However, a small group of trustworthy leaders were recruited, who were willing to risk their lives in order to be part of the Iraqi government. The staff of the MoD consisted mainly of former officers and civilians with a shortage in security experience. Therefore, training became an important means to prepare the staff. Training consisted of two elements. The first element was a training of three weeks in Washington, in which a course was provided for two weeks at the Near East South Asia Centre at the National Defence University. The other course took place at the U.S. Institute of Peace for one week. These courses were provided during the spring of 2004 in order to ensure understanding of civilian and military oversight, management control and eventually to construct an effective, accountable, democratic country. The second process consisted of classes and trainings in Iraq provided by defence advisors from different countries that were part of the coalition (Rathmell, Olikier, & Terrence, 2005, p. 29). The staff of the MoD was accompanied by trainers who provided courses based on important aspects that form a defence ministry, such as policy and logistics (CPA Order 67, 2004).

### *The armed forces*

After the breakdown of the Iraqi military in April 2003, it became clear that the IAF needed a reconstruction like the MoD. According to Professor Baker, Hamilton and the Iraqi Study Group, the Iraqi army was confronted with several challenges: lack in leadership, equipment, personnel, logistics and support (Baker & Hamilton, 2006, p. 9). The CPA had to disband a major part of the Iraqi military, which caused a shortage in the assistance in security, stabilization and reconstruction. Furthermore, the CPA was confronted with difficulties related to the demands for payments of former military staff. The Iraqi population felt insulted after disbanding the military, because the army was a very important symbol of their nation. With the reconstruction the CPA started with the intention to create a new Iraqi military (CPA Order 22, 2003). This time their aim was to create an accountable, effective and efficient military force.

The private security firm took place in June 2003 when Vinnell Corporation was hired under a contract of \$48 million to train 27 battalions of the NIA under guidance of the CPA. The new military consisted of three divisions that contained 12.000 men per division that aimed to defend and not threaten neighbour countries. Different opinions arose on whether to start with recruiting an officer and then forming the three divisions at once or forming the divisions separately. Over time, the contract with Vinnell Corporation was not extended, because of its lack in effectiveness. The coalition forces took over the training program (Stoker, 2008, p. 228). The CPA decided to form the divisions step by step and identify the leader later in the process. The intention was that the armed force had to be a reflection of the former military based on ethnic, regional and religious considerations, because the former Saddam military consisted of Sunni officers and Shia soldiers.

After the reconstruction of the IAF, another military force started to rise in Iraq: the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC). Professors Bryden and Hänggi state, that “a key element – and, in an important sense, a bridge between coalition and Iraqi capability and responsibility – is the creative initiative of the American military leadership to establish on a very rapid timetable an Iraqi Civil Defence Corps to work closely with the coalition military forces” (Bryden & Hänggi, 2004, p. 241). The ICDC developed the defence sector by following the advice of the commanders of the coalition to allow more Iraqi personnel to occupy certain functions, such as interpreters and human resources advisors. One of the most important needs was the requirement for a force that was operating on behalf of the Iraqi population during operations, so that Iraqi soldiers could operate with the coalition soldiers. The corps remained locally based but grew as a military unit. They were no longer a minimal unit provided with minimal equipment, uniforms and weapons. They needed less guidance and support compared to the IAF. Their missions and structures developed rapidly and they became a force that provided support to the coalition forces. The corps consisted of intelligent, linguistic personnel, drivers, humanitarian assistants and emergency responders. They were able to carry out patrols, convoys, checkpoints and they were also able to provide security for personnel of the coalition. Thus, the ICDC became extremely important for the Iraqi population, because they were operating as the Iraqi section in operations with the military coalition. After a certain period, they were provided with more equipment, such as helmets, body arm, heavier weapons and vehicles (CPA, Order 28, 2003). The U.S. Secretary of Defence decided in 2004 that the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) would take power over the ICDC that was renamed by the IIG to Iraqi National Guard (ING). After the decision of the IIG, the ING became part of the MoD. However, the ING remained operating in support of coalition forces, they became an important partner of the military coalition (CASUSS, 2007, p. 122).

*The police service*

After the abolishment of the Iraqi police, the NIP was not able to function properly because of two reasons: Firstly, the removal of the regime and its leaders, who were responsible for the former Ministry of Interior, left the NIP leaderless. Secondly, the NIP was not provided with proper training and equipment to provide assistance in maintaining order. According to professors Baker, Hamilton and the Iraqi Study Group, “the state of the Iraqi police was substantially worse than that of the Iraqi army. It had neither the training nor legal authority to conduct criminal investigations, nor the firepower to take on organized crime, insurgents or militias” (Baker & Hamilton, 2006, p. 10).

A report conducted by the CPA’s International Police Assistance Team states that in May 2003 the Iraqi police was not able to maintain order. The report concluded that the police force in Iraq needed to be reconstructed in order to operate successfully and become an efficient and accountable police force. Replacing the former IPS was a key part of the plan (Bryden & Hänggi, 2004, p. 245). The CPA appointed the private security firm, DynCorp, under a contract of \$50 million, to train a small part of the NIP under guidance of the CPA (Stoker, 2008, p. 225). A program was established with two reform policies on police transformation in order to provide security and maintain order. The first policy contained the return of the policemen that were in charge during the Saddam regime. The second policy was about providing a modern training to the former and to the new police service. The shortage of police advisors was the main reason for these trainings to be provided by military police units and private security firms, assisted by translators. They performed these trainings well, however their knowledge related to the culture and structures of the Iraqi criminal justice system was minimal. The police service consisted in July 2004 of 120.000 employees that were under aged, undereducated, and unfit for duty or reaching pension.

The U.S. Defence Department established an assessment and identification program to create an insight into the development of the Iraqi security forces. The evaluation showed that the police program was confronted with delays that would affect the capacity of the coalition forces to discontinue their complicity on security operations. The U.S. Department of Defence decided to transfer the responsibility of the NIA reform program from the CPA to the CJTF-7 in order to maintain the reforming proceedings of the IPS. The responsibilities were transferred to the military, because that was the only organization that succeeded in achieving a rapid development of the police in order to receive authority. The CJTF-7 conducted the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT) to carry out the proceedings under guidance of the CJTF-7. The CPATT consisted mainly of military and civilian employees that were led by a military officer. The team was responsible for the training, the equipment, and the mentoring of the IPS (Perito, 2005, p. 10).

*Population, border and weapons control*

The reforming proceedings of the urban and nationwide police were not the only concern of the coalition. During the Saddam regime, the border control and the population control consisted of more than 100.000 men who were not able to combat smugglers and infiltrators. According to professors Baker, Hamilton and the Iraqi Study Group, ‘‘these facilities protection units had questionable loyalties and capabilities’’ (Baker & Hamilton, 2006, p. 11). Minimum preparation was carried out to response quickly to the problem of controlling the borders of Iraq. The U.S. Border Patrol became responsible for the creation of border security agencies. This task was very difficult to accomplish (Perito, 2005, p. 8). In 2003, the CPA restructured both border and population control that became a department of Border Enforcement (DBE) (CPA, 2003). The DBE was responsible for the control of borders and customs, immigration and development of passports systems. The former personnel of the border and population control were abandoned or discharged, because of their involvement during the Saddam regime. The employees of the DBE had to be recruited and trained again. Coalition employees that were specialists from the U.S. and the U.K., several agencies and the U.S. army civil affairs unit carried out the reform program. During the reform implementation proceedings the coalition forces were responsible for safeguarding the border of Iraq (CASUSS, 2007, p. 177). The CJFT-7 was responsible for securing Iraq’s enormous ammunition storage sites. After a certain period, the ISF and the coalition became responsible for the control of the most accessible sites and arm sources. A shortage in military resources was the reason for these sites to remain a target for insurgents and terrorists (Rathmell, Olikier, & Terrence, 2005, p. 56).

*Infrastructure security*

After the looting, securing infrastructure was the major problem. The looting caused extensive sabotage and criminality focused on the infrastructure in Iraq (CASUSS, 2007, p. 157). The sabotage and criminal activities differed from bombings of oil pipelines and railroads, attacks on aircrafts, to the stealing of electrical wires and hijackings of trucks. The coalition forces, the ICDC and the police were responsible for combating these threats. In August 2003, the private security firm, Erinys International, was hired under a contract of \$40 million to train the guard forces that would protect the Iraq’s oil infrastructure (Stoker, 2008, p. 225). Overtime, several infrastructure forces were established. The main force was the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) that consisted of minimum trained guards established for each ministry. Each ministry was responsible for the control and finance of its FPS. Ministries with more resources and weaknesses, such as oil and electricity, needed to have additional training from private security firms in order to guard their infrastructure (CPA, Order 27, 2003).

*Intelligence services*


The CPA decided to proceed into discharging many Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS). However, reforming intelligence services was not highly recognized during the reform implementation process. As the HCDC states: “the coalition was understandably reluctant to rebuild Iraqi intelligence services, preferring that future Iraqi governments deal with the morally and political tricky subject of how to build effective but accountable services” (HCDC, 2005, p. 59). The CPA was confronted with tight networks that were difficult to remove. These networks served as a basis for insurgents and criminal activities. During the removal the CIA and its British opponent became responsible for the creation of an Iraqi intelligence structure. The structure was focused on effectiveness of the organization in order to obtain and process intelligence activities to support the coalition. However, one of the most discussed subjects was the detention policy for the INIS. The ones that were involved believed that the INIS should be able to arrest and interrogate suspects. Others felt that the police service had to be responsible for arresting and interrogation, given the offensive history of the former intelligence service. Another well-known issue was the employment of the former Iraqi intelligence service members. The Iraqi government was afraid that the INIS would cause a recreation of the old oppressive situation. The establishment of the INIS resulted in numerous questions related to the role of the MoI and MoD in the creation and oversight on intelligence abilities, to the relations between different agencies and implementation of intelligence functions created by the coalition. Finally, it was decided that INIS would not carry out any arrests or detention activities (Rathmell, Oliker, & Terrence, 2005, p. 64).

Employments and involvements of former Iraqi intelligence would decrease over time. After the authority was handed over to the Iraqi government, more confusing questions arose. Especially, after the declaration of the former Prime Minister Allawi explaining, that he wanted to organize the General Security Directorate with the ability to carry out arrests and detention activities. It was clear that the MoD and the MoI started to develop their own intelligence service (Krieg, 2014). Uncertainties arose about whether it was possible to create and coordinate an intelligence community. The Iraqis and their coalition advisors tried to develop a cooperation among intelligence services. However, the necessity for structures and their implementation was far more important than ensuring the cooperation of these structures among intelligence services (CASUSS, 2007, p. 52).

#### 4.1 Positive and negative outcomes of state security providers reform

In order to understand how the SFIR policy on SSR impacted the present SSP, an analysis of the positive and negative outcomes of SSPR is obliged. During the first stage of the invasion, assumptions of the pre-war coalition planning to receive assistance from the ISF to maintain public order appeared to be incorrect. Minimum preparation was carried out to recover reform programs. The unity of the Iraqi forces disappeared, because they disagreed with the occupation. The military forces, border security forces and a major part of the police forces returned to their homes in April 2003 and left their duties in which the security provider's facilities were looted. Disagreements on the removal of the Baath regime and disbandment of the remaining ISF and the institutions caused an increase in criminality, insurrections and terrorist violence. The coalition was trying to both decrease disorder and manage programs to reform the SS in Iraq. The Coalition Joint Task Force (CJFT-7) was forced to carry out operations against terrorists and insurgents even with its shortage in training and resources for these operations. Shortages in security and insufficient progress on reform were the reason for an increase in disagreements related to the invasion that caused obstruction in the process of reforming the security situation. By the end of June 2004, the CPA transferred authority to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). In early 2005 the Iraqi SS was still not able to provide public security and implement the rule of law. Assessment reports show failure in training personnel, reconstruction of infrastructure, institutional development, deployment of equipment, unit capability and capacity-building. Figure 4 displays one of the negative security effects, namely the increase of fatalities since the end of 2004.


**Civilian fatalities in Iraq 2003-2013**



Source: (O'Hanlon & Livingston, 2013)

Overtime, the concern among the Iraqi civilians was growing because of the increase in terrorist attacks and crime. According to professors Zaum and Cheng, ‘‘combating these problems has been further complicated by the large numbers of unemployed, easily available weaponry, a quickly widening gap between the rich and poor and largely impotent government’’ (Cheng & Zaum, 2012, p. 163). Iraq suffered from its lack in effectiveness on corruption control and other areas of governance. Figure 5 shows that terrorist attacks against civilians, ISF and the coalition and its partners were increasing since the end of 2004. Meanwhile, the CPA failed to accomplish reform objectives, such as disarmament and reintegration of former armed personnel. Professor Voorhoeve states that, disarming former fighters and reintegrating them into society as soldiers or policemen is essential in order to create peace. The lack of employment and reintegration can result in mutual conflicts and actions of revenge based on the hatred caused during times of war (Voorhoeve, 2016).

### Enemy-initiated attacks against ISF, civilians and the coalition and its partners 2003-2004



Source: (O’Hanlon & Campbell, 2007)

The growth in insurgent and terrorist violence and the failure of the ISF caused a greater delay. The great delay on the reform process and the negative security effects were also security responsibilities of the Iraqi security sector. The coalition force had primary responsibility since the transition of authority to the IIG.

The IIG became partly responsible for restoring order and combating political violence. Despite these negative security effects, the IPS and ING achieved minimal progress. At the end of 2004, they performed well during the combats against the army of Jaish al-Mahdi. It was clear that the IPS and ING developed their effectiveness and therefore became stronger institutions with valuable leadership (Rathmell, Oliker, & Terrence, 2005, p. 74).

### *The Ministry of Defence*

The recruitment and employment of the MoD personnel was drastically hindered, because of the deadline of transition of authority to the NIG by June 2004 (CPA Order 67, 2004). Some advisors argued that institutional reform structures and the MoD needed to be completed and reconstructed by April 2004, which meant that the MoD had to be reconstructed within the period of five months. Shortage in time made it very difficult to recruit proper and competent personnel. Many argued that the Iraqis had to be more involved in bureaucratic and security efforts. The CPA was also confronted with recruitment plans to focus on young people, with little experience that were involved during the Saddam regime. These plans were designed, so that young people with little involvement during the Saddam regime could identify competent and proper personnel, so they could also evaluate and train other staff. Young members would be less accustomed to their subject areas and older members would be unable to accept quickly new approaches. As professor Isenberg states, “the creation of competent, professional, and trusted forces will be essential for the formation of a central government that is in turn necessary if there is to be a future state of Iraq” (Isenberg, 2006, p. 154). It would have been possible to provide more assistance during the recruitment of new staff, if the reform programme of the MoD had been extended. However, great progress was made in a short period. Despite this positive result, the MoD slow start and limited capabilities caused some concern related to its ability to cooperate with ISF (HCDC, 2005, p. 49).

During the reconstruction of the MoD, limited public communication was provided. Armed forces were not really trusted after the Saddam period, especially by the Kurd community. It seems that a structured information campaign for the Iraqi community contributed in informing the public and political leaders about the NIA. Even in the summer of 2008, many Iraqi leaders were not informed about the fact that the NIA had to be smaller compared to the army during the Saddam regime. The mission of the NIA consisted only of defence operations. Informing the Iraqi community about these facts would have been better for the MoD and the CPA. However, figures from the public polls concluded that a major part of the Iraqi community supported the IAF. The shortage in time and Iraqi involvement made the reconstructed MoD vulnerable for the changes in politics. A stable reconstruction structure with more flexibility in time should have contributed to train personnel more in order to extend their capacity and learn more about their roles. This would have contributed to the development of the MoD in order to be prepared for political changes.

These principles were difficult to accomplish, as a consequence of the unstable situation in Iraq. More time would have provided possibilities to further develop institutional reform processes (Rathmell, Oliker, & Terrence, 2005, p. 31).

### *The armed forces*

The reconstruction of the IAF was a programme that succeeded in various ways. The programme consisted of well-prepared plans, responses to essential demands and good and doubtful decisions. The staff of the IAF was operating in a difficult period, because of the unclear nature of its missions. The IAF was not sufficiently qualified and extensive to become an important member of the combat in Iraq. These facts were not only a difficulty to their transition process, but they also resulted in many questions on whether the IAF would be able to build proper relations among civil-militaries in Iraq. Increase in coalition troops would not have contributed to solving the causes of violence and organized crime (Baker & Hamilton, 2006, p. 30). Various questions arose about the loyalty and ethnic considerations on whether some Iraqi armed forces would carry out missions to achieve national objectives rather than a sectarian agenda. According to professor Pfiffner, disbanding the Iraqi army in order to rebuild it endangered the coalition its efforts to reach success in Iraq (Pfiffner, 2010, p. 76).

After the transition of authority, it was clear that the efforts of the IAF to ensure cooperation among all ethnic diverse militaries were not reaching their objectives. Because of these problems, actors and U.S. military officials argued that the decision to hire private security firms has been a wrong decision. According to some of them the private security firms were hired, but no progress was achieved (Stoker, 2008, p. 227). However, the goals of the IAF to become a reflection of the Iraqi community deserved admiration. In August 2006, a major plan called ‘‘Under Operation Together Forward II’’ was conducted to combat violence by the coalition forces in corporation with the Iraqi forces to restore order and establish security (Baker & Hamilton, 2006, p. 15). Long-term plans carried out by the military in order to rebuild the IAF reached limited success. The HCDC stated after the transition of reforming authority from private security firms to the military that, ‘‘the Iraqi Security Forces have begun to develop the capabilities to provide effective security for their own people’’ (HCDC, 2005, p. 45). An important effort to create a relationship between the coalition and Iraqi capability and responsibility was the establishment of the ICDC aiming to reduce corporation with the coalition military forces (Slocombe, 2004, p. 11). The ING, the former ICDC, was a force that achieved varied success. The force was established to respond rapidly to urgent needs (CPA, Order 28, 2003). According to the commanders of the coalition force the ING operated effective with limited functions. Other CPA officials concluded that the ING would have been more effective if it had contributed to the police service with additional support (CPA Order 22, 2003).

A small part of the ICDC deserted the corps because of limited training and equipment, intimidation among many ICDC personnel by insurgents or sympathy to insurgents and terrorists. These weaknesses were caused by a shortage in strong local leadership. The leaders of the ICDC were uncertain of the coalition's efforts and they did not provide full support, because of the enormous criticism of the Iraqi population. The ING showed that their operation is more successfully under supervision of a more professional force. The rapid development of the IAF and ING was a difficulty to the MoD because of its weakness for political changes. The IAF have benefited from the investment in resources and security operations training, which were important to respond to the need for security. However, these principles created two risks: they could either become the supreme internal security force or they could develop into a powerful institution governed by a civilian ministry, that is vulnerable to political changes (Rathmell, Oliker, & Terrence, 2005, p. 40).

### *The police force*

In the early 2004, it was clear that the reconstruction process of the IPS was the most difficult reforming task compared to the tasks carried out by the coalition. The IPS had to be reconstructed so that they would be able to carry out basic police operations. However, the coalition was not sufficiently informed about the formation and membership of the police forces and the character of their equipment and funds (Baker & Hamilton, 2006, p. 13). Violence and criminality and the urgent need for democracy and reconstruction made it more complicated. These kind of reforming processes require understanding of the former IPS, the ability to transfer reserves of equipment and capital and the involvement of international police advisors. Some argued that the Iraqi community preferred foreign advisors for critical tasks, as they were harder to threaten or to bribe. However, the increase of foreign advisors would have led to distrust between Iraqi police and security services (Isenberg, 2006, p. 153). The development of international advisors and the implementation of infrastructure projects, such as communication networks were disturbed. The reforming program of the coalition was insufficiently focused on the police service. The IPS was suffering from insufficient financial resources, personnel and uncertain reforming support from the CJTF-7. It was clear the CPA needed to focus more on reforming the IPS, but unfortunately the U.S. State Department was not able to provide a sufficient number of police trainers and advisors. Meanwhile, the ICDC and the NIA were at the top of CJTF-7 priorities. Funds from the coalition created possibilities to purchase and distribute equipment and expand training programs. Expanding police units on the streets was not the solution for reconstruction of accountable and effective institutions and police service. The IPS was relatively respected by the Iraqi community. Their support was important in order to reach success in reforming the police service. The nation needed proper equipment and training of police forces in order to ensure long-term success (Bryden & Hänggi, 2004, p. 251).

The IPS' reconstruction programmes of training, equipping, recruiting and infrastructure building made some progress. Especially, training for specialist and leaders were creating positive results. Investments in advice, equipment and military support contributed to the reconstruction process in which the IPS grew considerably. However, delays in the program impacted the effectiveness of the IPS. Furthermore the IPS had two concerns: firstly, the capacity of the IPS to combat political violence and organized crime. Initiatives had to be taken by the IPS in order to reduce violence and crime. Secondly, the reconstruction process of the MoI had to be supported to accelerate the process (Perito, 2005, p. 12). Iraqi police services have to support the national mission to protect and serve all Iraqis. Too many employees did not support that mission, because they disagreed with the implementation structure of the reforming programme by the U.S. and the Iraqi government (Baker & Hamilton, 2006, p. 52). As professor Voorhoeve states, "it was a serious mistake to abolish the Iraqi police and reorganize them into a new police force. Outsiders cannot do that. The consequences were instability and huge costs in terms of human lives and money" (Voorhoeve, 2016).

#### *Population, border and weapons control*

The control forces of the population, the border and weapons were essentials for the reconstruction of the Iraqi SS. Disarmament of the entire community was impossible. The coalition became responsible for a major task to reconstruct the control units as border forces, electronic and physical infrastructure and databases (CPA, 2003). CJFT-7 tried to carry out some of these tasks under guidance of the CPA despite the fact that it was insufficiently funded and staffed. The CPA was unable to carry out these tasks as a priority and moved on to key principles, such as weapons, population, registration and visas. Coalition military tried to support the CPA by taking control of accessible border checkpoints. Soldiers, who served as immigration inspectors during the war, received a training of three hours. Notwithstanding, they were unable to assess regional passports or documents without Arabic language skills. The DBE needed to further improve the border, population and weapons control in cooperation with the MoI, which had a capacity shortage. These problems could be restored if external training and financial and technical assistance were provided. By June 2004, only 255 of the 18,000 DBE personnel received border patrol training. Lack in recruitment was the reason that CPA advisers were able to provide minimum training. These programmes had to be supported with investments. The programme made limited progress, but it had to be supported with proper immigration, population control and weapons registration systems in order to become effective (Perito, 2005, p. 9).

*Infrastructure security*

The number of attacks focused on important infrastructure have caused much damage in Iraq. These activities have impacted the reconstruction program, in which the ISF and the CJTF-7 were unable to manage and control the situation. Efforts taken by the coalition by funding tribes to provide protection to pipelines and road routes, may have contributed to the unstable situation. However, a few important efforts contributed to control the problem, such as training of security forces that were responsible for the protection of oil ministry, employment of repair teams, the infrastructure surveillance provided by the IAF and the establishment of coalition centres to provide assistance for contractors. The reconstruction of the ISF and the development of excellent coordination were essentials. Meanwhile, intelligence meetings on a local level had to be organized in order to improve infrastructure security in which the IPS needed to be involved (CPA, Order 27, 2003). The NIG implemented programmes in order to establish special military units to secure Iraqi infrastructure. These programmes came under control of the Interior Ministry. The intentions of these programmes were to clearly identify and register infrastructure personnel, improve their treatment and provide training (Baker & Hamilton, 2006, p. 14). The programs provided minimal training for the infrastructure security forces. Management of the forces had variable qualities and limited functions. Though, some professional infrastructure forces performed well in protecting the infrastructure facilities. Important issues, such as the policy for private security firms and actions of the state to give out services of tribal guards who requested money for their security stretches of railroads tracks, power lines, and roads that passed their territories still had to be solved (Rathmell, Oliker, & Terrence, 2005, p. 61).

*Intelligence services*

During the reform process of the intelligence service, the CPA made two mistakes based on exclusion and commission. The mistake made on exclusion was to not involve in the intelligence sector until it would be concluded that the INIS and other intelligence structures could be reconstructed by a coordinated and transparent structure in order to serve the institutional needs of Iraq. The CPA allowed external organizations from outside the CPA chain of command to get involved during the first stages of INIS development while little involvement was allowed from the host nation. It lost initiative in order to define the future of the Iraqi intelligence service. The CPA could prevent this by establishing more oversight in the early stages of a new intelligence service development. It would then be able to construct a reasonable and independent intelligence service focused on the needs of the Iraqi community. The mistakes on commission were made in the implementation process. The CPA was unable to effectively implement a distributed intelligence structure, as they were not interested in this approach and chose to focus on an accountable, democratic intelligence community. This approach would have succeeded if the MoI provided trustful support and cohesion was achieved among Iraqi ministries.

The CPA failed to successfully implement a coordinated and accountable capacity of intelligence structure. It was not willing to provide full commitment to the reconstruction of the intelligence sector. As professor Slocombe states, “central to all security is better intelligence” (Slocombe, 2004, p. 10). Given the terrible intelligence events during the Saddam period, it should have provided full commitment in order to reconstruct the Iraqi intelligence service to combat insurgent violence and organized crime.

After the U.S. and U.K. intelligence institutions decided to start the reconstruction of the Iraqi intelligence sector, the CPA provided full commitment far too late. At the time of transition of authority, the Iraqi intelligence sector was uncertain and confused about its mission. Sufficient efforts to ensure coordination among the Iraqi intelligence institutions were not carried out in which the Iraqi government did not accomplish its intelligence requirements. Professors Bryden and Hänggi state, that “all enemy groups remain extremely difficult intelligence targets, because they are small in number, based on multi-fold and longstanding personal connections and possess extraordinary effective counterintelligence methods” (Bryden & Hänggi, 2004, p. 240). One of the most important goals that was not achieved, was the establishment of a police intelligence unit to combat these enemy groups in order to reduce insurgent violence and organized crime (Rathmell, Oliker, & Terrence, 2005, p. 64).

#### **4.2 Present Iraqi security circumstances**


In order to examine the impact of the SFIR policy on SSR on the present SSP, looking into the present Iraqi security circumstances is necessary. Since the last U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011, the Iraqi minister Maliki replaced the U.S. morals, such as comprehensive governance, democracy and social justice to his personal ideals. Maliki justified his increase of power in ministries, security forces and civilian institutions by using the fight against terrorism and insurgency (Pfiffner, 2010, p. 77). Since the withdrawal of the coalition, the security situation deteriorated and thereby the Iraqi government and its security forces are unable to guarantee security of the Iraqi community (Nordland, 2015). A major part of the Iraqis feel no longer protected by the government and its security forces and therefore seek protection from the local or sectarian SP. Religious militias and insurgent groups responded to the need for security of the Iraqi citizens. According to professor Voorhoeve, the disunity among the Iraqi community was primarily caused by the decisions between Sunni and Shia Muslims. The Iraqi state was not logically created, because it was established during the British decolonization. Therefore, the Iraqi community identifies itself with its own religious authorities, which differ from Sunni to Shia leaders (Voorhoeve, 2016). The increase of Maliki’s power counteracted the developments of the Iraqi SS. This resulted in the security of the regime having priority over the guaranteeing security of the citizens. Maliki rearranged the SS to gain control over the security forces and became Minister of Interior and Defence.

He supervised the police force, the military and the intelligence services and implemented a system of management in which he closely controls the Special Forces and Counterterrorism Units. They operate as his private army and combat potential threats to the regime security. The management system consists of decision makers, mostly Shia, on strategic and operation level and they are loyal to the prime minister (Sissons & Al-Saiedi, 2013, p. 20). The units have completely removed Sunnis from the government and replaced them by loyal Shia commanders applying a philosophy based on sectarian loyalties, rather than being loyal to the entire Iraqi community. However, Kurds and Sunnis do not support the government, because they consider it as Maliki's personal Shia army that is responsible for the arrests, mistreatment, and the murder of opponents. Hence, these events resulted in a growth of insurgent groups over the last few years (Krieg, 2014).

The current security situation in Iraq remains harmful and several parts of the country are occupied by the IS since June 2014. The quick and brutal rise of the IS, can only be described as a failure of the SS in Iraq (Iftikhar Abbasi, 2015). However, the rise of IS shows that Iraq is confronted with a complex security crisis. In the last few years, uprising insurgency in West-Iraq is largely caused by Sunni-groups that mostly consist of former members of the Ba'ath regime against the Iraqi government and its militias. The IS is currently the largest powerful insurgent group. The insurgency in Iraq is part of a broader conflict between Sunnis and Shias in the various Middle East countries, such as Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. The conflict between Sunni and Shia groups in the Middle East is presumably sponsored by Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Sunnis and by Iran on behalf of the Shias. Many actors in this conflict justify their fight for power and personal interests by abusing religion, politics or sectarianism.

Figure 6 shows that the military activities of IS are currently focused on four main areas in Iraq. Firstly, IS tries to control the areas located around the Euphrates River in the direction of Baghdad in order to protect their supply lines and their control in the region from Syria to Fallujah. Secondly, the group operates around the Tigris River area to control the region of the rivers, because controlling these areas is important in order to expand their mobility and threaten Northern and Southern Baghdad (Martin, Anagnostos, & Bessette, 2016). Thirdly, IS shocked the Iraqi Kurds by attacking Northern Iraqi Kurdistan with U.S. weapons that were captured. IS also attacks Baghdad from the West of Fallujah by using bombings in Shia cities. The attacks are intended to reduce the morale among the citizens of Baghdad (Van Veen & Grinstead, 2014, p. 9).

**Iraq control of terrain 2016**



Source: (Martin, Anagnostos, & Bessette, 2016)

Professor Van Veen and Grinstead state that the IS carries out a strategy in which military tactics are combined with brutal violence and political measures in order to expand their caliphate. The insurgent group carries out attacks, such as murders and suicide attacks. The IS-rules in an occupied region consist mainly of the removal of opponents and the supply of basic services such as water, electricity and food. Removal of opponents, such as sheiks, preachers or large groups of different species is often used in order to gain power through fear (Shah & Hume, 2016). It operates by the usage of informants and intelligence services from the former Ba'ath party. Citizens of the caliphate are also provided with administrative services that consist of religious education, law enforcement and ethnic affairs. However, the living conditions of the caliphate citizens have decreased dramatically since the occupation of IS (Van Veen & Grinstead, 2014, p. 10)

The United Nations states in a report on the protection of civilians in the armed conflict in Iraq that, IS is responsible for the abduction of approximately 3,500 slaves in which the group forces women and children to sexual slavery and violence (United Nations, 2015). The on-going conflict is responsible for at least 18,802 fatalities, 36,245 injuries and for 3.2 million people who were supplanted. The United Nations hold the ISF and allies also responsible for a massive number of sexual abuses, violence, fatalities and abductions. IS carries out horrible methods to kill citizens, such as beheadings, burning captives alive and throwing them of buildings (Shah & Hume, 2016). The explosive attacks including suicide and vehicles bombers targeting citizens cause the highest number of fatalities (Aljazeera, Staff, 2016).

According to United States Department of Defence, the U.S. government has sent approximately 3,360 employees in which 1500 soldiers are operating on behalf of the coalition partners. They are responsible for trainings, the provision of advices and for the support of activities, such as assisting the DBE and the infrastructure forces and also assisting ground operations, intelligence services and the coordination of air strikes (Nordland, 2015). The current number of employees operating in Iraq is quite small compared to the occupation of 2003, in which 165,000 employees were active in Iraq. The U.S. government has decided to not get involved in direct confrontations with IS. Trainings, such as battleground strategies and infantry skills are carried out by U.S. Special Forces are provided to 11,500 Iraqi soldiers and volunteers. However, more than 250,000 Iraqi soldiers and tribal militias still have to be provided with these trainings. The main focus of the mission is the creation of a competent and loyal ISF that will be able to retake areas that are occupied by the IS (Iftikhar Abbasi, 2015).

The current Iraqi military, police service and Shia militias –supported by Iran- are fighting against IS with air strike support from the U.S in order to gain control over the IS-occupied areas. Iraqi citizens are suffering due to a shortage in food, medicines and fuel that caused the death of numerous people as a result of starvation and poor medical care. The trapped Iraqi citizens requested urgent airdrops provided with humanitarian supplies (Martin, Anagnostos, & Bessette, 2016). This appears to be the only way for supplies to reach citizens, because IS has placed mines at the entrance of the cities and forces people to stay. Aljazeera states that the security situation in Iraq is deteriorating every day (Aljazeera, 2016).

Daily confrontations between IS and the ISF and its militias are continuing. Ramadi is the city where the greatest confrontations take place. Since December 2015, approximately 150 Iraqi soldiers deceased in the operation to retake Ramadi. The ISF and its militias try to clear each area of explosives and they have recaptured a major part of the city. The ISF has not been able to get control over the Eastern part of Ramadi so far. However, the operation of Ramadi has caused a large number of fatalities among the ISF and its militias. Figure 6 shows that the IS continues to get more control over Fallujah, Mosul and eastern Ramadi, which have been occupied by IS since 2014 (Al-Marashi, 2016). Vincent Stewart, the U.S. Intelligence Agency Chief, states that the ISF are currently unable to carry out operations to recapture Mosul from IS. Airstrikes carried out by the coalition have been partly effective in supporting the ISF to recapture occupied areas from the group. The ISF have recently released a new operation in cooperation with the tribal fighters and Peshmerga troops, to recapture IS territory from southern Mosul and from south-western Makhmur towards Qayarrah. The ISF has started to send great numbers of soldiers to southern Mosul (Martin, Anagnostos, & Bessette, 2016).

## 5. Conclusion and recommendations

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In order to answer the research question of *how the SFIR policy on SSR from 2003-2011 impacted the present Iraqi SSP*, the sub-questions had to be answered first. The prior sections aim to systematically answer these questions. Literature formed the framework for analysing the SSR, the implemented SFIR policy on SSPR in Iraq and its impact on the present Iraqi SSP. The conclusions have been drawn with reference to several causes. It was not one particular problem, but rather a set of factors that had an impact on the present SSP in Iraq. Firstly, after the expectations of the coalition pre-war planners appeared to be incorrect, minimum preparation was carried out to recover reform programs. Proper identification and assessment preparation would have to be carried out to provide an insight into the political situation in Iraq. Secondly, disagreements related to the occupation caused an increase in disunity among the ISF and resulted in soldiers leaving their duties. Reform programmes would have to be recovered based on local ownership in which the host nation had to be involved to design, manage and implement their security policies. Thirdly, the decision to remove the Baath party in order to prevent it from possible recovery of their power position and the decision to disband the remaining ISF and institutions in order to rebuild them and accomplish different goals compared to the Saddam regime have caused an increase in criminality, insurgency and terrorist attacks, because a major part of the Iraqi community disagreed with the removal of the Baath party and disbandment of the ISF and institutions. It would have been better to understand the political construction of Iraq before removing the Baath party and disbanding the remaining ISF and institutions. Fourthly, the reform programmes provided minimal training for the ISF and were carried out with poor knowledge on the Iraqi culture, language and the judicial system. It was important to offer the host nation local ownership and share participation in the decision-making process, cooperate with the Iraqi authorities in providing training for the ISF and involve them in bureaucratic and security efforts. Finally, the transfer of the authority deadline caused a shortage in time that made it very difficult to extend training programmes. A more technical understanding of SSR and a stable reconstruction structure with more flexibility in time would have contributed to train personnel better in order to extend their capacity and would have taught more about their roles. These factors have impacted the present SSP, and share the responsibility for determining the unstable security situation in Iraq. In order to get a proper reform programme for the SS in Iraq, several measures will have to be taken. One of the most important measures is the disarmament of all militia and insurgent groups. Another important measure is a resignation of the Maliki regime. Furthermore, the implementation of a reconstruction programme that has been developed with proper assessment and identification preparation, political understanding, local ownership, sectarian diversity, flexibility in time and lastly, the restoration of faith in the common benefit of Iraq as a unified multi-sectarian nation.

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## 7. Appendices

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### 7.1 Transcript

#### Interview

Interviewee: Joris Voorhoeve  
Profession: Lectureship faculty board, law and safety  
Location: The Hague University of Applied Science  
Date: 20 January 2016  
Point of time: 9.30  
Duration: 18:39

Interviewer: Nabil Benali, as NB  
Interviewee: Joris Voorhoeve, as JV

NB: Dear Mr Voorhoeve, first of all thank you for your time and for the opportunity to do this interview with you. I am currently working on my final thesis focused on how SFIR policy on security sector reform impacted the present state security providers in Iraq. You are well-known because of your knowledge of international security and because of your experiences in Dutch politics as the former Minister. So, thank you very much! My first question is: Could you start with introducing yourself and tell me more about what you do currently?

JV: What I do currently? I teach international affairs particularly peace building, international law, human rights and how international organizations work.

NB: To what extend have you been involved in the developments of Iraq since 2003?

JV: I have not, because I left the Netherlands government in 1998. Then I have served for another one year and a half as a member of the parliament and then I left for a different position. So I was not directly involved with the policies in recent Iraq.

NB: Okay. But are you now involved in courses and minors that you are providing now for the students.

JV: Yes.

NB: Are they related these kind conflicts just like in Iraq?

JV: Yes. In my courses we deal with many conflicts, particularly with peace building after the violence has started. Because we see from some countries that ending a war is one step, but that's not enough, because a country can fall back into domestic violence like Libya. The situation for the population in Libya even got worse, because of the infighting between different rebel groups.

NB: What do you think are the most important aspects to ensure long-term peace through SSR?

JV: First of all, after a ceasefire there should be a temporary agreement on the nature of the government and the government with assistance of the international community should be able to bring the fighting forces into the national army and the national police, so that the government is the only institution which has weapons. Disarming former fighters, reintegrating them in society as soldiers or policemen or truck drivers or construction workers or teachers or whatever, is essential to make peace. If you don't do that, with a lack of employment, they start to steel and fight against each other and take revenge actions based on the hatred which was caused in the war period.

NB: Okay.

JV: And that explains why in countries where there is no rapid disarmament and reorganization of the armed forces, disarmament of civilians and reorganizations of the armed forces, you see often that the insecurity of the population increases after a ceasefire.

NB: Okay, that is interesting. What are your thoughts on the process of the SSR policy that was implemented to restore security in Iraq?

JV: My first thought is that the American British intervention should not have taken place. Because it increased the instability in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Second mistake was to disband, to dismantle, the government operators and try to reinvent Iraq as a country into new. This was an overestimation of what the Americans and the British could do. It was a serious mistake to abolish the police and turn it into a new police and abolish the armed forces and try to reorganize them and to change also the domestic political situation. One can say it was necessary to remove Saddam Hossein, but then power should have been handed to a group of Iraqi politicians who could count on the support of most of the population and did not have such dirty hands, such bloody hands, as Saddam Hossein. So, I separate the mistake of the intervention from the mistake of dissolving the Iraqi state and trying to renew it. Outsiders cannot do that. So, those I think were the two crucial mistakes. The consequences were instability and huge costs in terms of human lives and also in terms of money. Famous American economists have calculated that the total bill to the United States of the intervention

was 3000 billion dollars. I think this is one of the causes of the economic crisis of 2008. The United States could not afford this and had to borrow money. This led to very wrong investments.

NB: That is a clear answer. Can you also provide us with some positive effects of the policy that was implemented?

JV: Yes, there are many Iraqis who feel liberated from Saddam Hossein and who were very positive about removing the ruler. So, many individual people benefited from it. But there were also many people who were hurt by domestic terrorism of groups against each other who were hurt by the ongoing violence. So, when you give a view on what happened, you have to take the suffering of many people into account.

NB: What were the major causes that contributed to the disunity among the Iraqi population? Because not everybody was supporting the U.S. government or the coalition. What were the main reasons?

JV: The first cause was the differences between the Sunnis and the Shias. The government of Saddam Hossein was Sunni even though Saddam Hossein was not at all a religious man. He was just a dictator and he used religion to justify himself. But the Sunni religion in Iraq was a minority religion. Most of Iraq in the south was Shia and he suppressed them. Saddam also suppressed the Kurds in the north and he did that in a very bloody fashion. The Kurds in the north benefited from the American intervention, because they were able to create an autonomous Kurdish state in the north.

NB: Okay. What were the main reasons that caused a deep political crisis which is related to security in Iraq?

JV: The falling apart of the political system and the lack of balance between the different powers in Iraq and the lack of feeling solidarity among different people with the state Iraq. The state Iraq has not grown up historically in a logical way. It was created in the time of British decolonization. The boundaries of Iraq are artificial.

So, the people living there identify with their own leaders and not with the national leaders and particularly religious leaders like the Shia and the Sunni and off course also the language differences. The Kurds do not feel that they are Iraqis.

NB: Okay. Do you think that the SSR policy that was implemented also contributed to the current unstable situation in Iraq?

JV: I think so. Yes, because of the lack of balance and the weakness of the national government in internal divisions. The situation of the Kurds in the north is clear, the situation of the large Shia minority or majority in the south and the south east of Iraq is clear and the Sunni do not except that they changed from rulers of Iraq, to the Ba'ath party, to a minority which was powerless and that is one of the reasons of the birth of IS.

NB: How would you summarize the current security situation in Iraq? With ISIS now, they have taken large parts in Iraq.

JV: Yes. The Iraqi government is making progress in its struggle against IS. It has some territorial gains, it recaptured some cities, but the struggle is not over and it has spread off course to Syria. I feel also destabilization of Lebanon, which is a vulnerable state, a small vulnerable pluriform state. Jordan probably can handle it, because it has a stronger government and a more unified armed forces and off course their relationship with Turkey is difficult, because Turkey fights the Kurds at home and at the same time is an ally of the United States while the United States uses the Kurds in the struggle against IS. So, that is a complicated situation and I do not understand the policies of the Turkish president, because internal policy and external policy are opposed. It will be wiser to give the Kurdish, the large Kurdish population in Turkey a much better position and recognize that Turkey is a pluriform country with different people and different languages and unify the country in that way and support the Kurds outside Turkey. Fighting them inside and supporting them outside is a formula for failure.

NB: Do you think that they will reach success in the future? To remove ISIS?

JV: ISIS will be made smaller. It is very difficult to finish them entirely and the basic problem, the underlying long-term problem, is not ISIS. The underlying problem is very large groups of unemployed young men who are easy to mobilize or fighting in a war because for them it is a job. If have had or had some education, but you have no job. You want to start a family, you want to build a future and the only job available, which pays you 300 dollars a month, is becoming a fighter and you also given a Kalashnikov or heavier weapons and a uniform or a position as a local commander then you all of a sudden you think you are somebody and you can make a difference and have a mission in live. So, it gives unemployed and disoriented people a role in society and they take it because there is no better role for them play. So, the underlying problem, which is much bigger then Iraq. In many more countries then in Iraq, the enormous what is called 'bulge of young men' who are unemployed. They are in north Africa, they are in the Sahel region, they are in the middle of Africa, they are in Nigeria and that can only be solved by social economic developments. Giving people employment. I think the key to peace is decent employments.

NB: So one of the major causes that contributed to the developments of ISIS and many more terrorist groups in the Middle East is poverty?

JV: It is not poverty. One of the major causes is demographic change, but there are other causes to. It is also the way the world economy develops, the world economy has little employment for many, let's say half partly educated people. The world economy has lots of work for the well-educated, but the poorly educated, those without work experience, those without daily work discipline. Companies cannot use them. Armies can use them.

NB: That is true.

JV: This feeds violence in the world. So the only solution is, measures from many different sides off course you have to fight those who commit criminal violence, but you also have to encourage economic developments which creates employment. You have to have stable governments who are seen in the eyes of the population to be doing their best to fight corruption, to fight violence, to improve education and to improve employments.

NB: That was clear, thank you! That was my last question. Thank you for your time and for sharing your knowledge with me. The information you shared with me will be very useful for my final thesis. I wish you the best of luck with the rest of your career. Thank you once again.

JV: Thank you very much!

## **7.2 Interview evidence**