Enlargement fatigue in four EU member states

*What are the different and similar causes for four different EU member states that suffer from enlargement fatigue since 2000?*



Bram van Gunst

ES4e-4e

11070412

Dissertation supervisor: P.G. Nixon

04-01-2016

The Hague University of Applied Sciences

Academy of European Studies

# Executive Summary

Enlargement fatigue is an effect that has been felt in the European Union (EU) by member states ever since its creation in 1957. Enlargement fatigue can be felt in the member states in two different ways, which are the constitutional deepening of the EU and the geographical widening of the EU. While using a comparative research, the reasons why member states no longer want to enlarge have been investigated in four different member states. France, Ireland, Germany and Lithuania have been used in order to cover all different angles on enlargement fatigue. Each country has its own reasons to feel the fatigue, which are sometimes the same reasons as those of other member states, but at times the causes are unique and are solely related to domestic causes. Moreover, one ever-returning theme is the democratic deficit that is present in the EU and nation-states. In each of the cases it has been examined whether the countries have suffered from a democratic deficit in their decision making process, as this plays an important role with regards to the enlargement fatigue. Other important components that have an influence on enlargement fatigue are migration, economic reasons and domestic interest. These have also been used to investigate whether these have caused enlargement fatigue.

Furthermore, the research is centred on a few EU milestones in this timeframe, which are: the Treaty of Nice, the EU Constitution, The Lisbon Treaty and the accession of Turkey. These themes all play an important role, as they are all concerned with either widening or deepening of the EU. Similar and different causes for enlargement fatigue have been found, which is interesting, as it is an ever-returning theme in the EU.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary 2

Introduction 4

Methods 6

Enlargement Fatigue & the Democratic Deficit 8

Deepening vs. Widening 8

Enlargement fatigue 9

Democratic Deficit 10

Conclusion 12

France 13

EU integration 13

EU enlargement 15

Conclusion France 17

The Republic of Ireland 18

Treaty of Nice 18

Treaty of Lisbon 20

Conclusion Ireland 23

Germany 24

The accession of Turkey 24

EU integration 29

Conclusion Germany 30

Lithuania 31

Security 31

Energy 33

Support for enlargement 33

Conclusion Lithuania 34

Analysis 36

Conclusion 38

Points of improvement 39

Recommendations 39

Bibliography 41

# Introduction

Enlargement fatigue is a problem that arises specifically in the European Union, as it is probably the only organisation with such an extensive enlargement strategy (Brennan, 2014). To clarify, the candidate member states, the EU and the member states that are already in the EU can experience enlargement fatigue. There are two forms of enlargement fatigue, which are fatigue concerning the deepening of the EU, or fatigue with regards to the widening of the EU. (Brennan, 2014) Yet, enlargement fatigue is no new phenomenon in the history of the Union itself. Various countries have given expression to enlargement fatigue over the course of time but reasons for enlargement fatigue may vary a great deal. In fact, both governments and the public opinion have sometimes changed their opinion towards further enlargement from being in favour of, to being against further enlargement. It is interesting to investigate the reasoning of different countries behind their statements and to scrutinize each of the four possible statements by means of a four-way comparison. To clarify, an EU country can be in favour of or against further EU enlargement on a geographical basis but an EU member-state can also be in favour or against further EU constitutional integration. What is more important, in this paper it will be researched to what extend the member states feel enlargement fatigue and what components can be found that confirm this. In the end it will be clear if the countries selected indeed fit into the table below. The, four selected EU member states will be examined in order to investigate their experience with enlargement fatigue, which are France, Ireland, Germany and Lithuania.

Furthermore, enlargement and integration of the EU would not have been possible if the European Steel and Coal Community had not been created under the supervision of Jean Monnet (Burgess, 2011). Integration begun during the 1950s when the Schuman Declaration was worked out and France and Germany started to collaborate on a joint path of economic recovery while France could keep Germany’s industry in check. Together with Italy and the Benelux, Germany and France started down a road of economic and political integration that became both deeper and wider over the years (Burgess, 2011). Although grown in size and depth, the EU certainly knows the effect of enlargement fatigue that can have different roots. For example, this paper will show that during the period of the constitutional referendum in 2005, domestic political interests played a very big role in the outcome of the referenda in France (Carlos, 2007). However, in order to narrow the research down a little, the consequences of loss of sovereignty to the EU level have been left out. Following the research, this paper should be able to give an answer to the question; *What are the different and similar causes for four different EU member states that suffer from enlargement fatigue with regards to the period of 2000-2015?*

# Methods

In order to research this topic in the best possible way, while keeping in mind the feasibility of this research, a desk research appeared the most suitable option. The actors that were most important to this research were the four European member states namely, France, Ireland, Germany and Lithuania. These countries were closely researched and divided in the population of these countries, governments of these countries and the European Union. Each of these actors required a different approach of research.

Desk research was the best way of researching enlargement fatigue, as the public opinion data needs large quantities of respondents that can only be obtained by very large surveys in order to make them credible. Bryman also states that secondary data is a very important and useful tool with regards to research. Therefore, the secondary data that was available from mostly Eurobarometer and national surveys proved very useful. With regards to the tools and means that were at hand, secondary quantitative data was the best possible choice for the research.

Also, to cover different angles of the topic and get a broad view of enlargement fatigue causes, renowned periodicals such as the Guardian, Le Monde, the Economist etc., were used. In general, these papers give quite a clear overview of the topic although the real in-depth reasons are usually unaddressed.

Moreover, according to Bryman, the core of academic the research is academic literature, which is why most information came from the academic journals, periodicals and books that have been written on the subject (Bryman, 2008). The academic literature that often came from political or social journals, was used as the main source of information to investigate the different causes of enlargement fatigue in the four different member states, and provided profound knowledge that often explained both domestic and European causes.

The choice of four EU countries is because a descriptive and comparative study seems like the best possible way to conduct this research. However, the reason why the selected four countries have been chosen is three-fold. Firstly, the countries cover a range in chronological accession. France and Germany were in from the start, although a part of Germany joined after the unification 1990. Ireland joined in 1973, which is a bit in the middle, and Lithuania is a country that joined at a relatively late stage in 2004. Secondly, the countries selected vary in their importance and size, as Lithuania and Ireland are both small sized countries with relatively small populations. On the other hand, France and Germany are the largest countries in the EU in both size and population, as well as the countries with the greatest importance. Lastly, these countries have an interesting history of events that address enlargement fatigue such as, the Treaty of Nice ratification, EU constitution ratification, the Treaty of Lisbon ratification and the accession negotiations with Turkey.

The search for both similar and different causes will prove interesting according to the model below.

To clarify, in the timeframe of 2000-2015, France is the member state that is both against widening and deepening, while Lithuania is generally positive towards both. Germany is against widening and pro deepening and Ireland is the other way around, against deepening and pro widening.

# Enlargement Fatigue & the Democratic Deficit

Before on starts to read this paper it is vital that the concepts of enlargement fatigue and the democratic deficit are explained in the first chapter. As this research scrutinizes the problem of enlargement fatigue, it soon becomes clear that the democratic deficit is a re-occurring theme and that they are closely related.

## Deepening vs. Widening

In order to understand the enlargement fatigue situation in Europe, it is wise to clearly explain enlargement as it is. To clarify, enlargement consists of two kinds of change, which are the widening of the EU and the deepening of the EU. In this paper, widening refers to the geographical enlargement of the EU while deepening refers to the integration of the EU. Be that political, social, or economic integration of the EU. Although the two concepts are completely different, they are often linked to each other according to *Cameron.* He argues that, historically speaking after each geographical enlargement, the EU started to cooperate more close at a political level(Cameron, 2004)*.* Roughly he described that the very first accession round of the UK, Ireland and Denmark was accompanied with EU integration, in the form of a regional policy and a common fisheries policy. The second round of enlargement and third round led to the creation of a single market and after the fourth enlargement, the EU started to move towards a single economic and monetary union (Cameron, 2004).

In addition, enlargement can be explained as well through the scope of international relations. Several theories can be applied here but Schimmelfennig has explained enlargement, using the rationalist and constructivist paradigms. Using the scope of the rationalist paradigm, enlargement can be seen as a mutual benefitting agreement for both parties, which are the countries that are already in the EU and those that want to join. It would only make sense that counties join the EU if the gains from such membership will exceed the costs made. Naturally, the gain for those already in the EU would also have to exceed the costs. Costs and gains are not only economic but also political, as joining countries will lose some of their sovereignty to the EU level but get economic aid in return. This has been the case in Ireland for example as will be explained in the chapter appointed to Ireland (Schimmelfennig, 2015). On the other hand, Schimmelfennig used a constructivist approach to explain enlargement as following: The willingness of both members of the EU and applicants to join or be joined, is based on how much culture and belief is shared by both parties. To clarify, if a candidate state feels that it shares the same values of democracy as the EU, it will be inclined to join the EU on that basis. On the other hand, as language is one of the factors that binds people together in a nation, the EU already has a setback because of the many different languages that are present (Kamusella, 2001). In this sense, it is a far less materialistic way of looking at enlargement than the earlier mentioned rationalist approach.

Although enlargement has been defined above, it is not clear why enlargement is needed or wanted by nation-states in or outside of the EU. The reason for enlargement is in fact three-fold, as it is centred on prosperity, security and stability, as this is what the former Barroso commission promoted. The idea behind it is that a more secure and stable neighbourhood is in the interest of the states within the EU as it facilitates trade. These have been the main motivators behind enlargement since the fall of the Berlin wall, which led to the accession of many eastern European states (Waldner, 2006). Additionally, the EU’s still holds these values with the eye on creating a more secure neighbourhood but is no longer relying only on the enlargement tool. Instead it now turns to the use of the European Neighbourhood Policy as many bordering states are outside the EU’s geographical borders (Waldner, 2006).

## Enlargement fatigue

Now that enlargement has been defined more clearly, it will be wise to dig into this topic a little further, which is enlargement fatigue. This phenomenon can be suffered by both the member states and the candidate member states. However, in this paper only the enlargement fatigue suffered by the member states will be investigated (Szolucha, 2010).

Enlargement fatigue is generally speaking the unwillingness of certain member states to admit new member states or that this willingness is declining (Szolucha, 2010). To give a more solid idea of how enlargement is perceived in the EU, it is useful to consult the Eurobarometer. According to the Eurobarometer of 2007, European citizens were in favour of enlargement with 47%, whereas 39% was against enlargement (Szolucha, 2010). Over the years the positive attitude towards enlargement have declined for various reason, which can be economic, political or social. In fact, 2012 was the first year that enlargement was no longer favoured as 52% was against further enlargement. However, the various member states do perceive this development in different ways. Enlargement fatigue on itself is ambiguous as state 1 opposes to the accession of state A, while state 2 opposes to the accession of state B (Dimiter Toshkov, 2014). In addition, to some, it is seen as an opportunity while others see it as a threat.

First of all, new small to medium sized member states see the fatigue as a threat to the cohesion of the EU and the ability to come to a consensus. Further deepening of the union is needed tackle this problem but the fatigue blocks the possibility to further integrate the union (Szolucha, 2010). Deepening of the union should be able to bypass the difficulties that come with the geographical enlargement by creating Qualified Majority Voting for example. However, this kind of deepening is in turn blocked because the citizens of the EU do not wish to see more powers transferred to EU level (Szolucha, 2010).

Secondly, although older member states sometimes see fatigue as an opportunity to create a more civilized union, they sometimes seem to oppose to further enlargement due to the influences from domestic factors and political games. France is a striking example of this development as former President Chirac created a law where the people of France were to be consulted on future enlargement. This law was drafted with the eye on the Turkish accession into the union but was changed afterwards to a parliamentary consultation. This is further explained in the chapter of France.

Thirdly, the former Euro commissioner for enlargement Olli Rehn, has stated that one of the main causes of enlargement fatigue is the economic situation that member states experience. Roughly, in times of prosperity, the EU finds a lot of support among its citizens but this support declines when economy of the countries declines as well. Also, an underlying reason of this economic welfare is migration. During the ratification process of the EU constitution, migration became one of the main issues, as EU citizens were afraid to lose their jobs to migrants from the new member states. As was feared mostly in incumbent states such as France and the Netherlands. Other countries such as the UK and Ireland who were positive about the migration of workers at first, put limitations to the amount of migrants at a later stage (Szolucha, 2010).

## Democratic Deficit

One theme that plays an important role with regards to enlargement fatigue, be that deepening or widening, is the democratic deficit that is present in the EU. EU citizens from all nations have difficulty to feel connected to the EU. To clarify, a democratic deficit is any situation in which there is believed to be a lack of democratic accountability and control over the decision-making process (Collins, N.D.).

According to Rose Lemardeley, support and interest for the EU have fallen over time. In fact, where the electorate show up for EU parliamentary elections was once 63% in 1979, it was only 43% in 2009. (Lemardeley, 2013) This decrease has only worsened in last election when the turnout stagnated just above 43% (European Parliament , N.D.). The EU is often perceived as a distant institution with a complex framework that some find difficult to understand. A democratic deficit can exist in any given institution, be that the EU, nation-state or the regional level. However, a relation is visible between the size and the democratic deficit. If an institution is large, like the EU, it will take a long time for citizens to accomplish participation at any level. (Jensen, 2009). Even though the parliament has been given a much more important role over the years with more influence in the decision making process, support has fallen. Lemardeley also states that the democratic deficit is taking on new form with the constraining dissendus that is spreading in the EU the last decade. This is illustrated by the fact that the public opinion nowadays does have more attention for the EU than in the past but always in a very Eurosceptic way. In earlier years, the democratic deficit was illustrated by the permissive consensus, which was a more neutral deficit since the EU elite could act independently from the electorate because there was very little interest for the EU itself (Lemardeley, 2013).

Also, EU citizens have little interest for the Union according to Eurobarometer, as interest for the EU practically never rises above 50%, except in the early 90s. In general, the interest for the EU fluctuates between 20% and 40% as is shown in the graph below.



(Eurobarometer, 2008)

However, the disinterest that is shown here until the nineties usually added to the democratic deficit in the permissive consensus way. Nowadays, probably more interest will show in the years that follow after this graph but then in a more negative sense, which contributes to the constraining dissendus.

Finally, the lack of interest at an earlier stage, or the unfavourable interest at a later stage, is a part of the democratic deficit. The effect that this democratic deficit has on enlargement fatigue is sometimes clearly visible in this research. Cases that address the EU constitution like the French case or the referenda in Ireland show that there is a democratic deficit in the EU. Often the electorate does not know what they are voting for where the EU is concerned or they associate the wrong theme with the referendum. This is illustrated by the latest Danish referendum on one of the four opt-outs that were discussed during the ratification process of the Maastricht treaty. Last December, the Danish electorate voted a decisive no to the opt-in for the EU concerning Justice and Home affairs. 53% voted no to the referendum although the reason for this refusal had probably more to do with the current migration crisis. As a matter of fact, the opposition, led by Kristin Thulesen Dahl, campaigned that a yes to this referendum would lead to a decrease in influence on immigration and thus a greater influx of immigrants. On the other hand, the pro-camp, led by Prime Minister Rasmussen, claimed that the opt-in had absolutely nothing to do with immigration or asylum legislation. (The Guardian, 2015).

## Conclusion

To summarize this chapter, it can be stated that enlargement fatigue is no easy issue as it knows many faces. In the first part of this chapter enlargement has been explained as being two separate developments which can be either deepening or widening of the EU. Secondly, enlargement is explained through the rationalist and constructivist paradigms of international relations. Furthermore, the reasons for enlargement are to stimulate prosperity, security and stability in the European region. In addition, the concept of enlargement fatigue is more closely explained by giving examples of how different member states feel and perceive the fatigue in their own way. The former commissioner for enlargement fatigue Olli Rehn argued also that enlargement fatigue is closely linked to economic welfare and migration.
The second part of this chapter addresses the re-occurring democratic deficit in this paper. The deficit is explained by showing the decrease in the turnout of European parliament elections and through the use of Eurobarometer polls that also show a decrease in interest in the EU. Furthemore, the shift from a permissive consensus to a constraining dissendus is explained and its importance with regards to the democratic deficit. Lastly, the most recent topic addressed is the referendum in Denmark concerning the second opt-in on Justice and Home affairs that might very well have been influenced by the democratic deficit.

# France

## EU integration

France is a country that is opposing to both widening and deepening of the EU and has been in the EU the longest. Other countries such as the UK and Austria also have a tendency to oppose to both widening and deepening of the EU but France has been in the EU the longest and has been a key actor in the shaping of the EU. In the first section, the background and history of enlargement fatigue will be discussed using France as an example, in order to illustrate what enlargement fatigue entails and what kind of causes there can be. Next, the EU integration process will be discussed which is centred mainly on the EU constitutional referendum. Lastly, the attitude of France with regards to the geographical enlargement will be discussed, referring to the accession of Turkey.

To begin with, it might be interesting to take a look at the attitude of France towards enlargement fatigue when the EU was still young. The history of France within the EU will give an idea of the background of enlargement fatigue. In fact, France is a member-state of the EU that has always had a decisive role in the EU ever since it’s creation. The French Republic was by far the biggest country within the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and has therefore been the key actor behind the EU actions until the accession of the United Kingdom (UK) in 1973. Of course Germany was part of the Union as well although divided until the early nineties, which made Germany’s political input significantly less (Patterson, 2011). In fact, Germany was not eager to become a dominant player in the European theatre because of the two imperialistic attempts in the first half of the 20th century but looked to France to take the lead in Europe (Patterson, 2011).

However, with regards to the accession of the UK it cannot be left unsaid that France was opposed to the UK entering the EU. Mainly because it meant a new and big state at the European table that was able to challenge France’s great influence in the European theatre. Moreover, with the accession came the supposedly American influence that was closely related to the UK (BBC, N.D.). It was De Gaulle’s firm policy to make France an independent actor in the world through the use of the EU and the accession of the UK would endanger this ambition. General de Gaulle actually blocked UK accession applications twice in 1963 and 1967 by threatening other members to quit the union if they were to precede accession negotiations with the UK (BBC, N.D.).

Although this policy might indicate enlargement fatigue on the surface, the actual reasons for this block on accession by De Gaulle were more profound. Partially, his argument was that the USA and Great Britain were dominating the European theatre too much through their presence in NATO. This was also the reason why France took measures that led to French’s NATO exit in 1966 (Martin, 2011). In General, it is quite clear that France’s attitude towards European enlargement was mainly decided by de attitude of De Gaulle. However, De Gaulle came from a military background and the decisions he made were often based upon a military point of view, which was probably needed as well in a time frame that was dominated by the threat of the Cold War (Philip G, 1980). Yet, the menace of the cold war was almost two decades ago at the time of EU constitutional referendum and this time France was again not in favour of EU enlargement in the form of further European integration.

To clarify, it is only to point out how different the causes can be with regards to enlargement fatigue, when it actually touches the same negative outcome illustrated by the constitutional refusal of France in 2005. This time it was the population of France as a whole who had a say in the outcome instead of one man in the form of De Gaulle. Also the form of enlargement fatigue was different as this concerned deepening of the EU instead of widening. In addition, the reasons for De Gaulle’s block on the UK’s accession are quite clear today but it might be interesting to investigate what the reason was for France’s “no” in 2005 to the EU constitution. One of the reasons for the French to say no had quite a different background as the people of France were caught up in domestic political games caused by the election campaigns. In fact, according to Fin Laursen, the ambitions of Nicolas Sarkozy led to a breach in the pro EU constitutional coalition of President Jacques Chirac. Sarkozy’s strategy to become the new leader of the UMP and eventually France’s new president was successful but did partially cause the rejection of the EU constitutional reform (Laursen, 2008).

Another more practical cause can be found when making a small comparison with the referendum held by Francois Mitterrand prior to the treaty of Maastricht in 1992. When to hold a referendum is apparently also a matter of strategic timing if one wants it to be successful (Vassallo, 2008). Francois Mitterrand planned his referendum about the Maastricht Treaty quite carefully just after a rather calm summer holiday which gave his opponent little time to prepare their anti-Europe campaign. On the contrary, at the last referendum in 2005 the opposition was simply more organised because they had more time and a better timeframe to work with, as there were no large holidays in between (Vassallo, 2008).

Of course, there were other reasons as well that were discussed during the debate about the EU constitution such as the economic situation of France and how the constitution would affect this. In the debates, the EU got a rather bad image since many cheap eastern European workers would come to France to replace French workers while unemployment was already high at 10% (CIA World Factbook, 2015). According to the BBC the French uttered their frustration about high unemployment towards sitting President Chirac in the referendum. They did not only put the blame for high unemployment rates on him but also used their vote to express their doubt on the EU integration and enlargement programme (Wyatt, 2005). Interesting to see is that France’s refusal of the EU constitution came a bit as a surprise since the main political parties where in favour and there was a lot of support from the European Union as well. In the end, it has been said that the French rejection was caused by a failure in the organization of those in favour and not necessarily due to the efforts of the opposition (Wyatt, 2005).

## EU enlargement

In the next part it will be interesting to see what kind of attitude France had with regards to further EU enlargement on a geographical scale as this focuses on the widening of the European Union.

The first case that immediately draws the attention is the case of Turkey that has been interested in Europe for a long time, as it already formally applied in 1987 and started accession negotiations in 2005. However soon after the talks began it became clear that there were certain issues that blocked the talks with Turkey such as the Turkish troops that were still occupying parts of Cyprus (The Economist, 2005). In fact, France’s main enlargement struggle is centred on Turkey and Turkey’s foreign policy with regards to Cyprus. At that particular time it was the French president Sarkozy who had a strong opinion about the accession of Turkey into the European Union. As a matter of fact, it was rather negative when he said that Turkey would never become a full member of the European Union (The Economist, 2005). However, one should again take notice of the political aspirations of the newly appointed President, which were also shaped by political games that would make him more popular with the public. According to different Euro barometer polls, (surveys carried out by the European Commission in order to obtain the general opinion of many European citizens) the accession of Turkey was not seen as very favourable (Yilmaz, 2007). One question in particular shows the general attitude of the French towards Turkey’s accession very clear. It stated that 55% of the French would still oppose Turkey even when the government would meet each and every requirement set by the European Union (Yilmaz, 2007). This might have influenced the opinion of Sarkozy as he was drawing near to the Presidential elections. Supposedly, this is also the reason why Sarkozy was positive towards a privileged partnership with Turkey as proposed by the Germans (The Economist, 2005). Still the Euro barometer also proves quite clearly that the French do not feel as if Turkey should enter the EU. Moreover, the former president Valery Giscard D’Estaing has also expressed a negative sentiment towards Turkey’s accession far more early in an interview with the French newspaper ‘Le Monde’. Being the man in charge of the drafting of the constitution he stated that only 5% of Turkey lies within Europe’s geographical/political boundaries and the same goes for the nation’s capital, which is situated in Asia (Le Monde, 2002). Although, D’Estaing was out of office already for quite some time, his opinion on the matter was probably highly influential with regards to the public opinion.

Next, if one scrutinizes the enlargement round of 2004, it is interesting to see that support was already low for the biggest enlargement round at that time. As the Eurobarometer shows in its opinion poll of 2004, 52% of the French were not in favour of new states joining the EU in the future against 32% who were in favour of new states in the EU (Eurobarometer, 2004). The numbers are rather clear on the subject of enlargement and still did the French government support the accession of both the enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007. Oya Dursun-Ozkanca argues that this is mainly because of the existing democratic deficit in France and in the EU between the ruling elite and the public opinion. She also states that the greatest flaw of the democratic deficit is that the ruling elite in the form of government is unable to properly show the population the necessity of enlargement (Oya Dursun-Ozkanca, 2013).

It is quite clear now that the perception of the French towards enlargement has changed with regards to future enlargement. Where there was once enthusiasm to be found for new members in the EU, the French now find themselves more and more reluctant to let new members join the EU. A good illustration of their sentiment can be found in President Jacques Chirac’s proposal to hold referenda on every candidate country that wishes to become an EU member after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria (Bartak, 2006). In the case of the latter mentioned two countries, the reasoning for France’s hesitant attitude was due to the growing unemployment in the country. The admission of again two more relatively poor countries into the EU would without a doubt mean that more cheap labour would come their way (Bickerton, 2006). Yet, the actual benefit of the enlargement was not necessarily negative as the enlargement brought a lot of economic advantages for older EU members as well as the new ones (Francesca D'Auria, 2008). Nevertheless, the fact remains that the enlargement was overall perceived by the French as having a negative effect on domestic economies.

## Conclusion France

As one of the EU’s largest and oldest key actors, France has always held a dominant position on the EU enlargement process. Under De Gaulle, France decided who entered the Union and who didn’t, especially with regards to the accession of the UK. However, more recently there are reasons why the French did not support further geographical enlargement that have typical enlargement fatigue components. Firstly, the electorate is influenced by political games of Sarkozy who was campaigning to get votes for his Presidential elections. Secondly, there was the democratic deficit because the French Parliament did support further enlargement even though the French people did not share this support at all, as is shown in Eurobarometer polls. Thirdly, economic interests were perceived as threatened by the French electorate as they felt that new eastern European states would worsen the unemployment rates.
With regards to EU integration, the same factors can be identified as well, partially because they have the same roots. First, politicians who campaigned against the EU constitution such as, Sarkozy influenced the electorate in their referendum, which are again domestic political games. Second, the French uttered their frustration about unemployment in this referendum on the EU constitution instead of really voting on the theme. This example carries both the features of enlargement fatigue as it entails a democratic deficit and the French associate it wrongly with their economic status. The part that does not necessarily have to do with enlargement fatigue, is about the timing of a referendum, although it did influence the outcome of referenda.

# The Republic of Ireland

To start with, Ireland has had quite a say in Europe’s constitutional shaping in the last decade since it was opposing two treaties fervently. That is to say, first the Nice Treaty in 2001 that was rejected by 54% of the 35% turnout (Left, 2002). Later on the treaty was ratified in a second referendum where the turnout was higher as well. However, in 2008 the Irish had once more a referendum on the treaty of Lisbon and voted ‘no’ again, only to ratify the treaty in a second referendum that was held later that year. To clarify, Ireland’s position towards enlargement already has a different background than earlier discussed France, as Ireland is in the EU since 1972 and is thus not a founding member. Also, Ireland is a relatively small country in the EU with a population of 5 million but managed to stir up the European Union nonetheless. Although Ireland adopted both treaties, it does qualify as a country that is in favour of widening and against deepening of the EU, as the research will show that the case is not as black and white as it seems.

## Treaty of Nice

Chronologically, it is wise to scrutinize the referenda of 2001 and 2002 first, in order to better understand the motivation behind the Irish rejection of the Treaty of Nice. The reasons for the Irish initial rejection are in fact quite numerous and certainly not without a cause. Firstly, the treaty of Nice (ToN) is dealing with the accession of 10 new member states into the EU and is therefore directly targeted at enlargement and the widening of the EU. Although the Irish government was rather surprised about the rejection of the ToN, it was obvious that the population of Ireland had serious doubts about the effect that new member states would have on their influence in Europe. Ireland, being a small country, would relatively speaking lose significant voting power as bigger and especially more member states would enter the European Union (Dan S. FelsenthalI, 2001; Department of the Taoiseach, 2012). The Irish felt somewhat intimidated by the new states because they too would be integrated in the new form of Qualified Majority Voting. A country such as Poland, who represents 27 votes in the council of ministers against only 7 votes for Ireland, can be perceived as a threat. Romania, the Czech Republic and Hungary also represent new and far larger countries in the council of ministers and could therefore also be regarded as a threat to the position of Ireland within the EU. However, it must be stressed that this was a perception of the people of Ireland and not the Irish government. It was of course the people who voted in the referendum and this also explains the outcome of this referendum, as the government was unconcerned about the decline of Irish influence in Europe.

Secondly, there is the financial picture of Ireland that has changed a lot since its accession in the EU. Ireland has received large funds in the beginning from the EU in order to stimulate the nation’s economy and not without success. Ireland has known a booming economy since its accession and has cost the EU a total of 30 billion dollars in the 25 proceeding years according to Mc Allister (McAllister, 2001). However, after the accession of the new member states, Ireland would lose these funds, as they would now go to the new member states that are more in need of these European funds. Moreover, instead of receiving money from the EU, Ireland would have to start paying their share to the Union in order to support the new coming countries. This is of course not very favourable for the Irish and might explain their initial rejection of ToN. Still, the Irish government was aware of other advantages and did back the Treaty of Nice since the government had already ratified the Treaty. It was in fact a bit of an embarrassment that the Irish electorate voted ‘no’ as Ireland had been a great benefactor of the EU (Marsh, 2002). In addition, another financial matter was the fact that the Irish economy has always depended on agriculture in the past and was therefore also depending on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). With the coming of 10 new member states it meant that Ireland would have to share the CAP with more members and they would receive less. Nevertheless, the Irish can of course not deny the favours granted to them by the EU in the past to the new member states, as that would be somewhat unfair.

Next, one of the main topics was the interest of the Irish population in the question of Irish neutrality. Ireland had always maintained a neutral position as it did in the Great War and the Second World War. Concerning their role in intergovernmental organisations such as NATO for example, Ireland has also remained neutral with the exception of the United Nations. Especially after the Second World War, Irish neutrality was highly valued as many Irish thought it was because of their neutrality that they came out the war nearly unscratched. However, with the coming of ToN, Irish neutrality would be jeopardized due to the further cooperation in the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) through the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) (Feeney, 2002). To clarify, the CSDP was no new topic in ToN as it was already quietly established in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 but the ERRF caused more commotion this time, as it was probably a more tangible topic. This development of the ERRF was regarded as unfavourably by many Irish and became therefore one of the main reasons to say ‘no’ to ToN. However, after the first referendum Ireland made a well-defined national declaration in Seville on the 21 of June 2002, declaring that they would give their support to the CSDP. Nevertheless, only after a referendum was held in accordance with the Irish constitution and thus the approval of the Irish, will Ireland give its support to the CSDP (Department of the Taoiseach, 2012). This declaration was probably a great factor that persuaded more Irish to vote in favour of ToN during the second referendum.

Lastly, interesting to see are not only the reasons why Ireland initially rejected ToN but also what persuaded and motivated the Irish to vote in favour of the second referendum. One of these reasons was the above-mentioned declaration in Seville about Irish neutrality, which certainly had a positive effect on the second referendum. In addition, the yes camp established a Forum on Europe directed by the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Bertie Ahern in order to inform its citizens about Europe in an unbiased way. This was also done in the period between the first and the second referendum in order to make people more aware of the necessity of ToN although the actual effect is hard to prove. Furthermore, the government gets better information because the Oireachtas (government) gets the possibility to monitor European affairs more effectively on a regular basis. That is to say, ministers have the obligation to attend parliamentary committee meetings before and after European Council meetings in order to clarify decisions that were taken in those meetings (Gilland, 2002). Last but not least, the yes camp was not taking any risk this time with the second referendum as they made a financial budget that was about € 1,7 million against a much smaller budget from the no camp that had only €170,500 to spend.

## Treaty of Lisbon

The treaty of Lisbon is a different case from the ToN but does contain a couple of similarities, which is of course no surprise as each signed EU treaty transfers more power to the European level. This occurrence always raises the issue of ‘how much power should be trusted to the European level’ out of fear of losing too much of the nations sovereignty. Alongside with this recurring sovereignty issue, there are also the returning issues of Irish neutrality, taxation and conscription. New issues are abortion, the vague format of the treaty and the Irish commissioner that had to leave the commission due to structural changes in the EU commission. However, the treaty is an interesting one to look at because it found its roots in a different document, namely the European Constitution that was blocked by both the Netherlands and France in 2005. Therefore, it might be fruitful to first look at the EU constitution and Ireland’s attitude towards it before focussing on the Lisbon Treaty.

The head of government of Ireland had, like all other heads of European governments, already said that the EU constitution was the right choice for Ireland in the EU. At least that is what their Prime Minister Bertie Ahern claimed during the ratification process in May 2006 (BBC, 2007). On the other hand, opinion polls showed that the Irish were in fact divided about the Lisbon Treaty with 35% Irish against the constitution and 30% in favour of the constitution while 35% did not know (Wikipedia, N.D.). These are of course just opinion polls and as Ireland was delayed in the ratification process because of the French and Dutch rejection, the real outcome of the Irish constitutional referendum will remain unknown. Yet, when one takes a look at the result of the first Lisbon treaty referendum, it is likely that the Irish would indeed have voted ‘no’ for the European constitution. As a matter of fact, the Lisbon treaty is often regarded as a replacement for the European constitution. As a replacement, it is often considered as a deliberately more difficult designed constitution but then in the form of a treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon would then only have to be ratified by referendum in Ireland, since Ireland is the only country in the EU whose constitution obligates its government to hold referendums on constitutional matters (Schlamp, 2008).

To clarify, the first reason for the referendum’s initial failure was that the EU was accused of deliberately confusing both Irish national politicians and the electorate with an incomprehensible text, which could be used to quietly pass it through a small referendum without much bother (Schlamp, 2008). The truth is that it did not quietly pass through at all and therefore raised a lot of commotion in all of Europe. Not understanding what to vote for seemed to be one of the most prominent reasons for the Irish to vote ‘no’. Different polls showed that percentages varying from 20% to 40% did not know what they were voting for and that they were not going to vote for something they did not know about. Apparently, it was a misjudgement from the Lisbon Treaty designers to think that ignorance would work out in their advantage as they actually lost the first referendum. The ratification process was of course also subject to domestic political games and the ‘no’ camp very successfully used the confusing treaty in their advantage. For example, the slogan if you are not sure of something don’t sign’ was a very clever one, although easy to use (Brugha, 2008).

The second reason for the negative referendum outcome was the abortion issue, which still plays an important role in the generally Catholic Irish society. Abortion is unacceptable for a majority of the Irish and it was forbidden in the Irish constitution to conduct abortion even in cases of rape, suicidal mothers and mothers in mortal danger because of their pregnancy. The government was at that time also against abortion and willing to protect life at any stage no matter the costs. This was also due to the influence of the Catholic Church on the government in these matters. Only in the last couple of years has the right on abortion gained more ground in Ireland and legislation was provided for the extreme cases of life threatening pregnancies and suicidal mothers (McDonald, 2013). However, during the time of the Lisbon Treaty, abortion was still considered as an act against life and seen as murder. Many Irish, including the government, were against abortion and the Irish electorate was led to believe that the Lisbon Treaty would make abortion legal. This was partially due to the anti-abortion activist group ‘Coir’ that claimed that Irish law on abortion would be dictated from the European Court of Justice. This was not true but it raised a lot of suspicion towards the Lisbon Treaty.

One of the other re-occurring themes is the Ireland’s neutral position in the world with the exception of the UN. This issue was of course already treated in the Nice Treaty, where Ireland’s neutrality was secured once more with the Declaration of Seville. Nevertheless, the Irish remained suspicious about this subject and was centred on conscription. The reason for this suspicion was an article Article 42(3) in the Lisbon Treaty, which states; *'Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common defence and security policy',* and *'Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities'* (EEPA, N.D.). This does indeed give the impression that Ireland would become more involved with the EU’s external actions, but it says nowhere that conscription is necessary. Although based on a non-existing fear, the doubts of the Irish are understandable because the treaty is a rather vague and it does not say clearly that these provisions are in fact linked to the creation of the European Defence Agency (Nash, 2009). What possibly had a large influence on the whole matter was that the UK was at war with Iraq at that time and Ireland was very much aware of that fact. The Irish were not eager at all to join the US, UK, France and other European states in this war (Brugha, 2008).

Finally, there were a few small matters that had a negative effect on the referendum as well. Namely, Ireland would supposedly lose its attractive business climate due to provisions from Brussels in the new treaty, as people believed that low business taxes would be regulated in Brussels, under the Treaty. This was not the case. Neither could the rumours of the US involvement be substantiated, as the US supposedly had interest in a block on the Lisbon Treaty in order to secure their influence in military matters through NATO (Brugha, 2008). To clarify, a strong Common European Defence policy could challenge the US influence in NATO and was given as a reason for an American financing a large part of the no campaign.
A ‘No’ canvasser needed to raise a fear on one issue. To succeed a ‘Yes’ canvasser needed to re-assure a voter on about five issues, such as neutrality, conscription, abortion, taxation and the Irish Commissioner (Brugha, 2008). Still, although some of these fears were unreal and biased, the Irish electorate was also bullied into signing the Treaty because there would be severe consequences once Ireland would have rejected Lisbon for the second time (The economist, 2008).

## Conclusion Ireland

In spite of a few insecurities about the enlargement, Ireland and the Irish have a positive attitude about new states joining the Union. Although the neutrality issue played an important role in both referenda, it is not a component of enlargement fatigue. The declaration of Seville illustrates perfectly that Ireland will not cooperate in any further EU military integration. An issue that was an actual enlargement fatigue component, and uniquely related to ToN, was the economic situation because the Irish electorate felt that they would lose significantly on EU funds such as the CAP.

With regards to the Lisbon Treaty, It must be said that many of the Irish assumptions were based upon confusing information about the treaty of Lisbon. Therefore, the example of Ireland also shows the impact of the democratic deficit in the EU and the smart campaigning of those who oppose to further EU integration. Although the Irish did vote yes on the Lisbon Treaty in the end, it still was an ambiguous outcome since the EU first tried to mislead the Irish with an incomprehensible text and when that failed, the yes camp spent a very large budget on selling the Treaty. Also, the fear that the Lisbon Treaty would affect the business climate is a typical enlargement fatigue indication. Two factors that did influence the referendum but were not an actual signs of enlargement fatigue were; the abortion issue and the fact that the Irish electorate was threatened that Ireland would have severe, although held vague consequences when they would not accept the treaty. Moreover, Ireland being the only country where constitutional changes had to be put to a referendum, does illustrate how other countries electorates would have reacted when they would have had the option of a referendum. The outcome could easily have been a similar one like the negative outcome of the EU Constitution referenda in 2005.

# Germany

The case of Germany is a case that is centred mostly on the accession of Turkey into the European Union. The relation between Germany and Turkey is interesting because Germany’s opinion about Turkey is often crucial and sets out the line on which the European Union operates. Germany also has a lot of interest in Turkey as it has the highest number of Turkish immigrants in the EU, which causes the German public to have a strong opinion towards Turkey and the accession. Other important factors are the economic ties between the two countries, the Kurdish minority issue, a privileged partnership and Erdogan, the current President of Turkey. With regards to the deepening of the European Union, Germany has always been in favour of doing so and has in fact been one of the driving factors behind European integration and shows this through continuous support for the EU constitution and other integration treaties.

## The accession of Turkey

If one takes a look at the background of the situation concerning the accession of Turkey, it is quite clear that the accession of Turkey has been on the discussion table for quite a long time. In fact, talks with Turkey delivered their first result in 1963 when the Ankara Agreement was signed between what was then called EEC and Turkey. The main aims were to improve living conditions in Turkey by means of restriction-free trade between the EEC and Turkey, while at the same time trying to decrease the existing disparities between the EEC and Turkey with the eye on future collaboration. The truth of Turkeys ambitions was revealed in 1987, when the country applied for full EU membership, which resulted in a candidate member state status in 1999, twelve years later (Delelgation of the European Union to Turkey, N.D.). In other words, negotiation and procedures went very slowly. Certainly when these are compared to certain other EU member states that have also sought the membership of the EU. For example, the dates of application for accession of all the 2004 enlargement nations date from after 1990. However, the application for the accession of Turkey, which had already begun in 1987, has only resulted in the candidate-membership status. It is safe to say that Turkey is considered a different case compared to other member states or other candidate member states. The idea of a ‘privileged partnership’ that was brought up by Germany as an alternative to full membership, certainly stresses the exceptional case of Turkey (Öner, 2014). Various factors play important roles in the slowdown of the accession process. Internal issues in Germany such as the Turkish minority in Germany and economic factors have a large influence on German public opinion. In addition there are external factors such as the Kurd minority issue in the eastern part of Turkey and also the possible perceived decline in democracy under ruling President Recep Tayyip Erdogan that greatly influences the opinion of the German government.

First, Germany is the member state in the EU with the highest percentage of people that oppose to the accession of Turkey. The reason for the high percentage of opposition can be traced back easily because Germany counts the highest percentage of Turkish immigrants in the EU as well. According to Saz, these two variables are inseparable, higher immigration flows in every EU country also result in more opposition to the accession of Turkey (Saz, 2011). Three million Turks are living in Germany at present and even though many are integrating and even assimilating, there are still large groups that do not seem to integrate and cause trouble in the German society. To clarify, a study among 2nd generation Turkish migrants showed that both men and women find it difficult to assimilate, although women seem to have more problems with it than men (Hartmann, 2014). In addition, in Germany there is a gradual rise of Islamophobia, which is also linked to the Turkish immigrants (Saz, 2011). Many Germans seem to believe that if Turkish immigrants cannot adapt to the German culture then they will no be able to adapt to the European culture either. Consequently, Turkey entering the European Union will probably not work out either, as there simply is too much of a cultural difference. Furthermore, public opinion in Germany is also heavily influenced by the on-going economic crisis and finds its roots in the trouble with Greece. Many Germans believe that the accession of Turkey would again cost Germany considerable amounts of money, and this makes public opinion negative in general towards any enlargement (Öner, 2014). However, some aspects of public opinion are irrational, such as Islamophobia. Islamophobia has been on the rise in Germany for a few years now and came to a climax when 25.000 protesters went on the streets on January the 5th in Dresden. Strangely, Dresden is a city with only 2% foreigners but apparently is very anti-Islam (Lindsey, 2015). As a result, islamophobia is a rather bad development for the Turkish immigrants because most Turks are Islamic as well. In addition, with regards, to the economic situation in Turkey, the economic growth rate has been higher in Turkey than in most European countries, which would probably make them a contributor to EU funds instead of a burden (Principal Global Indicators, N.D.).

In fact, considering the economic position of Turkey, the business sectors on the German side as well as the Turkish side are still very much in favour of Turkey entering the EU. From all the European countries, Germany is the nation that has most economic ties with Turkey, even though investments have declined in the recent years (Öner, 2014). Business lobbyists also influence German political parties. These are lobbyists who see a lot of potential in the German-Turkish relation and always try to smooth the path for businesses. Moreover, important German parties like the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) find their support mainly among the business people, entrepreneurs and self-employed. Business interest is an import factor for these parties, which explains why they also feel the urge for closer cooperation with Turkey (Öner, 2014). Closer cooperation is defined, as helping Turkish businessmen getting their visa’s faster and easier for example. These changes were accelerated for a while after Turkey got the Candidate member state status but are out-dated at present, as visa’s for Turkish businessmen still take a lot of their time and require a lot of forms (Wilson, 2010). On the other hand, the CDU’s main opposing argument is that the accession of Turkey would overburden the EU because of its size and economic structure (hurriyetdailynews, 2013). In other words, the business relationship of the two countries is fluctuating on the tides of political cooperation, even though Germany and Turkey are dependent economically on one another.

Furthermore, the Kurdish minority issue in Turkey is an issue of importance with regards to its accession into the EU. As Germany holds the largest number of Turkish immigrants and has the largest business interest, the developments around this matter are of great importance. Germany shies away from cooperation with a country that supresses certain minorities as Germany holds human rights standards in high regard. In addition, the EU uses its enlargement policy in order to spread the rule of law, democracy, human rights, freedom of press, etc., which were established in the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’, in countries that do not yet fully apply these standards. Turkey has already made progress in this area but the Kurdish issue is one that comes with challenges (Chaudhuri, 2005). In order to show the EU its willingness to meet the European standards, Turkey changed some laws that were aimed at the Kurdish minority in 2003 (Chaudhuri, 2005). These changes consisted of laws regarding the freedom of speech and free press, which were indeed big steps for the Turkish government. However, the Kurdish people in Turkey still experienced a lot of hardship in practice as bureaucracy and restrictions at other levels circumvented these new laws. A striking example was the newly adopted law in 2003 by the Turkish parliament concerning the opening of Kurdish school in Turkey. Supposedly, Kurdish schools should be able to be opened anywhere in Turkey without restriction from the government. Yet, the National Security Council (NSC) that gives permission for the construction of these schools is no longer approved to do so under the new law. In fact, the NSC has lost much of its influence in this matter to the civil authority. It is the civil authority that makes it again impossible for the Kurdish minority to build their own schools (Chaudhuri, 2005). This is a law concerning the education but there are various other examples that affect the freedom of speech and press liberty. These forms of discrimination are not tolerated from the EU point of view, or the German perspective. It is in fact weakening the support for a European Turkey unless real changes are made in this area. Unfortunately, European standards on these issues have declining priority under the rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

After 10 years of leading Turkey as their prime minister, Erdogan from the neo-Islamist Justice and Development party (AKP), has cleverly secured its position as Turkeys leader in the position of President of Turkey. After a constitutional change, the Turkish electorate can now elect its President directly. This is of course not wrong, as it is the same system in France for example. The President of Turkey was elected by the Parliament and the tasks of the Presidents were limited. However, president Erdogan also aims to extend the executive powers of the President and thus secures its position as a powerful leader of Turkey for at least another five years (Tisdall, 2015). In a way the switch to President seems to have a lot of similarities with Putin’s change from President to prime minister and back, which has kept him in power since 2000. Not only the European countries see this change as a dangerous step, also the US and even the AKPs own members start to question the policies of their President. The deputy prime minister, who originated from the AKP as well, publicly told the President to stop interfering in government policy on the Kurdish matter. The situation is roughly being described as slowly drifting away from democracy and the EU cannot keep on going with the process of Turkish accession. Under the rule of President Erdogan, the liberty of press has been reduced severely. Cartoonists were sentenced to jail after drawing insulting cartoons about the Turkish President last March (Today's Zaman, 2015). But there are more rumours of Erdogans authoritarian aspirations that would give the country a major setback with regards to the accession into the EU (Ghitis, 2015). Governmental forces interrupted peaceful demonstrations in March as well, as students and even teenagers were arrested because they were criticizing the President. The cause for this aggressive reaction is the election round that is coming up in June and the President clearly fears the spread of opposition. Moreover, perhaps one of the more shocking displays of democratic decline was the brutal interruption of demonstrations in Istanbul’s Gezi Park in 2013 (Ghitis, 2015). These violent acts are convincing neither the German government, nor the German public opinion that Turkey was making progress on the European path. However, the recent election results of June showed that the ruling AKP party lost its majority in parliament for the first time in 13 years. This might indicate a change in the authoritarian rule of the President but the consequences are hard to predict (Letsch, 2015).

In 2013, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that she was considering reopening the negotiations with Turkey despite the general opinion of the CDU, which is that Turkey should instead get a privileged partnership. This ‘privileged partnership’ has been on the table since 2004, when it was first brought up. Not only by Germany but also by France for example that was also more in favour of this privileged partnership when President Nicolas Sarkozy was still in office. Turkey does not feel much for such an alternative as it has already been given the status of candidate membership and thus sees this development as a relapse. The partnership would in fact add little to the current status of Turkey and it would only limit Turkeys influence in the decision making process in the future (Pope, 2009). Nevertheless, it does illustrate the enlargement fatigue from which Germany is suffering. The privileged partnership is probably not going to be a success as Turkey does not feel a lot for such an agreement and the EU loses its integrity to some extend. This is also confirmed by Hansen who states that the EU has a normative obligation to give possible candidate countries more aid and yet keep these countries at arms length because of materialistic reasons (Hansen, 2007). Yet, the Germans still feel that there exists too much difference between them Turkey on religious, political and geographical grounds. Only concerning their business relation do they feel a strong urge to cooperate. Nowadays, the plans for a privileged partnership or full membership are both slipping away in the eyes of the Europeans as Turkey’s priorities have changed argues former EMP Andrew Duff (Duff, 2014). In fact, he says that it would be better if the accession talks would be postponed for the time being. This does of course also fit in quite smoothly with the promise of head of the EU commission Jean-Claude Junker, who stated that the EU should not enlarge in the upcoming 5 years at all. Junker promised no enlargement in the Balkans, Iceland or Turkey as the Union shall first have to focus on internal improvement, although the Balkans will always remain on the enlargement agenda.

## EU integration

The next part is concerned with the role of Germany with regards to the European integration process.

If one takes a look at the major EU integration pinnacles in the timeframe of 2000-2015, the Treaty of Nice, the EU Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty all play a decisive role in the EU integration process. Germany has since its unification always been a key promoter of European integration and has started to play a bigger role in the concerned policies over the past few decades. The German people also feel strongly towards European integration and have in general a positive attitude. During the ratification process of ToN in 2002, Eurobarometer found out that the Germans had an overall positive attitude towards the idea of a European Constitution with 65% in favour of a European Constitution. Only 11% thought that the Constitution was a bad idea (European Commission, 2002). During the ratification process of the EU Constitution, the German public opinion plunged in approximately one year with 11% from 79% to 68% concerning their support for the EU Constitution (European Commission, 2005). Although this decrease appears to be significant, compared to the numbers from 2002, support decreased with merely 3%. Also in both polls, Germany ranks number six among the countries that support the EU Constitution, which made it a country with steady support for the EU constitution. In addition in the years following the rejection of the EU Constitution, Germany remained supportive as 73% of the public said to be in favour of an EU Constitution in 2007 (European Commission, 2007). Despite this fact, governments feared that referendums on a new constitution would still not be supported in the future and thus the Lisbon Treaty was created, which did not have to be put to a referendum in any country except for Ireland.

Although the German population had an overall positive view on the Lisbon Treaty, certain politicians in the German government were not convinced of the eligibility of the Lisbon Treaty and its relation to the German Constitution. This was already the case during the ratification process of the EU constitution in 2005, but since the French and the Dutch rejected it at that time, the case was never resolved. Initially, the German government had already ratified the treaty in 2008 with an overwhelming majority, but due to an unclear transfer of powers to the EU level, the ratification process was delayed. To clarify, a member from the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), Peter Gauweiler, stated that the Lisbon Treaty was undermining the democratic decisions of the German Parliament. Gauweiler argued that the EU Commission could at some point overrule democratic decisions made by the German parliament under the Lisbon Treaty. He illustrated a hypothetical example where a German Minister proposed a new law in the German Parliament that was rejected. Yet, if this minister was to go to the European Commission while being supported by governments from other member states, the Commission could still take initiative to legislate on this topic. Consequently, the German government would have to accept the European legislation on this topic although it had already democratically decided not to adopt the legislation. As a result, the issue was brought before the German federal constitutional court (Miller, 2009). In the end the court ruled that the German parliament was not suffering from any democratic loss in this field, also because national parliaments were going to play bigger roles in EU decision making in the future. In the final stage of the ratification process, the Lisbon Treaty was ratified in Germany with a vast majority in the Bundesrat with 446 in favour of the treaty and only 46 against. However, a small change was the fact that there were 4 laws passed that secured participation of the German parliament in case of modifications to the Lisbon Treaty (Jáuregui, N.D).

## Conclusion Germany

The enlargement fatigue that has been discussed in this chapter knows two sides. To begin with, Germany has most Turkish migrants and the German population has a generally bad experience with these immigrants, which is why a majority of the German electorate does not support a future accession of Turkey. Immigration is an important component of enlargement fatigue, as are the economic reasons. Although the economic reasons are in fact not real threats to the economy of Germany, the German electorate does believe that a future accession would bring another financial burden, as is experienced with the Greek crisis. The lack of ability of the government to explain the truth of the economic situation to their electorate also speaks of a slight democratic deficit. Additionally, the proposition of a privileged partnership is also perceived as a form of democratic deficit, which demonstrates the enlargement fatigue in Germany as well. On the other hand, the violation of Human rights in this chapter plays an important role in the attitude of Germany towards accession but it is not a component of actual enlargement fatigue.

With regards to the deepening of the EU, Germany is one of the main driving forces of EU integration as both government and public support further EU integration. Even though there were certain doubts about the integrity of German democracy during the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, the Treaty was still widely accepted in the German Bundesrat.

# Lithuania

The case of Lithuania is very different from the cases that have been discussed earlier, as Lithuania was one of the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004, making it one of its youngest members. Also, as most states that joined the union in 2004 were former Soviet states, so was Lithuania, which was the first Soviet Satellite state that became independent from the Soviet Union on 11th of March 1990. Lithuanian and other former Soviet states were quite eager to join the EU as even the least enthusiastic of all (Poland) was in favour of joining with 77% of the electorate in the pre-accession years (Gardner, 2015). Being a country that is in favour of both widening and deepening of the EU, Lithuania draws its positive attitude towards EU enlargement from security and energy. With regards to further enlargement of other states and candidate member states, Lithuania believes that the EU is a strong incentive for them to improve their economies and political systems.

## Security

Firstly, as the Lithuanian accession into the EU was mainly motivated by apprehension for the former USSR, security played a key role at that time and still does. According to the Eurobarometer of 2006, 83% of the Lithuanian electorate was supportive with regards to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was also shared in similar percentages by the other Baltic States and former USSR states (European Commission, 2006). Support for the CFSP is a form of further EU integration as it aims at the creation of a single point of view on European external affairs. In addition, the possible reason for their generally higher support for a CFSP likely finds its roots in the end of the cold war. Lithuania and other Baltic States are a little too often reminded of their former oppressing neighbour Russia, as memories of those time are still quite fresh in the inhabitants memories.

Estonia was the first country to be under cyber attack in Europe, and also the first in the world. Not long after the first attack, similar attacks on Lithuania were confirmed that could also be traced back to Russia. The Lithuanian government had just adopted a law banning the use of communist and Soviet symbols, which was not appreciated by the Russian government. No eligible proof was present that Russia was indeed behind the attacks although indications were present. Yet, even before those events, the Russian-Lithuanian ties were already tense because of a dispute over recompense for Lithuanian victims that were maltreated in Soviet camps during the Cold war (Ashmore, 2009). The cyber attacks are ambiguous because they are in fact acts of war but cannot be treated as such due to the fact that their origin cannot be ascertained and there are no international rules on cyber attack. Nevertheless, these events carry a certain message in the Baltic States and therefore in Lithuania as well. The Baltic States know very well that what happens to their neighbour could easily happen to them as well. In addition, security is an important matter for Lithuania and can be achieved through roughly three institutions, which are: the nation-state, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) but also through bilateral relations. Due to the fact that Lithuania is a relatively small country with less than three million inhabitants, it has to look to the other to institutions for security. This can be said of the whole Baltic region that feels threatened by their Russian neighbour (Górnikiewicz, 2013). Also, in the field of cyber security Lithuania is not as advanced as its northern neighbour Estonia and thus the country depends on foreign assistance (Jakub, 2013). With regards to the more classical security threat that is felt in Lithuania, the country was depending on NATO more than it was on the EU. Recently the role of NATO in the Baltic States has been declining due to a shift in the US priority from Europe to Asia, as the US has always been a key actor within NATO (Trainauskienė, 2014). Lithuania is aiming to get more support from the EU and this might come in the form of institutions like the CFSP, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Yet, in 2007 at the time of the cyber attacks, Lithuania had more faith in the existing structure of NATO than the European institutions. The Lithuanian government would rather see the European defence organisations as a pillar within NATO than as an organisation on itself in order to keep interests aligned (Archer, 2008). Further EU integration in the field of security is plausible as long as it does not replace the role of NATO.

Security is one major point of importance for Lithuania concerning EU integration. However, there are plenty of other factors that positively influence the attitude towards the deepening of the EU. The economic growth rate has also added to a more positive attitude towards further EU integration as Lithuania has recently adopted the Euro currency. The adoption of the Euro is a striking form of economic integration and a result of long economic cooperation and stability. Lithuania has always been ambitious to join the Eurozone and has made great effort in the past to make this happen. In the period ranging from just before the accession into the EU in 2004 to just before the global economic crisis in 2008, Lithuania had exceptional GDP growth rates. With varying growth rates between 7% and 10%, Lithuania was a booming economy and gained a lot by joining the EU (Foundation Robert Schuman , 2014).

## Energy

The other pillar of European integration for Lithuania is the energy that the country needs. Lithuania and other Baltic states are still heavily dependent on energy from Russia in the form of gas but also electricity, and the need for power is rising. The Baltic States are in fact still connected to the Russian electricity grid, which is called the BRELL. This includes all the countries in the Eastern Baltic region namely Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but EU Baltic states prefer a connection into the European energy grid (White, 2015). The possible reason why the Baltic States feel that they should change energy grids is because they have had disagreements in the past with Russia and at times Russia has used energy as leverage. A very concrete example is the case of Lithuania and Russia in 2006. At that time, the Lithuanian government was in disagreement with the Russian government concerning the selling of an oil refinery. Lithuania did not want to sell this particular refinery to a Russian syndicate and as a result, the Russians shut down the so-called “Druzhba” pipeline. Russia argued that is was due to technical problems but 8 years later the pipeline was still not repaired even though Lithuania and the EU both had offered repairs. Also, when relations got tense between Russia and Lithuania, the prices of oil rose unreasonably compared to the prices that neighbour countries had to pay (Pavilionis, 2015). Consequently, the search for alternatives became more important as a more reliant energy supplier would invoke less security issues. Also with the eye on the on-going crisis in the Ukraine, which is also partly about energy, Lithuania would rather see an energy supplier that is more politically aligned than they have now. Although the plans for connecting to the European energy grid are still quite young, they certainly do look attractive despite the high costs that are involved. The current President of Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaite who said that the synchronization between the Baltic energy grid and the European grid would enhance security and transparency between the European states, shares this idea. In fact, it would add to the completion of the European energy market, which is a prominent form of EU integration (DELFI, 2015). Still, gas will remain a point of discussion, as Gazprom, a Russian company, will keep delivering most gas.

## Support for enlargement

According to the Lithuanian ministry of foreign affairs, EU enlargement is still a wanted development. The Lithuanian government still backs the EU Commission in this policy as the government clearly sees the advantages of EU membership for those countries that are asking for a candidate status or those that already have that status (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 2014).

The exact reasoning of Lithuania to support enlargement in the future remains unclear. What is certain though, is that Lithuania has benefitted greatly from its candidate membership status as well as its actual membership. Just like the other former Soviet Baltic states. For these states, the EU brought security, stability, peace and prosperity after years of living without them. As mentioned before, the fall of Communism in the early nineties brought many changes and with the prospect of entry into the EU Lithuania did its best to live up to the EU standards. In this perspective the Lithuanian government and its people believe that this policy will also work for new member states as it once did for them (28-watch, N.D.). At least that was what the Lithuanian minister of foreign affairs stated who was in office from 2006 till 2008. However, the Lithuanian people also felt that enlargement was an important development at that time as Eurobarometer polls shows that 68% of the Lithuanian people believed that further enlargement was a positive thing in 2007 (Baltic News Service, 2007; Bickerton, 2006). Until now, Lithuania has kept this positive attitude towards enlargement as current minister of Foreign affairs Linas Linkevicius also affirms the on-going support for further EU enlargement. This is however, in contrast with the statement of the newly anointed President of the European Commission Junker, who stated that the EU should not take on any new members in the upcoming 5 years when he is office. There is of course a difference between taking on new member states and keeping the negotiations going with the candidate member states. Especially in Lithuania’s vision, the promise of membership also stimulates stability, prosperity and peace.

## Conclusion Lithuania

In general, Lithuania feels little of the enlargement fatigue that is present in other EU countries. The country has made a lot of progress since it shifted from Soviet state to independency and then to full EU membership. Because Lithuania is still reminded of their past by both memories and new incidents with their neighbouring country Russia, they do believe that closer cooperation with the EU will provide them with more security and security in energy. However, NATO will still be the key organisation when it comes down to security and the EU will be more useful to secure their energy. Furthermore, because of its positive experience with the EU, Lithuania is confident about further enlargement as it clearly sees the advantages of both candidate status and full membership. This is also partially confirmed by the latest Eurobarometer who researched the support for future among all the member states. Lithuania rates second behind Romania with 64% in favour of enlargement and 24% against future enlargement (Eurobarometer, 2015).

# Analysis

To summarize, enlargement fatigue knows four important components, which are the domestic political games, the democratic deficit, migration, and economic reasons. The countries research show that three out of four suffer to some degree from enlargement fatigue, be that deepening or widening and one country feels little to no fatigue, which is, Lithuania.
 The case of France illustrates how this EU member states copes with enlargement fatigue with regards to widening as it opposes to the accession of Turkey. First, the French Electorate demonstrates a democratic deficit since they oppose to geographical enlargement while their government is in fact pro. Secondly, political games also influenced the public opinion in a negative way as former president Sarkozy campaigned a popular campaign against the accession of Turkey in order to get more votes for the presidential elections. With regards to the deepening of the EU, France is also against further integration on the basis of unemployment, which is an economic reason. Yet, the French vote against the constitution was partially because of a democratic deficit because the French electorate associated the wrong theme with the referendum at hand. Additionally, the French restrain from further integration is also because of the political games that Sarkozy played. The factor that plays a minor role in the outcome of referenda is the timing of referenda, yet this is no real enlargement fatigue component, although it could be reckoned as a political game.

 Next, the case of Ireland shows a member state that is pro EU geographical enlargement although, it did have some doubts about their economic situation at first with the coming of ToN. However, it is also a country that opposes to further EU integration because of two reasons. First, the referenda about the treaty of Lisbon illustrated that the Irish suffered from a democratic deficit because they did not understand the treaty. Second, the Irish feared that their attractive business climate would suffer under the Lisbon treaty, which demonstrates an economic reason for enlargement fatigue. Two factors that influenced the public opinion but have little to do with enlargement were the abortion issue and the ambiguous threat from the EU if the Lisbon treaty would not pass the Irish referendum.

 Furthermore, Germany’s case illustrates a member state that opposes to EU geographical enlargement that is centred on the Turkish accession talks. An important feature of enlargement fatigue is migration, which has greatly influenced the majority of the German electorate in a negative way towards the accession of Turkey. In addition, the German electorate perceived the accession as a probable threat to the economic situation of their country as they were afraid of a repetition of the Greek crisis. This is an economic factor that influences enlargement fatigue even though it is not completely realistic. The Turkish economy is better than some EU member states economies and the inability of the German government to explain this to their electorate demonstrates a slight democratic deficit. Yet, the real democratic deficit is shown by the privileged partnership that Germany initiated, instead of full EU membership. On the contrary, the violation of Human rights in Turkey is not perceived a component of enlargement fatigue although it does play an important role in Germany.

With regards to further EU integration, Germany has always been a promoter. The case study shows that Germany aims to keep as much sovereignty as possible but it often taken the lead with regards to further integration.

 Finally, Lithuania is of course the country that has felt no real enlargement fatigue so far as it needs the support and security that the EU can offer this country. Yet, it is equally interesting to investigate why the country is positive towards further deepening and widening of the EU. Security, energy and a good experience since joining the EU certainly explain why Lithuania remains positive about further enlargement and further integration.

# Conclusion

In the period of 2000 until today, France, Germany and Ireland have indeed experienced enlargement fatigue in many different ways. The democratic deficit, domestic political games, economic reasons and migration all play a role in these countries and sometimes the same cause effects multiple countries. On the other hand, the case of Lithuania shows the causes that instigate the opposite of enlargement fatigue. In this case security and energy are the greatest factors that motivate Lithuania to remain positive towards further enlargement, deepening as well as widening. In the graph below, it shows for all the countries how their electorate feels about the future accession of new member states nowadays. Although in French, the survey asks whether the interlocutor was in favour or against future enlargement. They could also answer that they did not know.

 (Eurobarometer, 2015) Blue is in favour, red is against and grey represents the people who do not know.

According to the graph above Lithuania supports widening of the EU with 64% and 24% are against. Germany is against widening of the EU with 67% against and 25% in favour. France is similar to Germany with 63% against and 27% in favour. Ireland is somewhere in the middle and is in favour of widening with 46% in favour and 41% against widening. This graph underlines to some extend the findings in this report with regards to geographical widening. With regards to the deepening of the EU, France and Ireland have shown in this research that they experience enlargement fatigue. Yet, clear numbers as these above can not be found as the deepening of the EU is spread across multiple cases such as the Treaty of Nice, EU constitution and Treaty of Lisbon for example.

## Points of improvement

A regrettable shortcoming of this research is the fact that there are few no surveys over the course of time that regularly discusses enlargement fatigue as an issue. The same goes for surveys about EU integration, which is of course a more complex topic. In this research the public opinions of the member states are always issue or topic related such as the Lisbon and Nice treaties or the accession of Turkey and the EU constitution. It would be a valuable addition to this research to know the opinion of the member states electorate on the enlargement fatigue both widening and deepeing. It is after all not unthinkable that an electorate can be in favour of widening of the EU in general but targets one specific country that it does not want to enter. This could very well be the case for Germany. Also, more research on countries such as Norway, Switzerland and Iceland could offer an interesting perspective since these countries are in various areas much more aligned with the EU and would be accepted more quickly than say, the Balkans. Furthermore, the loss of sovereignty to EU level always adds to the enlargement fatigue. However, this is a very large topic, which is present in all the member states and could therefore not be treated in this research.

## Recommendations

Enlargement is one of the EU greatest tools in order to spread peace and prosperity and therefore the EU should continue to enlarge. However, enlargement is no longer as plausible as it once was as enlargement fatigue manifests itself in four different ways. Firstly, the domestic political games have influenced enlargement fatigue in France, which is quite hard to counter. Secondly, the economic situation is often perceived in a negative way as is the case in Germany, France and to some extend Ireland. The EU should continue to promote the benefits of the internal markets as nations electorate more often fear new and cheaper economies instead of seeing the actual economic benefits new member states. Next, migration plays an important role in Germany, as the Germans feel threatened by the accession of Turkey because of their experience with current Turkish immigrated part of the population. The EU should treat this situation delicately and keep in mind the feeling of the Germans and EU electorate towards the accession of Turkey. Moreover, the most important theme that is present in three out of the four member states researched is the democratic deficit. The EU should continue to integrate further in order to tackle European and global issues. Yet, in this research it shows that both the EU and the national government often underestimate the referendum at hand. More should be done in order to explain the referendum issue to the electorate in order to prevent failure in passing the referendum because of the lack of understanding. This research underlines once more the importance of good communication between the governments and their electorate.

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