Combating Islamic Radicalisation
in France and in the Netherlands

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Abstract

In recent years, the threat of Islamic terrorism became visible in several European countries. The terrorist attacks that occurred in France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, etc. shocked the European society. Especially the phenomenon of home-grown terrorists, individuals who radicalised in European countries, developed into a growing concern for governments of Western countries. The new challenge governments faced was to counter radicalisation effectively in order to prevent future attacks from happening. However, the term of radicalisation is surrounded by ambiguity and a universal definition is non-existent. Furthermore, it is yet uncertain where exactly extreme beliefs turn into radical beliefs and at what point a government should intervene.

This research evaluated the magnitude of radicalisation in France and the Netherlands and analysed the counter radicalisation measures in the two countries respectively. The two countries were chosen due to the different magnitude of the issue they experience and due to the fact that both countries have a relatively large Muslim population. In recent years, France has encountered more domestic terrorist attacks than any other European country. Since 2015, more than 240 people in France have been killed by supporters of the terrorist organisation IS. Countering terrorism and radicalisation has been high on the French agenda since the 2012 Merah attacks. Especially radicalisation in prisons remains a pressing issue to be tackled by French authorities since several of the attackers of previous terrorist attacks have reportedly been radicalised or strengthened their radical beliefs during their prison experience. Since 2012, the French government has continuously set up new measures to combat radicalisation and terrorism. After the November 2015 attacks in Paris, the French government declared the state of emergency, which lasted two years and received notable criticism for violating the private lives of French citizens. After analysing the French counterterrorism and counter radicalisation measures it was understood that the French government utilises an informal approach, meaning that the different agencies involved in combatting radicalisation do not work under a central authority. This approach has the benefit of linking intelligence and justice, however, it also leads to competition and issues in communication and cooperation. Furthermore, it was surprising that France did not implement any counter radicalisation measures until 2014. In addition, the French counter radicalisation policies are set up to dismantle the means of radicalisation, but not the causes of radicalisation.

The Netherlands, on the other hand, encountered apart from the 2004 van Gogh assassination no Islamic terrorist attacks in recent years. Nevertheless, the Dutch government developed measures to counter terrorism and radicalisation in recent years. Contrary to France, the Netherlands applies a formal approach to counter terrorism and radicalisation in which the NCTV is responsible for the coordination of tasks. This approach has the benefit of facilitating coordination and communication among the different agencies responsible for counter radicalisation. Furthermore, the Dutch government has

implemented counter radicalisation measures since 2007. After analysing the Dutch counterterrorism and counter radicalisation measures it came into view that the Dutch counter measures had a restrictive and a preventive premise. The measures focused on destroying the means of radicalisation as well as the causes for radicalisation. In addition, the Dutch policy papers are much more open about the measures mentioned and why these measures are included. Also, weaknesses of past policies are explained as well as how these weaknesses will be eliminated with the new policies. Nevertheless, the uncertainty regarding radicalisation and its development must be abolished in order for governments to be able to counter radicalisation more effectively.

Preface

This thesis is written as part of the bachelor program of European Studies at The Hague University of Applied Sciences. The basis for this research originally stemmed from my interest in terrorism and radicalisation.

This thesis was mainly written before the Strasbourg attack of December 11, 2018 occurred. Therefore, this paper acknowledges the event but chose not to include it in the study.

I would like to thank my supervisor for the guidance and support during the process of writing this thesis. I would also like to thank Kees van den Bos for taking the time to meet with me and for sharing his expertise and knowledge. Lastly, I would like to thank my family and friends for the support and encouragement.

1   Introduction

In January 2018, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) published 'Ten Issues to Watch in 2018', an in-depth analysis of ten key issues and policy areas that are likely to occupy a significant place on the political agenda of the European Union in the year of 2018. The very first one of the 'ten issues' mentioned in the publication concerns the issue of terrorism. The EPRS refers to the issue of terrorism as one that is unlikely to abate in the near future and as one that will thus continue to pose a threat to the Member States of the European Union. In addition, with the phenomenon of the return of foreign fighters from Iraq and Syria, terrorism is a prime security concern for the European Union. Furthermore, the EPRS acknowledges that terrorism can be countered if radicalisation can be prevented:

'*For the moment, effectively tackling radicalised individuals within the EU who may be beneath the authorities' radar, and preventing further radicalisation, appear as the most pressing problems.*' (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2018)

In recent years, especially Islamic radicalisation has gained a significant momentum on European soil and with it the phenomenon of so called 'home-grown terrorists' has emerged. The European Parliament defines home-grown terrorists as individuals, who have radicalised in European countries, where they reside, without having necessarily travelled to Iraq or Syria or other known conflict zones (European Parliament, 2018). Most of the recent attacks in Europe were carried out by home-grown terrorists, who affiliate with the terrorist organisation IS, sometimes referred to as ISIS. Radicalisation has a pivotal role in the phenomenon of home-grown terrorists. Hence, in order to stop home-grown terrorists, radicalisation must be prevented in European countries. Thus, this paper will analyse radicalisation itself and will further examine the counter radicalisation policies in France and in the Netherlands as well as the circumstances surrounding radicalisation and the Muslim population in both countries.

There are multiple reasons why France and the Netherlands were chosen for this study. Firstly, both countries have relatively large Muslim populations. In 2016, 4.9% of the European population were Muslim. However, the Muslim population in France and in the Netherlands exceeded this percentage. In 2016, 8.8% of the French population and 7.1% of the Dutch population were Muslim (Pew Research Center, 2017). Secondly, both countries have been affected by Islamic terrorism in the past, however within different scopes. In the modern era, the Netherlands encountered one Islamic terrorist attack in 2004 and prevented two possibly lethal terrorist attacks in 2018. France,

on the other hand, encountered numerous calamitous Islamic motivated terrorist attacks in recent years. Since 2015, more than 240 people have been killed by ISIS supporters in France. Thirdly, the two countries were chosen due their different immigration policies. Poor immigration can be a reason for individuals to adopt extreme beliefs. While the French immigration policy is designed upon an assimilation approach, the Netherlands utilise multiculturalism in their immigration policy.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the counter radicalisation policies in France and in the Netherlands and to further assess where the two policies differ and where they could complement each other.

The main aim of this dissertation is to answer the central research question: '*What are the strengths and weaknesses of the French counter radicalisation policies in contrast to that of the Netherlands?*' The following five sub questions have been constructed to answer the research question:

1. *What are the initial circumstances that led to the momentum of Islamic radicalisation in the two countries respectively?*
2. *With which policies does the French government counter Islamic radicalisation within its territory?*
3. *With which policies does the Dutch government counter Islamic radicalisation within its territory?*
4. *In what ways do the two approaches show similarities or differences?*
5. *What approaches of the Dutch counter radicalisation policies could be utilised by the French government and vice versa?*

This dissertation will start by presenting the literature on the topic. This is followed by an explanation of the methods used for this study. After that, the sub questions will be answered in the results and in the analyses section. In the end a conclusion as well as a list of references will be given.

2   Terminology

Demand and Supply

The following paper utilises the terms 'demand' and 'supply' in the way that supply defines the radical groups and demand being the individuals, who are potentially joining radical movements. The convergence point of supply and demand is where a radical movement will flourish (Hellmuth, 2015). Once this interaction becomes unbalanced, this radical movement will begin to deteriorate and, in some cases, even vanish. In order for counter radicalisation to be successful the supply side must lose its appeal in the eyes of the demand side. In other words, an absence of new recruits is needed to weaken the radical groups. This connection between the demand and supply side does not only rely on the relationship between the two sides, but also on external factors having political, social, cultural, or economic origins. One important determinant of these external factors is the government of the affected state. Government work regarding counter radicalisation is complex, since the actions of the government could be counterproductive and motivate even more people to join radical movements.

Hard and Soft Counter Radicalisation Measures

In this paper, hard counter radicalisation measures refer to methods with the purpose to demolish radicalisation centres and to tackle sources of radicalisation. Soft counter radicalisation measures have the aspiration to prevent individuals from radicalising and to reintegrate those who are already radicalised, for example by strengthening social participation and creating immunity.

Islamic Radicalisation

This paper acknowledges the existence of various branches of extremism, such as leftist, right, Basque, Corsican and many more. However, the focus of this paper is on Islamic extremism and therefore Islamic radicalisation. The terms Islamism, Jihadism and Salafism must be used with great caution. Islamism is perceived as a wide spectrum of beliefs and behaviour. Islamist groups consider Islamic values and laws as central factors in public life. Islamists are convinced that Islamic law (sharia) should be applied in politics and they perceive Islam as a distinct political project. Salafism, on the other hand, is the idea that true Islam is visible in the lives of the early, righteous generations of Muslims. Salafists are known for dressing and acting like the first generation of Muslims. They are less involved in politics, which stands in contrast to Islamism (Wagemakers, 2016). A minority of Salafists can be considered Salafi-Jihadists or Jihadists. Jihadism is the idea that jihad, a religious war, is an obligation to all Muslims and not just by a representative. Coupled with Salafism, it is a military approach and many terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda can be classified as Salafi-jihadi. While Islam is widely perceived in connection to violence, most Muslims are not violent

(Hamid & Dar, 2016) . This paper will mainly refer to Islamism and Islamic radicalisation, since Salafism and Jihadism can be included in the term Islamism. Jihadism will only be used when referring to the religious war.

Home-grown Terrorists

This paper will mainly focus on home-grown terrorists. The European Union does not give a definition for home-grown terrorists. This paper understands home-grown terrorists as European citizens or legal European residents, who are linked to and inspired by radical Islamic terrorist groups such as ISIS. Home-grown terrorists are often born and raised in the West or have a strong affiliation to the West and have spent a prolonged period of time in Western countries. What is most concerning for Western governments and societies is the fact that these home-grown terrorists were radicalised or adopted radical Islamist ideologies within Western countries. Home-grown terrorists may go abroad to follow the Jihad in other states or may be following nonviolent or violent actions in their Western countries (Zekulin, 2015). The emergence of home-grown terrorists emphasizes the need for functioning counter radicalisation policies on Western soil.

ISIS / IS

This paper will occasionally refer to the terrorist organisation ISIS, also known as IS, since the most recent cases of terrorist activities in Europe can be mostly linked to the organisation. The Islamic Networks Group (2018) explains that ISIS stands for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Sometimes the abbreviation ISIL is used, referring to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or the Arabic name 'Daesh' is utilised. In short, the abbreviation IS, Islamic State, is commonly used. The IS has members of all genders, ages and ethnicities. Furthermore, IS has occupied large areas in Iraq and Syria, where the organisation is terrorising, murdering and driving people away from their home-countries. ISIS is successful in recruiting new members, since it targets individuals who feel like outcasts or feel discriminated by Western countries.

3   Abbreviations

AIVD	General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands
CIPDR	Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation
DGSI	Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure
DST	Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire
EPRS	European Parliamentary Research Service
EU	European Union
FSPRT	Database for the Processing of Alerts to Prevent Terrorist Radicalisation
ISIS (IS)	Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (officially known as Islamic State)
HLCEG-R	High-Level Commission Expert Group for Radicalisation for the European Commission
NCTV	National Coordinator for Counterterrorism
PART	Press Kit for the Action Plan Against Radicalisation and Terrorism
RG	Renseignements Généraux
UCLAT	Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste
UN	United Nations

4   Literature Review

In response to the tragic images that were distributed all over the media in the days, months, and even years following the events of 9/11 only few called for a balanced reaction. This is linked to the doctrine of the realist Stephen Walt (1987), who hypothesises that states act according to a balance of threat theory, which is a consistent topic of International Relations and shows how realist thinking is linked to constructivist theories. His balance of threat theory received a lot of scholarly attention and is regarded as especially important in approaching measures to counter terrorism and radicalisation. Walt's balance of threat theory claims that a state's alliance behaviour is regulated by the threat it perceives from others. In other words, states form alliances to forestall domination from stronger powers. However, the balance of threat theory also applies when states try to protect themselves from other states or organisations that pose a threat to national independence. The threat level is affected by multiple factors such as geographic proximity, aggressive intentions and offensive power. In his study, Kratochvíl (2004) explains that the main weakness with Walt's balance of threat theory is his state-centric perspective, which does not consider the threat of non-state actors. Nevertheless, the underlying idea of analysing the origin of the threat and the state's demeanour in case of a threat is a useful inception to construct a model for threat politics as Kratochvíl (2004) suggests in his study. Regarding the rising threat of terrorism, especially in European countries, the balance of threat theory plays a significant role in the counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policy making.

4.1   Terrorism

A generally accepted definition of the term 'terrorism' is lacking, because different bodies, organisations and governments use different definitions. Pawlac (2015) explains that this lack of a common definition leads to a patchwork of approaches. Furthermore, he points out that the UN has recognised that an internationally accepted definition of terrorism is necessary to make the fight against terrorism more effective. According to him, the United States define international terrorism as violent acts or acts dangerous to human life, with the intention to intimidate or coerce the civilian population, influence the policy of a government or affect the conduct of a government. Russia, on the other hand, defines terrorism as 'the ideology of violence and the practice of influencing the adoption of a decision by public authorities, local self-government bodies, or international organisations connected with frightening the population and (or) of unlawful violent acts' (Kuznetcov & Kuznetcov, 2013). According to Roser, Nagdy and Ritchie (2018), terrorism can be understood as the use or threat of violence to achieve a political goal. Van der Heide and Geenen (2016) refer to terrorism as being a high-impact phenomenon. They claim that governments intend

to make it governable, administrable and comprehensible. However, they point out that this is made difficult by the unpredictable nature of terrorism. Notwithstanding the fact that it is challenging to define the term 'terrorism', it is clear that it usually involves violence and has a political purpose. As Roser, Nagdy and Ritchie (2018) point out terrorism is not a 21st century phenomenon. Early examples of radicalisation include the Sicarii, an early Jewish terrorist organisation established in the 1st century AD. They also refer to the Reign of Terror during the French revolution as state terrorism. The study of Rapoport and Renard (2016) establishes four major waves of global terrorism in the modern era. The first wave is the anarchist wave which occurred from the 1880s until the 1920s. The second wave is defined as having nationalist or anti-colonialist motivations and occurred from the 1920s to the 1960s. From the 1960s to the 2000s, new left terrorism had its peak. This fact is supported by Coolsaet's (2013) study explaining that in the 70s and 80s, Europe experienced radical left terrorist groups. Followed by anarchist terrorist groups in the late 19th century. The fourth and final wave of terrorism they mention is the religiously motivated one lasting from the 1980s till today. Islamic terrorists started being active in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s.

However, what makes modern terrorism so different from the terrorism of previous decades is its transnational character, claims Wainwright (2018). A dominant feature of modern terrorism, which shaped the development of counterterrorism policies, are the previously mentioned attacks of 9/11. Roser, Nagdy and Ritchie (2018) referred to 9/11 as a turning point in world history. The events that occurred on September 11, 2001 had a lasting impact, as Coolsaet (2013) explains, on political integration of justice and internal security. His study shows that when the European public was asked in 2003 what the two most important issues facing their countries were, only in Spain the majority mentioned terrorism as an issue. In the UK, 28% mentioned terrorism and in Italy 24%. In other European countries, most citizens did not consider terrorism to be an issue. Anxiety regarding terrorism on European soil remained low throughout the early 2000s. In 2004, 16% of European citizens referred to terrorism as one of the two most colossal issues challenging their countries. In May 2012, this number reached its historic low with only 2%, which reflects on the decreasing significance terrorism had in Europe. A study conducted by Wike, Stokes, and Simmons in 2016 showed that, connected to the recent refugee crisis, in eight out of ten surveyed European countries half or more than half of the citizens believed that incoming refugees would lead to more terrorism.

Furthermore, Renard (2016) explains in his study that the current wave of terrorism is perceived as more violent than the prior waves of terrorism. This more violent perception of terrorism can be traced back to the development of terrorism. The current wave of terrorism is characterised by blatant brutality against innocent civilians and more geographical distribution. However, his study points

out that Europe today is much safer from terrorism than it was in the past. He explains that the number of terrorist attacks in Europe has decreased since the late 20th century. For example, in 1979 more than 1,000 attacks happened in Europe, compared to the 300 attacks in Europe in 2015. According to Renard (2016), the current fear of terrorism has more psychological reasons. In addition, he points out that current terrorist attacks seem to take place everywhere and can be executed by anyone. Wainwright (2018) supports this by writing that modern terrorism is less predictable and impacts people's lives more directly. This outcome is contrary to the findings in the final report of May 2018 by the High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation for the European Commission (HLCEG-R). In this final report an increase in terrorist attacks and fatalities in recent years is mentioned. However, the numbers mentioned such as a total of 142 reported attacks in 2016 is much lower than the 1,000 attacks in 1979.

What is surprising about the current Islamic terrorist wave is that European citizens join terrorist organisations like ISIS. These European citizens who join terrorist organisations such as ISIS are referred to as home-grown terrorists or as the enemy within. Ragazzi (2015) refers to home-grown terrorism as a terrorist threat coming from within European societies. Furthermore, Renard (2016) points out that the terrorist organisation ISIS has three goals: provoke fear, polarisation and encouraging others to join the group through propaganda and recruitment purposes. ISIS has proven to be especially successful in triggering fear since more and more European citizens let the fear of terrorism impact their daily lives. Fear being part of the daily life is a major victory for ISIS. All this is linked to the feature of unpredictability that is new about modern era terrorism. Anyone can be a terrorist; nationality does not play a role and attacks can happen anytime and anywhere.

ISIS has shocked society with its success in recruiting a number of 'foreign fighters'. In his study, Renard (2016) writes that Europol estimates more than 5,000 European citizens having left Europe to affiliate with Islamic fighters in Syria. This phenomenon poses a challenge for security services since they could be a real threat when returning to Europe. The study of the HLCEG-R (2018) demonstrates that the return and relocation of the foreign terrorist fighters pose a long-term challenge for the Member States. Member States are required to balance coercive and soft measures, since the imprisonment of the returnees might only lead to a delay of the threat they pose. In other words, imprisoning returnees will not de-radicalise or rehabilitate them. The threat they pose will only be delayed until they are released from prison. Especially children returning from conflict areas or children who were raised in radicalised places pose a challenge for governments. The HLCEG-R (2018) emphasizes that even though guidelines on dealing with child returnees exist, further research is necessary to develop a multidisciplinary and interagency approach to come up with practical

solutions. Moreover, it makes ISIS's recruitment strategy far more successful than that of any other contemporary terrorist organisation.

Two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the EU adopted an *Action Plan on Combatting Terrorism*, as Coolsaet (2013) mentions in his study. This plan, for example, facilitated a European arrest warrant and defined a general concept of terrorist offenses. In addition to that, counterterrorism became a focus point of Europol. The concentration on tackling terrorism constantly declined only to be revived by a terrorist attack on European soil, such as the Madrid and London attacks of the early 2000s, and died down shortly after. After the London attack the *European Union Counterterrorism Strategy* was adopted. Coolsaet (2013) explains that the strategy consisted of four pillars: prevent, protect, pursue, and respond. 'Prevent' was meant to tackle the radicalisation and recruitment process. 'Protect' was aimed at sheltering citizens. 'Pursue' was trying to pursue terrorists and 'respond' intended to refer to the 2004 solidarity clause. Coolsaet (2013) refers to the protect pillar as having the slowest process due to its complexity and being the most challenging of the four pillars.

4.2   Radicalisation

It is necessary here to be explicit about what exactly is meant by the word 'radicalisation'. A precise definition of radicalisation has proved elusive. Coolsaet (2013) described radicalisation as 'ill-defined, complex, and controversial'. Furthermore, he pointed out that radicalisation can be understood as the consequence of extremists trying to influence youngsters in mosques, prisons, schools, and via the internet. Neumann (2013) claims that different historical, political, and cultural contexts lead to different notions of radicalisation. For McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), radicalisation is the 'development of beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of any group or cause in conflict'. Neumann (2013), van den Bos (2018) and the HLCEG-R (2018) add that radicalisation is the process through which people become extremists and acquire violent extremist beliefs. Demant and De Graaf (2009) also refer to radicalisation as a process and add that it is a volatile process, meaning that radical movements can fall apart or turn itself into a non-radical movement. Hellmuth (2015), however, states that some argue that recognizing radicalisation as a process is a mistake. She argues that some perceive it more as an accumulation of extreme ideas. Since politicians and academics struggle to find a clear definition for the term radicalisation, Pisoui and Ahmed (2016) point out that a lack of understanding how exactly radicalisation works remains evident and that more research is needed to fully understand radicalisation to be able to develop counter measures. They claim that conceptual ambiguity leads to ineffective counter radicalisation methods.

Neumann (2013) and Pisoui and Ahmed (2016) further identify two different branches of radicalisation in their studies, one of them focussing on extremist beliefs and one focussing on violent extremist behaviour. While experts are aware of the fact that both branches are relevant, clarification is still needed regarding their interaction and their order along the radicalisation process. To understand radicalisation, it is necessary to understand how and why it emerges. Only by understanding the causes politicians and experts will be able to set up effective counter measures.

In its study, the HLCEG-R (2018) explains that the phenomenon of radicalisation is not new. However, radicalisation happens now at a much faster pace and a more alarming scale. Several studies, such as the one by Coolsaet (2013), have explained the emergence of 'self-radicalisation' or 'self-recruitment' on European soil. The first case of an attack executed by self-radicalised terrorists were the Madrid bombings, which were carried out by Spanish-Moroccans. Other cases are the assassination of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004. Both attacks were carried out by immigrants of Moroccan decent, who were born and raised in the Netherlands. The study of the HLCEG-R (2018) mentions that it is unclear how many radicalised individuals are currently residing in EU Member States. However, French and British security services have each reported around 20,000 radicalised individuals. In Germany, 11,000 individuals were reported. These numbers are useful to outline the magnitude of the current issue facing the EU. Furthermore, the study for the European Commission (2018) refers to radicalisation as posing multi-dimensional challenges and therefore calling for multifaceted responses. The HLCEG-R (2018) demands an involvement of all relevant actors at international, national, regional, and local levels to work on policies with the purpose to counter and prevent radicalisation.

The reasons why individuals decide to join Islamic radicalised collective action in Western Europe can have various roots. Murshed and Pavan (2011) mention political factors, including the foreign policy of the West about the Muslim world, as a reason why people adapt radicalised thoughts. Many scholars like Murshed and Pavan (2011) and Stewart (2008) are certain that the behaviour of many Muslims originates from their socio-economic disadvantages in Western countries. In his book 'Why Men Rebel', Ted Gurr (1970) explains that relative deprivation can lead to rebellion, which is basically a similar concept to radicalisation. These disadvantages are visible in the lower incomes and higher unemployment rates among Muslim populations in Western countries as well as in an under-representation of Muslims in public life. Murshed and Pavan (2011) identify these disadvantages as horizontal inequalities. Horizontal inequalities refer to group-based inequalities. In the case of the Muslim population in Europe, this means that Muslim citizens residing in European countries are generally poorer, less employed and are not accurately represented in the public. These

socio-economic disadvantages the Muslim community is experiencing in Europe can lead to rebellion and thus to radicalisation.

Some scholars like Lewis (2003) and Murshed and Pavan (2011) see the issue originating from historical grievances, such as the hurt pride of Muslims who project their historical decline on the Western society. Murshed and Pavan (2011) name, as an example, the extensive banishment of Muslims who refused to convert to Christianity in Spain in the 16th and 17th century. Samuel P. Huntington (1996) claims that the real problem facing the West is not Islamic fundamentalism, but the Islamic civilisation itself, which feels superior to the West. This anti-European or anti-Western sentiment of some Muslims might lead to them wanting to punish the Western society for what happened in the past.

Another reason named by Murshed and Pavan (2011) is the Western assumption that violence is in the nature of Islam. They explain that Islam is widely perceived as an intolerant and violent religion, which advocates violence against its adversaries. Moreover, they criticise that these assumptions are based on discriminating and restricted interpretations. After 9/11 immigration is often linked to terrorism by right wing intellectuals as Coolsaet's (2013) study shows. Even prior to 9/11, Islamophobia was considered a global phenomenon and the beginnings of Islamophobia were already visible two decades earlier. According to Coolsaet (2013), a single monolithic category of 'Muslims' was formed by the Western society, amalgamating ethnicity with religion and ignoring the diversity within Muslim communities. In the same vein, Murshed and Pavan (2011) add that in reality Islam has many faces in the present as well as in the past. They refer to political, missionary and Jihadi Islamic activism. Political Islamists address Muslim misgovernment and social injustice and try to reform politics through political action. Examples for political Islamists are political groups, such as the Muslim brotherhood. Missionary Islamists, on the other hand, address the corruption of Islamic values and seek for moral and spiritual rearmament. Examples of missionary Islamists are the *Tablighi* and the *Sufi* movements, which differ theologically but are both peaceful movements. Jihadi Islamists address the oppression by non-Muslims, politically and militarily, in the Islamic world and act through armed resistance and violence. Examples for Jihadi Islamist groups are Al Qaeda and ISIS. While there are several Islamic groups that try to achieve their goals through using violence, the majority of Islamists act peacefully.

Furthermore, this generalisation of the term 'Muslim' continued with the second and third generations of Muslim immigrants has led to individual identity as being regarded as a singular phenomenon. These European-born Muslims were usually better educated than their parents and

were more sensitive toward the feeling of being second-class citizens in the countries they were born in. Many of them started to identify themselves with the cause of their discrimination. Surveys used by Coolsaet (2013) showed that European Muslims identified with their religion rather than with their nationality. Reason for this is their group identity in which religion is among the most important factors of forming group identity. This is supported, as Murshed and Pavan (2011) mention, by opportunistic politicians who provoke hatred for Muslims. This can be seen by the growth of anti-Muslim immigrant parties all over Europe. Moreover, they outline that individual identification with group objections is crucial to Muslim radicalisation. Meaning that through identifying with the perceived injustice the Muslim community is experiencing, individuals are more likely to become radicalised. All in all, cultural aspects such as the approach of the European society towards Muslims and the identity struggle European-born Muslims encounter can lead to individuals following radicalised Muslim identity-based actions.

To conclude the reasons for radicalisation, Murshed and Pavan (2011) note that terrorism only happens when radicalised Muslims adopt the total set of actions. Often Muslims just settle for peaceful protest or act by rejecting Western cultural practices.

Doosje, Loseman and van den Bos (2013) conducted a study in which the process of radicalisation is perceived as being driven by three factors: personal uncertainty, perceived injustice and perceived intergroup threat. Their study refers to personal uncertainty being the first determinant of a radical belief system. They define personal uncertainty as 'a subjective sense of doubt or instability in self-views, world-views, or the interrelation between the two'. Furthermore, they conclude that the feeling of personal uncertainty may lead to identity uncertainty. Their study explains that when people experience such feelings they are more likely to adopt extreme ideas. As a second factor, they name perceived injustice. Doosje, Loseman and van den Bos (2013) argue that perceived injustice is a basic determinant of joining the process of radicalisation. The third determinant their study mentions is perceived group threat. They claim that when people feel that their group is being threatened they are more likely to join a radical belief system.

It is also important to understand the places of recruitment in order to counter radicalisation effectively. Hellmuth (2015) names mosques, community centres, the internet and prisons as eminent places for recruiting Jihadi fighters. One radicalisation method commonly used by terrorist organisations is via the internet. The study of the HLCEG-R (2018) mentions that recruitment via the internet and through social media is an issue all Member States are confronted with and that the issue remains a primary concern. In his study, Renard (2016) explains that a study from 2014 linked

between 46,000 and 70,000 Twitter accounts to ISIS supporters, with an average of 1,000 followers each. However, he points out that it is more than likely that this number has changed since then. Twitter has reportedly claimed to delete more than 20,000 accounts monthly related to terrorism and extremism. Pisoui and Ahmed (2016) add that visual and audio factors have significant importance in propaganda and in the radicalisation process. They explain that content is administered on social media and is often absorbed by young people who are vulnerable and therefore get motivated to participate. Pisoui and Ahmed (2016) also point out that it is unclear how these materials impact individuals in their radicalisation process.

Other popular places for radicalisation are prisons. The HLCEG-R (2018) recognises prisons as hatcheries for radicalisation and advises Member States to improve their competence to advance, enforce and assess risk assessment tools and disengagement programs to support the rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorists and radicalised individuals. In the recent terror attacks in France and in Belgium, it was proven that authorities were familiar with the attackers and that some of them were even imprisoned prior to the attacks. The 2012 and 2015 attackers in France were either radicalised or strengthened their radical beliefs during their prison experience as Hellmuth (2015) mentions in her study. Pisoui and Ahmed (2016) named prisons as popular radicalisation places due to prisons functioning as turning points from a criminal past to a Jihadi life. Individuals turning to Islam while in prison are named born-again Muslims. Additionally, they mention the unusual circumstances in prisons concerning isolation, loneliness and vulnerability as an incubator for radicalisation. The study of the HLCEG-R (2018) declares the prevention of radicalisation in prisons as a momentous challenge for Member States of the EU. This is due to the fact that it remains unclear which of the existing measures are actually successful. For example, the effectiveness of isolating radicalised prisoners from other inmates remains dubious. Nevertheless, Member States are advised to take actions such as offering religious counselling in prisons and investing in capacity building measures. Additionally, HLCEG-R (2018) advises national governments to work closely with Eurojust and to consider alternatives to prisons, especially regarding women and children. Pisoui and Ahmed (2016) claim that prison radicalisation requires more research to understand the psychological aspects of radicalisation and to develop effective counter measures.

Pisoui and Ahmed (2016) name in their study universities as one of the most concerning radicalisation places. They outline that some radicals have a university degree and that universities can either work as creators or as impediments to radicalisation. Radical preachers can use universities as distribution places for their radical ideas. Moreover, Pisoui and Ahmed (2016) identify research gaps concerning the exact role universities play in radicalisation, how and when radical message

should be restricted in universities, and exactly how universities should handle radicalisation cases since university students are adults.

4.3   Counter Radicalisation

De-radicalisation and disengagement are methods needed to counter radicalisation. Neumann (2010) defines de-radicalisation and disengagement as processes in which individuals discontinue their engagement in organised violence and terrorism. Pisoui and Ahmed (2016) suggest that conceptual clarity regarding how materials such as social media and visual and audio factors impact individuals in their recruitment process is needed to implement effective preventive measures. Foley (2009) believes that in order to prevent and prosecute terrorism successfully, intelligence collection and evidence presentation are crucial for present-day democracies encountering Islamist hostility.

Policy makers need to understand these determinants in order to tackle radicalisation at its source. Pisoui and Ahmed (2016) conducted research for the Austrian Institute for International Affairs to analyse the gaps in previous radicalisation research. Their study demonstrates that one of the defaults of radicalisation research lies within a lack of understanding how exactly radicalisation works. Several studies, such as the one by Pisoui and Ahmed (2016), have shown that more research is necessary to fathom the causes, courses and the mechanisms of radicalisation in order to prevent and counter it. Pisoui and Ahmed (2016) named an understanding of the relationship between radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism as crucial to identify radicalisation as a complex phenomenon. In other words, it is important to clarify which factors influence radicalisation and the processes how these factors lead to radicalisation. The success of counter radicalisation policies, according to Pisoui and Ahmed (2016), originates from understanding how certain people interpret and deplete, for example, online extremist content. However, they mention that such research is unethical since the participants would be intentionally disclosed to extremist content. These findings have shown that more research is needed to design effective counter radicalisation measures.

Coolsaet's (2013) study mentions that throughout the years it was widely acknowledged that the EU's 'one-size-fits-all' approach regarding radicalisation was inconceivable. It was accepted that counter radicalisation should happen at a local level. The study of the HLCEG-R (2018) supports Coolsaet's approach. The Group's study points out that each Member State has different specific needs and therefore should address issues according to their individual situations. However, they add that there is a shared interest among the Member States in strengthening information exchange and cooperation between the states at a European level. Hence, the HLCEG-R has investigated methods to strengthen cooperation among the Member States. Furthermore, the HLCEG-R (2018) advises

Member States to evaluate measures to reduce terrorist and extremist content on the Internet and to reinforce counter narratives and alternatives.

Another way to counter radicalisation named by the HLCEG-R (2018) is through education and social inclusion. The Group explains that schools and universities should promote social inclusion and democratic values by managing controversial issues with open discussions. They also recommend to train educators to help prevent radicalisation through information campaigns. This paper will not elaborate on the counter radicalisation measures set up by the EU, since the focus is on two particular states. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that some action is taken on an EU level, for example through initiatives such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network and the European Strategic Communications Network. Furthermore, the HLCEG-R (2018) mentions in their study that local authorities, civil society organisations and police officers should be included in counter radicalisation measures. This also applies for religious leaders, communities and institutions. However, each state encounters issues with radicalisation in different extents and due to different reasons and should therefore design its own counter radicalisation policies.

However, the scholars Demant and De Graaf (2009) identify the problems with government policies concerning de-radicalisation in context to underlying issues regarding coordination. Many different bodies with different perspectives in relation to radical movements operate independently from each other. They can support each other, but sometimes they completely disagree with each other. Therefore, coordination between different governmental bodies should be improved in order to counter radicalisation more effectively.

5   Methodology

The research for this study is a comprehensive and interpretative analysis of qualitative research data to determine the key factors relating to terrorism, radicalisation and counter radicalisation. The research is conducted from primary and secondary data. A triangular approach is used to get different perspectives on the process of radicalisation, the current situation and the countermeasures in France and the Netherlands. A triangular approach means that literature from academics, governments and the media is used for this research. The literature needs to represent research from different levels to ensure the results represent the government, academics and the public. Finally, the research is compelled to span many different areas, as the objective is to assess how the situation regarding terrorism and radicalisation in France and the Netherlands is and what the strengths and weaknesses of their countermeasures are.

The objective of using primary data is to gain first hand data and to collect original information. The advantage of utilising primary data is that the data is collected specifically for the purpose of this study (University of Minnesota, 2018). The primary sources included in this study are government sources and an interview with Kees van den Bos, a professor for social psychology at the University of Utrecht and author of several academic articles and the book 'Why people radicalise'. Government sources are used in this study since they can be defined as authoritative and credible means of information. Furthermore, they provide direct evidence of government activities and policies. In order to be able to understand and analyse the existing counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies in France and in the Netherlands, government sources are an asset. Therefore, government documents such as policy papers are preferred as to other sources, as the government is the target of this study. Primary data is also acquired via an interview with Kees van den Bos, as mentioned above. Interviews are beneficial since they provide insights and opinions of experts in the studied field. Kees van den Bos is interviewed to better understand the situation in the Netherlands. The interview takes place at a later stage of the research process. The reason for this is that the results of the desk research lay the ground to ask in-depth and specific questions to the expert.

The advantage of using secondary sources is that a magnitude of information is provided and that the level of expertise and professionalism is usually high (Crossman, 2018). Secondary data for this research is acquired through academic journals found on academic databases and books. The academic articles and books written by professionals are used to understand the concept of radicalisation and its process as well as its origins. Finding a common definition for the term 'radicalisation' is difficult since scholars struggle to agree on one common definition. Furthermore, this literature is used to analyse the key factors of the radicalisation process and the reasons for

radicalisation. Academic journals are peer-reviewed sources, which are useful since they provide credible and clear information (CQ University Library, 2018). Moreover, academic journals contain focused and broadened perspective, which help to obtain wide knowledge about the field to be studied. Books are scholarly sources which provide deep insights into topics and background information. Books are used in this study to gather historical data and to add depth.

Newspaper articles are also utilised in this study to examine issues in context of their time, such as the public opinion on the counterterrorism and counter radicalisation measures implemented in France and the Netherlands. Furthermore, newspapers are employed to obtain information about more recent events. It is important to keep in mind that newspaper articles are possibly not credible. Newspapers can be used as a primary or as a secondary source, depending on the purpose and the style of the article. In this paper, newspapers are used as a primary source to explain the terrorist attacks in France and in the Netherlands. They are used as a secondary source to make sense of the public opinion concerning the counterterrorism and counter radicalisation measures in France and the Netherlands.

The consolidation of these approaches should be sufficient to answer the research question and thusly achieve a respectable outcome of this study. A weakness is that this study deals with recent policies and current issues, thus it is difficult to predict the outcome and the impact these actions and policies might have. In addition, it is difficult to find information about more recent events, since radicalisation and terrorism are ever-changing phenomena. Furthermore, uncertainty regarding the term 'radicalisation' and the process of radicalisation itself leads to difficulties finding a clear direction. Additionally, the researcher's knowledge of the Dutch language is minimal, meaning that not all Dutch sources could be used.

6 France

This chapter provides background information regarding terrorism in France and describes the recent terrorist attacks on French soil. Firstly, it is important to analyse the position of the Muslim population in France. Secondly, the French policies set up to counter terrorism and radicalisation will be analysed. Lastly, the situation regarding radicalisation in French prisons will be delineated.

6.1   Muslim population in France

In 2016, around 5.7 million Muslims resided in France and made up around 8.8% of the French population (Pew Research Center, 2017). France is the European country with the largest Muslim community. In the 19th century, France was present in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria as a colonial power. El Karoui (2016) explains in his study, that during World War I France brought Moroccan, Senegalese and Algerian men to France to work in factories. After World War II, France needed help with reconstruction, which led to a large influx of people from the Muslim world. El Karoui (2016) explains that the vast majority of Muslims living in France now originate from the post-war period. The study of Murshed and Pavan (2011) mentions that several of the second- and third-generation migrants, born and raised in France, have developed a feeling of resentment towards the French society due to the discrimination they experienced, which led them to believe that it is not possible to be French and a Muslim. This leads to personal uncertainty, which is, as mentioned above, a possible determinant for adopting radical beliefs (Doosje, Loseman, & van den Bos, 2013). Furthermore, French Muslims suffer from inequalities in the socio-economic, political and cultural area. French Muslims are less likely to finish secondary school and to find employment. In addition, around 60% of the French prison population are Muslim and residential discrimination is high due to many Muslims living in low-income housing around major French cities named the *banlieus* (Murshed & Pavan, 2011). Van den Bos (2018) heavily criticised the banlieus. He claims that banlieus are whole neighbourhoods of individuals and families that have not been well integrated. Perceived injustice, another determinant for radicalisation named by Doosje, Loseman and van den Bos (2013), can originate from the socioeconomic disadvantages the French Muslim population experiences.

France has a secular tradition, which can be seen in most of its policies. The CIPDR explains that secularism does not mean the rejection of religions but assures freedom of belief and worship (Crowell, 2017). When it comes to the French integration policies an assimilation approach is visible. The minorities are able to live their freedom of religion, language and culture within private spheres,

but in the public sphere they are expected to live according to the French values. This is visible, for example, in French law forbidding school girls to wear a hijab (Choquet, 2017).

6.2   Terrorism in France

6.2.1   France's history with terrorism

Marret (2009) identified the issue with terrorism and radicalisation as one that has affected France for many decades. France was not only affected by Islamic terrorism, but also by Basque, Corsican, and far leftist terrorism in past decades. France's painful history with domestic terrorism began around 1980s (Foley, 2009). Early examples of terrorist attacks on French soil are the assassinations of General René Audran, working for the French Ministry of Defence, in 1985 and of Georges Besse, the director of the car company Renault, in 1986. These attacks had separatist or left-wing background. In the 1980s, France and its citizens started to encounter violence from terrorist groups from the Middle East. The Abu Nidal Organisation, a Palestinian nationalist militant group, and the Hezbollah, a Lebanese Islamic political and militant group, were responsible for several terrorist attacks in France during the 1980s. In the 1990s, most terrorist attacks in France were carried out by the Armed Islamic Group, an Algerian Islamic militant group (Rault, 2010). From 1996 until 2012, however, France did not encounter any domestic Islamic terrorist attack and the French counterterrorism institutions and policies were admired

for their effectiveness (Hellmuth, 2015).

6.2.2   Recent terrorist attacks in France

In 2012, France encountered its first domestic Islamic terrorist attack since 1996. Since 2012, France has encountered more domestic terrorist attacks than any other European country. The table below briefly outlines the terrorist attacks that occurred on French soil since 2012.

Date	Organisation/Background	Death	Injured	Description
11. – 19. March 2012	Al-Qaeda (disputed)	7	5	Mohamed Merah carried out several gun attacks in Toulouse and Montauban (Jarry, 2017).
May 2013	Islamic motivated	0	1	The French convert Alexandre Dhaussy stabbed a French soldier (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.).
December 2014	ISIS	1	3	A French national attacked three police officers with a knife (Europol, 2016).
7-9 January 2015	ISIS, Al-Qaeda	17	22	On January 7, two gunmen attacked the Charlie Hebdo

				office and killed 12 people. On January 8, a gunman shot a police officer. On January 9, Coulibaly murdered four hostages in a kosher supermarket (Yoo, 2017).
February, 2015	unclear	0	3	A man armed with a knife attacked three police officers in front of a Jewish community centre in Nice (BBC, 2015).
26 June, 2015	ISIS (disputed)	1	2	A man decapitated his boss and initiated an explosion (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.).
21 August, 2015	ISIS	0	4	A man prepared to carry out a mass shooting in a train, but was stopped by other travellers who witnessed him preparing to attack (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.).
13 November, 2015	ISIS	130 (+7)	413	Several attacks were carried out in six venues in Paris, including a football stadium, a concert hall and various restaurants and cafés (Rubin & Peltier, 2017).
13 June, 2016	ISIS	2	0	A man kills a police officer and his wife in their home (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.).
14 July, 2016	ISIS	86	434	A man drives a truck into a crowd celebrating the Bastille Day in Nice (Rubin & Breeden, 2017).
26 July, 2016	ISIS	1 (+2)	1	Two attackers kill a priest in a church and take hostages (Willsher, 2016).
3 February, 2017	unclear	0	1	A man attacks a police officer and a soldier outside the Louvre in Paris (Gov.UK, 2018).
20 April, 2017	ISIS	1 (+1)	3	An ISIS soldier shot a police officer in Paris (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.).
23 March, 2018	ISIS	4 (+1)	15	A man hijacked a car, shot multiple police officers and attacked a supermarket (McAuley, 2018).
12 May, 2018	ISIS	1 (+1)	4	A man attacked police officers and civilians outside the Garnier Opera with a knife (Samuel, 2018).

Table 1 provides an overview of the domestic terrorist attacks France has encountered since 2012. France suffered its first domestic terrorist attack in more than a decade in March 2012 when Mohamed Merah, who reportedly became radicalised during his prison experience, committed multiple assaults with a firearm over several days in Montauban and Toulouse. The attack resulted in twelve casualties, seven of whom died and five of whom were lethally wounded. Out of the seven deaths, two of them concerned French soldiers, one of them a French army paratrooper and three of them children (Jarry, 2017). As shown in Table 1, France encountered some less drastic attacks in 2013 and 2014. Closer inspection of the table shows that France encountered a total of five terrorist attacks in 2015. On the 7th of January, 2015 two gunmen, the Kouachi brothers, attacked the offices of the French satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris and killed twelve people, including seven journalists and two police officers. On January 8, an associate of the Kouachi brothers, Ahmed Coulibaly, shot a police officer. On January 9, 2015 Ahmed Coulibaly took four hostages in a kosher supermarket and murdered them. Chérif Kouachi, one of the Kouachi brothers, met Ahmed Coulibaly in prison when they both served their sentence. While Coulibaly became radicalised during his prison experience, Chérif Kouachi intensified his radical beliefs while in prison (Hellmuth, 2015) . The gravity and the issue of prison radicalisation are explained below. At the time of its occurrence, the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks were the deadliest attacks on French soil in 50 years (Yoo, 2017).

However, the deadliest terrorist attacks in French history happened on the 13th of November 2015. In the evening, various attacks were carried out at six different locations in Paris. The locations included the Stade de France arena, the streets in the 10th and the 11th arrondissements, and the Bataclan concert hall. 130 people died in the night of the attacks and another 413 people were injured. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attacks. The November 2015 Paris attacks led to a national trauma and to frictions between security and civil liberties (Rubin & Peltier, 2017).

As can be seen from the table above, less than one year later France encountered another deadly terrorist attack. On the 14th of July 2016, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a Tunisian resident of Nice, drove a truck into a crowd celebrating the Bastille Day on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice. 86 people were killed and more than 430 were injured. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack (Rubin & Breeden, 2017). On the 23rd of March 2018, a gunman hijacked a car and shot multiple police officers in Carcassonne. He then drove to Trèbes and opened fire in a supermarket and took hostages. Five people were killed in the attack, including the attacker himself. The attacker was actively involved with ISIS (McAuley, 2018). However, in 2018 the French government announced that two

terrorist attacks have been thwarted. Furthermore, Prime Minister Edouard Philippe issued that since the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks a total of 51 planned attacks have been circumvented (News Wires, 2018). Nevertheless, since 2015 more than 240 people in France have been killed by ISIS supporters, thus the demand for preventive and responsive counterterrorism and counter radicalisation measures is growing.

6.3   Counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies in France

The recent wave of Islamic terrorist attacks in France called for the French government to set up new measures and policies in order to counter the issue of terrorism and radicalisation. According to the European Parliament, France has the largest number of foreign fighters travelling to Iraq and Syria to fight for the Islamic State. A reported number of 1,910 French nationals have left France to participate in the Jihad (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2018). This means that in France many citizens or residents turn into home-grown terrorists, who become radicalised on French soil. The following part will explain and outline how the French government tries to counter this.

6.3.1   Responsibility for French counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies

First, it is necessary to explain what institutions are responsible for the French counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies. In his article, Foley (2009) mentions that from 1995 till 2007 two domestic intelligence services, the *Renseignements Généraux* (RG) and the *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (DST), were responsible for intelligence gathering on terrorist suspects in France. Furthermore, he explains that the DST also worked on law enforcement together with the *Police judicaire,* the anti-terrorist section of the French national police, and the *Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste* (UCLAT), the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit. The French security agencies are directed by investigating magistrates (*juges d'instrcution*). Hellmuth's (2015) study criticises the magistrates for having a wide range of powers but being unable to use them properly due to a lack of manpower and logistics.

Moreover, Foley (2009) explains that the various French counterterrorism agencies do not work under a central authority, since authority is distributed among several agencies, and that their mandates overlap. Foley (2009) draws attention to the fact that the French counterterrorism agencies rely on interpersonal relationships to interact. According to his study, the French counterterrorism agencies apply informal routines. Furthermore, he points out that this informal approach led to unbalanced change which amplified the responsibilities of intelligence agencies but eliminated the police's anti-terrorist unit. This led to competition and coordination issues among the concerned

agencies such as overlapping mandates. Foley (2009) castigates that the French counterterrorism model relies on informal alliances and personal relations. Nevertheless, he complimented the informal approach for linking intelligence and justice and thereby ensuring the links between all the key factors in the process to counter terrorism. Hellmuth (2015) mentions that in 2012, after the Merah attack, the DST and the RG were merged into the *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure* (DGSI) to increase cooperation among the two intelligence services.

6.3.2   France's early counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies

This part will analyse France's early counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies. According to Crowell (2017), the CIPDR defined radicalisation as the 'process by which an individual or a group adopts a violent form of action directly linked to an extremist ideology with a political, social or religious content that disputes the political, social or cultural order'. This unclear terminology led to problems when setting up counter measures. Furthermore, she explains that this led to difficulties designing a program that does not unintentionally categorize conservative Muslims as radicals.

In the 1980s and 1990s, France was considered to be a sanctuary for international terrorists. However, by the late 1990s, France had encountered various successes in preventing terrorist attacks (Suzan & Shapiro, 2003). This might be a reason why Hellmuth (2015) explains in her study that France was one of the only few European countries that did not engage in any soft counter radicalisation measures after the 2004 and 2005 attacks in Europe. Marret (2009) advocated the French counterterrorism policies of the early 2000s for being well designed to counter the potential threat of terrorism. Foley (2009), however, criticised that France developed its counterterrorism system only regarding threats that it had faced, meaning that France acts according to Walt's balance of threat theory. Marret (2009) partly supports that criticism by claiming that terrorism in France was not perceived as the culmination of the radicalisation process from 2002 till 2005. He criticised France for not perceiving radicalisation in connection to terrorism even though other European countries already worked on the issue in 2009. However, he also pointed out that this approach had its advantages. Firstly, it implies that terrorism is a criminal activity rather than the culmination of a process. Secondly, it helps making a clear distinction between the fight against terrorism itself and the conditions for terrorism or political violence. In addition, Marret (2009) explains that France was sceptical about introducing counter radicalisation measures since radicalisation is not a direct violation of law and counter measures could possibly lead to violations of civil liberties that are constitutionally protected such as the freedom of speech and religion.

From 2001 till 2012, France did engage in counterterrorism measures domestically and internationally. From 2012 to 2016, a total of six laws were passed by the French Parliament to counter terrorism, out of which two are directly linked to counterterrorism, one military programming law as well as laws on intelligence gathering (PART, 2016).

6.3.3 Plan de lutte contre les filières terroristes et la radicalisation violente

In 2014, the *Plan de lutte contre les filières terroristes et la radicalisation violente* (Plan to combat terrorist networks and violent radicalisation) was adopted (Le Foll, 2014). The plan contained twenty-two measures concerning displacement of terrorists, strengthening of surveillance strategies, especially regarding cyber terrorism, and international cooperation to combat terrorism (Le Foll, 2014). The plan had four focus points:

1. Stop and prevent terrorists from travelling to Syria or Iraq by reinforcing border checks and the possibility of withdrawal of travel documents.
2. Disrupt the active recruitment places and methods in France, especially online recruitment, by increasing detection and surveillance.
3. Intensify international cooperation to counter terrorism and radicalisation. French authorities cooperate with European specialists to prevent and decrease the phenomenon of radicalisation.
4. Set up preventive measures to contradict hate preachers and create a national centre for support and orientation for families (Gouvernement.Fr, 2018).

The plan had a repressive approach rather than a preventive approach. Furthermore, measures were taken to counter 'cyber jihadism' and to increase international cooperation in the Schengen area to combat terrorism (Cornevin, 2014).

6.3.4 State of Emergency

Immediately after the Paris attacks in November 2015, the French government declared the state of emergency regime and extended it six times. The state of emergency ended two years later, on the 1st of November 2017 (Osborne, 2017). The state of emergency gave significant power to the Minister of the Interior and the prefects of each department. For instance, they had the power to order warrantless searches or place individuals under house arrest. Especially the use of warrantless searches received negative media attention since they were often ordered on the grounds of very little evidence. In February 2016, 3,289 warrantless searches had been recorded from which only 28 offences were connected to terrorism (Boutin & Paulussen, 2016). Paye (2017) heavily criticised the state of emergency for its ineffectiveness and its inability to prevent the Nice massacre. Public

opinion regarding the state of emergency was controversial and it was perceived as incompatible with the guidelines of the European Convention for Human Rights (Boutin & Paulussen, 2016). Paye (2016) supports this opinion and points out that according to the European Court of Human Rights any intrusion in the private lives of citizens should only be allowed based on clear and detailed rules in a written law. Paye (2016) further claims that the state of emergency did not intend to prevent terrorist attacks, but to invade and restrict the private lives of French citizens.

6.3.5 Press Kit Action Plan Against Radicalisation and Terrorism (PART)

After the Paris attacks of November 2015, the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (CIPDR) introduced the Press Kit for the Action Plan Against Radicalisation and Terrorism (PART) (2016). PART was adopted in May 2016 and replaced the *Plan de lutte contre les filières terroristes*. For the first time a national plan included measures to prevent radicalisation. The plan contained 80 measures, including 50 new measures. PART can be divided into seven priority areas:

1. Detecting signs of radicalisation and terrorist networks as early as possible
2. Monitoring, restricting and negating terrorist networks
3. Combating terrorism in its international networks and retreats
4. Increasing the reach of preventive measures to guarantee personalised methods for different populations
5. Developing applied research concerning counter-speech and involvement of the French Islamic Community
6. Enhance protection of vulnerable sites and networks
7. Ability to react to terrorist attacks and show resilience (PART, 2016).

PART included new measures especially focused on combatting radicalisation. For example, it contained measures such as creating rehabilitation and citizenship centres in every region in France. Other measures include extending the prison sentence for an individual convicted of terrorism from 22 to 30 years. PART was heavily criticised by Maddy Crowell (2017), who argued that the creation of rehabilitation and citizenship centres was ineffective since it would be better to re-socialize individuals in their home environments rather than segregating them. However, the plan also included measures to eliminate barriers in the operation of intelligence services to have a more structured way of information sharing (PART, 2016).

6.3.6   Prevent to Protect- National plan to prevent radicalisation

In February 2018, the CIPDR presented the 'Prevent to Protect' plan, a national plan to prevent radicalisation. As the French Prime Minister, Edouard Philippe (2018), announced the plan focuses on the situation in prisons, urban policy, and improving the dialogue with the Muslim population in France. The 'Prevent to Protect' plan is an advanced version of the 2014 *Plan de lutte contre les filières terroristes* and the 2016 Press Kit for the Action Plan Against Radicalisation and Terrorism (PART). Furthermore, the 'Prevent to Protect' plan contains sixty measures, focusing on five main themes:

1. Shielding minds from radicalisation
2. Widening the prevention/ detection network
3. Understanding and preparing for developments in radicalisation
4. Training local stakeholders and assessing practices
5. Tailoring disengagement schemes (CIPDR, 2018).

Philippe's (2018) statement acknowledges that while ISIS has lost territorial stronghold due to international cooperation, the threat posed by home-grown terrorists is still present in France. Furthermore, he explains that the success of the 'Prevent to Protect' plan is dependent on the mobilisation and coordination of state agencies, local authorities and the civil society. The first main theme 'Shielding minds from radicalisation' includes measures to prevent radicalisation in schools, to improve illegal content withdrawal from the internet, and to develop counter-narratives. The second area 'Widening the prevention/detection network' contains measures to involve civil services, local authorities, sports, businesses, and higher education in radicalisation prevention. Furthermore, measures to increase research regarding the Islamist threat in France and the radicalisation process are mentioned under the 'Understanding and preparing for developments in radicalisation' theme. The fourth topic incorporates measures to encourage the involvement of professionals and to strengthen monitoring of stakeholders involved in counter radicalisation initiatives. At last the fifth main theme 'Tailoring means of disengagement' sets up efforts to reintegrate, monitor and support those already radicalised (CIPDR, 2018). The 'Prevent to Protect' plan also explains that on February 20, 2018 19,745 individuals were registered in the Database for the Processing of Alerts to Prevent Terrorist Radicalisation (FSPRT). Out of the registered individuals 77,3% were male adults, 22,7% were female adults, 2.3% were male minors and 2.7% were female minors.

The 'Prevent to Protect' plan received criticism for segregating radicalised prisoners from the rest of the prison population in separate prison spaces, since it could lead to jihadist leaders being surrounded by potential recruits. Furthermore, the French approach is often criticised for being

unfocused. For example, Senator Esther Benbassa denounced that the government gave millions of Euros to associations for de-radicalisation programmes, which led to many people opening associations without being experts since it was uncontrolled (Williamson, 2018).

6.3.7   Plan national de lutte contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme & Plan d'action contre le terrorisme

In March 2018, Edouard Philippe (2018) announced the *Plan national de lutte contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme* ('National Plan to combat racism and antisemitism'). This plan contains measures to fight racism and antisemitism in France. Even though, the plan is not specifically set up to counter radicalisation it includes important measures which might eliminate some of the causes for radicalisation. As previously stated, the socio-economic disadvantages Muslims have to face in Western countries and the Western assumption that violence is in the nature of Islam can be reason for people to join a radical belief system (Murshed & Pavan, 2011). However, Kees van den Bos (2018) explained in the interview conducted with him that racism is hard to counter since racism is driven by implicit motives rather than explicit prejudice. In his opinion, the connection between radicalisation and racism can be eliminated by governments and social authorities treating different groups in a respectful and fair manner. In July 2018, a new anti-terrorism plan was introduced by Prime Minister Edouard Philippe (Le Gouvernement, 2018). However, this plan solely contained measures regarding terrorism itself and did not contain any measures concerning radicalisation.

6.4   Radicalisation in prisons

Since it was made public that Chérif Kouachi and Ahmed Coulibaly were either radicalised or strengthened their extreme beliefs while in prison, the issue of prison radicalisation received significant attention. Prisons are a popular recruitment place due to various reasons. Marret (2009) explains in his study that the practice of religion in prisons can provide a moral framework and thus ensure stability in the prison environment. Moreover, he explains that Islam first appeared in French prisons in the 1970s and that Islam was tolerated by the prison authorities in the 1980s. The first official case of prison radicalisation is the case of Khaled Kelkal, an Algerian living in Lyon, who became radicalised during his four-year prison sentence by a radical prison imam in the 1990s. Kelkal was involved in several terrorist attacks in France in the early 1990s (Marret, 2009).

Marret's (2009) study argues that prisoners imprisoned for terrorist activities influence fellow inmates due to their intellectual superiority, culture and their strong sense of morality. Furthermore, he explains that religion is often used as a solution when in isolation, since it creates a sense of solidarity among the Muslim population in French prisons. In addition, he mentions that some join

due to conformism while others join to belong to a community in prison. Hellmuth (2015) adds that inmates often face existential questions, that can be answered with the help of religion. Marret (2009) concludes that France is a victim of the success of its counterterrorism strategy, since radicals were easily imprisoned and radicalised others while imprisoned. In other words, since France imprisoned many radicals and terrorists, they influence and sometimes even recruit other prisoners. The French prison system only utilises isolation for the most dangerous inmates, since it could lead to human rights issues (Hellmuth, 2015).

Prison imams are often used as counter radicalisation agents who promote moderate Islam in jails. However, there were cases of radical prison imams who recruited inmates. Marret (2009) explains that radical prison imams led to new measures in which the French state introduced programmes to train the prison imams to teach Islam in connection with Western values. Furthermore, Hellmuth (2015) points out that the working conditions of prison imams have to be improved in order for them to work effectively. Her study explains that in 2015 prison imams did not receive a pension and social security. Furthermore, she states that the budget for Muslim chaplains will be doubled in the future, but it will not be able to eliminate the problem. The measures in PART (2016) regarding Muslim prison chaplains mainly intend to recruit new prison guards and new prison chaplains. The 'Prevent and Protect Plan' did not include any measures to improve the working conditions of prison imams (CIPDR, 2018). Hellmuth (2015) further mentions that cooperation with prison imams is difficult due to France's stance on secularism, which forbids a republic meeting a social problem on the means of religion. Therefore, formal partnerships between government agencies and imams or religious institutions are not possible. According to Hellmuth (2015), isolating radical prisoners to prevent further radicalisation and to provide additional security could facilitate group polarization of radicals and might lead to them becoming even more extreme. This is in accordance to the criticism the 'Prevent to Protect' plan received for segregating radicalised prisoners.

This chapter outlined the recent terrorist attacks France encountered as well as the French policies regarding radicalisation and terrorism since 2014. This chapter has shown that France encountered the most concerning terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016. In response to the terrorist attacks, France launched action plans in 2016 and 2018 with the sole purpose to prevent and counter radicalisation. Even though terrorist attacks became less momentous after 2016, it is unclear whether this is a direct response to the implementation of the counter radicalisation plans.

7   The Netherlands

This chapter focuses on the situation regarding terrorism and radicalisation in the Netherlands. It will describe the position of Muslims in the Netherlands and outline the Dutch counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies. Additionally, this chapter will examine the Dutch case regarding prison radicalisation.

7.1   Muslims in the Netherlands

In 2016, around 1.2 million Muslims resided in the Netherlands, making up around 7.1% of the total Dutch population (Pew Research Center, 2017). Most of the Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands originate from Turkey and Morocco. Around 40% of the Muslims in the Netherlands are second-generation migrants (Murshed & Pavan, 2011). In his study, Buijs (2009) explains that the Muslim population in the Netherlands, especially the Dutch Moroccan population, suffers from socio-economic disadvantages. This means that unemployment and poverty rates are much higher among the Muslim population in the Netherlands than among the general population. For example, in 2009 around 22% of Dutch Moroccan population were unemployed, while the unemployment rate among the native Dutch population was around 6% (Buijs, 2009). Muslim communities have formed in low-cost housing areas, leading to Muslims being the most poorly regarded minority in the Netherlands (Murshed & Pavan, 2011). This can be regarded as some form of socio-economic segregation, which, as mentioned before, can function as a motivation for individuals to adopt radical beliefs.

Furthermore, Buijs's (2009) study points out that many Moroccan immigrants have the sentiment that the Western lifestyle is not compatible with the Muslim way of life. This is supported by the study of Doosje, Loseman and van den Bos (2013), which includes an example of an extreme Islamic person saying: "Dutch people talk and gossip too much, our characters do not go well together". Moreover, in order to further understand the position of Muslims in the Netherlands it is necessary to investigate the Dutch integration policies. During the period of labour migrants in the Netherlands, during the 1960s and 1970s, the Dutch integration policies intended to make re-integration in their home countries easier for the immigrants. Therefore, the focus of these policies was to maintain the cultural identity of the immigrants. Buijs (2009) explains that the labour workers were able to practice their religion and follow language courses in their mother tongue. However, in the late 1970s/1980s it became clear that the guest workers would not return to their home countries. In response, the Dutch government began to treat Islam equal to other minority religions in the Netherlands. The Dutch integration system switched to a multicultural approach, meaning that the Dutch policies focused on integration and management of religious and cultural diversity (Buijs,

2009). Measures were taken to allow Islamic practice and rituals as well as establishing prayer rooms and Mosques.

In the 1990s, immigration policies intended to increase immigrant participation in education and in the labour market, regarding culture the focus was on assimilation. Immigrants were expected to learn the Dutch language and learn the values of the Dutch society (Buijs, 2009). In the late 1990s, integration courses were made mandatory for immigrants. In response to the economic recession of the late 1990s/ early 2000s, an increase in unemployment and school dropout rates among immigrants emerged and an overall doubt regarding the multicultural integration approach started to grow. After the 2004 van Gogh assassination, 80% of the Dutch population demanded stricter integration measures (Murshed & Pavan, 2011). Buijs's (2009) further explains that the government in response shifted towards more restrictive integration policies. Restrictive integration policies might be counterproductive, since they can lead to personal uncertainty, which is another reason why a person might adopt radical beliefs (Doosje, Loseman, & van den Bos, 2013). By now, however, the Dutch integration approach has changed to a multicultural approach including more dialogue, cooperation and incorporation.

7.2   Terrorism in the Netherlands

In the 1970s, the Netherlands encountered a number of terrorist attacks by the Moluccan minority living in the Netherlands. From 1975 until 1978, the South Moluccans hijacked trains and occupied consulates and schools and took hostages. The final terrorist attack carried out by South Moluccans took place in 1978 and ended with two deaths. The attacks carried out by the South Moluccans ended the lives of 11 people in total (Demant & De Graaf, 2009). What is remarkable about the Moluccan movement is that after an attack in 1977 was brought to a violent end, the Moluccan activists started to doubt the power of violence and started to form a political party to reach their political goals and restrained from violence (Demant & De Graaf, 2009). After the Moluccan movement stopped its violent actions, the Netherlands did not encounter any major attacks until the early 2000s.

In 2002, the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn was assassinated by a Dutch environmentalist (Buijs, 2009). On 2 November 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri, a well-educated and well-integrated Moroccan Muslim, murdered Theo van Gogh, a film maker and columnist. The murder was carried out in public view and Mohammed Bouyeri left a note behind which included radical Islamic texts. Theo van Gogh was murdered due to his political beliefs by a home-grown terrorist. Van Gogh's murder led to a wave of panic in the Netherlands and the Dutch population reacted through a series of arson attacks against the Dutch Muslim population (Buijs, 2009). The Dutch Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia recorded 106 anti-Islamic violent incidents in the month after the assassination of

Theo van Gogh (Murshed & Pavan, 2011). Since the assassination of Theo van Gogh, the Netherlands has not encountered any major incidents.

However, on August 31, 2018 a young Afghan with a German residence permit stabbed two American tourists at the Amsterdam train station. The attack has reportedly been carried out under a terrorist motive and was quickly brought under control by the Dutch police. The Dutch government applauded the reaction of the police for being prepared for potential terrorist attacks (Anonymous, 2018). A few weeks later, on September 27, 2018 the Dutch police arrested seven men, who were suspected of planning, at an advanced stage, a major terrorist attack in the Netherlands. Dutch authorities were already familiar with three of the men, since they tried to travel abroad to join foreign militants (Solanki, 2018). Reportedly there have been links between the seven men and the terrorist organisation IS. Furthermore, it is known that the men were in the possession of handguns and were working on getting explosives (BBC, 2018). At the moment, the Dutch government assesses the national threat of a terrorist attack at the level 'substantial', which makes up level four out of five (NCTV, 2018).

7.3   Counterterrorism and counter radicalisation in the Netherlands

7.3.1   Responsibility for Dutch counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies

In the early 2000s, the AIVD (the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) was responsible for counterterrorism in the Netherlands. After 2004, the AIVD increased its personnel, antiterrorist capacities were developed for the police force, and a central post was developed to enhance cooperation between the responsible agencies (Demant & De Graaf, 2009). In 2005, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTV) was assigned responsibility for the coordination of tasks in relation to counterterrorism. This can be defined as a formal approach. This was necessary, since a number of bodies and organisations were involved in counterterrorism, and harmonisation and coordination leads to more effective policies (NCTV, 2011). The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism is still responsible for preventing disasters and crises today (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.).

7.3.2   The Netherlands' early counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies

Before 1973, the Netherlands did not have a counterterrorism policy. Preparations for a Dutch counterterrorism force reached an operational level after the 1972 Munich tragedy in Germany. In 1973, the Dutch government presented antiterrorism measures for the first time, which focused on

combating offenses but did not consider the ideological or political motivations of terrorists (Demant & De Graaf, 2009). The Dutch counterterrorism policies further developed in the 1990s and in 2001. After the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004, a new law on Terrorist Crimes was adopted, which made terrorist acts and all activities connected to terrorism such as recruitment and conspiracy punishable offenses. In summary, terrorism crisis management turned into a pivotal component of the Dutch security policy (Demant & De Graaf, 2009). The new counterterrorism strategy was characterized by a hard and robust tone. Hellmuth (2015) appreciated the tough security-measures for being accompanied by softer prevention measures the Netherlands adopted in 2004. According to Demant and De Graaf (2009), the measures of 2004 were effective in disrupting the known networks and cells. Furthermore, their study mentions that from 2006 onward the Dutch counterterrorism policies started to focus more and more on de-radicalisation. In 2007, a plan of action to combat radicalisation was presented and measures were taken by local authorities to prevent radicalisation. The plan of action was characterised by its close collaboration with Islamic organisations to boost social readiness to fight back, especially among the Dutch Islamic population (Demant & De Graaf, 2009).

7.3.3   National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2015

In June 2011, the Dutch government introduced the National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2011-2015. The objective of the plan was to reduce the risk and the fear of terrorist attacks as well as limiting the possible damage of an attack. Furthermore, the strategy includes restrictive, protective and preventive measures in order to be fully effective. The Dutch government considers cohesion, harmonisation and coordination between all the bodies active in counterterrorism as important. In 2011, the threat posed by terrorism was perceived as unpredictable and changeable. Even though, the Netherlands was not affected by terrorist activities at that point in time, the Dutch government recognised the state as vulnerable, which was the reason for setting up the strategy. Several rules were laid down for formulating and executing the policies in the strategy. For example, the measures should not interfere with the democratic legal order or the infringements of Dutch state organisations. Additionally, the measures were set up upon a legal basis and had to be proportional, meaning that they had to be in balance with the free exercise of basic rights. Furthermore, Waltz's balance of threat theory was considered. The strategy states: 'The nature of the threat determines the approach' (NCTV, 2011). Moreover, the strategy was divided into five pillars:

1. Procure: Due to the unpredictability and the changeability of the terrorist threat, intelligence and information gathering are essential. Intelligence exchange between organisations and bodies should be facilitated.

2. Prevent: The focus of the Dutch government is on the prevention of violent extremism. Measures to hinder an attack and prevent extremism are included in the strategy.

3. Protect: The state, the legal order and the society have to be protected against potential terrorist attacks. This also applies for the Dutch vital sectors and the protection of national harbours and airports. This pillar is aimed at the optimal combination of technological protection, identification of security risks of new technology and security awareness.

4. Prepare: The Dutch society must be prepared for the possible consequences of a terrorist attack.

5. Prosecute: In order to prosecute terrorist suspects cooperation between the police and the judiciary are necessary (NCTV, 2011).

The main objective of the strategy was to ensure that the Dutch government is prepared for threats and developments in the future. Furthermore, strategic choices are included that are separated into four arrays: International Jihadism, Migration and Travel Movements, Technology and Innovation, and Continued Development of the Surveillance and Protection system (NCTV, 2011).

7.3.4   The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism

After the most recent wave of Islamic terrorism in Europe, *the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism* was introduced in 2014. The 2014 plan intended to prevent radicalisation and to curtail the breeding ground. Furthermore, the plan had three objectives: the protection of democracy and the rule of law, to fight and weaken the Jihadist movement on Dutch soil and to abolish the breeding ground for radicalisation (Ministry of Security and Justice, National Coordinator for Securty and Counterterrorism, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2014). The plan can be divided into five main topics:

1. Risk reduction regarding jihadist travellers

2. Travel interventions

3. Radicalisation

4. Social media

5. Information-sharing and cooperation (Ministry of Security and Justice, National Coordinator for Securty and Counterterrorism, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2014)

A comprehensive approach was utilised for this policy. Regarding radicalisation, measures were included to disrupt recruiters and people who distribute jihadist ideology with the purpose of stopping the dissemination of the radical message. Furthermore, radicalisation should be detected and countered to prevent an increase of jihadism and encourage narratives. Additionally, social tensions should be countered since they lay ground for radicalisation (Ministry of Security and

Justice, National Coordinator for Securty and Counterterrorism, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2014).

7.3.5 National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2016-2020

In 2016, the NCTV introduced the National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2016 to 2020, which sets out an extensive strategy that obligates all government partners to approach extremism and terrorism jointly. The strategy is based on the expected threat for the period of 2016-2020 and draws on the National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2011-2015. The threat for this period is perceived as variable and unpredictable and is expected to continue growing. Furthermore, the National Counterterrorism Strategy contains several principles such as comprehensive approach with the purpose of taking preventive, restrictive and invigorating measures, a local approach with the purpose of using the comprehensive approach also at a local level, and a threat-based approach with the purpose of setting priorities according to the threat assessments, similar to Waltz's balance of threat theory. The main focus of this strategy is on the comprehensive approach (NCTV, 2016). The National Counterterrorism Strategy is divided into five areas of intervention:

1. Procure: intelligence gathering about (potential) threats to national security and Dutch interests abroad
2. Prevent: prevention and disruption of extremism and to foil terrorist attacks
3. Protect: protection of people, property and essential processes from extremist and terrorist threats
4. Prepare: prepare for terrorist violence
5. Prosecute: enforce law in the face of extremism and terrorism (NCTV, 2016).

The strategy is set out for five years and has the purpose to combat the threat posed by extremists and terrorists in the Netherlands, including right-wing, left-wing, Islamic, and animal rights extremist. In addition, combating radicalisation is recognised as an important part of the strategy. This means that policies are set out to reduce polarisation and to promote social cohesion. Withal, the NCTV understand that an identification of the radicalisation process is necessary to combat terrorism and extremism effectively. Just like Kees van den Bos (2018), the NCTV perceives the radicalisation process as originating from lawful activism towards extremism towards violent extremism and subsequently to terrorism. The strategy includes topics of interest such as the role of digital resources in radicalisation and recruitment, the possibility of a further grow of jihadism, and the connection between contemporary terrorism and the criminal world.

The strategy was set up according to the evaluation of the National Counterterrorism Strategy of 2011-2015 and avoids the negative points resulting the evaluation. The following five points were labelled negatively influencing the authorities' intervention capability:

1. The strategy's broad direction can create conditions for selective attention.
2. Social partners and security partners tend to drift apart when the threat is perceived as low.
3. When the threat is perceived as low, the national partners' capabilities fluctuate.
4. The integrated local approach is powerful; however, the capabilities of local authorities tend to fluctuate.
5. The NCTV has the role to mediate and choose between political and implementation interests, which is a recurring issue (NCTV, 2016).

In conclusion, it was evaluated that when the terrorist threat was less evident, the intervention capability of authorities fluctuated. These five points were considered when setting up the new counterterrorism policy. Another point that resulted from the evaluation was the issue of conflicting roles, therefore a balance must be made between wanting to achieve progress and the need to consider all the multifarious aspects. Furthermore, the NCTV (2016) is aware of the fact that radicalisation continues to present a threat to the Netherlands.

7.4   Radicalisation in prisons in the Netherlands

Prisons have played a significant role in the narratives of all radical movements in the modern era. The Netherlands have policies dealing with prisoners convicted for terrorism related offences. In 2010, the Netherlands only held five convicted terrorists in its prisons. The Netherlands is the only country having a terrorist wing, where all prisoners convicted for terrorist offences were segregated from the rest of the prison population. The terrorist prisoners can interact with each other, but not with other inmates. The Netherlands, in addition, does not suffer from prison over-crowding and is even leasing space to Belgium. The Dutch prison policies rely on less formal mechanisms and the Dutch prison staff is trained to detect signs of radicalisation, for example changes in behaviour and beliefs. However, as Neumann (2010) points out, this could lead to an oversharing of religious conversions, which do not necessarily have to be radical. The Dutch government realised the importance of prison imams to counter radicalisation in the 1990s. The Dutch prison imams are state-funded and have to undergo certain trainings and must have certain qualifications. For example, prison imams are not only required to be religious figures who can offer spiritual care, but they are also expected to function as social workers, experts in radicalisation and interlocutors between prison authorities and Muslim inmates. Furthermore, prison imams have to fulfil language requirements and commit to ongoing training exercises (Neumann, 2010).

8   Analyses

The aim of this study is to contrast the French counter radicalisation policies with the Dutch ones. To provide a reliable answer to this subject, radicalisation itself and the issues respecting finding a clear definition and understanding were examined. Furthermore, the position of the Muslim population in both countries was scrutinised. Lastly, the past and present situation regarding terrorism and radicalisation in France and the Netherlands were evaluated as well as the counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies in both countries.

This chapter's purpose is to analyse the results of this study. Firstly, general issues connected to radicalisation will be discussed. Secondly, the findings regarding the situation in France as well as the French government actions and policies will be analysed. Thirdly, the same will be applied for the Netherlands. Lastly, it will be investigated where the two countries have common approaches and where they differ from each other. Additionally, it will be explored how the two approaches could complement each other.

8.1   Radicalisation

The following part will examine the uncertainty regarding the term of radicalisation and its elements. As mentioned in the Literature Review, a precise definition for the term of radicalisation has proven elusive. Scholars and politicians struggle to find a concrete definition for the phenomenon of radicalisation. Prior studies have referred to radicalisation as being a process through which people adopt radical beliefs and possibly become extremists. Some scholars, however, disagreed with referring to radicalisation as a process and defined it as being an accumulation of extreme ideas. This uncertainty is also visible at an international level, since different states use different definitions. For example, France refers to radicalisation as the 'process by which an individual or a group adopts a violent form of action directly linked to an extremist ideology with a political, social or religious content that disputes the political, social or cultural order' (Crowell, 2017). The Netherlands, on the other hand, perceive the radicalisation process as originating from lawful activism, towards extremism leading to violent extremism and subsequently to terrorism. While both countries refer to radicalisation as a process, their definitions differ in the details. The Dutch government limits radicalisation towards having a political background and refers to it as the predecessor of terrorism, while France declares that radicalisation can have political, social or religious backgrounds. The French government did not directly link radicalisation to terrorism and therefore neglected the importance of countering radicalisation in order to combat terrorism. This might lead to a possible explanation as of why France did not implement any measures to counter radicalisation until 2014,

whereas countries such as the Netherlands have been actively combatting radicalisation since the early 2000s. This uncertainty surrounding radicalisation may support the hypothesis that the conceptual ambiguity might lead to ineffective counter radicalisation measures. In other words, it might be difficult to prevent radicalisation without having clarity what exactly the term indicates.

One interesting finding is that it is unclear where exactly radicalisation starts in as much as at what point governments should intervene. The findings regarding radicalisation are somewhat limited due to the uncertainty surrounding the subject as mentioned before. When Kees van den Bos (2018) was consulted concerning this issue, he explained that governments should take action once individuals start to question democracy and the rule of law. He further explained that this, coupled with sympathy for violence, indicates that an individual is on the wrong path. However, without truly understanding radicalisation itself and its process, it is difficult to be able to say when a person reaches the point where strong beliefs turn into radical beliefs. The only indication about the character of a radicalised person given by the French and the Dutch definition is that the radicalised individual sympathises with violence. However, governments should act before an individual takes violent actions. Therefore, it is necessary to assure greater awareness among the public, so that they contact the authorities once they perceive early signs of radicalisation. For example, teachers, imams and sports coaches should undergo a certain training in order to be able to detect early signs of radicalisation and to alarm authorities. To sum it up, it is nearly impossible for governments to locate where exactly radicalisation starts or where a radicalised individual starts to pose a threat. Radicalised people usually do not openly admit that they are radicals. Therefore, it is important to train public authorities to detect early signs of radicalisation to prevent further radicalisation and start the rehabilitation process.

The uncertainty surrounding radicalisation is an important issue for further research. This paper is aware of the fact that designing a universal definition of the term and eliminating uncertainty regarding radicalisation will not abolish the problem in general. However, preventive measures might be more effective if governments have a clear definition and framework to utilise.

8.2   France

The following part will focus on France. As the result section has shown, France has been a victim of domestic terrorism since the 1980s. The French government was successful in preventing various terrorist attacks from 1996 until 2012. However, since 2012 France has been more affected by terrorism than any other European country. In addition, many of the attacks described in the result

section were carried out by home-grown terrorists, meaning that the attackers radicalised while they were in France.

One unanticipated finding is that France did not implement any counter radicalisation measures until 2014, even though France encountered its first domestic modern era terrorist attack in 2012. It may be the case, therefore, that this disengagement in countering radicalisation might be one of the reasons why France was affected heavily in recent years. The French government failed to perceive terrorism as the culmination of the radicalisation process and was afraid to violate civil rights by implementing counter radicalisation measures (Marret, 2009). Some scholars perceived France's inaction regarding radicalisation as something positive as it made terrorism a criminal activity and not the culmination of a process. Furthermore, they commended the French approach for making a clear distinction between the fight against terrorism and the conditions for political violence. However, France's recent and ongoing issue with radicalisation could possibly be linked to the passivity concerning counter radicalisation in the past. It can thus be suggested that some of the terrorist attacks in recent years could have potentially been prevented if the French state would have countered radicalisation earlier. For example, the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks of January 2015 might have been prevented if prison authorities would have been trained accurately to detect early signs of radicalisation. Chérif Kouachi, as mentioned in the result section, intensified his radical beliefs while in prison. If the prison personnel would have recognised Kouachi as a radical, they could have tried to rehabilitate him and he might not have carried out the attack. The *Plan de lutte contre les filières terroristes et la radicalisation violente* of 2014 did not include sufficient measures to counter radicalisation, albeit France had already encountered various attacks in the previous years.

Another important finding was that France utilises an informal approach to combat terrorism and radicalisation, meaning that multiple agencies work on these issues. As mentioned in the result section, no agency has the central authority, which leads to overlapping mandates, increased competition between the various agencies and a lack of coordination. Furthermore, the communication between the agencies relies on interpersonal relationships. In 2012, the coordination issue got partly eliminated by merging the DST and the RG into one body, the DGSI. France's informal approach is applauded for linking all the key factors, like intelligence and justice, in the process to counter radicalisation (Foley, 2009). However, the lack of communication and coordination could harm the counter radicalisation outcome. For example, if one agency fails to exchange certain information with another agency, efforts to combat terrorism and radicalisation could be damaged. In other words, although the divide between intelligence and justice can be

bridged via an informal approach, it does have its downsides, especially regarding communication, competition and coordination.

In reviewing the literature, data was found regarding scholars denouncing the state of emergency, introduced by the French government after the November 2015 attacks. The state of emergency regime received criticism for not being able to prevent the major terrorist attack of July 2016 or the less momentous terrorist attacks that occurred during the time of the state of emergency. Furthermore, as mentioned in the result section, only few of the warrantless searches turned out to veritably having a terrorist background and the public complained about human rights violations. Scholars like Paye (2016) claim that the state of emergency violated the private lives of individuals and mostly intended to eliminate privacy rather than preventing future terrorist attacks. This study confirms that the state of emergency restricted private lives and was unsuccessful in preventing the July 2016 massacre. However, this paper believes that France acts according to the balance of threat theory mentioned in the Literature Review. This observation may support the hypothesis that the French government truly believed that a state of emergency was necessary to keep the French citizens safe and to try and prevent future terrorist attacks. When the state of emergency was first introduced, the French government experienced a high amount of pressure and had to act quickly. It can therefore be assumed that the violation of private lives was necessary to do everything possible to assure the safety of French citizens. This leads to a moral dilemma for a government since it needs to contemplate the importance of safety over the importance of freedom.

The second question in this research was with which policies the French government tries to counter radicalisation. In the result section, the French policies connected to counter radicalisation have been outlined. Furthermore, analysing the effectiveness of the policies can be done by analysing how the reasons mentioned in the Literature Review, why individuals adopt radical beliefs, can be abolished with the help of the counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies. The first plan introduced after the new emergence of terrorist attacks in France in 2012 was the *Plan de lutte contre les filières terroristes et la radicalisation violente* (Plan to combat the terrorist networks and violent radicalisation) of 2014. The plan had a repressive approach rather than a preventive approach. The reasons why people adopt extreme beliefs were not tackled, however measures to disrupt recruitment places and to hinder hate preachers were included.

Two years later, the Press Kit Action Plan Against Radicalisation and Terrorism (PART) was introduced. The current study found PART effective for including a measure regarding the facilitation of communication between the agencies responsible for radicalisation and terrorism and

the distribution of tasks, which might help to eliminate the negative aspects of an informal approach. Furthermore, measures to combat personal uncertainty/identity uncertainty are included in the plan. For example, extracurricular activities dedicated to developing critical thinking skills and to exercising good judgement regarding media and social networks are included. Moreover, the plan tries to decrease Islamophobia and perceived injustice by supporting institutions that represent the Muslim faith. This is supported by a measure inclining to disseminate a critical discourse on radicalisation ideologies and an open-minded discourse on information about Islam. However, most of the measures included in PART are focussing more on monitoring, de-radicalisation, support of families of radicalised individuals and further research on the subject.

In 2018, 'Prevent to Protect', the national plan to prevent radicalisation, was published by the CIPDR. The very first measure included in the plan is somewhat controversial in the eyes of this study. The first measure states to develop initiatives to support the principle of secularism and to defend the French values in French schools. While this measure might help individuals to better identify with the French republic and to better understand the French values, it could also increase personal uncertainty by teaching children other values than the ones they learn at home. The plan focused less on tackling the reasons for radicalisation and more on abolishing the means of radicalisation, to prepare for developments in radicalisation and to improve international cooperation.

Also in 2018, a plan was introduced to counter racism and antisemitism. Measures to counter racism might be able to decrease personal uncertainty, perceived injustice, perceived group threat and Islamophobia. This study agrees with Kees van den Bos (2018) and claims that governments should focus on treating different groups in a respectful and fair manner and giving them a feeling of equality. The result section has shown that the large Muslim population in France struggles with personal uncertainty and that the Muslim population is generally speaking more deprived than the overall French population. These issues could be decreased with the plan to counter racism and antisemitism.

All in all, some of the reasons why people radicalise have been addressed in the policies and further policies are included regarding monitoring, de-radicalisation, disruption of recruitment places and communication between agencies. This study, however, realises that the overall focus of the French counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies is less on helping the individuals, who might already undergo radicalisation or are possible victims of radicalisation, and more on destroying the means of radicalisation. This paper does understand that destroying the means of radicalisation, such as hindering online recruitment, are useful measures to combat radicalisation. However, this does

not tackle the issue at its core. Furthermore, this study noticed that the French policies are somewhat one-sided. While measures are included that ought to teach the French republican values and secularity in schools, no specific measures are included to teach French citizens about the religion of Islam. Teaching French citizens about Islam might be useful to avoid the wrongful assumption of Islam being a violent religion as well as to avoid prejudice and to increase tolerance and open discourse. It can thus be suggested that even though the French policies are developing in the right direction, further research and policies are necessary in order to combat radicalisation adequately.

8.3   Netherlands

The first question in this study sought to determine the initial circumstances that led to the momentum of Islamic radicalisation in France and the Netherlands. The following part will focus on the initial circumstances leading to the momentum of Islamic radicalisation in the Netherlands. The Netherlands encountered various terrorist attacks in the 1970s, mainly carried out by the South Moluccan activists. However, the South Moluccan activists started to doubt the power of violence and decided to reach their political goal by forming a political party and thus becoming a part of the Dutch political system. In the early 2000s, the Netherlands encountered two assassinations with political backgrounds. One of them was carried out by an environmentalist and one of them by a radical Islamist. In recent years, the Netherlands did not encounter any terrorist attacks even though all its neighbouring states were affected by Islamic terrorism. In 2018, a minor attack was carried out at a train station in Amsterdam but was quickly brought under control by the Dutch police. Another potentially lethal terrorist attack was thwarted by the Dutch police in 2018. When Kees van den Bos (2018) was asked why he thinks the Netherlands have not been affected by Islamic terrorism apart from the Van Gogh assassination, he said that for one the Dutch approach, which does not only focus on repression but also on prevention, is reason for this as well as, to some extent, luck. This study, therefore, analyses why the Dutch counterterrorism and counter radicalisation approach has proven to be effective in the past.

One important finding is that the Dutch government has actively tried to counter radicalisation since 2007. In 2007, a plan to combat radicalisation was created and it was characterised by its preventive nature and the strong collaboration with Islamic organisations. Furthermore, the Dutch counterterrorism and counter radicalisation approach can be identified as a formal approach. The NCTV is responsible for the coordination of the tasks of the agencies involved in counterterrorism. Hence, it could conceivably be hypothesised that a formal approach in connection with an early implementation of preventive measures might be reason for the effectiveness of the Dutch counter radicalisation policies.

The third question in this research was with which policies the Dutch government counters Islamic radicalisation. Once again it will be analysed whether the Dutch counter radicalisation policies are set up to antagonise against the reasons for radicalisation. The National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2011-2015 included restrictive, protective and preventive measures. The plan mentioned that more research regarding the causes of radicalisation and its solutions are necessary. Furthermore, measures to hinder online recruitment are included. The plan also aims to identify signs of radicalisation early on to prevent the radicalised people from committing terrorist attacks. Measures are included that aim on offering people opportunities to fully participate in the Dutch society. Making individuals part of the Dutch society could eliminate the identity struggle some radicalised people encounter. Furthermore, the plan understands that the feeling of historical grievances is part of the breeding ground for radicalisation and that acknowledgement of these feelings might decrease the breeding ground for radicalisation (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.).

In 2014, *the Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism* was introduced. The plan had the intention to prevent radicalisation and to decrease its breeding ground. The plan included measures such as making jihadi recruitment and hate speech punishable by law. Moreover, the plan contained measures regarding the cooperation with the Muslim community such as allying with imams and mosque administrators, opposing Islamophobia and enhancing informal parenting support and Quran education for identity building. With these policies, the reasons for radicalisation like personal uncertainty, perceived injustice, perceived group threat and Islamophobia can be partially eliminated. One interesting finding was that a measure is contained concerning social debate about the rules of law. As mentioned earlier, Kees van den Bos (2018) explained that for him radicalised individuals start to pose a threat once they start disagreeing with democracy and the rule of law. Creating a space in which individuals have the opportunity to openly discuss and share their points of view regarding democracy and the rule of law can lead to them better understanding the Dutch political system and, therefore, to them supporting it rather than opposing it. Additionally, in case an individual does not agree with the Dutch politics, that individual might turn to political measures rather than violence to express their disagreement.

In 2016, the National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2016-2020 was distributed. The strategy mainly focused on a comprehensive approach to combat terrorism and radicalisation. The plan understands that a tailored approach is necessary to counter radicalisation since each case of radicalisation is unique, dynamic and multifaceted (NCTV, 2016). Nevertheless, there are no new measures included that actively eliminate the causes for radicalisation.

To sum it up, various measures have been included in the policies that counterbalance reasons for radicalisation such as perceived uncertainty, perceived injustice, perceived group threat, political factors, historical grievances and Islamophobia. Measures to de-radicalise individuals, to monitor potentially radicalised people and to disrupt the radicalisation process have been included in multiple measures named in the plans. However, a few causes for radicalisation have not been considered. It can therefore be assumed that additional policies to eliminate the causes of radicalisation might be useful to combat radicalisation, even though these findings suggest that the Dutch approach is effective.

8.4   Comparison: France vs. the Netherlands

After assessing the situation and the policies intended to counter terrorism and radicalisation in both countries, the following part will aim attention at the differences and similarities concerning the two approaches as well as to analyse where they might complement each other.

Both countries have a relatively large Muslim population. The French Muslim population makes up around 8.8% of the French population and mainly originates from the large influx of people from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia emigrating to France after World War II to help with the reconstruction. The Muslim population in the Netherlands makes up around 7.1% of the total population as mentioned in the result section. In the 1960s and 1970s, many Moroccans and Turks came to the Netherlands as guest workers. In both countries, the Muslim population suffers from socio-economic disadvantages. Unemployment and poverty rates are much higher among the Muslim population than among the rest of the population in both countries. Furthermore, in both countries low-cost housing is mainly used by the Muslim population. In France, the so-called *banlieus* are mainly populated by Muslims. Same applies for low-cost housing in the Netherlands. Living in low-cost housing often leads to its inhabitants being poorly regarded by other citizens. Furthermore, it does lead to isolation to some extent and therefore hinders the immigration process, since immigrants often stay in neighbourhoods with other people from their home-countries. Therefore, the overall position of the Muslim population in both countries is similar.

It is interesting to note that although the Muslim population in both countries originates from labour migration, the immigration approach in the two countries differs greatly. While France acts accordingly to an assimilation approach, the Netherlands implement multiculturalism in their immigration policies. In France, immigrants are able to live according to their religion, language and culture within private spheres. However, in the public sphere it is expected that they behave

according to the French values. In the Netherlands, a different approach is visible. When the labour immigrants first came to the Netherlands, it was expected that they would eventually return to their home-countries. Therefore, the focus was on making reintegration easier for the immigrants, meaning that measures were taken so that they could keep their cultural identities. After it became clear that the immigrants would stay in the Netherlands, the government switched to a multicultural approach in which the policies were set up to manage cultural and religious diversity. In response to the South Moluccan attacks, many demanded assimilation instead of multiculturalism, which was implemented throughout the 1990s. Today, however, the focus has switched back towards multiculturalism. It is interesting that even though both countries have a similar immigration history, they still utilise different immigration policies. This study claims that the assimilation approach could possibly increase the feeling of personal uncertainty, since immigrants can follow their own culture only at home, however, they should behave according to French values in the public sphere. Especially second or third generation immigrants might experience confusion regarding their identity, which has previously been mentioned as a potential cause for radicalisation.

In the current study, comparing French policies to Dutch policies showed that the two countries differ greatly in regard to values and approaches. The Netherlands usually apply a multicultural approach which allows policy makers and institutions to closely collaborate with Muslim organisations. This study perceives this approach as useful in the sense that the Muslim community feels accurately represented in the Dutch society. Furthermore, Muslim organisations might have better understandings about the sentiments of the Muslim population in the Netherlands and might therefore be able to help with designing successful counter radicalisation measures. France, on the other hand, has a secular tradition. This paper sees difficulties with a secular approach, especially in regard to counter radicalisation policies, since dialogue with Muslim organisations might help to create more effective countermeasures. Furthermore, it complicates cooperation with the Muslim community since they might feel insufficiently represented. These findings suggest that a multicultural approach might be more effective in order to combat radicalisation.

Regarding radicalisation, another interesting finding was that the Netherlands implemented soft counter radicalisation policies for the first time in the early 2000s. France, on the other hand, did not implement any soft counter radicalisation policies until 2014. The reason why France did not enforce any soft counter radicalisation measures was that the French counter terrorism approach was seen as successful during the 2000s and therefore it was perceived as unnecessary to create counter radicalisation measures. The Netherlands, contrarily, encountered extreme radicalisation cases in the early 2000s and therefore implemented counter radicalisation measures early on. The Netherlands,

however, have not encountered any recent terrorist attacks, while France has been a victim of various attacks in recent years. This observation may support the hypothesis that France's disengagement in countering radicalisation is reason for the momentum radicalisation has in France nowadays.

Another difference between the Dutch and the French approach can be seen in radicalisation in prisons. In the Netherlands, a terrorist wing, where all prisoners convicted for terrorist offences are segregated from the rest of the prison population. In other words, prisoners incarcerated for terrorist offences are only able to communicate with each other. One must keep in mind, that the Netherlands has the means for a terrorist wing, since prisons are not overcrowded and the number of prisoners imprisoned for terrorist offences is relatively small. In France, the issue with prison radicalisation is much more crucial than in the Netherlands. Some of the attackers of recent attacks have reportedly been radicalised or strengthened their radical beliefs while serving their prison sentence. In French prisons, only the most dangerous inmates are put in isolation due to overcrowding in French prisons. Therefore, prisoners incarcerated for terrorist offences have the possibility to recruit other inmates. Other than that, France and the Netherlands employ prison imams to promote moderate Islam in prisons. It can thus be suggested, that if the means allow it, France should work on a terrorist ward to prevent other prisoners from undergoing radicalisation.

Additionally, this study observed that France and the Netherlands also differ in its counter radicalisation approach. As mentioned in the result section, the French approach can be defined as informal. This means that in France the counterterrorism agencies do not work under a central authority. Several agencies share the authority, which leads to an overlapping of mandates, coordination issues and increased competition. However, the informal approach is seen as beneficial for linking justice and intelligence and thereby linking the key factors in the process to counter terrorism. In the Netherlands, a formal approach is utilised. Meaning that the NCTV is responsible for coordinating the tasks. A formal approach is beneficial in that sense that competition is decreased. This study confirms that an informal approach might lead to confusion and competition, which might make the counter radicalisation policies less effective. In general, therefore, it seems that a formal approach might facilitate coordination and as a result counter radicalisation measures might be more effective.

In taking a closer look into the policies set up by the French and the Dutch government, one unanticipated finding was that the Dutch policy papers are much more open about the Dutch governments' approach than the French policy papers. Both governments published in detail how they approach the prevention of radicalisation. However, the Dutch government explained in more

detail how each measure can be implemented and why it is necessary. The French policy papers often only stated the measure, but not how it would be implemented or why. Furthermore, the Dutch policy papers explain the weaknesses of their previous policies and how these weaknesses will be eliminated with the new policies. This study suggests that French authorities also analyse the weaknesses of previous studies and try to eliminate them in new policies, notwithstanding this is not included in their policy reports. This study has been unable to demonstrate a connection between the openness of government papers and the effectiveness of its sources. However, it can be assumed that citizens understand politics better if they are more accessible.

The Dutch and the French counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies include many measures to monitor radicalised individuals and to de-radicalise them. The Dutch approach included many measures that intend to prevent radicalisation at its core. The French approach contains several measures that counter some of the causes for radicalisation, however it was noticeable that the Dutch approach is stronger regarding this issue. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that both governments attempt to assure the security of its citizens and act with the goal of preventing future radicalisation. Thus, even though the governments do everything in their power, more research is necessary to improve the current counter radicalisation policies.

To conclude, there are several aspects about the Dutch counter radicalisation approach the French government might consider in order to make its counter radicalisation policies more effective. One should keep in mind that the circumstances regarding terrorism and radicalisation in the two countries differ greatly and France encounters more pressure in countering radicalisation and terrorism effectively than the Dutch government. Furthermore, the two countries vary greatly in size which makes the French policies much more complex and difficult to implement than the Dutch ones. Further research should be undertaken to investigate the term and the development of radicalisation as well as how to properly counter its causes in order to make future measures more successful.

9   Conclusion & Recommendations

The aim of the present research was to examine what the strengths and the weaknesses of the French and the Dutch counter radicalisation policies are. In this investigation, the initial circumstances leading to the momentum of radicalisation in France and the Netherlands were analysed as well as the counter radicalisation policies in both countries. Furthermore, it was necessary to examine the phenomenon of radicalisation itself and to assess in what ways the counter radicalisation policies in both countries could complement each other.

One of the most significant findings to emerge from this study is that so far no universal definition for the term of radicalisation has been found. International organisations, governments and scholars struggle to find a common definition. While some refer to radicalisation as a process through which people acquire extremist beliefs, others refer to radicalisation as the accumulation of extreme ideas. This ambiguity regarding the term of radicalisation might be reason for ineffective counter measures.

Furthermore, this study has shown that not only the term of radicalisation is surrounded by uncertainty, but it is also unclear where exactly radicalisation begins or where a radicalised individual might pose a threat. It is equivocal at what point extreme beliefs turn into radicalisation and at what point a radicalised individual is willing to make use of violence. Usually radicalised people do not openly admit that they are radicals and want to use violence in order to achieve their goals. It is therefore crucial to raise awareness among the public concerning early signs of radicalisation, so that authorities can be informed, the rehabilitation process can take place and attacks might be prevented.

This study has identified that the current situation regarding terrorism and radicalisation is different in the two countries. While France has encountered numerous, often lethal attacks with a radical Islamic background, the Netherlands have not encountered a radical Islamic motivated attack since 2004. The research has also shown that the two approaches differ greatly. France did not implement any counter radicalisation measures until 2014 and in general an informal approach is used, which increases competition between the different agencies responsible for counter radicalisation as well as decreases coordination. In addition, in French prisons, inmates convicted for terrorist offences are able to communicate with non-radical inmates and have the opportunity to radicalise them. However, since 2012 the French government has continuously worked on improving its counter radicalisation policies. As the result section has shown, the French government introduced a new national plan to counter radicalisation every two years since 2014. The Dutch government, on the other hand, introduced counter radicalisation policies for the first time in the early 2000s. Moreover, a formal

approach is utilised to set up counter radicalisation policies, meaning that the NCTV is responsible for the coordination of tasks. Additionally, Dutch prisons have a terrorist wing, where inmates imprisoned for terrorist offences are kept separately from the rest of the prison population. These findings suggest that in general the two approaches differ greatly from each other.

The investigation of similarities between France and the Netherlands has shown that both countries have a relatively large Muslim population. The Muslim population in both countries is generally more deprived than the overall population. In other words, in both countries the general Muslim population suffers from higher unemployment rates, living in low cost housing areas and lower education. This study has shown that socio-economic disadvantages could increase radicalisation, since they lead to a feeling of perceived injustice which was distinguished as one of the reasons for radicalisation.

Based on the research conducted for this study and the results gained, the following recommendations have been established. In order to avoid confusion and to make counter radicalisation measures more effective, it might be useful to set up a universal definition for the term radicalisation. Additionally, further research should be conducted regarding radicalisation itself and at what point a radicalised individual might utilise violence in order to prevent future attacks. Furthermore, policies with the purpose to counter radicalisation should not only focus on preventing individuals from further radicalising but should also consider the reasons why people radicalise and try to eliminate these reasons.

In conclusion, France and the Netherlands encounter the threat of terrorism and radicalisation differently and, therefore, counter the subject differently. Both countries act upon their traditions, hence France follows a secular approach, while the Netherlands utilise multiculturalism. The counter radicalisation policies in both countries are to some extent effective and this study has shown that their policies developed further over time. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess where the strengths and weaknesses lie and where the two approaches could complement each other. Furthermore, further research is necessary to avoid the uncertainty surrounding the subject of radicalisation. All in all, this study believes that the French and the Dutch governments first and foremost want to assure the safety of their citizens and set up the policies with the best intentions. Nonetheless, this paper would advise to focus more on the causes of radicalisation, since eliminating the causes would decrease the breeding ground of radicalisation. Thereby, counter radicalisation policies could be more effective.

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11 Appendices

11.1 Appendix 1: Transcript Interview

The following interview was conducted on December 4, 2018 at Heidelbeerglaan 1, Utrecht. In the following transcript 'Miriam' refers to the interviewer and 'Kees van den Bos' refers to the interviewee.

Miriam: In your book 'Why people radicalise' you mention perceived injustice as one of issues driving people to adopt radical believes. Many Muslims in the Netherlands and in other European countries encounter socio-economic disadvantages due to racism, do you think that policies aiming to decrease racism can lead to less radicalisation?

Kees van den Bos: Basically, I am not sure. Also, because the fight against racism might not be that successful in this country. And that is also, what current insights in social psychology tend to show is that quite often racist kind of reactions are driven not so much by explicit prejudice but more by implicit motives, implicit reactions. So, we almost automatically make a distinction between people from different groups and different races, ethnicity and gender and age and all these different categories. And it might be difficult to counter that. So, that's one thing and more societal observation is that this country tends to think of itself as very tolerant, but in fact we are adopting majority culture and we really are adhering to that culture to a strong extent. So, that is another thing. But what I do think would be important is that if Dutch governments, Dutch societal authorities, employers, and others would treat those from different groups really in a respectful and fair and just manner. That will not solve everything, but it will be an important starting point. Also, because it will empower those minorities, who have been mistreated and therefore they will respond more positively towards others. They will respond more positively back and then you get a positive dynamic kind of process. So that would be my inclination. So, it might be good to, let's say, to specify it on the fairness and unfairness of treatment.

Miriam: Alright, so by treating them more equally, radicalisation could be prevented to a certain extent?

Kees van den Bos: Yes, especially when you show them respect and listen to their concerns and pay consideration to it, meaning that you really consider their views. That does not mean that you need to pamper them. You can really say we act, for instance, in a constitutional democracy, where we think the rule of law is very important. And you really have to stick to that and to the basic human

values that are associated with that, such as freedom of speech or gender equality are very important. You cannot trespass those boundaries. So you can also be firm in that respect, but you can make a first step if you give people fair treatment. Because then they feel like they are seen as fully fledged members of society, so that is very important.

Miriam: That is connected to my second question. I read the article "Determinants of Radicalisation of Islamic Youth in the Netherlands" and in it you mentioned perceived uncertainty as another reason why people radicalise. So basically, the identity struggle has to disappear in order to prevent radicalisation?

Kees van den Bos: Yes, exactly. And those things in combination, so perceived unfairness or fairness, perceived uncertainty or experienced uncertainty and in combination they affect what people do and how we respond. And also, in my book I include a third variable, which is that you are sufficiently able to control your emotions. For instance, when I see someone or something that makes me very angry, it can be very important, it is crucial that we somehow control our emotions. That we do not act upon our anger or our sadness or fear. So, the combination of perceived fairness, unfairness, uncertainty and self-control – those are core issues I think.

Miriam: Do you think that there is something that a government could do to encourage self-control? Do you think that this is something that could be taught in schools in some way?

Kees van den Bos: Well, I do think that it can be learned. It depends a bit on the specific individual or groups of individuals, who it concerns. Perhaps you could do it in schools. A well-known example seems to be boxing lessons. In poor neighbourhoods, you can teach children how to box in a sportsmanship kind of way. If you do that, then chances are that the kids learn how to control themselves, because boxing is a good example. If you get a punch, then you really have to fight in a controlled manner. So sports, seems to be a good example. Perhaps, sports could be installed a bit more in schools or stimulate it a bit more so that local communities participate more in it.

Miriam: What measures do you think a government could adopt that would be useful to prevent radicalisation?

Kees van den Bos: In my book, I wrote that there is not one golden bullet – there is not one golden solution that will solve the problem. That noted, I do think that it is important that societal authorities like the government, the prime minister, etc. really step in and, for instance, they could communicate to the Muslim youth "I do respect you, I treat you very seriously". These messages are symbolic,

because the authorities serve an important symbolic role in society. So if they treat you in a fair and just manner, than you respond positively to it and open up. In combination, that message also does not need to pamper these people. You can also have a firm message, saying "wait a minute, these are the rules of the game and you should stick to those rules, otherwise you are in big trouble". But if you respect the rules, I will treat you fair and defend your rights and be interested in your concerns, which does not mean that I will always be able to fulfil your concerns but I am seriously paying attention to you. I think that is important. That is something we are not really used to, at least not in this country, where we have a bit of an individualistic kind of culture. Meaning that people have to sort it out for themselves while integrating society. We find it very important that you do that, but we do not explain or tell you or inform you in any way how you should do that. So that is a bit of discrepancy I guess.

Miriam: When in the 1970s guest workers from Morocco and Turkey came to the Netherlands, the focus was less on integrating them and more on them keeping their original values and beliefs and culture, since it was expected that they would return to their home countries eventually. Do you think that not integrating them properly back then, led to the closed-up Moroccan and Turkish communities you can find today in the Netherlands?

Kees van den Bos: That has definitely something to do with it. There are also other issues. For example, in this country, but also in other European countries or in the rest of the World, we have populist right-wing parties, that spread negative or even aggressive messages against, for example, these guest workers. As a result of that, you team up with your group. That is a natural reaction. The third thing is that we have a housing policy, so we build houses basically for similar kinds of people with similar financial backgrounds. Then you should not be surprised when you end up in our cities with neighbourhoods that are more or less isolated and resemble each other. So these three issues are in my opinion among the most important ones.

Miriam: In general, the Netherlands did not encounter any major incidents related to terrorism or radicalisation in the last few years. Do you think that this an indicator of the effectiveness of the Dutch counterterrorism and counter radicalisation policies?

Kees van den Bos: Well two reactions. I think that, for instance right-wing extremism was a really big thing in the 1980s. With respect to Muslim extremism or terrorism which has started to emerge in the last 15 years across the world, we do not have that much experience with it apart from the Theo van Gogh incident. And there was an assassination of a right-wing politician, Pim Fortuyn,

who addressed immigrants in a bit of a negative way. So we had some issues, but I think also it has something to do with our Dutch approach in which we do not look at repression only, but we pay attention to prevention. We try to do that in several kind of ways and I also think we are somewhat lucky. We have been lucky. What the National Coordinator of Counterterrorism does in this country is to be present in the whole of society. So not only on the governmental level, but also in the streets and trying to sort out what's going on. So that is an important aspect.

Miriam: You mentioned prevention, which the Netherlands has been active in for quite some time. While, for example, France only implemented preventive measures in 2012. Do you think that might be a reason for the gravity of the issue of radicalisation France has encountered?

Kees van den Bos: That might be the case. I know from France as an informed newspaper reader, so I am not an expert. But I do think that it plays a role. It also might be that sometimes it's good to see the parallels with how countries fight crime. So, we do it and the Dutch police does it in a less strict kind of way and more in the way of considering what is going on in neighbourhoods and can we try to prevent the people from being attracted to criminal behaviour. Whereas in France, I often have the impression that French police men are much stricter and harsher. So that might be a reason. There is another thing, I am not sure whether that is related to difference between France and the Netherlands, but when you think of radicalisation, the idea is that radicalisation involves at some point radical thoughts. However, radical thoughts are not criminal behaviour. They are not illegal. But when people have developed radical thoughts, they might at some point turn towards illegal violent behaviour. It might be that we step in a bit earlier, when people or groups of people start to develop radical thoughts, that we try to intervene and try to get in contact with them. Ex. Boulder. You need to work together. So working together is a core issue in our society. Perhaps, we also do that when we see an individual or a group starting to develop radical thoughts. We realise that something is going on and we try to talk to those people. That might lead at least to some extent to successful prevention. Perhaps the French take freedom of speech more seriously that we do. So, they think that radical thoughts are not a problem. But then the ironic consequence is that you wait longer until the shit hits the fan and then you need to act in a more repressive kind of way. It might also be ironically because you treat freedom of speech and radical thoughts more seriously, meaning that you can think whatever you like, therefore you end up acting in a more repressive way.

Miriam: My research showed, that many scholars struggle with finding a clear definition for radicalisation and a lot of uncertainty surrounds the process of radicalisation. Do you think that the

struggle of finding a clear definition for the term 'radicalisation' is impacting the effectiveness of counter measures?

Kees van den Bos: Well the definition issue is really important in the literature and in the policy decision making and the court of law and the treatment of radicalisation and associate issues such as terrorism. In my book, I did it in a socio-psychological way. I tried to circumvent the problem by jumping in and saying well these are my working definitions. Basically, what I do is I try to define a radicalisation process where activism, staying within the law, is somewhat different from extremism, where you cross the boundaries of the law, violent extremism, where it is not only illegal but also violent, and then terrorism, where you take violent action because of ideological reasons. So those are my anchor points and that is the radicalisation process I am looking into. Of course, realising all the disadvantages. The process is probably not as linear as it seems. What I find very important is that when you study these kinds of issues and try to work on it, you need to do that in a constructive kind of way. So, I can see all these problems, all these definition issues, but I want to make progress, I want to see when do people start to violate the law and when do they really have build-up disregard for it. When do they start to sympathise with violence, when do they start to sympathise with ideological rigid thoughts. That's really what I am trying to do and I think that is more valuable than to stick with definitional issues. You can easily write a book about the definitions alone and then you don't have any other content. You have full access to our national counterterrorism policies; they are really interesting. There is a lot of information there. I think that is also typical of how we approach the whole issue of radicalisation and counterterrorism. That we are so open about it. That is also part of our open society, because it is crucial to fight violent extremism and terrorism but you do so in such a manner that we still end up with the open democratic society that we love so much.

Miriam: Yeah that was the issue in France for example. When the state of emergency was introduced after the 2015 attacks, many felt like it was not to prevent terrorism or radicalisation, but that it was about invading the private lives of citizens, which led to anti-French sentiments.

Kees van den Bos: Exactly, and then you get this dynamic which is uncontrollable. That is really a problem.

Miriam: We just spoke about how difficult it is to define radicalisation. In your opinion, where comes the point along the radicalisation process where a government should intervene or where is

the point where a person does not just have strong beliefs anymore but becomes an extremist who is willing to take violent action?

Kees van den Bos: Well, I do think when people start to build up a disregard for the rule of law and the constitution of democracy, then these are big indication that things are really wrong. Of course, this couples with sympathy for violence. What I do think is that when people really start to believe the immorality or the injustice they see cannot put themselves in the perspective of other parties or groups involved. That does not mean that you emphasize with that, but if you cannot engage in perspective taking in that respect then you really seem to lose the idea of what a democracy is all about and that, for me, is a red flag that something is going wrong.

Miriam: What would you advise governments to consider when setting up counter radicalisation measures? Do you think that there is an aspect that has been disregarded to far that governments should consider for their approach?

Kees van den Bos: Yes, you probably should apply the full integrative approach the Dutch government has adopted. Meaning work should be done on prevention but you should also include repression when things are seriously wrong, which is a duty of a state and which also gives security to which others will respond in a positive manner. Not to focus on one thing only and definitely pay attention to the prevention aspect.

Miriam: How do you think integration and radicalisation are connected?

Kees van den Bos: Yes, I do think that they are often related. Not necessarily always, but quite often. That is something a government could and should work on. For example, the banlieus in France are a serious problem because whole neighbourhoods are not well integrated into society. So this creates all kinds of problems and issues. Not only in terms of radicalisation but also in relation to the families living there. As a society it's your duty to take care of that.

11.2   Appendix 2: Student Ethics Form

**European Studies
Student Ethics Form**

Your name: Miriam Louka

Supervisor: Marije Minkman

Instructions/checklist
Before completing this form you should read the APA Ethics Code
(http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx). If you are planning research with human
subjects you should also look at the sample consent form available in the Final Project
and Dissertation Guide.

a. [√] Read section 3 that your supervisor will have to sign. Make sure that you cover all
these issues in section 1.
b. [√] Complete sections 1 and, if you are using human subjects, section 2, of this form,
and sign it.
c. [√] Ask your project supervisor to read these sections (and the draft consent form if
you have one) and sign the form.
d. [√] Append this signed form as an appendix to your dissertation.

Section 1. Project Outline (to be completed by student)

(i) Title of Project: Combating Islamic Radicalisation in France and in the Netherlands

**(ii) Aims of project: Study the subject of radicalisation and analyse the French and the
Dutch counter measures**

**(iii) Will you involve other people in your project − e.g. via formal or informal
interviews, group discussions, questionnaires, internet surveys etc. (Note: if you
are using data that has already been collected by another researcher – e.g.
recordings or transcripts of conversations given to you by your supervisor, you
should answer 'NO' to this question.)**

YES

If no: you should now sign the statement below and return the form to your

supervisor. You have completed this form.

This project is not designed to include research with human subjects . I understand that I do not have ethical clearance to interview people (formally or informally) about the topic of my research, to carry out internet research (e.g. on chat rooms or discussion boards) or in any other way to use people as subjects in my research.

Student's signature _____-   date - _____

If yes: you should complete the rest of this form.

Section 2 Complete this section only if you answered YES to question (iii) above.

(i) What will the participants have to do? (v. brief outline of procedure):

 Interview with Kees van den Bos

(ii) What sort of people will the participants be and how will they be recruited?

 Professor for social psychology

(iii) What sort stimuli or materials will your participants be exposed to, tick the appropriate boxes and then state what they are in the space below?

 Questionnaires[   ]; Pictures[   ]; Sounds [   ]; Words[   ]; Other[√].

Interview questions

(iv) Consent: <u>Informed</u> consent must be obtained for all participants before they take part in your project. Either verbally or by means of an informed consent form you should state what participants will be doing, drawing attention to anything they could conceivably object to subsequently. You should also state how they can withdraw from the study at any time and the measures you are taking to ensure the confidentiality of data. A standard informed consent form is available in the Dissertation Manual.

(vi) What procedures will you follow in order to guarantee the confidentiality of participants' data? Personal data (name, addresses etc.) should not be stored in such a way that they can be associated with the participant's data.

Student's signature: .... date: ....

Supervisor's signature (if satisfied with the proposed procedures)**: ....
     date: ....**