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Officer Education

The Road to Athens!

Harry Kirkels
Wim Klinkert
René Moelker
(eds.)

The cover image of this edition of NL-ARMS is a photograph of a fragment of the unique 'eye tiles', discovered during a restoration of the Castle of Breda, the home of the RNLMA. They are thought to have constituted the entire floor space of the Grand North Gallery in the Palace of Henry III (1483-1538). They are attributed to the famous Antwerp artist Guido de Savino (?-1541). The eyes are believed to symbolize vigilance and just government.

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Introduction

Wim Klinkert, Harry Kirkels and René Moelker

The year 2003 is a very special year for the Royal Netherlands Military Academy (RNLMA) at Breda. The oldest and largest officer education in the Netherlands has existed for 175 years and this event coincides with far-reaching changes in the educational programme. These changes are necessary to receive accreditation as an academic Bachelor education. A jubilee and an educational reorganization are both excellent reasons for a reflection on the specific characteristics and problems of institutions for officer education that aim for more than military-technical skills.

This volume of NL-ARMS discusses a number of aspects related to officer education and training as they have developed over time at home and abroad. A closer inspection of both the field of tension between science and 'the military' and role of values and norms inherent to the officer profession lies at the heart of book. However much it may have changed since the end of the Cold War, the elements that make the officer profession so special are still very much in evidence. Officers are not made at university - in Athens - nor are they solely shaped through the hardships of military practice - in Sparta. Their specific knowledge and skills as warrior, diplomat and manager can only be acquired in an environment and structure designed for the purpose. Institutions for officer education have pursued and are still pursuing this ideal, and the present volume attempts to contribute to that quest.

The modern military policymaker can enhance the quality of his decisions by employing his knowledge of considerations and decisions made in the past and traditions cherished by institutions. **Enthoven** points at the place and importance of a getting a feel of the maritime environment in the education of naval officers. This is where for a large part lies the heart of that profession. How did this element of nautical training claim or receive its place over time? Is this one of the key elements in the education of naval officers?

Sinterniklaas describes the phenomenon of the 'second way' for us. Over time the Services have used different sources to educate their officers from. As it appears, an academic education was not always necessary, which opened the possibility for a second way towards the officer profession. What were the arguments that formed the foundation of this system? What does its existence tell us about the armed forces' view on the necessity to have the Athenian as well as the Spartan element represented in all its officers?

The contributions **Klinkert & Groen** and **Klinkert**, too, are historical in character. Research into the history of the Dutch officer education, on which these articles are based, shows that the combination of character building, knowledge and military skills

forms the core of officer education. The three elements were rarely in balance, though. Knowledge has won ground - an advance that was begun almost a century ago. Character building has proved to be the most intractable of them all. The boarding school system and the harsh military order and discipline were the means employed in the nineteenth century. Nowadays, the Cadets' Corps, in cooperation with military leadership of the RNLMA, plays an important role in it. Unity of thinking and effort in this area is difficult to attain, especially when the freedom of cadets and the diversity of their social backgrounds have increased so strongly.

Attempts to establish other institutions for officer education besides the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, have only been successful for the second way described by **Sinterniklaas**. An education of its own for the colonial army, the subject of **Klinkert's** contribution, and for the air force, as a separate Service, has never been realized, because of the costs but also because of the argument of unity in the officer corps.

Moelker discusses the role of values and norms in the educational environment as a basis for future performance in the officer corps. The RNLMA holds a rather exceptional position here in that much is left to the cadets themselves. Outward appearance, codes of behaviour, systems of sanctioning - on the one hand, they are residues of a past when almost all officers derived from the highest social layers of the population, and on the other hand, they have been benchmarks of behaviour and distinction to this day. In times when the behaviour of officers is more and more assessed by ethical standards, aspects of this special element in officer education regain importance.

Understanding and insight in one's own situation grows by comparing oneself with others. The neighbouring countries of the Netherlands have entirely different military histories. A small nation, like the Netherlands neutral for a long time, and a big power with a very prominent military past, have given substance to their officer education in different ways. **Kollmer**, in his analysis of the German model, points out that the balance between Sparta and Athens has a tendency to gravitate towards the former. Character and military skills, for historical reasons, hold a prominent place in German military thinking. Of great importance is the special organization of the German post-WWII officer education. Such a breach with the past is extremely rare in European history. With its *innere Führung* and close ties with civilian universities the German education has found its own, unique path. A military academy where the aspirant officers live and work together is a thing of the past for Germany.

The Belgian system is closer to the Dutch. **Manigart** points out the essential difference of the Brussels academy, where, in contrast to Breda, a completely civilian-academic education for all Services is offered. In doing so, it seems a definite choice has been made for Athens, without doing away with military skills and character development. Apart from the condition that in the Netherlands the officer education

will have to fit the four-year straightjacket, it is questionable whether this is the Dutch model of the future.

Past and foreign experiences - they are starting points for acquiring a better insight in the problems that are inherent in officer education. The last four contributions extrapolate the present new developments to the future. Thus, **Bleumink, Moelker and Vogelaar** discuss the specific requirements that officers have to meet in Peace Support Operations. The nature of these PSO can be diametrically opposed to the traditional task concept of the military. The complexity of the environment and the repercussions stemming from decisions taken at a low level, make working in such a context more than challenging. Almost as a matter of course this requires a much broader academic education. But should Athens surpass Sparta? As mentioned before, this seems to be the trend in the Netherlands.

Another modern development is the converging of military and police tasks. There are essential differences between the two, but a new and innovative step has been taken with the choice to make the Royal Marechaussee a separate Service and to entrust its initial officer education to the RNLMA. **Crul and Leijtens** show how the Marechaussee positioned itself over time and how its tasks changed. Was the choice for the other Services instead of the police organization a self-evident one? And does this choice symbolize the broader range of tasks for the modern armed forces as a whole?

Oonincx takes sides in the discussion on whether the RNLMA educates managers or warriors. Over the last decades the management and public administration sciences have clearly gained ground as the dominant academic approach in the Dutch officer education. But can an officer be so easily compared to a civilian manager? Is this the outcome of a way of thinking that can develop in a longer period of peace? Does not a military academy sell its soul by adopting such an approach?

In **Haltiner** the lines come together. He gives an overview of how tradition and modern development converge to give substance to the officer education and force their designers to make choices in order to retain their relevance. In the process they cannot afford to betray the Spartan roots of this form of education and training. Each nation will do this in its own style, based on its own historical background. It is not unthinkable, however, that in the end, as with Rome, all roads will lead to Athens.

The editors wish to express their gratitude to Rop Willems whose expertise made this edition possible. He is a patient man.

θαλαττα! θαλαττα! –The sea! The sea!

The Royal Netherlands Naval College and the Art of Seamanship

Victor Enthoven

Abstract

The Royal Netherlands Navy operates on, above and below the surface of the sea. What does this mean for the naval officer? First of all, he operates in an inherently dangerous environment. The sea itself, as well as life and work on board, harbours many dangers. Secondly, it is impossible for the crew to leave the ship during periods at sea, which can last up to about eight weeks. The ship forms a close and self-reliant community. In other words, the crew have to sail the ship safely, together. Basic naval or nautical training at the Royal Netherlands Naval College in Den Helder is oriented towards this. After a short historical survey of the basic naval training of the aspirant naval officer or midshipman of the Seaman Branch over the past few centuries, the present-day organization of basic naval training within the curriculum of the College and the various tools employed in it will be described.

Introduction*

During the so-called march of the Ten Thousand (401-399 BC), following the battle of Cunaxa, Xenophon conducted the Greek troops safely through the interior of Asia Minor to the Black Sea and subsequently to Pergamum. On seeing the Black Sea his men shouted deliriously θαλαττα! θαλαττα! ‘The sea! The sea!’¹ For them it meant the end of months of hardships.

The Royal Navy operates on, above and below the surface of the sea. What does this mean for the naval officer? First of all, he operates in an inherently dangerous environment. The sea itself, as well as life and work on board, harbours many dangers. Secondly, it is impossible for the crew to leave the ship during periods at sea, which can last up to about eight weeks. The ship’s is a close and self-reliant community. In other words, the crew have to sail the ship safely, together. Basic naval or nautical training at the Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine (KIM), known internationally as the Royal Netherlands Naval College (RNLNC) at Den Helder is oriented towards this.

First of all, the environment – the ship and the elements of water and wind – must be explored. The ship itself forms a threat, loaded as it is with missiles, torpedoes, shells and large quantities of flammable and explosive substances. The work on deck is dangerous, too – helicopter operations, replenishing at sea and maintenance – and it may result in people getting injured or going overboard. The Officer of the Watch on the bridge is responsible for this safe conduct of the ship and its crew.

Besides, the sea is an inherently dangerous environment for man. Even when the circumstances are favourable the ship may ground, be holed or sink, and in fine weather a person may fall overboard and drown. There is always the possibility of a collision. Normal circumstances, up 6 or 7 on the Beaufort scale, fog, harbour dangers and require the expertise known as seamanship. The danger increases in bad weather. The transfer of wind energy to the water causes waves, and the quantity of energy stored in them can be fierce enough to damage or even sink the ship (Bedet, 1976). To carry out an operation effectively in a storm, with regard to safety as well as result, requires a good deal of seamanship. If, on top of that, the propulsion or steering conks out in bad weather the ship and its crew are in great danger. So, what is it like to operate in this (potentially dangerous) environment?²

In order to function independently as Officer of the Watch, the midshipman has to be trained to sail the ship safely, being aware of the risks of collision, running aground, storm damage and loss and injury of his or her personnel. He/she has to know how to navigate: Where am I; Where do I want to go and how do I get there safely; What are the risks and how do I determine them? During basic naval training the theory of navigation has to be applied and in order to do this the student has to know about the procedures on the bridge.

Furthermore, in the education attention can be paid to the social environment of life aboard a ship: what is it like to be working and living together with people you have not chosen in a relatively small space for longer periods of time? There is no way you can avoid each other. Besides, the platform (the ship) is constantly moving, which makes you feel tired sooner. The job has to be done together, even if there is an incompatibility of characters. Hence, the well-known sailor's dictum: a ship is as seaworthy as its crew.

Apart from a limited theoretical element, basic naval training particularly involves maritime practice and the art of seamanship itself: the ability to sail safely. To this end the RNLNC employs several tools. Navigation and manoeuvring the ship can be learned in the full mission bridge simulator. In addition, the College has several training vessels at its disposal. During the three-year initial training two longer periods at sea in the



The *Van Kinsbergen*, 1999. Courtesy of the Head of Nautical Training RNLNC.

operational fleet are scheduled, traditionally called the *bootjesreis* (Initial Sea Time) and the *kruisreis* (Sea Time). During the first major practical training period, the Practische Bedrijfsintroductie (Practical Introduction to the Navy) basic nautical training is completed with the *zeewachtstandaard*–A (Bridge Watchkeeping Certificate –A): the initial (military) navigation ticket, with which the young officer proves he is able to sail the ship safely under normal circumstances.³

After a short historical survey of the basic naval training of the aspirant naval officer or midshipman of the Seaman Branch over the past few centuries, the present-day organization of basic naval training within the curriculum of the RNLNC and the various learning tools employed in it will be described.

The forerunners of the RNLNC.⁴

Throughout the centuries there has always been a tension between the practical and theoretical aspects of the education of the naval officer. On the one hand, sailing a ship is an art in which experience and skill in handling the ship and attention for safety have always played an important role. It is a routine that is only mastered through frequent practice. On the other hand, sailing safely involves a thorough technical know-how and insight: Where am I and how is the ship behaving? What can I expect from the ship and the systems and do they perform as they should? Basic naval training is mainly concerned with the former: the art of sailing a ship.

Up until 1829, the year the RNLNC was founded, naval officers were mainly trained aboard operational vessels. The midshipman acquired practical experience under several commanders. This on-board training was not bound by hard and fast rules. Thus, the duration of the training was not fixed and up until about 1750 no requirements were set for the theoretical knowledge of the officers-to-be. There were, however, all sorts of private teachers in the ports, who, for a fee, would enrich the practical skills of the (aspirant) officer with the theoretical knowledge of navigation. In fact, they were miniature nautical colleges.⁵ Whether or not the aspirant officers were also taught naval tactics by these private tutors is unclear. It is a fact, however, that Cornelis Douwes, mathematician, examiner at the Amsterdam Admiralty Board, and founder of the Algemeen Zeemans-College (General Nautical College) in 1749, possessed a copy of one of the earliest Dutch naval tactical works, the *Grondbeginselen der Zee-Tacticq* (*Principles of Naval Tactics*), by Jan Hendrik van Kinsbergen. Moreover, several naval officers and, in particular S. Geerts, Commodore and Teacher at the Amsterdam Admiralty Board, had ordered 56 copies of the same work. (Kinsbergen, 1782: part 1; Prud'homme van Reine, 1990: 177-184). By the end of the 18th century the education of midshipmen consisted of a mixture of practice and theory.

After the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784), which had ended far from successfully for the Dutch Republic, Guillelmus Titsingh brought about the establishment of the Kweekschool voor de Zeevaart (Nautical College) in Amsterdam, funded by the Vaderlandsch Fonds ter Aanmoediging van 's Lands Zeedienst (the National Fund for the Promotion of Sea Service) in 1785. Its objective was the training of young sailors. It was a nautical college with a boarding school system. Out of philanthropic considerations the training was free of charge. The College did not offer a specific midshipmen's education, but a general nautical cadre training, not directed at any one type of shipping or function on board.

The education consisted of a theoretical part ashore and a practical training on board. In the inner court of the College there was a scale model of a fully-rigged frigate, which was used for lessons in boarding a ship, hoisting, reefing, stowing and trimming the sails. Apart from that there were two practical training periods aboard operational ships. The duration of these training trips was not bound by rules. Some trainees would be on cabin duty to the West Indies or the Mediterranean and back, others would go to the Dutch East Indies as apprentice mates. Yet again, others were commissioned as midshipmen on a man-of-war and made their re-appearance at the school only years later. On completion of his voyage the student was to report at the school and present a journal and a certificate signed by the Commanding Officer. Now would follow a period of further education, after which he would be sent to sea again for a voyage of his own choice, usually in the rank of second or third mate. After this second trip the education was rounded off, its complete duration – theory and practice - lying anywhere between four and eight years.⁶

After 1795, during the Napoleonic era, the basic naval training of the midshipmen came under great pressure. Because of the hegemony enjoyed by the Royal Navy few Dutch ships ventured to sea. In order to give the midshipmen some nautical training, though, two brigs, relatively fast ships with two square rigged masts, were purchased, 'intended to serve as practice school for the cadets', as aspirant naval officers were then called. The *Vlieg* and the *Arent* were armed with six guns and had a crew of one Commander, two Lieutenants, a Boatswain, a Helmsman, a Surgeon, a Cook, six Sailors and 27 cadets. The age of the cadets varied between 12 and 30. The trips of these instruction vessels were limited to the coastal waters and the Zuyderzee. On 1 November 1799 the two brigs were decommissioned again. This first experiment in nautical training in a group had not been a success, one reason being the great difference in age between the midshipmen.

The private nautical education ashore had not been very popular among naval officers, who considered it to be too theoretical and too little practice-oriented. For this reason the Cadetten-Instituut voor de Marine der Bataafse Republiek (Cadets' College for

the Navy of the Batavian Republic) aboard the frigate *Euridice* was established in 1803. The ship lay at Hellevoetsluis. For the first time in its history the Dutch navy had its own training college. The instigator of this initiative, Junior Captain C.J. Wolterbeek, was appointed as the commander of the ship and the College. Supplementary Captain J.F.L. Schröder (1774-1845) held the position of Director of Studies. Nowadays the RNLNC has also a Vlagofficier KIM –VOKIM (Flag Officer Naval Officers' Training) and a Dean who bears the final responsibility for the faculty. The nautical-military subjects, including navigation, were given by (petty) officers. Civilian lecturers taught the general subjects, such as mathematics, science, geography, history and three modern languages (Dutch, English and French).

It was the intention to undertake training voyages with the *Euridice*. After all, in 1802 a treaty between France and Great Britain had been signed in the Peace of Amiens. But only a year later war broke out again and this forced the training vessel to stay in port. Several cadets were sent to warships in the Texel Roads, so that they could at least experience some active service. In the middle of May 1805 the *Euridice* was designated as a troop ship for the Dutch East Indies. The midshipmen's education was transferred to the former plague house at Feyenoord, Rotterdam.

The memory of the *Euridice* was kept alive in the form of a large instruction model of a ship that was used to teach the workings of the rigging (sails, spars and lines) to the cadets. The brigs *Zeemeeuw* and *Haay* were assigned to the college as training trips.

The derelict premises at Feyenoord were vacated after only three years. In 1809 several old Dutch East India Company warehouses at Enkhuizen were taken over. Simultaneously with this move it was decided that from then on only midshipmen from the Enkhuizen Cadets' College could be commissioned as naval officers.

The curriculum hardly changed. From their fourteenth birthday the cadets were required to spend six months annually on a training vessel. In order to limit the large flood of candidates, a school fee of f 300 was introduced. On top of that there were the expenses for equipment, books and other educational tools. In comparison with the fleet training and the College in Amsterdam, the Cadets' College was an expensive education.

The annexation of the Kingdom of Holland into the French Empire meant the end of an independent Dutch navy. With the various colleges closed, only a few midshipmen continued their education at Brest at the École Maritime Impériale or at Toulon aboard the training vessel *Duquesne*.

With the restoration of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1813/14 the Royal Netherlands Navy was founded. Fleet training was re-established and in 1816 several midshipmen were admitted to the Artillery and Engineer school at Delft. The training for the Seaman Branch took three years, after which the midshipmen were stationed at a man-of-war in order to gain practical experience. In the parade ground the rigging of

a three-master was constructed and two cannons on a ship's gun carriage were added to the practice battery. The brig *Havik* was made available as instruction vessel, and behind the school, in the Vestgracht, the heavy gun schooner *Kapitein van Brakel* lay moored as training vessel. For training at sea the midshipmen were appointed to operational ships that made trips to the Baltic, amongst other faraway places.

By Royal Decree of 29 May 1826 the Royal Netherlands Military Academy (KMA) was established in the Castle of Breda. On 12 December 1827 King William I decided to found the Royal Netherlands Naval College and it was accommodated in the storehouses of the former naval docks at Medemblik. In contrast to Delft or Breda, the instruction ships could be moored directly in front of the college.

The Royal Netherlands Naval College (RNLNC)⁷

Until 1869, when the Hoofdgebouw (Main Building) was constructed, the RNLNC led a nomadic existence. Below, a short survey is presented of the various locations, followed by a brief reflection on the different educational visions over the years.

From Medemblik via Breda to Willemsoord

The RNLNC was first established at the former Rijkswerf (State Wharf) at Medemblik. On 1 June 1829 the education started. On this occasion H. Beijerman, professor of naval history, geography, morality and literature, delivered a speech, 'Over het hoog belang, dat Nederland thans nog heeft bij eene welingerigte Marine' (On the great importance at present of a well-equipped Navy for the Netherlands). (MacLean, 1976: 18-30).

The memoirs of M.H. Jansen, who was billeted there from 1831 until 1833, give a good insight into the fortunes of the RNLNC during the Medemblik years. He roundly condemned it, saying that there was no instruction vessel, although there was the cutter *Ever*, with which the senior year made a summer trip across the Zuyderzee and ventured as far as the Nieuwdiep near Den Helder. The arrival of *Urania* in 1834 meant quite an improvement, as now the young lads could learn the ropes, at least according to Jansen. (Honoré Naber, 1925: 60, 66, 70, 77)

At the end of the 1840s the education at Medemblik was discontinued. First of all, the climate was deemed too unhealthy, as the death rate was much higher than in other places. It was too humid there, too. Only Zeeland was thought to be unhealthier. A second argument for closing the college was money. In these years, as so often, governmental policy was dominated by 'economizing by simplification'. The King decided to move the education to Breda and the RNLMA was renamed Royal Navy and Army Academy. The first midshipmen arrived on 5 September 1850.

A rigged mast was erected in the Academy grounds, and in the Spaniards' Gate several sloops were moored, which allowed the midshipmen to row on the moats of the castle. Practical artillery training was given with the help of an imitation ship's battery, whereas nautical training was given on the Zuyderzee aboard the brig *Zeehond*.

Within the Navy, Breda was never very popular, as this 'Navy on the moors' was too remote from the 'element on which one was to spend one's life'. Besides, discipline was felt to be too strict. One of the former commanders of the midshipmen company at the RNLMA, the later Vice-Admiral F.A.A. Gregory, wrote years later:

It has always been irksome to me, how little freedom was given to the young men and how they were checked at every turn, in a way that I have never been able to accept. In their daily so-called spare time, what little of it they had, no opportunity was granted them to move really freely or to enjoy themselves.

On 25 April 1857 it was decided that there would be another Royal Netherlands Naval College, this time at Willemsoord in Den Helder. On 1 October 1857 the last midshipmen left Breda.

At Willemsoord the midshipmen were accommodated aboard a guard ship. The lectures were given ashore, first in the large hall of the Commandantengebouw, called the Palace, and later in the so-called study halls at the Rijkswerf. Only in 1869 did the College acquire an accommodation that it could truly call its own, and where it has been to this day.

Educational vision

As mentioned above, there has been some creative conflict throughout the centuries between the theoretical education and the more practice-oriented training of the naval officer. Based on identical arguments, the education was made more theoretical (academic), or alternatively, more practice-oriented, with a greater emphasis on the craftsmanship of the naval officer. This tension has existed from the very foundation of the RNLNC. Jansen again:

Pilaar and Heinsbergen were opposed to each other. The former wanted to instruct thoroughly what the midshipmen had to know on board; the latter merely wanted them to develop their thoughts in order to be able to learn later what the midshipmen needed on board... It is true, neither Heinsbergen nor Pilaar attained his objective, for Pilaar did not succeed in teaching what midshipmen needed on board, and Heinsbergen did not succeed in inspiring a zest for work, so that it appeared that there was a discrepancy either way.⁸

In short, it comes down to Pilaar wanting a more practice-oriented training, geared

to performance aboard a ship. Heinsbergen advocated a more theoretical education, at a higher level of abstraction, teaching the midshipmen skills that would not only serve them well aboard the ships, but also in their later careers. It is a discussion that has been going on at the RNLNC and in the Navy to this day.

By the end of the 19th century teaching had become too much of a priority at the RNLNC, according to an anonymous observer. There were 33 subjects, not counting practical skills such as shooting, sailing, fencing, arm-to-arm combat, etc. There were eight hours of lectures daily during the summer, and seven in winter. Besides, there were two hours a day set aside for self-study. An anonymous observer commented, 'It is precisely in the great quantity of science that midshipmen have to absorb, that the main failure of the education lies'. In his view, especially the exact subjects, such as mechanics, analytical mechanics, differential and integral calculus and astronomy could be cut down, so that more time for self-study would become available. In his view, there should be more attention for liberal arts subjects as well. Only at a later stage in one's career should there be more opportunities to arrive at scientific profundity. On top of that there should be more and better qualified lecturers. As it was, the Commander of the College also held the post of director of studies. (Anonymous, 1890-91: 121-126)

But he had more criticism on the educational programme of the RNLNC. Thus, more attention should be paid to learning about torpedoes, electrical engineering and naval tactics. All this criticism eventually led to the establishment of a Naval Staff College in The Hague, shortly after World War I. (Gerritse, 1990: 108-119; Dam van Isselt, 1928)

After World War II a development in a non-academic direction could be discerned, with a greater focus on practice. The reason for this was a decrease in enthusiasm for the College as a result of an economic revival with a shrinking labour market, and the loss of most of the naval tasks in the East Indies after the independence of Indonesia in 1948. In the mid-1950s there was an urgent appeal in the *Marineblad* for 'as few formulae as possible' during the training. The RNLNC leadership was given the task to develop a curriculum with less mathematics for the aspirant seaman officers and more practical lessons for the technical branches. Towards the end of the 1950s, however, again a change of direction became necessary.⁹

Drastic technological developments were forthcoming for the next generations of naval vessels: navigation (with electronic positioning), propulsion (from steam to gas turbines), means of communication and electronic warfare, advanced armament (e.g. guided weapons) and a continued automation of weapon and command systems. A growing need for scientifically educated naval officers emerged. All this made Defence Minister P. de Jong, a former submariner, decide in late 1962 to expand the three-year training period of the RNLNC with a practical training period and a academic continuation course. From now on the total duration of the education would be five years: an

initial three-year education at the RNLNC, followed by a Practical Introduction to the Navy (PBI) just short of a year, and finally an academic continuation course in Den Helder or at another location. The Navy leadership was somewhat concerned, though, that the more liberal academic education of their officers might endanger their military prowess. That is why a clear division between the military and the academic pillars of the education was created.

Over the last forty years this arrangement has not been changed. Its dichotomy, however, laid the foundation for constant infighting: the new naval officer as an academically formed military manager, who somehow has to reconcile conflicting norms and values. The debate focussed on the question of primacy: a military profession with an academic education, or an academic profession in a military organization? Now the emphasis would be more on practical training, academic education would come later. In the course of the 1960s the more academic education gained prominence, but it never came to a naval university.¹⁰

With a formal scientific system lacking, the RNLNC embarked on a sort of *de facto* scientific system by concluding contracts with several universities. Apart from that, the professional education with a view to the practical functioning of the officer came into the picture again from the mid-1980s onwards. Training, educating and supplying sufficient numbers of qualified officers for the operational units became the RNLNC's objective. An important facet in bringing the education closer to naval practice was the operational training through periods at sea, like the PBI in the fourth year. Its primary objective was an increase in practical experience and a better distribution over the total period. Thus, the traditional *bootjesreis* (Initial Sea Time) was reintroduced for the most junior cadets at the end of their first year. The *kruisreis* (Sea Time) for the second-year students – abolished for all but the Seaman Branch – was re-introduced for all disciplines, and the Marines got a lot of practical training. The eight-month PBI became a truly operational function for all branches. The officers for the Seaman Branch were required to obtain their Bridge Watchkeeping Certificate-A. Broadly speaking, this arrangement whereby military discipline and academic thinking are merged, is still used today.

Midshipmen taking a sight during the *bootjesreis* in 1961. Courtesy of the photo archive of the RNLNC.



The *Zeefakkel* in the 1970s.
Courtesy of the photo archive of the RNLNC.



In the new millennium, however, the RNLNC finds itself on the eve of major changes. To begin with the college has to amalgamate with the IDL (Netherlands Defence College) and the RNLMA into one *Faculteit Militaire Wetenschappen* (FMW - Faculty of Military Sciences), a difficult process. Besides, the MOD has decided to follow the example of civilian universities in opting for a recognized, so-called accredited, academic Bachelor and Master education, BaMa for short. This encompasses an academic education, in which there will be a distinction between the academic curriculum, subject to civilian norms, and a military professional training. The RNLNC, or rather the FMW, will be obliged to offer a three-year programme, the content of which will be assessed by an independent institution for its academic level. Because of its practical nature, the art of seamanship will largely be excluded from this, with the possible exception of the writing of a report on the practical training during, for instance, the PBI. It will result in the College offering a four-year education, roughly one year of which will be devoted to the practical, non-academic education, including basic naval training. On completion of this initial education, the midshipmen will obtain the recognized degree of Bachelor of Arts (BA) or Bachelor of Science (BSc), depending on the course: technical sciences, management or military sciences.

It is the FMW's intention to submit a request for accreditation of a three-year scientific Bachelor by the end of 2004. How basic naval training for the aspirant seaman officers will be realized, is still unclear at the moment. What is certain is that the RNLNC will want to hold on to a distribution of basic naval training over the years, as has always been the case. The argument for this position is twofold: on the one hand, it is all about relating theory and practice, on the other, there is the motivational aspect for the student.

Seamanship

In the introduction it was already stated that sailing a ship is an art. Prior to the foundation of the RNLNC in 1829 the midshipmen learned this skill in practice. Nautical expertise was acquired on the job. Until that moment the seaman officers were not trained on training vessels (see Table 1). This changed with the *Urania* in 1834, when nautical training became a permanent factor in the education at the RNLNC. Over the years the officer who had not received basic naval training was phased out from the Royal Netherlands Navy. On 1 August 1872 the last seaman officer to have followed the old fleet training, without any practical sailing training, left the Navy. The Seaman Branch now consisted exclusively of men who had acquired experience on a sailing training vessel during their education. (Alphen, 2000a: 219)

Table 1: Naval Officers trained on a sailing training vessel, 1801-1862

Year	Total number of Naval Officers	Trained on a sailing training vessel	
	No	No	%
1801	334	24	7
1817	286	96	33
1832	323	112	35
1847	339	232	69
1862	359	342	95

Source: Alphen, 2000a: 219.

In the early 20th century nautical training was as follows. The midshipmen admitted to the third year made a two-month sea trip aboard the sailing training vessel *Urania*. The two junior years were allowed to join during the last two weeks of the trip. Part of the third-year sailing programme also took place aboard the instruction vessel *Ever*. Next to a sailing training vessel, the RNLNC had had this decommissioned gunboat, with which the manoeuvring of a mechanically propelled ship could be practised, at its disposal since 1894. After their final exams in April the last-year students subsequently made a longer voyage of three to four months aboard one of the bigger ships, known as the *bootjesreis*. Finally, they received a commission as Ensign First Class. (Dijkers, 1998: 20)

Nautical instructional tools

As mentioned above, the RNLNC momentarily possesses three unique instructional tools to support nautical training: a sailing training vessel, an instruction vessel and a

full mission bridge simulator. They will briefly be discussed below. Subsequently, the present curriculum for the Seaman Branch at the RNLNC, which obviously differs from the other branches, will be described.

A. Sailing training vessels

Thanks to Marc van Alphen's research the use of the sailing training vessels of the Dutch navy is well-documented, as presented in Table 2. (Alphen, 1999a: 1, 4-9; 1999b; 2000a: 215-230; 2000b: 153-174) From 1834 onwards the Royal Netherlands Navy had possessed a sailing training vessel, with an obvious preference for the name *Urania*. However, at the beginning of the 20th century the heads of the College were of the opinion that a mechanically propelled training vessel would be sufficient to give the students nautical training and in 1912 the sailing instruction vessel was scrapped. During their summer leave the midshipmen were given a sloop to sail with. Apart from that, the rowing and sailing club possessed several dinghies. For Sea Time a schooner would occasionally be rented from the pilot service.

The driving force behind the re-commissioning of a sailing training vessel as part of the nautical training was the lecturer of Seamanship and Shipbuilding J.H. Coolhaas. Many from within and outside the College agreed with him that sailing was more character building than using steam ships or motor vessels. It would bring the midshipman in closer contact with the sea and it enabled him to get a good feel for the power of sea and wind, creating an awareness of the dangers. He/she would develop an intuitive



The *Urania* after her refit in the 1950s.
Courtesy of the photo archive of the RNLNC.

Table 2: Sail training vessels used by the Royal Netherlands Navy, 1789-2004

No.	Name	Type	Launched	In use as training vessel
1.	<i>Arend</i>	Brig	1798	1798-1799
2.	<i>Vlieg</i>	Brig	1788	1798-1799
3.	<i>Euridice</i>	Frigate	1802	1803-1805
4.	<i>Zeemeeuw</i>	Brig	1800	1806
5.	<i>Haay</i>	Brig	1800	1807-1809
6.	<i>Irene</i>	Brig	1807	1810-1812
7.	<i>Havik</i>	Brig	1807	1817
8.	<i>Kapitein van Brakel</i>	Schooner	1803	1818-1828
9.	<i>Ever</i>	Cutter	?	1831-1832?
10.	<i>Urania</i>	Corvette	1832	1834-1850, 1857-1867
11.	<i>Zeehond</i>	Brig	1850	1851-1856
12.	<i>Astrea</i>	Corvette	1832	1867-1888
13.	<i>Urania</i>	Corvette	1867	1868-1908
14.	<i>Ternate</i>	Brig	1849	1888-1893
15.	<i>Aruba</i>	Schooner	1873	1894-1907
16.	<i>Argus</i>	Schooner	1882	1905-1907
17.	<i>Urania</i>	Cutter	1873	1910-1911
18.	<i>Astrea</i>	Cutter	1880	1911-1912
19.	<i>Nr. 3</i>	<i>Schokker</i> (pilot ship)	1878	1923-1927
20.	<i>Willemsoord</i>	Schooner	1889	1925-1926
21.	<i>Willemsoord</i>	Schooner	1915	1927
22.	<i>Urania</i>	Yacht	1941	
23.	<i>Urania</i>	Yacht	1928	1938-1939, 1948-2000
24.	<i>Stad Amsterdam</i>	Clipper	1999	2000-present
25.	<i>Urania</i>	Yacht	2004	

Source: Alphen, 2000a: 218

Numbers 3, 8, 12, 14, and 15 never sailed with groups of midshipmen, but only served as moored instruction vessels. Number 10 was renamed *Astrea*, and began a new life as number 12, as a stationary instruction ship. The vessels under numbers 17 up to and including 22 were taken over or borrowed from the pilot service. Number 22 was the *Urania* built in Surabaya. Because of the Japanese invasion this so-called 'Indonesian' *Urania* never sailed with midshipmen. Because number 23 is currently being rebuilt, midshipmen temporarily use number 24. Number 25 will be the rebuilt version of 23.

sense of safety at sea. Moreover, putting him aboard a (small) sailing vessel was supposed to reveal sooner whether a person would be unsuitable for the tough life of a sailor, with regard to such qualities as stamina in physically harsh circumstances and seasickness, and a realization of the necessity of leadership and working with hard and fast procedures. (Bakker, 1978) However tough the circumstances, a ship must be sailed.

There were, however, no funds to even have a small yacht built, let alone a training vessel in full sail. The offer of a retired naval officer B. Nierstrasz to sell his private yacht *Tromp* for f 30,000 guilders, proved to be the solution. The *Tromp* had been built at Haarlem by order of Nierstrasz in 1928 according to a German design. The ship attracted attention for her length of 24 metres, the beautiful shape of the hull, auxiliary engine and the American gaff rig, allowing her to be sailed with a relatively small crew. The navy purchased her in 1937 and the following year she was commissioned as *Urania*, with Coolhaas as her first commander. In May the ship made her first voyage with midshipmen.

Unfortunately, the *Urania* served only briefly as a training vessel. Because of the outbreak of World War II there were no calls at ports abroad. After the capitulation in May 1940 the ship was sent to Germany where she served as a training ship for the Kriegsmarine in Flensburg. In 1946 the *Urania* was discovered demasted at a wharf at Svendborg (Denmark). Only in 1948 was the fully restored yacht re-commissioned as a training vessel for the RNLNC.

Sailing with midshipmen, in races and otherwise, was the main function of the *Urania*. The ship accommodated a crew of seventeen, twelve of whom were trainees. Over the past decades the *Urania* has sailed with thousands of aspirant naval officers, with an average annual mileage of 6,000 nautical miles. The interior as well as the exterior appearance of the ship has undergone drastic changes over time. In the 1950s the Bermuda ketch rig replaced the gaff rigging. Later the cabin, a part of the ship below the waterline, and the deck were replaced.

In 2000 she was declared unfit by labour and shipping inspectors. The bunks, for instance, had become too short, with the increasing height of the midshipmen, and there were no facilities for female crew. Besides, corrosion had thinned the skin. At the end of 2001 it was decided to rebuild the ship. In fact, a new ship, closely modelled on the *Urania*, has been designed and built, that meets all the (inter-)national legal regulations for seagoing vessels. The original capacity of seventeen berths is retained, while the ship can be sailed by a minimum crew of six. In the spring of 2004 the RNLNC will again possess a state-of-the-art sailing training vessel.^{II}

B. Mechanically propelled instruction vessels

After the transition of the sailing ship to the mechanically propelled ship, the sail training vessel was not adequate anymore for practising the skill of manoeuvring a ship. After all, a propelled ship sails and behaves differently from a sailing ship. It was for this reason that in 1894 the former gunboat *Ever* was commissioned at the College. This type of gunboat, nicknamed ‘flat-iron’, was originally armed with a heavy gun and served as defence of the sea inlets. After she had been stripped of her armament, the *Ever* became an instruction vessel and she was used extensively for the *bootjesreizen* on the Zuyderzee. Up to and including 1914 this type of ship was used as training vessel, after which the skills of navigating and manoeuvring were acquired aboard the operational ships, for instance during the *kruisreis*. (Bosscher, 2000: 32)

The relative peace and quiet of your own training vessel usually provides a better climate than the often-hectic activities on the bridge of an operational ship. Nevertheless, it was not until 1964 that the RNLNC would again possess its own training vessels: the ancient *Hobein* and the *Hendrik Karssen*. (Borselen, 2000: 79) The bulk of nautical training over the past twenty-five years has taken place on the *Zeefakkel*. This was no mean thing, as the small ship was notorious for her yawing. With their sympathetic

Table 3: Mechanically Propelled Training Vessels, 1894-2003

No.	Name	Type	Launched	In use as instruction vessel
1.	<i>Ever</i>	Gunboat	1873	1894-1922
2.	<i>Gier</i>	Gunboat	1875	1907-1910
3.	<i>Das</i>	Gunboat	1876	1909-1914
4.	<i>Havik</i>	Gunboat	1874	1910-1914
5.	<i>Hobein</i>	Patrol boat	1948	1964-1972
6.	<i>Hendrik Karssen</i>	Communication vessel	1948	1964-1972
7.	<i>Zeefakkel</i>	Survey vessel	1951	1974-1998
8.	<i>Bulgia</i>	Patrol Boat	1954	1986-1995
9.	<i>L 9520</i>	Attack landing craft	1964	1988-1991
10.	<i>Van Kinsbergen</i>	Instruction vessel	1999	1999-present

Source: *Marine Jaarboekjes*. With thanks to W. Aerts

understanding the small permanent crews of these vessels welcomed the groups of midshipmen, and under their guidance the young people were able to develop their nautical skills. In 1999 the *Zeefakkel* was decommissioned and replaced by the specially-designed 41.5 metre *Van Kinsbergen*. For the first time in its history the RNLNC possessed a purpose-built training vessel, with an instruction room containing four chart tables supplied with every conceivable navigation instrument. (Kok, 2000: 45-49)



The bridge simulator, 2003.

Courtesy of B. Dienaar.

C. The bridge simulator

In the early nineties the curriculum for Bridge Watchkeeping Certificate–A increasingly became a problem, in particular because of a shortage of training opportunities aboard ships. Following the example of many other nautical colleges, the RNLNC introduced the Haverkamp full bridge simulator in 1994, named after nautical expert P. Haverkamp.

The purchase of the bridge simulator was intended to increase the output of the limited time available for seamanship. After all, ships cannot generate ‘on call’ the circumstances necessary for realizing the training objectives. Apart from that, it proved to be impossible to plan more practice hours within the available training time. So an increased output was the answer. Not only the simulator, but also a right mixture of simulation and actual practice has to contribute to the quality of the practical training.

Several characteristics of naval vessels have been developed for the simulator and various virtual ports (e.g. Den Helder) can be generated. For the purpose of assessing student performance, assessment forms have been developed by the staff. Meanwhile, the simulator has become popular with the Royal Navy Tactical School and the Fleet itself, and also foreign navies use it for training purposes. (Extra et al., 2000: 122)

*The present curriculum*¹²

The objective of basic naval training is clear. During PBI the Seaman Branch student has to obtain his Bridge Watchkeeping Certificate–A, which allows him to sail the ship independently and safely under normal circumstances as Officer of the Watch. This excludes such eventualities as heavy weather, manoeuvres at sea and mooring the ship and leaving harbour. But making a harbour approach is a normal circumstance, and in order to do it successfully the student must be familiar with the ship and the elements of wind and water. He also has to be able to be away from home for a long time

and to be the right sort of person to function in a small community aboard a ship. On top of that he has to be able to sail the ship safely.

Table 4 gives an overview of the nautical subjects that are presently incorporated in the curriculum, apart from purely theoretical subjects in navigation and ship hydrodynamics. PBI included, this comes down to the midshipmen of the Seaman Branch spending almost an entire year out of their first four years of education on nautical training, approximately 140 days of which are so-called sea days.

The practical periods of general nautical training comprise a first introduction to the water: rowing and sailing in sloops. Nautical Sciences–1 is in fact the preparation for the *bootjesreis*: a first introduction to sailing proper. In the bridge simulator and aboard the *Van Kinsbergen* the most important basic principles are practised. During class the

Table 4: Survey of Nautical Courses for the Seaman Branch, 2003 (In Hours)

Year	Description	Sailing	Lectures	Bridge simulator	Total
<i>First year</i>					
	Practical period general nautical training–1	8			8
	Nautical sciences–1	32	40	20	92
	<i>Bootjesreis</i> (Initial Sea Time)	200			200
					300
<i>Second year</i>					
	Practical period general nautical training–2	4			4
	Manoeuvring–1	8	30	4	42
	Practical period nautical sciences–2	8	20	8	36
	Passage planning for <i>kruisreis</i>		8	4	12
	<i>Kruisreis</i> (Sea Time)	240			24
					334
<i>Third year</i>					
	Practical period general nautical training–3	4			4
	Practical period nautical sciences–3	28	24	28	80
	Bridge Watch Keeping Certificate–A		40		40
					124
<i>Fourth year</i>					
	Practical Introduction to the Navy (PBI)*	360		4	364
Total		892	162	68	1,122

Source: *Studiegids KIM*, 2002-2003

*The minimum legal requirement is 45 sea days.

preparation for the trips in the *Van Kinsbergen* takes place, e.g. handling the various navigation instruments. On the trips the midshipmen take turns as Officer of the Watch, they apply navigational theory and two 24-hour trips are carried out, one aboard the *Van Kinsbergen* and one aboard the *Urania*.

By tradition the *bootjesreis* takes place at the end of the first year, just before summer leave. Its objective is to introduce the midshipmen to the core activity of the Royal Netherlands Navy, sailing. Besides, the midshipmen have to show they can be away from their homeport for several weeks and possess a knowledge of and insight into relevant work and living conditions aboard. (Oosterhuis, 1996; Duindam, 2001)

The *bootjesreis* usually consists of two parts. The first takes place onboard *Urania*. This relatively small ship was chosen because she exposes the midshipmen to the elements in an intensive way, as the distance from the deck to the waterline is only small. As the *Urania* is currently under reconstruction, a week's sailing period aboard the clipper *Stad Amsterdam*, a replica of a nineteenth century freighter, has been scheduled the past few years. Many consider this ship less suitable as the distance to the water is too great and also because the direct effects of steering and ship behaviour underway are less easy to feel. (Oord, 2000: 24-25; Sprang, 2001: 17-18; Kok, 2002: 7-8) In 2004 the *Urania* will be available once more.

The *bootjesreis* is also a first introduction to the organization. The midshipmen are stationed on one of the operational ships, where they have to fulfil general ship duties, such as administrative tasks.

Nautical training in the second year is dominated by the *kruisreis*. In Manoeuvring-1 the principles of manoeuvring a ship are taught, and the theory is followed by a session in the bridge simulator and a day's manoeuvring aboard the *Van Kinsbergen*. The Practical Nautical Training Period-2 mainly takes place in the bridge simulator and the instruction vessel. In three four-hour sessions sailing in the proximity of a traffic separation zone (the 'highways' of the sea) by day and night, and sailing in narrow channels, is practised in the simulator. One day is used to prepare a trip on the *Van Kinsbergen*. On this eight-hour period of sailing, and a 48 hour-trip a large number of exercises are carried out. In the Passage Planing for Sea Time an assessment is made as to whether the students have all the nautical knowledge and skills from the first two years at hand. This is tested in the bridge simulator and in an exam.

The Sea Time for the midshipman of the Seaman Branch is a monitored sailing period of six weeks aboard a small ship, such as a minehunter or the hydrographic survey ships. He is trained to carry out the duties of the Officer of the Watch, and on top of that he has to learn how to sail and manoeuvre this type of vessel. Afterwards the student is expected to possess the basic practical and social skills to function as a naval officer in an operational unit. Moreover, he is expected to have the routine skills to be safely on

watch on the bridge under normal circumstances. The midshipmen of other branches are stationed on the large ships, where they perform activities related to their particular branch. (Oosterhuis, 1998)

Nautical training in the third year is a preparation for PBI. Now the emphasis lies on the so-called passage planning, during which all sorts of data are collected about the area in which the ship will sail, such as current, shallows and other dangers, sunrise and sunset, etc., and the course is plotted. All this is done in the Practical Nautical Training Period-3. The students are expected to be able to apply the nautical knowledge at the level of Bridge Watchkeeping Certificate-A, which is tested in the bridge simulator and the *Van Kinsbergen*.

During PBI the practical part follows aboard one of the operational ships. In order to be submitted for the Bridge Watchkeeping Certificate-A the student, who by now has the rank of Sub-lieutenant, has to have at least 45 sea days under his belt. When the commander of the ship is of the opinion that the student meets the norm, a four-hour exam in the bridge simulator takes place. When he passes, the VOKIM recommends the Sub-lieutenant for certification by Admiral NL Fleet, which completes his nautical training at the RNLNC. Later, during his operational appointment after the RNLNC, the Bridge Watchkeeping Certificate-B will follow, which qualifies the young officer to sail the ship independently as Officer of the Watch under all circumstances.

Conclusion

Nautical training at the RNLNC is broadly directed at three aspects. First, the midshipmen must get to know the ship and the elements at sea. Secondly, the aspirant officers must be trained to sail the ship safely. Thirdly, they have to be able to function in a small community far from home. Since the foundation of the RNLNC in 1829 the nautical training of midshipmen has held pride of place in the education of the aspirant seaman officer. In this process sail training vessels, instruction vessels and, more recently, a bridge simulator have been indispensable tools.

As long as the kingdom of the Netherlands has a Navy, there will be the necessity to prepare and train future naval officers for this sometimes-hostile environment.

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Notes

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¹ Xenophon, *Anabasis*, book IX, section 24.

² Interview held on 25 April 2002 with Commander W.V.E. Veldhoven, Head of Nautical Training RNLNC, 1999-2002.

³ Bridge Watchkeeping Certificate-B, which certifies the Officer of the Watch has is able to navigate the ship safely under all circumstances, and the tactical deployment of the ship in times of war, are not included in the curriculum of the RNLNC. (Wouters, 1995)

⁴ Unless otherwise stated this section is based on Alphen (1996).

⁵ A recent introduction to some of these lecturers is presented by Mörzer Bruyns (2001).

⁶ The Sea School has gone over into the Higher Nautical School in Amsterdam. Nowadays, the institute forms part of the Hogeschool van Amsterdam as the Amsterdam Maritime Academy. (Acda et al., 1985; <http://www.imt.hva.nl/mo>

⁷ Unless otherwise indicated, this section is derived from Bosscher (2000). For the education of the RNLNC at Medemblik, see: MacLean (1976).

⁸ J.C. Pilaar was a lecturer of nautical science. Professor Heinsbergen taught mathematics and according to Jansen, 'the resigned soul of the badly harmonizing body.' (Honoré Naber, 1925: 54, 55 and 70).

⁹ The present and following paragraphs are based on Borselen (2000: 55-127).

¹⁰ Legislation regulating the scientific education (WWOK, for short) was to give scientific recognition to defence education. In spite of several Bills to that effect, it never came to this.

¹¹ Staff requirement 13.074, re-construction of HMS *Urania*, 6 December 2001.

¹² This section is based on the *Studiegids KIM, 2002-2003* [*Study guide RNLNC, 2002-2003*]. For a more general survey of nautical training at the RNLNC, see: Wouters (1995).

Where duty may lead us

The 'second way' in the Royal Netherlands Army and Royal Netherlands Air Force

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Abstract:

Since its foundation in 1828 the Royal Netherlands Military Academy (RNLMA) has been considered the principal tool for the officer education of the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA) and (later) the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAf). This position is not entirely justified. During almost the entire period of the existence of the military-academic officer education at Breda, there were officers who had not received their education there. The most important motivation for both Services was the shortage of qualified middle management. This situation proved to be more problematical for the RNLA than the RNLAf. From its the start as an independent Service the RNLAf has had a different organization than the RNLA and it has accepted the officers 'from the ranks' more easily.

Introduction

This year the Royal Netherlands Military Academy (RNLMA) celebrates its 175th anniversary. Since 1828 it has educated the bulk of the officers for the RNLA, and since 1939 for the RNLAf. The bulk, for as long as the RNLMA has existed, there have been Army as well as Air Force officers who received their initial education elsewhere. They are known as officers of the 'second way' or 'B-category officers'. They were not, as their counterparts of the RNLMA, educated 'academically' and therefore they had to content themselves with a place in the shadows of the 'Lords of the Castle'.

Their eclipsed position is not entirely justified. They formed an indispensable element in the adequate functioning of both Services, but the institutions that educated them did not receive the appreciation they deserved. Surely, the anniversary of the RNLMA is a good occasion to put the officer education of the 'second way' into the limelight.

What is the 'second way'?

Military schools play an important role in the education of professional soldiers. First of all, a mandatory formal education in the application of legitimate force ensures an identical professional competence for all service personnel. The complexities of the job require some sort of education as a preparation for the future function. Besides, through his education, the soldier distinguishes himself from amateur or illegal users of vio-

lence. Moreover, because of their identical training, soldiers of the same rank are interchangeable. Secondly, military schools foster an esprit de corps, which the armed forces set great store by. Thus, a skillfully organized system of military education provides the foundation of two important conditions for the military professional: a sense of belonging to a group and the conviction that this group has unique qualities.

From 1789 onwards the professionalization of Dutch officers began to expand enormously. Before that time it had been impossible to receive a formal officer education. An officer was expected to learn his job in practice, which posed considerable problems for the artillery and engineers, the arms that were seen at the time as technical-scientific. At the close of the 18th century the officers of these arms possessed too little theoretical knowledge of technical subjects to be able to function adequately. To ensure a certain basic level of theoretical knowledge, the commanding officers of the technical arms decided to introduce officer exams in 1822. These exams generated a demand for formal education, prompting the commanders to establish schools in order to meet it. The traditional arms of the cavalry and infantry quickly followed suit.

This system, however, presented a disadvantage in that the great diversity in education of army officers led to different styles of leadership, dependent on the school they had attended. Needless to say, this did not improve the operational unity of the army as a whole. Consultations with the then monarch King William I, resulted in the establishment of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, which opened its doors in 1828. One of its characteristics was a direct recruitment of aspirant officers, called cadets, from civilian society. Cadets of the technical as well as the traditional arms received a military-scientific education within a boarding school system. As the parents of the cadets had to pay a fee for board and lodging, a study at the RNLMA was only possible for the well-to-do. Through this system the army leadership attempted to professionalize the officer corps by making it homogeneous, highly educated and somewhat aristocratic. As will be shown in the following, the political and military policy makers have never been able to fully attain this objective.

Apart from aspirant officers coming straight from civilian society, following the initial military-academic education, there were also officers with a different background. After all, the army had the possibility to recruit from among the non-officer group. It was possible to offer an officer education to privates, corporals and NCOs with a number of years of experience in the army under their belts. The result was an education and background of officers that was fragmented still, with obvious consequences for the professional skills and esprit de corps.

Options available to the political and military leadership

In retaining officers recruited from the ranks, political and military policymakers had to somehow justify their choice. Basically, they had four options, each with its own implications for the educational level, and they will be described in this section.

In the first place the system could provide the military leadership with the possibility of rewarding outstanding NCOs. The promotion to the rank of lieutenant would come at the end of the NCO's career, and a short course would suffice to give him the necessary know-how to function adequately. The incidental character of this promotion guaranteed a certain level of homogeneity within the officer corps, as the bulk of the officers had gone through the RNLMA.

Next, it could offer the possibility to make use of the expertise that only NCOs possessed. After all, they had practical leadership experience and by giving them functions in the next higher rank, this experience was exploited to the full. In practice, for the NCO this meant a promotion at a relatively advanced age. Acknowledging the practical value of NCOs, however, implied a more structured form of promotion than for reasons of reward. Thus, RNLMA-educated officers operated beside former NCOs in the subaltern officer ranks. The result was a breakdown of the homogeneity in the middle cadre of the armed forces.

Thirdly, the idea of promoting NCOs could be motivated by the need to fill vacancies in the officer ranks. In this situation the officer education from the ranks functioned as a buffer for a recruitment problem of the RNLMA. Dependent on the number of vacancies, NCOs could make the transfer to the officer ranks in relatively large numbers. If the shortage of officers extended to the ranks of field and general officers, former NCOs in the second half of the nineteenth century could, at least in theory, fulfil these functions, too. In such an eventuality extensive education was necessary in order to narrow the gap with the military-academic RNLMA education. In this manner the 'second way' could begin to compete with the RNLMA both in numbers and quality.

Finally, the possibility of reaching an officer rank could play a part in the recruitment of NCOs. A more or less guaranteed promotion to officer gave the NCO a prospect of more prestige, money and easier duties, than he would otherwise have. Thus, keeping open the 'second way' could play a role in recruiting and retaining unmarried volunteers for the army. In this option, too, relatively many NCOs would transfer to the officer corps, necessitating an extensive education in its turn.

The following sections will examine just how the leadership in actual fact justified the retention of the 'second way' of the Royal Netherlands Army and the Royal Netherlands Air Force, and how these decisions affected the educational level.

The 'second way' in the Royal Netherlands Army prior to World War II

The history of the 'second way' in the land forces was closely linked to the personnel demands of the armed forces, and, by extension, the RNLMA. The nineteenth century army leadership had a demand for a highly educated, homogeneous and somewhat aristocratic officer corps and the RNLMA was the institute to provide it. The King and the army leadership, however, realized that they had to offer NCOs an attractive career prospect, as they might be lost for the organization if they got the feeling that their careers bogged down. It was because of this that in 1826, the year in which he approved the establishment of the RNLMA, King William I decided that outstanding NCOs could take an officer exam especially designed for the purpose. To be eligible for it they needed to have a number of years of service under their belts, during which they had demonstrated a certain degree of 'civilization', and an excellent execution of their task.

In doing so, King William I deliberately made the choice to allow different degrees of professionalism within his officer corps, as the NCOs took a different officer exam from the cadets. This immediately begged the question what difference would be desirable and acceptable. In 1835 the King and the army leadership decided that the difference between former cadets and former NCOs should not be too great, taking the officer exam at Breda as the norm.

This created a paradox that would occupy everyone's attention for years to come. If the 'second way' could not meet the RNLMA-norm, the officer corps would consist of officers with different backgrounds and intellectual levels. For many within the military this was clearly undesirable. If, on the other hand, the level of the 'second way' managed to approach, or even equal, that of the RNLMA, a different problem arose. If NCOs proved capable of passing such an exam, they showed they had enough capability to graduate from the RNLMA, which would make two separate educational institutes superfluous. This situation, then, would undermine the justification of an NCO-officer education.

The discussion acquired an extra dimension when the RNLMA became more academic in the 1860s. In 1869 it was formally linked to the civilian Hogere Burger School (h.b.s.), established in 1863. The underlying idea was that the teaching of general subjects could be left to the h.b.s., and the RNLMA could become a purely military vocational education. This, however, created great problems with the recruitment of potential officers, and they were even increased by the simultaneous expansion of the army. As lowering the entry requirements for the RNLMA was out of the question, the military policymakers took to establishing other officer courses. Initially, this led to a system of military education in which almost each individual arm provided its own short officer course. Most of them were only short-lived, except for the Hoofdcursus (Principal Course) at Kampen. Established in 1869, the Hoofdcursus educated aspirant

officers from the ranks of the infantry and the military administration. The military policymakers chose this arm because there was a great shortage of infantry officers (especially in the East Indies). As for the military administration, it was not considered to be academic, which made an expensive RNLMA education unnecessary.

The initial justification of the 'second way', a reward for outstanding NCOs, was pushed somewhat to the background with the emergence of the Hoofdcursus. As it was, its existence created the possibility to attain the rank of officer through a non-academic, and for the students cheap, route. In other words, it began to compete with the RNLMA, in numbers as well as quality. Although there were those within the government, parliament and the armed forces, who saw some advantages in the 'second way', its very existence went straight against the aspiration of creating a military-academic officer corps consisting of a social elite. However, abolishing the Hoofdcursus was out of the question, due to the shortage of officers, and that is why the policymakers decided to increase the level of the education at Kampen. The low student fees ensured a constant supply of candidates. This development continued for decades and led to a flourishing Hoofdcursus, producing almost half of the infantry and all military administration officers just after World War I. However, with regard to the content of the education as well as its organization, the Hoofdcursus had become very similar to the RNLMA in the early decades of 20th century. When in the twenties there was no demand anymore for two initial officer courses, this similarity proved to be fatal for the Hoofdcursus. Budget cuts and a reduction of the number of available places in the officer education allowed a centralization of these courses. Once again government, parliament and the policymakers had an opportunity to realize their ideal officer corps. The budget cuts proved to be the end of the Hoofdcursus and the last officers swore their officer's oath there in 1928.

After World War II

For a long time the 'second way' remained closed. Only after World War II, when the size of the armed forces increased again after many years, was the door set ajar slightly. The post-war government and army leadership faced the difficult task of building up the army from scratch, and once again vacancies in the officer ranks had to be filled by officers who had not had a military-academic education at the RNLMA. The resumption of the officer education from the ranks took place in 1960. From that year onwards it became possible to obtain the certificate of preparatory higher and middle education (vhmo) at the so-called Biesma-h.b.s., aligned to the Air Force Officer and Cadre School, which gave a right of entry to the RNLMA. This situation lasted until 1967, when the Royal Netherlands Army re-established the officer education of the 'second way'. Like a century earlier, the 'second way' had a cold start with a rapid succession of reorganiza-

tions. A lack of funds and clear vision hampered a smooth development. This somewhat amateurish situation ended in 1974 with the establishment of the Education Centre for Officers of Special Duties (OCOSD) at Breda.

There were two differences in the way the existence of the 'second way' was justified, before and after World War II. The main difference between the Hoofdcursus and the OCOSD was the fundamental decision of the army leadership to realize a separate career for officers of the 'second way'. 'Hoofdcursianen' as the students of the Hoofdcursus were called, had, in principle at least, been able to reach the rank of general, and this had occasionally happened, although former cadets would get prevalence in filling these ranks. This possibility did not exist for OCOSD students. The army leadership wanted to preserve the most senior ranks for former cadets, so that OCOSD officers could only reach the rank of major. The policymakers, however, did recognize the qualitative and quantitative potential of these so-called B-category officers. They had followed a new type of civilian education: havo (higher general secondary education). The introduction of the Mammoetwet in 1963 had meant the end for such forms of education as h.b.s. and m.u.l.o. From then on civilian education distinguished vwo (pre-university education, consisting of atheneum, grammar school and lyceum) and general secondary education, consisting of havo and mavo (a higher and middle type, respectively). From the year the Mammoetwet was introduced, pre-university education (vwo) became the entry requirement for the RNLMA, whereas the OCOSD recruited its trainees from among the havo population. This meant a change in the composition of the students of OCOSD as, from now on, young people entered coming straight from civilian society. With regard to the NCOs, it can be said that the military leadership consciously made a conscious effort to exploit their leadership experience. This combination - appreciation of NCOs and a new educational background - constituted the second difference between the OCOSD and the Hoofdcursus.

Apart from these differences, however, there are also striking similarities between the two. In the late 1980s the level of education at the OCOSD began to rise, a development that was brought to a halt by the end of the Cold War. The drastic reorganizations resulting from the fall of the Berlin Wall, changed the Royal Netherlands Army from a large, static, preponderantly conscript army into a small, mobile professional force to be deployed flexibly. In the first instance this led to a blurring of the difference between the A-category officers and B-category officers, which was a positive development in itself. The nature of the new army demanded an increased attention for individual responsibility and development of the military personnel, for which the limited career of the OCOSD officer was ill suited. This was eventually formalized by a change of name from OCOSD to OCO, as, at least in theory, there were no 'special duties' anymore.

As in the post-World War I period, the reorganizations of the 'second way' after the

Cold War proved to be a mixed blessing. Restructuring and downsizing of the armed forces provided the framework of the reorganizations of the officer education, and soon it became clear that there was no room for two officer courses. Thus, the policymakers once more decided to end the officer education with the lesser prestige, funds and preparatory education. Consequently, the OCO was abolished in 1996.

The 'second way' in the Royal Netherlands Air Force

The development of the 'second way' in the RNLAf began at a time when the organization had only just become independent, and it should therefore be understood in that context. The catalyst in the striving for independence from the Royal Navy and Army was World War II, when Dutch airmen operated within the Royal Air Force, flying British planes. Naturally, after the war the Dutch airmen, in considering the organization of the air force, leaned strongly towards the example of the, independent, RAF. After World War II the process of separating the Air Force from the Royal Netherlands Army began. In the early 1950s the Air Force leadership gave three reasons to justify an increased independence and the development of the organization's own identity. First, there was the difference in mentality of the air force compared to the land forces. Air force personnel, from the nature of their task, should possess a very high capacity for improvisation in order to function adequately. This resulted in a greater emphasis on self-discipline, sense of responsibility and team spirit than was usual in the army. Secondly, the air force was first and foremost a technical organization, which implied a need for individual and specialist technical skills, as opposed to the group technical skills of the army. This, in its turn, finally, led to a different structure to the one that was customary in the army. Strong emphasis on self-discipline was needed in order to uphold the necessary military structure.

The desire for more independence and an air force identity of its own, which formally materialized in 1953 when the Netherlands Air Force (NLAf) became the *Royal* Netherlands Air Force (RNLAf), had consequences for the existing organization. The idea found expression in the ambition of the RNLAf to have its own personnel policy, which implied the need for separate selection and training centres for air force officers. In other words, air force officers should be trained in an air force environment. This had not been common practice, hitherto, the majority of air



force officers having been educated at the RNLMA, which in the eyes of the air force cadets was strongly oriented towards the army.

What, then, were the advantages of an education in an air force environment and what was it supposed to be like? A separate educational centre for air force officers had the advantage of a greater efficiency and specific air force matters becoming generally accepted among officers, as Chief of the Air Force Staff Lieutenant-General A. Baretta put it in 1954. He attached great importance to establishing such a centre at or near an air base. It was there that aspirant officers could acquire the air force traditions. Besides, they would be able to profit from various fringe benefits of the air base, such as the presence of civilian air institutions, exercise terrain and glider clubs.

It did not come to a separation from the RNLMA and the establishment of a Royal Air Force Academy (RAFA), although planning for such an institution was well under way in the late 1950s. The RNLA leadership, however, found it very hard to find a suitable location for the RAFA. On top of that there was no room in the budget, nor were there enough qualified lecturers. Instead of establishing the RAFA, the RNLMA was reorganized to accommodate the RNLA's wishes. Thus, it became possible for the RNLA to develop its own identity and traditions within the existing framework.

Above, cursory mention has been made of the fact that not all officers of the Netherlands Air Force (NLA) received their education at the RNLMA. Already from the start, the NLA, too, had its 'second way'. There were several reasons for this. Immediately after World War II the nascent air force had a great need for qualified cadre personnel and facilities to train them. At first the NLA could not provide them, and this is why the first NLA officers of the 'second way' received their education at the Infantry Reserve Officers School (SROI) of the RNLA. This solution was far from satisfactory for either party. The RNLA needed all its attention for the build-up of its own troops and the NLA leadership felt this solution was not in line with the ambition of an air force identity. What was needed was an air force education that would offer aspirant officers the opportunity to acquire the specifics of their Service. The most practical solution would be a school for air force reserve officers.

The new school, the Military Aviation Reserve Officers School (SROML) opened its doors in 1947. In its original set-up this was to be a one-off project in order to provide the air force with executive personnel at short notice. The need for officers, however, was too great to close the school and therefore the Air Force leadership decided to give SROML a more permanent character. Thus, the Air Force Officer and Cadre School (LOKS) was already established on the first of July 1947. Its location was the Klooster Barracks at Breda and it educated NCOs as well as officers until 1948, when, in a comprehensive RNLA reorganization, LOKS was transferred to the Trip van Zoudtlandt Barracks, also at Breda.

LOKS went off to a good start. Under Captain Tjark Biesma, who was to lead the school from 1953 for thirteen years, it grew into a fully-fledged institute of the 'second way'. In 1958 LOKS offered 17 different courses for NCOs and officers. There were officer courses for reserve officers of the air force, the Air Force Women's Detachment (LUVA) and regular officers. These courses were relatively short, as the RNLAf, due to its specialist character, laid an emphasis on the specialist education of its officers. LOKS exclusively offered general officer education and left the specialist training to other air force units. From 1960 onwards, moreover, it became possible for outstanding NCOs to take the h.b.s. state exam at the so-called Biesma-h.b.s, mentioned earlier. On completion of this education they could apply for admission to the officer education.

At the same time LOKS specialized in officer education. In 1960 the RNLAf leadership decided to train its NCOs in a separate institute, the Air Force Cadre School (LKS), which received the designation 'Royal' in 1970 (KKSL). Meanwhile, LOKS tightened the ties with the other officer education centres. Its students' association, Corps Aspirant Reserve Officers (CAROL), maintained close relations with the Air Force Cadets' Association 'De Manche', and there were annual sports exchanges with the schools for reserve officers of the RNLA and OCOSD.

From 1967 until 1975 the 'second way' of the RNLAf went through several reorganizations. First, LOKS was transferred to Gilze-Rijen Air Base in 1967, where there were sufficient training and education facilities. In 1973 it was re-christened Air Traffic Control, Intelligence and Military Training School (VIMOS). One year later a new school, the School for Officers for Special Duties (SOSD), was established. SOSD's objective was to offer candidates with higher vocational education an officer training in their speciality. Although both VIMOS and SOSD did produce a number of officers, they were closed down again even before they were officially opened, to merge into the Air Force Officer School (LUOS) in 1975.

The RNLAf leadership began to structure and further develop the organization and education of LUOS. The institute was meant to acquire a fully-fledged position within the system of military education within the RNLAf. To this end various categories of officers were described more precisely, including their final ranks, and LUOS education was adapted accordingly.

In the 1970s the RNLAf distinguished four officer categories, subdivided into service groups:

- Service Group of Air Force Officers. These officers had been to the RNLMA; their final rank was Lieutenant-Colonel or higher;
- Service Group of Air Force Officers for Special Duties (OSD). These were officers with a higher vocational education certificate. They could come from civilian society as well as be NCOs who had followed a higher vocational education in their

spare time. There was also the possibility for a selected group of NCOs and reserve officers with a havo certificate (higher general secondary education) to follow a modular officer education. The final rank for this category was Major;

- Service Group of Air Force Trade Officers. Officers of this service group came from the NCO ranks. Before being admitted to the officer education they had to serve a minimum of two years as Warrant Officers I. On completion of the course they acquired the rank of Lieutenant, which after four years could result in a promotion to Captain;
- Service Group Air Force Reserve Officers. They were conscripts who received their education at LUOS. Military personnel on a short-term contract, called KVV or, later, BBT, also belonged to this service group. The final rank of this group was usually Lieutenant. KVV or BBT personnel could qualify for a transfer to the BOT (long-term contract) category, which brought them in the Service Group of Air Force Officers for Special Duties.

Like in the RNLA, the policymakers made a clear distinction between officers with and without a military-academic education. Thus, the objectives of LUOS were essentially different from those of the RNLMA. LUOS primarily focussed on the ranks that were needed most in the RNLA, lieutenants and captains. The courses, which varied from several weeks to four years, depending on the category, were strongly practice-oriented. The pupils and students could be distinguished by the different collar and, later, shoulder strap badges. In 1977 LUOS adopted a unit emblem.

Restructuring and downsizing of the armed forces after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 forced the RNLAf to reconsider its personnel policy, which involved a modernization and a simultaneous 15% downsizing of personnel in the period of 1991-1996. The modernization mainly pertained to a more flexible recruitment, education and career of the military personnel. The downsizing of personnel involved in education was realized by centralizing similar tasks as much as possible in one location. First of all, LUOS had to move from Gilze-Rijen Air Base to Woensdrecht Air Base, with a simultaneous integration into the Air Force Education Service. Soon after, KKSL followed suit. The facilities in Gilze-Rijen were not adequate anymore, due to back repairs and the distance between the separate buildings. At the same time there was ample accommodation in Woensdrecht Air Base, as the planned stationing of American nuclear cruise missiles had been called off. The Americans had already built a new infrastructure that could be purchased cheaply. This operation had the added advantage of cost savings, as the merger of KKSL and LUOS allowed lower personnel numbers and a more efficient management. The same arguments were used by the RNLAf leadership in 1991 to move the Air Force Instruction and Military Education School - LIMOS (from

Nijmegen) and the Air Force Electronic and Technical School - LETS (from Arnhem) to Woensdrecht and to merge them with LUOS. This move brought the complete Air Force education together under one roof at Woensdrecht Air Base, with the exception of the RNLMA. As the new institute could hardly be called a pure officer education, it needed a new name: Royal Military Air Force School/Woensdrecht Air Base (KMSL/Vlb Wdt).

The 'second way' of the RNLAf had become a small part of an educational centre that, except for the RNLMA officer education, co-ordinated all initial military training, the pilot's training, career courses and a large number of function courses. For NCOs it was still possible, after the initial NCO courses, to follow a number of courses that would bring the officer rank within reach. Broadly speaking, this structure still exists today.

Conclusion

The 'second way' found its origin in the army and there were two reasons for its existence. In the first place NCOs were to attain a reasonable prospect of promotion during their careers. Secondly, it soon appeared that the norm of the military-academic education at the RNLMA was far from appealing to civilians with a h.b.s. certificate. Promotion of NCOs into the officer ranks proved to be necessary to fill the vacancies there. To educate them, an independent institution was established - the Hoofdcursus. In the course of the years it became increasingly similar to the RNLMA, which eventually was one of the arguments to close it down, leaving the RNLMA as the sole educator of officers. This blocked the way to the officer ranks for NCOs.

The successor to the Hoofdcursus, OCO, was also justified by a shortage of officers. There were, however, two major differences with its predecessor, in that there was a maximum rank attached and the entry requirement was the new havo certificate. The similarity with the Hoofdcursus was that in its drive to attain a higher level of education it became increasingly like the RNLMA, and again the policymakers chose to close the institute down for the 'second way' as soon as the RNLMA could meet the requirements for officers.

The primary justification for the 'second way' in the RNLAf was, as in the RNLA, a shortage of subaltern officers in a rapidly expanding organization. The developments that led to the establishment of LOKS took place within the context of the drive for independence of the NLAf, particularly in relation to the RNLA. The idea was to educate air force officers in an air force environment, and the RNLMA reorganized to make this possible. LOKS, however, had a strong trump card from 1967 onwards: its location on an air base. Officers educated there, and at LUOS, its successor, were indeed educated in an air force environment. The reorganizations that were to affect LUOS after 1989

did not lead to a fundamental discussion about the existence of the 'second way'. It became generally accepted that NCOs had an opportunity to become officers, even to the extent of becoming one of the institutionalized ways of attaining that aim at the KMSL/VLb Woensdrecht.

Thus, the RNLAf accepted different categories within its officer corps more easily than the RNLA. Not all officers had to have a military-academic education under their belts. An explanation for this may be the institutional differences between the two Services. An army officer is usually a troop commander, whereas the air force is of its nature a very technical Service, with a high regard for individualism and self-discipline. In other words, an air force officer is a professional specialist rather than a troop commander. When NCOs could boast a certain experience in a specialist professional area, they could acquire the knowledge and skills required to become officers in a relatively short course.

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Notes

- ¹ I would like to thank the commander of 132 DMLO SQ, lieutenant-colonel P.J.M. van der Heijden, who gave me the opportunity to write this article during my detachment to his squadron. I would also like to thank lieutenant-colonel L.M.M. Baltussen (ret.) for his comments on the draft of this article.

The Indian Military Academy

The Academy that never was (1900-1940)

Wim Klinkert

Abstract

From 1890 onwards the Dutch East Indies were without its own institution for officer education. Officers for the East Indian Army were educated in the Netherlands. For half a century officers of the East Indian Army tried to bring about its restoration with the help of Indo-European and East Indian politicians. The Dutch political and military leadership successfully opposed this ambition, arguing that the Dutch East Indies had too little potential to sustain an officer education of sufficient quality of its own. Besides, the idea of an East Indian Army that was too independent was unwelcome in the Netherlands.

Introduction

In 1911 the Royal Military College, the first military academy in Australia, was established, India followed suit in 1922 (Prince of Wales Royal Indian Military College Dehra Dun) and in 1936 the Philippines got their own officer training institute (Philippine Military Academy).¹ The three countries had in common that they were not independent at the time they received their officer training institute. The Dutch East Indies, the largest colonial state in the area after British India, never had such an institute, although it had its own army and in spite of serious efforts of European expatriates and the indigenous community to establish one. What is the history of ‘the academy that never was’?

The Dutch East Indies had had its own army since 1836. It was a regular army, founded on long-term voluntary contracts, whose principal task it was to uphold internal law and order in the vast archipelago. In this capacity, it generally carried out small-scale guerrilla-type operations until 1910, as the only representation of the Dutch authority from Atjeh to New Guinea in many areas. The Royal Navy was the most obvious defence against external threats, although the army had to take into account the contingency of amphibious landings from an external enemy.

The personnel of the East Indian Army was to a large extent indigenous: Javan, Ambonese, Menadonese (of Celebes), and Timorese. The European soldiers came from various countries until 1900, in particular Germany, but after the turn of the century, only Dutch volunteers were recruited. (Bossenbroek, 1992)

Finding sufficient numbers of personnel was a chronic problem, as the East Indian Army was almost continually in action somewhere, stretched over an extremely vast

area and not enjoying a good reputation.

The officers were educated in the Netherlands. In 1840 the first RNLMA-trained (Koninklijke Militaire Academie – Royal Netherlands Military Academy) lieutenants for the Indian Army left for the East Indies. Other sources for the recruitment of officers were the NCO corps and the so-called courses, amalgamated in 1890 into the two-year Hoofdcursus (Principal Course) at Kampen. They educated Infantry and Military Administration officers for the East Indian Army (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger –KNIL), whose educational backgrounds did not qualify them for the RNLMA. The most famous East Indian Army officer to be educated in this way was J.B. van Heutsz.

In the East Indies itself the choice of officer education was very limited indeed. From 1818-1826 there was an institute in Semarang that educated recruits not only for the Army, but also for the Navy and the Department of Public Works. It produced 63 army officers of all arms and services and the Military Military Administration. Later it became possible to be educated as an officer at the various arms and services schools, such as the Artillery School at Weltevreden, although it must be said that only small numbers and the lower officer ranks were concerned.

The principal education in Java was the Military School at Meester Cornelis - a suburb of Batavia - established in 1852 to produce more lieutenants coming from the NCO ranks. Until 1860 Dutch nationality was not a requirement and approximately 10% of the students were of German descent. During the years it existed, the course duration was changed from two (1860) to three years (1872), and back again to two (1883). It was intended for the Infantry, Artillery, and for a short while also for the Cavalry and the Military Military Administration. The reduction in course duration may be related to the establishment of preparatory education by the arms and services themselves in the 1870s.(Schuitemaker, 1986: 175-179).

In 1890 a new legislative regulation for military education resulted in a concentration of the officer education at two institutes in the Netherlands, viz. the Hoofdcursus at Kampen and the RNLMA at Breda. As a result, the last students were admitted to the officer education at Meester Cornelis in 1893, and two years later the last officer exam in the Dutch East Indies took place, bringing the total of officers educated there up to 1,116. Henceforth, the School only prepared students for the entry exam for the Hoofdcursus at Kampen. As entry to the RNLMA and the Hoofdcursus was restricted to small numbers of students born in the East Indies, the opportunities to build up an officer career from there were very limited indeed. One of the reasons for this was the very scarce h.b.s.-education (public general secondary education) available in the archipelago, which meant that only very few would attain the level to do the entry exam.

In order to keep recruitment up to the mark, however, the 1890 Act made provision

for the establishment of a Cadets' School. From 1893 onwards the 4th and 5th forms of the h.b.s. could be followed in a military boarding school in the Netherlands. After these two years at Alkmaar, these cadets could be admitted to the RNLMA at Breda. Thus, many officers began their East Indian Army career at Alkmaar. The attraction of this option was increased by the absence of an education fee. In fact, until 1933 the training for the East Indian Army was to remain free of charge, whereas the RNLMA education for the Royal Netherlands Army cost at least 400 guilders a year.

Shortly after the transfer of all officer training to the Netherlands, the East Indies began to make a bid for restoring an officer training of its own. It is possible to distinguish three periods when this call was stronger than at other times. The first came around the turn of the century and the other two were related to both World Wars.

Turn of the century

Around 1900 there were great changes in and related to the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese expansion and the arrival of the Americans in the Philippines created a more volatile international security situation. Besides, the British-Japanese defensive alliance allowed the British, traditionally the protectors of the Dutch colony, to concentrate more on Europe, where the German navy had embarked on a large scale expansion programme. So it was not unthinkable that the Netherlands would have to make a greater effort to defend the East Indies than before.

In the archipelago itself, the first decade of the century saw the violent completion of the subjection of all the outlying districts. This coincided with the proclamation of the so-called ethical policy, an attempt to bring education, infrastructure and health care at a higher level in order to enable the indigenous population to profit from the benefits of western civilization. Did this also entail the introduction of conscription? It would certainly end the recruitment problem. But was conscription only to be for European inhabitants or could it also function as a way of involving the indigenous population more in the state on a basis of equality? (Teitler, 1979) For the time being the discussion did not yield any concrete results, as was the case with the idea to merge the East Indian and Royal Netherlands Army officer corps.²

From the turn of the century officers of the East Indian Army showed themselves to be critical in the military press of the decision to transfer the officer training to the Netherlands. They argued – with some justification – that the education at Kampen and Breda was far too Dutch in character, and that the quality of the military teachers with regard to the Indian subjects was not up to the mark. In their view this was caused by the fact that teachers often owed their appointments to the fortunate coincidence of their being on leave in the Netherlands when a vacancy occurred. Besides, the level of

Claas Spat, Malay teacher at the RMA in Breda 1897-1925, he opposed the founding of an Indian Military Academy



Malay acquired in the Netherlands was inadequate, and Javanese was not even on the curriculum there.³

Outside the military the Indische Bond (Indian Alliance), a lobby group of Indo-Europeans, pressured for the restoration of the East Indian officer education. In 1901 they requested the Governor-General to pledge himself to re-establish an officer education in Java. He refused, pointing out that the East Indies could boast neither the experience nor the capacity, and that it would be detrimental to the uniformity of the Dutch officer training. Moreover, he feared there would be too little interest.⁴ As long as the h.b.s.-education was a requirement, the Governor-General was right. In the Netherlands 1,440 h.b.s.-pupils a year passed their final exams, whereas there were only 34 in the East Indies, with only Batavia, Semarang and Soerabaja possessing a h.b.s..

On 4 July 1902 the Indische Krijgskundige Vereniging (Indian Military Society) devoted a conference to the topic. The officers attending concluded that the present road from archipelago to officer rank was too far, in a literal and figurative sense. Few parents were inclined to send their children off to Alkmaar or Breda at a young age to let them study there for years, and the slight opportunities for attending h.b.s. in the East Indies, concentrated in Java at that, did not make things easier. Per year three to six h.b.s.-pupils chose to sit the RNLMA entry exam. In the eyes of the officers, therefore, the problem was more of a practical nature than a principled anti-military attitude. Besides, if there were an education in the East Indies that catered for the specific East Indian circumstances, the pupils would be sure to come. More attention for promotion prospects for NCOs and a limited lowering of the entrance requirements, for instance, three years of h.b.s.-education, would create more interest. In this way an attractive alternative for a career in Internal Administration would be created.

There were also counter arguments: the high cost, the small number of Europeans in the East Indies, the difficulty of finding good teachers - these were reasons enough for the failure of such an experiment, according to the opponents. Claas Spat, the RNLMA lecturer of Malay, was among them. He pointed out that few Indian parents aspired to a military career for their sons, and that the Indian climate, in a literal as well as figurative sense, was unsuitable for studying.⁵

Apart from an education of its own the Indische Bond aimed at a broadening of opportunities in the Netherlands. Indian-born candidates for the RNLMA, and there

was only room for six, could only opt for the Infantry. The authorities in the Netherlands, however, pointed out that the regulations allowed an aspirant officer, once accepted to the RNLMA, to change his arm or service.⁶

The discussion at the turn of the century slowly petered out, except in one respect: the opening of the officer training to the indigenous candidates, whose exclusion was no longer defensible within the framework of the ethical policy. From approximately 1900 onwards there had been constant pressure from Parliament and the media to broaden the opportunities, but, obviously, there were also clear warnings against giving command functions to indigenous officers in the army. After much debate in 1907 the Military School at Meester Cornelis opened its gate for an officer education for candidates of the indigenous nobility. Their contracts were, however, decidedly less attractive than for officers of Dutch descent, as far as pay, retirement and career prospects were concerned. Nevertheless, it was a way for the Dutch government to commit the traditional elite to the colonial rule. Until its demise in 1914 this education produced 13 officers. (Bouwman, 1995: 17-32; 41 ff)

In 1910 the Minister of War installed a State Committee to conduct a thorough investigation of the military education and to propose plans for a more economical and effective organization. Several of its members were officers of the East Indian Army. In 1913 it concluded that the education should remain concentrated in the Netherlands. Officers of the East Indian Army should be acquainted with the Dutch and European circumstances; after all, in case of an emergency, they should also be able to serve in the Dutch armed forces in the Netherlands.⁷ An East Indian education seemed further away than ever, until World War I changed all that.

World War I and after

Just like the mother country the archipelago had to press home its neutrality by use of force of arms between 1914-1918. World War I led to the realization in the East Indies that in case of an emergency the country had to rely on itself. The debate on the introduction of conscription, with or without an indigenous element, and the training of reserve officers flared up again. The larger the armed forces in the East Indies were going to be, the more the demand for officers would grow.⁸ Although in 1917-18 the institution of some form of conscription came very close, the political leadership backed away from it. The whole discussion gave a new lease of life to the question of an East Indian officer training, this time in more advantageous circumstances than around 1900.

Two decades of ethical policy and economic development in the archipelago had led to a greater Indian self-confidence among the (Indo-) European population and nation-

alistic aspirations among the indigenous elite. The institution of an Indian officer training fitted both sentiments perfectly.

Not only had the East Indies had an embryonic parliament (Volksraad – People's Council) since 1918, civil higher education, too, had developed. (Kielstra, 1902) In 1920 a Technical University was established in Bandung (Giebels, 1999: 66), institutes of Legal and Medical Higher Education followed in Batavia in 1924 and 1927, respectively. A committee of professors even advised the establishment of an Indian University.⁹ Since 1915 Bandung had had a h.b.s. and the number of h.b.s.-graduates lay between 35 and 93 per year in the period of 1913-1919, and it was still growing. Would an Indian Military Academy not be the next logical step? The RNLMA and Hoofdcursus were partly funded with Indian money, which, no doubt, could be transferred to the East Indies.

In 1916 at last the possibility arose for indigenous aspirant officers to be educated in the Netherlands, albeit in very modest numbers. A total of 27 indigenous cadets studied at the RNLMA between 1919 and 1939, and five were admitted to the Hoofdcursus between 1916 and 1925. From the perspective of an indigenous elite that was aspiring for a speedy emancipation, these numbers were disappointing.

Whether, in the light of these developments, the establishment of an Indian Military Academy was a logical step, was a matter for debate in military circles as well as in the Volksraad. In 1919 Captain F. Kroon saw a rosy future for a completely Indian education. In his view the old objections of little enthusiasm and lower educational level among the Indian youths did not apply anymore. Besides, he wanted a strictly disciplined military education, which the RNLMA, where after World War I the cadets were given more freedom, simply did not offer. This Indian criticism of the Breda education would not die throughout the interbellum. The regular East Indian Army needed officers who had been trained and educated in a strict and disciplined regime, with a strongly developed sense of *esprit de corps* and with a sound knowledge of the Indian military practice. As for the academic level, Kroon did not wish to make any concessions; a military academy had to build on a 5-year h.b.s.. Small wonder he was upset by stories emanating from the Volksraad and his own colleagues¹⁰, who pleaded for lower entrance requirements in order to recruit enough candidates.¹¹ In the Volksraad Lieutenant-Colonel J.V.L. Oppermann advocated the establishment of an Indian Military Academy (IMA).¹²

Emblem of the Cadettenschool in Alkmaar. From 1893 until 1923 hundreds of boys from the East Indies received their last two years of hbs-education here before entering the RNLMA at Breda



After the idea of conscription for the indigenous population had been rejected, the leadership of the Indian Army and the politicians in the Netherlands had no further intention of seriously considering the establishment of an IMA. Appeals from the Volksraad, by mouth of Colonel H.C. Kerckamp and Under-Lieutenant (ret.) S.J. Aay¹³, were rejected by the Army Commander with the remark that as long as the government was considering a comprehensive review of military education, any discussion on the subject would be pointless. Moreover, funds for such an expensive plan were lacking anyway. In the meeting of 10 July 1922 Aay stated:

It is high time to transfer the education to the East Indies, and to stop wasting our Indian money on keeping alive the all but bankrupt institutes in the Netherlands.

With these words he referred to the downscaling of officer training in the Netherlands after World War I and the heated discussion that arose there in 1921 on how the officer training could be made attractive in times of budget cuts, fewer promotion prospects in the army and a poor reputation of the military profession in general. One of the solutions was an amalgamation of the education of professional and reserve officers. This was an anathema in Indian eyes, as it would strengthen the Dutch character of the education, with its lax discipline and little attention for the tough military practice even more. Its attractiveness for the East Indies would decrease even further if the Dutch officer training should seek refuge in a transformation into an academic institution and doing away with the boarding school system, as was proposed by many RNLMA lecturers in 1921. As it was, the Indian circumstances demanded a training based on the development of discipline, order, military skills, comradeship and knowledge of the archipelago.¹⁴

Again it was Captain Kroon who took the initiative in the discussion. In 1921 he urged that the East Indian interests be taken seriously, and if they could only be served by establishing an IMA, that should be the target.¹⁵ The government proposals for a rigorous restructuring of the military education and in the process do away with the Cadets' School and the Hoofdcursus, two important institutions for the East Indies, all the more called for an Indian contribution to the discussion. Two committees of Indian officers tackled the problem in the final months of 1921, one in The Hague and one in Bandung. Both found that the establishment of an education in the Dutch East Indies should be the objective, although they realized this would be asking too much at short notice. For now, the education for the Indian Army at the RNLMA should get a more recognizably Indian nature. Both the Cadets' School and Meester Cornelis had to prepare candidates for the RNLMA.¹⁶ But these institutes stood under pressure, and in 1923 the Cadets' School disappeared, the Hoofdcursus followed in 1928 and the

Military School at Meester Cornelis in 1929. The only way to become an officer was through the h.b.s. and RNLMA.

In 1921 the Indian Army Commander Dijkstra came up with a remarkable suggestion to reduce the shortage of lieutenants: the establishment of an Indian education for candidates who had three years of h.b.s. or mulo under their belts. When this plan was rejected by the Minister of Colonies, Dijkstra replied:

At one time or other it must come to the establishment of an indigenous militia and although ample use will and must be made of reserve officers, a core of indigenous professional officers will have to be formed, which cannot be supplied by the Netherlands, whereas, moreover, it is only logical that the East Indies offers its sons for this in the first place.

In the same missive Dijkstra pointed out that the level of secondary education in the East Indies had improved and that Java, with its cool mountainous climate, could provide suitable locations for an IMA, in Tjimahi or Bandung, for instance. Finally, he argued that an education in the Netherlands did not automatically lead to a tendency to 'think Dutch'; after all, did not Indian nationalism stay alive among the Indian students at the Dutch universities?¹⁷

In 1922 Dijkstra reviewed his opinion, when he argued that there would be cheaper ways of getting the required number of lieutenants, for instance by educating NCOs to Under-Lieutenants, or by reducing the number of lieutenant posts and by allowing officers of the Netherlands Army, detached to the East Indies, to transfer to the Indian Army.¹⁸

In the East Indies the discussion did not yield any concrete results, although it proved possible to give a more Indian ring to the officer training in the Netherlands. Thus, the RNLMA got an extra application year for engineer officers of the Indian army and an Indian course to enable officers to brush up their knowledge of the archipelago.

In the course of the twenties the ideal of an Indian Academy seemed to fade quickly, in particular as a result of limited financial means and a reduced demand for officers since 1923. Most energy was spent by the Indian officers on proposals for improvement of the Indian education at the RNLMA. Besides, the Indian Army Commander quite emphatically asserted his influence on the curriculum of the Indian education, by commenting on duration and content of the course. As long as the promised legislative reorganization of the military education had not been put into effect, there might still be some hope for an IMA. The crucial debate took place on 30 August and 3 September 1929 in the Volksraad. The proposal submitted by the government left little room for doubt: it was cheaper and more efficient to concentrate the education at Breda. Thus, all officers serving the Crown of Orange would get to know each other well, and be

acquainted with the Dutch circumstances, in which Indian officers should also be deployable. Besides, the Dutch government claimed, there was too little enthusiasm in the East Indies to justify an education there. There was little opposition against this view; only Volksraad member R.P. Soeroso devoted his speaking time to a plea for an Indian officer education, which in his opinion would enhance recruitment for the army. For him an IMA was an instrument in the emancipation of the indigenous population. The Volksraad agreed to the proposal of the government, but the process in The Hague was never fully completed. This, incidentally, did not change the actual situation: the only officer training was and remained at Breda.

During the thirties Soeroso and Soetardjo were the only members of the Volksraad to consistently plead for more indigenous cadets at the RNLMA as well as an Indian officer education in Java. The only political support they got from the Dutch parliament came from the communist MP R. Effendi. From 1935, however, the growing international tension caused positions to shift in India as well as in Breda.

Towards World War II

From the mid-thirties there had been appeals from the East Indies for the appointment of a Head of Indian education at the RNLMA, to guard the interests of the Indian Army cadets. The intention was to form these cadets into a unit and to aim at a curriculum that would be as Indian as possible. After several years of struggle this approach proved to be a good alternative for an IMA, made even more viable by increasing numbers of cadets and growing financial means. In fact, from 1939 Breda offered its own Indian course. But also in the East Indies change was rapid.

In September 1936 a reserve officer education for the KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indian Army – the official name since 1933) was established in Bandung, called CORO (Corps Opleiding Reserve Officiëren – Reserve Officer Training Corps) since 1938. Initially, only the Infantry was educated here, but in 1938 the Military Administration and in 1940 the Artillery followed suit. The education, however, was exclusively intended for conscripts with a h.b.s. background, so indigenous candidates did not qualify. In July 1938 Soetardjo used the heightened interest and greater financial leeway for the armed forces to table a motion in the Volksraad:

Considering the fact that the question of the defence of this country in relation to the international political situation has increasingly shifted to the centre of the attention of the community, presses upon the government to establish an education for officers in the army in this country.

The motion triggered off a debate in which the indigenous members emphasized the participation of their community in the defence of the Dutch East Indies. Opponents of an Indian officer education pointed out the larger numbers now admitted at Breda and stressed the *Rijksverband* (Cohesion of the Realm). *Volksraad* member Sol was of the opinion that all officers should taste the joys of a cadet's life at Breda and that they should be educated in the idea of the *Rijkseenheid* (Unity of the Realm). He did not want to go beyond a reserve officer education in the East Indies. Other Dutch members dug up the old arguments of high cost and little enthusiasm. The one exception was Van Helsdingen who rejected the imperial idea and who thought that it would be consistent with the political development that the East Indies educate their own KNIL-officers.

KNIL commander M. Boerstra strongly advised against the motion. Apart from the traditional arguments, he declared that from a psychological perspective the government attached great value to the education being situated in the Netherlands. Besides, the aspirant officers would gain a broader view of the world from their Dutch experience. On top of that, an education of such high technical level simply could not be realized in the East Indies. He was also strongly opposed to a restoration of the education at Meester Cornelis.

Soeroso could not understand why the East Indies could have civil Higher Education, but not military. He refused to see why the feeling of *Rijksverband* depended on the location where one was educated. He argued that precisely from an Indian education great propaganda value for the army could be expected and he elaborated with a plea for the development of the young people of the East Indies and the armed strength of the indigenous population. Remarkably, the Indian argumentation triumphed in the end. The motion was carried with 26 to 25 votes. It was a symbolic victory, without any political consequence.



Banner of the RNLMA at Bandung, Java, 1940-1942. The year 1828 and the St. Andrew's crosses refer to the RNLMA at Breda.

In 1940 the situation changed drastically as a consequence of the German occupation of the Netherlands. CORO was opened up for non-Europeans and the RNLMA was re-established in Bandung in 1941, with a relatively great proportion of indigenous and Chinese cadets. The East Indies finally had its own officer education, until the Japanese invasion in March 1942 abruptly put an end to it.

Conclusion

There has never been an Indian Military Academy. The political as well as the military leadership in The Hague continually argued that such an institution would be too costly and that the basis for sufficient quality and quantity of students and lecturers was too slight in the Dutch East Indies. These were rational arguments, but apparently there was also an emotional boundary, in spite of ethical policy and emancipation. Giving the KNIL its own education and handing officer functions to the indigenous population was a development that, in the eyes of the Dutch government, threatened rather than enhanced the Rijkseenheid. An administrative and intellectual Indo-European and indigenous elite was allowed to emerge, be it slowly and under close scrutiny, but a military elite clearly was a bridge too far; was it too dangerous for the maintenance of Dutch authority? A question all the more tantalizing if this situation is compared to that of the Indian Army in British India.

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Notes

- ¹ British India had had its own *Army Staff College* in Deolali (near Bombay) since 1905. In 1907 it was re-located to Quetta (Baloetsjistan). In Begaum there was a *Senior Officers School*. The possibility to establish a staff school at Batavia was investigated in 1874. Nationaal Archief Den Haag (NA), Archief Generale Staf inv. Nr. 39.
- ² *De Indische Gids* (1988), pp. 779-822; (1900), pp. 300-315, 597-623, and 1507-1514 and (1901), pp. 151-181.
- ³ *Indisch Militair Tijdschrift* (1898), pp. 150-155 and 593-618 and (1901), pp. 476-484 and *Indische Gids* (1898), p. 413.
- ⁴ *Militair Weekblad* 12 September 1901.
- ⁵ *Orgaan van de Indische Krijgskundige Vereeniging* (1902-1903), pp. 3-75 and *Orgaan van de Vereeniging ter Beoefening van de krijgswetenschap* (1904-1905), pp. 89-185.
- ⁶ NA, Archief Ministerie van Oorlog, inv. Nr. 4146.
- ⁷ *Verslag van de Staatscommissie voor de reorganisatie van het militair onderwijs*, Den Haag (1913), pp. 65-66 and 166.
- ⁸ *De Indische Gids* (1917), pp. 606-614.
- ⁹ *Preanger Bode* 6 and 7 July 1921.
- ¹⁰ Amongst others Lieutenant-General Van Rietschoten and Lieutenant-Colonel Swaab
- ¹¹ *Orgaan van de Indische Krijgskundige Vereeniging* 1919 and 1920.
- ¹² *Handelingen* 13 December 1920, p.593.
- ¹³ Trained at the pupils school at Nieuwersluis, left for the Dutch East Indies in 1894 and founder of the NCO association *Ons Aller Belang*.
- ¹⁴ *Preanger Bode* 7 and 8 January and 13 July 1921.
- ¹⁵ *Orgaan Nederlandsch-Indische Officiersvereniging* 1921, pp. 675-685.
- ¹⁶ *Orgaan Nederlandsch-Indische Officiersvereniging* 1924, pp. 164-166, 197-198, 264-266, 312-317 and 348.
- ¹⁷ Dijkstra to the Governor-General 8 November 1921, NA, Archief Indische Mailrapporten iv. Nr. 2440.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.* 23 May 1922.

Dutch dilemmas.

Officer education at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy (1828-2003)

Petra Groen & Wim Klinkert^I

Abstract

The Royal Netherlands Military Academy began its life as an institution of secondary education. In the course of its 175-year history two clear landmarks stand out: in 1890 the Academy became a military vocational school for pupils with a h.b.s.-education and in 1960 the choice for an academic education was made. The year 2003 may prove to be yet another landmark with the introduction of the Bachelor education. Should officers be educated to be generalists or specialists; how should the academic education relate to a practical military training; how should the values and norms of the officer profession be inculcated in the cadets? These are questions which formed a constant throughout the Academy's entire history. There have been marked changes in recruitment as a result of a democratization and an almost exclusive origin from protestant civil servant/military families has shifted to a much more diverse background of aspirant officers.

Introduction.

By the joining together of the northern and southern Netherlands in 1815 a new state arose in north-western Europe, the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It had been the wish of the Vienna Congress to create a strong buffer north of France in order to contain any possible future French expansion. The fledgling kingdom built a new army and an officer corps to go with it and in doing so it took a significant step forward in this field. King William I did not want the various corps to recruit and educate their own officers any longer, and he entrusted a central state institution with it, the Royal Netherlands Military Academy (KMA), situated in the Castle of Breda. It was here that the aspirant officers of all arms and services of the army went through the same education. In this manner the monarch wanted to create a homogeneous officer corps for the army of his new state. The pillars of the new institute were the transfer of knowledge and 'military education' in the values and norms of the traditional officer class and the new officer profession.

Surveying the 175 years of RNLMA history, it can be said that transfer of knowledge and military education have remained the alpha and omega throughout. But this seeming continuity conceals changes as well as recurring problems. What the content of the required knowledge and education was to be, how it should be realized and in what man-

Cadets leave the Academy in formation, November 1938.

Holding the banner is D. de Iongh, president of the Senate. The banner detail is commanded by W.H.J.E. van Daalen, on the right, armed with klewang. Both De Iongh and Van Daalen were cadets of the East Indian Army.



ner both pillars should relate to each other, changed over the years. The experiences gained at the RNLMA itself had an effect on this process of change, as well as the views and wishes of the military organizations for which the RNLMA functioned as main supplier: the Royal Netherlands Army (KL), the Royal Netherlands East-Indian Army (KNIL) from 1836 until World War II, and later the Royal Netherlands Air Force (KLu). The Dutch society, too, of which the armed forces were a part, and, still further afield, the military developments in Europe and south-east Asia had their impact on the education. An important watershed was the 1890 Act on military education, when the RNLMA became a military vocational school, building on the h.b.s.-education. Another was the choice for academic education in 1960. Possibly 2003 may prove to be yet another with the new legal tie-up with civil higher education.

The questions that have continued to be topical in spite of these watersheds, are:

- to what extent can or must the RNLMA provide academic education?
- should the RNLMA produce generalists or specialists?
- how can the military as well as the theoretical/academic education be given enough substance, in view of the limited time available?
- how should the military education of the aspirant officer be realized?

The answer to this last question does not only relate to the officer ideal envisaged by the RNLMA leadership, but also to the backgrounds of the aspirant officers, the cadets. The present contribution will therefore be concluded with a brief analysis of the changes in recruitment numbers in a geographical, religious and social respect during the past 175 years.

Academic education

A constant factor in the history of the RNLMA has been the concern for the level of the theoretical education. Initially, the RNLMA was a military secondary school, linked to a theoretical, or, according to 19th century norms, 'scientific' vocational education, that was supposed to give the officer enough intellectual substance to carry him through the rest of career with the help of a certain quantity of self-study. The Secondary Education Act of 1863, which meant the birth of the h.b.s.², led to drastic changes, for it allowed the RNLMA to specialize into a military school, building on knowledge the students had acquired at secondary school. It was hoped by the leadership of the army that the somewhat higher age of the students would have the added advantage of the sharpest edges of the hazing – a big problem for decades – being taken away. After a failed experiment between 1869-1879, it was finally realized in the Act on Military Education of 1890, the first landmark, or watershed, in this phase of the RNLMA history. From that year onwards the RNLMA was a military vocational school at a post-h.b.s. level. With regard to the entry requirements the RNLMA followed the Dutch High Schools, but it was not included in the Higher Education Acts that later laid down the scientific status of the Technical High School at Delft (1905), the High School of Commerce in Rotterdam (1913) or Wageningen Agricultural High School (1918).

Some progressive officers were of the opinion that the RNLMA should transform itself into a Military High School. Professor W. Storm van Leeuwen, a former officer, launched this idea in 1910 and the prominent liberal officer J.T.T.C. van Dam van Isselt elaborated it. Their argument was that the reputation – and therefore recruitment potential - of the officer profession would decline, if no academic status was attached to it. For h.b.s. students the RNLMA would become increasingly less appealing, with the High Schools competing for them.

This argument carried some weight with the Minister of War W. Cool. Together with the continuous criticism of the high costs of the RNLMA and the difficulty of recruiting sufficient cadets with the required level of education, this was enough reason for him to appoint a State Committee to see into the matter. In 1913, after three years, the committee gave the advice to raise the content of the study to such an academic level that civil recognition would become possible, however without affecting the military aspect of the education. The RNLMA was to retain a boarding school system and the first year should have a strong orientation towards military practice. The committee supported the argument that a higher level of education would enhance the reputation of the profession and recruitment potential. However, World War I threw a spanner in the works and the advice was not implemented.

After World War I virtually the entire educational staff of the RNLMA backed the High School idea under the influence of the developments that had manifested

themselves during the war. Apart from the earlier arguments they also pointed at the position of the professional officer who should be able to hold his own in an environment of academically educated reserve officers, emancipated conscripts and the rapidly increasing technical complexity of warfare. The lecturers, military as well as civil, joined forces in the so-called Breda Committee, in order to realize the transformation into a Military High School, this time even without the boarding school system. The endeavour failed because of the military establishment. It is true, the Commandant, the inspector of Military Education, the Indian Army commander, and the Minister of War did want education at an academic level, but only if it was not too theoretical and insofar as it was necessary for the further education of the officer. Their main objection concerned the proposed abolishment of the boarding school system, which in their view did not have a deforming influence, but a uniquely forming one. It was military spirit and not academic capacities that in the end constituted the quality of an officer. That higher education would enhance recruitment was deemed a hypothesis as yet unproven. Contrary to the situation of around 1910, when recruitment had been the main problem, it was the funding of the education that caused the most worries in the twenties. Because of this the theoretical education was even shortened for the majority of the cadets by a year in 1924, by 'contracting out' the first year to the Schools for Reserve Officers. The rear-guard action fought by Engineer Officer C.P. Brest van Kempen in 1926 was doomed to fail therefore. In his book *Onderwijs en opvoeding aan de KMA (Education and upbringing at the RNLMA)* he presented an inspired re-iteration of the arguments since Storm van Leeuwen for the scientification of the education, without the military straightjacket of the boarding school system. But the announced review of the 1890 Act did not come. The RNLMA was and remained a military vocational school, as stipulated in the Act, with a theoretical education at an academic level insofar as this was necessary for the remainder of the officer's career. Because of this, the RNLMA missed out on the rapid developments in the civil academic and higher education. A fossilization in Breda was the result. Especially in the technical subjects these arrears could never be made good anymore.

The situation did not change immediately after World War II, in spite of ambitious plans of the leadership of the armed forces, who wanted to realize a tie-up between the RNLMA and higher education, taking the newly established Nederlands Opleidingsinstituut voor het Internationale Bedrijfsleven (Netherlands International Business School) Nyenrode as an example. However, the time, financial and personnel resources were lacking to make the break with the past. Only in the late fifties was the course changed, when a choice was made for a legally established academic education of the aspirant officer, albeit within the familiar boarding school system. The arguments were also familiar: on the recruitment market the competition with the universities had

to be improved, the social status and the position of the regular officer with respect to reserve officers and his task as a leader and educator of conscripts required an academic education, and then there were the military-technological developments. That it proved possible to set out a new course in 1960 on the basis of arguments that had discredited the educational staff in 1921, had everything to do with the big recruitment problems for the RNLMA in the post-war reconstruction years, the comparatively easy financial situation of the armed forces, the absence of the practice-minded obstructionists in the Dutch East Indies, and of course the less extreme nature of the proposals of 1958-1960, which left the boarding school system intact. In essence these plans did not go beyond the proposals of the State Committee of 1913.

The academic education that began in 1960, the second landmark in this respect, also marked the beginning of a thirty-year struggle for legal recognition of the academic character of the RNLMA education. This struggle for the Academic Military Education Act (WWOK) was a very protracted one and eventually it was lost. The reasons for this primarily lie in the infighting between the RNLMA and the Royal Netherlands Naval College (KIM), their hierarchical and organizational embedding within the armed forces, and the doubts outside the military about the academic level of both institutes. Already in the early sixties RNLMA and RNLNC were hard put to present a common proposal for the WWOK, which was a clear indication of the difference of opinion on the character of the education – higher vocational or academic education. The pursuit of a separate legal regulation for the officer education met with parliamentary opposition in 1963 and 1987. An incorporation of RNLMA and RNLNC in the Higher Education Act, as Parliament suggested in 1963, was out of the question for the leadership of the armed forces, as this would jeopardize the control over ‘their’ officer education, and on



Cadet studying, 1950s.

top of that would let in the 'spectre of democratization'. Moreover, in 1963 and 1987 Parliament (preponderantly the left parties) had reservations about the academic character of the RNLMA and RNLNC, a doubt that was shared by an important governmental advisory body, the Academic Council, and incidentally also by the educational staff of the RNLMA. Another advisory body, the Educational Council, even stated in 1985 that an officer education and an academic education were in principle mutually exclusive. Given this situation, the Secretary of Defence faced a tough choice in 1990. He either would have to change the organizational structure and embedding of the officer education in such a way that the Commanders in Chief would lose some of their grip and that outsiders would assess the academic quality – at the worst possible moment -, or he would have to withdraw the Bill. He chose the latter option, also because of the pressure exerted by his social-democrat colleague on Education.

With the struggle for the WWOK lost, the aspiration for a basic education that had civil recognition of the officer corps did not wane. Considerations of recruitment and an increasing complexity of the armed forces, along with a national and international environment in which officers would have to be able to function, kept the flame going. Incidentally, in spite of the erratic academic status of the RNLMA, its recruitment potential among pre-university students did not decrease in the nineties. This may have been caused by the solution the RNLMA sought, and found, to shore up its academic ambition. Although legally an academic status had been withheld, it managed to conclude formal contracts of cooperation with institutions of higher education. This enabled the RNLMA to contract out part of its (technical) education or offer its graduate officers the prospect of an academic continuation course. This strategy may yield special rewards at a time when national higher education has been in a process of reform since 1999, leading up to the introduction of the Anglo-Saxon Bachelor-Master educational model, while in 2001 the quality of the theoretical part of the RNLMA education was assessed as academic by an unsuspected outsider, the Vereniging van Samenwerkende Nederlandse Universiteiten (Association of Cooperating Dutch Universities). If this institution gives the same predicate on its next visitation, an accreditation of the RNLMA as an academic Bachelor education becomes a real possibility. It would be the third landmark, after the fundamental change of 1960, in the pursuit of establishing the tie with civil education, and in doing so fulfil a century-old ambition.

Generalist or specialist

There was no discussion in the first decades of its existence about the theoretical part of the RNLMA education. When the Academy opened its gates in 1828 it was the express intention to offer all cadets one and the same general theoretical curriculum, with a view

Handling technology is important in
any officer training.
In the 1950s the Signal Corps was one of the
pioneers in using modern radio equipment.
Here, cadets are training in the field,
approx. 1955.



to the homogeneity of the officer corps. It was crammed with mathematics to guarantee an adequate education for the technical arms and services. Still, it became necessary to introduce an extra year for the Engineers, whereas in practice the mathematics course for Infantry and Cavalry was simplified to avoid too much drop-out.

After 1890, when the RNLMA became a military vocational school, this general theoretical education was replaced by a somewhat differentiated curriculum, geared to the different requirements of the various arms and services. Broadly speaking, there was a technical study for the Engineers – although as early as in 1910 it had been considered whether this education had not better be contracted out to the Technical University at Delft -, and a curriculum with a minimum of mathematics and science for the infantry and Cavalry, with the course for the Artillery taking up a middle position. In 1930 an administrative-economic course was added for the cadets of the military Military Administration, the first service at the RNLMA. Apart from that, in spite of opposition, the number of theoretical subjects especially intended for the East Indian professional practice grew. At the same time World War I caused the introduction of new subjects in the general theoretical part of the education during the interbellum period, such as (military) sociology, intended to prepare the future officer better for his task as leader and educator.

The same themes played an important role after World War II in the debates on the reform of the education. 'Military leadership' became the general theme of the education that started in 1960. As far as the academic education was concerned this was a departure from the arm-or service-specific theoretical curriculum. Instead, there came three disciplines: an administrative-economic, a technical, and a social-economic variant, although for the cadets destined for the technical functions the freedom of choice was very limited indeed. What was striking, too, was the absence of a discipline directed at the military core business: operations. As a result of the criticism of the too theoretical character of the education, the high costs, the striving for legal recognition of the academic part of the education and the positive experiences with the subject of management, that was also making its way into the academic world, a new academic educa-

tion was designed in 1974. 'Military management' was to be its binding factor. A multi-disciplinary basic education in military management for all cadets, and a full integration of the academic and military elements were the objectives, the 'educational model 1985', the result. The three old disciplines were replaced by three new ones: technology, operations and economics, but the old faculty departments still remained intact. In spite of all the generalist intentions, there still remained three specialist studies under the flag of military management due to obstruction by the departments and the ambition to meet the WWOK-requirements. It even proved impossible to set up a common first-year course. The integration of the military and academic elements of the study, hard enough in theory, also failed in practice.

This result after years of discussions, together with the lost struggle for the WWOK, made the Minister of Defence and the armed forces chiefs decide on a fundamental change of the education. The military management study that was introduced in 1992 formed a rigorous break with the past in many respects. The first phase of the education, KMA-I, had a much more generalist character. For almost two years the cadets followed a common education, with a strong emphasis on management. The bulk of their specialist academic education, KMA-II, the cadets would get as lieutenants, so after their first posting, and certainly with regard to the technical disciplines this would take place outside the RNLMA. For what had once been the RNLMA's pride - its own technical education - the end was really near. In order to enhance the ideal of integration, the old departments were replaced by new ones and incorporated into one faculty: the Faculty of Military Management Studies (1992).

The 1992 model was not given a long lease of life. The separation between KMA-I and KMA-II caused practical problems and the changing personnel policies made it necessary that the education also accommodate the new, short-term, officer category. Finally, the prospect of Bachelor status for the RNLMA had its impact, just as previously the struggle for the WWOK had determined the arrangement of the education. The long generalist basic education has in the meantime been reduced to a seven-month preliminary course for the long-term cadets – not jointly anymore with the short-term cadets –, followed by a specialist academic Bachelor education. There is still no certainty yet about the epithet to be given to this education. Possibly the line is followed that has become popular in the world of officer (continuation) education. If so, in the future the RNLMA will be part of a broad defence Faculty of Military Sciences, incorporating three disciplines: management and administration, technology and military science. The presence of the latter in this set-up would mean the emancipation of a discipline that could not develop itself in the peace organization between 1960 and 1990, and a loss of territory for (military) management, which flourished in a climate oriented towards internal management processes.

Military education

Another recurrent theme in the history of the RNLMA is the debate on the relation between the academic and the military education and the link with the first military function. When it was first established, the RNLMA was expressly intended as a theoretical education, albeit in support of military practice. However, the RNLMA-educated officer had no idea about practice until 1890. The summer exercises he took part in did not prevent him from starting his first function rather awkwardly, as the continuous complaint was.

In the period 1890-1918 this problem was tackled by detaching the cadets to the units, while the first year on a function was seen as a training-period. This was, however, an 'expensive' solution, and it disappeared after 1918. A cheaper solution, that was introduced in 1924, was to give the first year-students their military training at the Schools for Reserve Officers, although this did have some repercussions on the theoretical education. But these solutions were enough to silence the complaints about the education of the RNLMA officer in the Netherlands being too theoretical and not practical enough. This was different in the colonies. The detachment to the Dutch units and the Schools for Reserve Officers did not link up with military practice in the East Indies, for which almost half of the cadets were destined after 1890. The establishment of an officer education on East-Indian soil would be a solution, but it was out of the question in the Netherlands for colonial-political reasons and it was also a bridge too far for the East-Indian Army commander. The alternative was an education geared at the Indian military practice at the RNLMA, which was realized in 1939, due to the continuous pressure of the Indian lobby.

After World War II, initially, and particularly in the 1950s, the emphasis lay on the training as platoon commander. With the introduction of the academic education in

Military training of Artillery cadets at
Oldebroek, 1958.



1960 the old complaint resurfaced: the military training fell short of the mark and did not link up with the first function. The 1960 model envisaged an intermitting military training after the initial general military training of a few months in the three (or four) following years. As a result of these complaints an 'improved' model was already introduced in 1965, in which the intermitting training was replaced by a specialist function training during the last year. This, however, did not really mend the situation. The military training remained inadequate for military practice, while the lieutenant was academically too highly educated for his first function, which resulted in demotivation. Besides, study drop-out was high among cadets who were more interested in things military than academic, and who, after their basic military training had to wait until their fourth year for the follow-up of their military training. After a parade of project groups had looked into the matter, the 1985 model in essence returned to the intermitting training of the 1960 model, while on top of that the military training was to be integrated more into the academic curriculum than in 1960. The latter proved an impossible mission, with the possible exception of leadership training. The former, as in the period 1960-1965, did not take away the complaints. Once more, the 1992 model was a choice for a function-oriented training in the last year. Again, it did not link up seamlessly with the first function, and in addition there were new complaints about the character of the education being too generalist, which was certainly inadequate with respect to technical subjects and did not prepare sufficiently for the new reality of missions abroad. For the time being, however, the BaMa-model that is still being developed, provides a function-oriented training as a conclusion to the bachelor education after an initial seven-month general military training.

For the practical training a solution for the problems brought along by the 'scientification' of the education at the RNLMA in 1960 proved difficult to find. Since then, each time essentially a choice has been made for an intermitting or continuous function-oriented training after the initial basic military training. After all, the margins for solution are very narrow indeed. There is a limit to the duration and the costs of the education and therefore a choice for a substantial theoretical education will have consequences for the military training. There are other solutions, such as the German officer education, where the aspirant officer first gets his entire military training, followed by a monitored detachment, after which he starts his theoretical education. Another possibility would be to consider his first year on function as a training year, as is done in other professions with a problematical link between education and professional practice, by offering practical training periods. Such solutions, however, have a serious disadvantage: they increase the duration of the education and consequently the costs.

Character development

An essential part of the officer education is the instilling of (military) values and norms and a feeling of *esprit de corps*, essential elements in the process of professionalization. In the 19th century the emphasis lay on military values such as discipline, obedience, self-sacrifice, courage and fidelity. The civil values and norms, those of a *gentleman*, were self-evident, as the large majority of cadets came from the higher social circles of the population and, as officers, would remain there.

The 20th century, especially after World War II, would bring considerable changes. The democratization of recruitment, the socialization of all level of the military and the more civil character of the education caused the emphasis to shift away from the traditional military values and norms – they certainly did not disappear – and made it necessary to instill any values and norms the cadets may have lacked originally.

There were and are two instruments at the RNLMA for enhancing *esprit de corps*, camaraderie and cohesion as well as character development: the boarding school system and the Cadets' Corps. The former was the official tool of old and it found justification in disciplining, fostering professional norms and the development of the *esprit de corps*; the latter evolved in the course of the 20th century from a social club into an integral part of the education and character development.

The boarding school system, the initially undisputed and principal instrument for the character development of the officer, has been the butt of criticism since the end of the 19th century. Progressive officers such as Van Dam van Isselt opposed it, claiming it would foster the formation of an officer class detached from civil society. Proponents of a better study climate, such as Storm van Leeuwen and Brest van Kempen criticized it for its supposed crippling of independence and sense of responsibility. For them it was an impediment to the ambition of a truly free academic education. Theirs was a minority voice. The military establishment kept supporting the boarding school system, as it was supposed to enhance recruitment potential – it lowered the expenses and anxieties of the (East-Indian) parents – and because it saw it as the ideal environment for disciplining and developing the *esprit de corps*. The Indian lobby in particular was a strong pressure group in favour of the system.

After World War II the boarding school system returned. The fundamental change set in only after two decades. After the failure to establish a campus in 1947, the scientific drive of 1960 caused the first cracks in the traditional boarding school bulwark. For recruitment and study reasons the objective in 1960 was to give the senior students more freedom, - the fourth-year 'students in uniform' should be able to live completely on their own – and to allow them to have their own digs. It was to some extent a recognition of Storm van Leeuwen and Brest van Kempen's criticism. The original idea of a gradual increase of freedom per study year eroded in the seventies and

after. On the one hand, the Academy leadership felt a hesitation to give the cadets true freedom as this would undermine discipline and make it impossible to attain educational objectives. On the other, it became increasingly harder to maintain the more trivial regulations, especially when the spirit of the societal changes began to penetrate the Academy. Von Meijenfeldt was the first Commandant (1976-1980) who dared to make a more radical choice in favour of freedom, but it went so far that it had to be revoked. Nevertheless, the trend had been set. The use of the term 'open boarding school system' in the eighties was in fact an admission that the traditional system had outlived its purpose and that the boarding school system had in fact become a 'student barracks'. Only for the first-year students, who still lived in dormitories at the Castle, was the traditional situation maintained. Now, in 2003, accommodation in the Castle is limited to the first few months of the education only.

After 1995 it was more a matter of 'providing accommodation' than a boarding school system. The large numbers of cadets, spread out over several locations, with considerable variations in age, keen on the fulfilment of their individual needs and financially so well off that living elsewhere was a perfectly realistic option, made the boarding school system a thing of the past. This, however, does not mean that ideals such as the attainment of an esprit de corps and the instilling of norms and values disappeared in the process. They have, at least in part, become more emphatic elements of the task of the Cadets' Corps.

The Cadets' Corps began in 1879 as an association in the Grote Markt at Breda. In the 1860s a number of hazing scandals had caused some considerable embarrassment to the RNLMA and it was thought that the causes for this could be found in the strict military regime at the Castle. As a form of compensation the Academy leadership gave the cadets a certain measure of freedom and independence, which was gratefully accept-

International contacts are an important part in the lives of cadets. Meetings between military academies were actively promoted especially after World War II. Here, one of the first visits to Breda of Sandhurst cadets, approx. 1951.



ed by the cadets, who lost no time in establishing their own association and sports clubs and other societies. Besides, in the gradually emerging structure they integrated the important process of informal socialization. The hazing, that between 1836-1869 could easily have developed into a barbaric ritual, not unusual in military and other boarding schools, was thus channelled within the framework of the Cadets' Corps, with its own board in the form of a Senate, similar to that of student associations (1898). The Corps developed an identity of its own, finding expression in organizing balls, sports games and other events and the publication of a yearbook. Corps life, which filled the cadets' spare time after study hours and military training, had already contributed substantially to the fostering of the esprit de corps, group building and character development long before it became an official pillar of the education. The period after World War II was to bring major changes with regard to this aspect.

As early as the 1950s the Corps saw an educational role for itself with regard to cadets who did not come from higher social circles. That education had to be a broad one, ranging from cultural education to etiquette and the promotion of socially desirable behaviour and dress, on and off duty, which in its turn required more and more internal rules and regulations and an internal disciplinary system for maintaining them.

The introduction of new cadets into the Corps has continued to this day, but over time the pressure of social change and the concern for bad publicity has made the event physically and mentally less strenuous. This process was reflected in the name applied to it: 'ragging' or 'hazing time' were first replaced by 'coordination period', and in the nineties by 'introduction period'. This period traditionally culminated in the acceptance into the Corps, confirmed since 1952 by the Cadet's promise. That promise – a foreshadowing of the officer's oath – forms the foundation of the values that the Corps wants to represent internally as well as externally. Fidelity, honesty, and obedience are its central concepts.

Step by step, but at an ever-increasing pace since the nineties, the Corps has been made into a pillar of the education by the RNLMA leadership. Already in the sixties it was recognized that the Corps was indispensable for character development and group building, but in spite of the acceptance of cadets in various consultative bodies, and the role of staff members in the cadets' associations, the Corps was not provided with the means and authority necessary for this aspect of the education. The Corps operated independently and was not really a player in the many educational changes, especially when things came to a head, a fact which became amply evident in 1992 when the reduction of the duration of the education almost meant the demise of the Corps.

The Corps as a binding element, as a basis for the informal networks that are so important within the officer corps, and as the guardian of the norms and values of the officer, has certainly been put under pressure. There are a number of factors that

The 'Assaut' is the yearly traditional gala ball organized by the cadets themselves. It is formally opened by a dance of the chairman of the Senate with the Commandant's wife, 2003.



contribute to this. The weakening of the boarding school system, along with individualization as a social phenomenon and wider possibilities for the cadets to spend their spare time, make it more difficult for cadets to get a sense of going through the RNLMA-period together. Besides, it proved to be increasingly difficult to maintain values and norms and the traditional Corps etiquette with a growing social heterogeneity of the cadet population. Nevertheless, there were counterforces, that seemed to gather momentum as the boarding school system lost its binding potential. First of all, the RNLMA leadership integrated Corps activities into 'the duty', a process by which autonomy was traded off for more facilities and a formal big stick with respect to cadet participation. Secondly, the Corps emancipated as the leadership began to consider it more and more as an equal partner, and finally, the educational aspect seemed to benefit from the increased attention for (professional) ethics discernable within the armed forces since 1996.

Officer material

The development of an esprit de corps and ensuing values and norms of the officer is not only determined by the 'ideals' of the educator. Success in this process of socialization is also dependent on the backgrounds of the cadets, as was mentioned above. The more heterogeneous the backgrounds, especially social origin of the cadets, the more difficult it will be to forge one corps out of this amalgam.

From the very first days of the Academy, therefore, the cadets were an elite group. Selection took place at the gate in order to sift the wheat from the chaff. Neither social origin, nor religious or geographical backgrounds of the cadets were formal barriers to admission. In the nineteenth century school qualification, entry exams and the school fee served as selection instruments to recruit the flower of the nation. After 1910 the entry exam disappeared from the array of selection instruments and the low school fees

had to function as a means of recruitment. After World War II this remained so, but also a selection board made its appearance. In the fifties it explicitly took the social and political origins of the applicants into consideration. Later the board lost interest in the social backgrounds of the candidates, although a reliability check remained. Motivation became the most important criterion. At the same time, after 1989 the selection process was tied up with a new phenomenon: the departmental target figures for female and (since 1998) ethnic military personnel.

Selection was not only bound by the qualitative requirements of the Royal Netherlands Army, the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army, and the Royal Netherlands Air Force, but also by their quantitative needs. In general, the rule was (and is), the greater the supply, the stricter the selection. With the exception of the period between 1869-1877, the RNLMA could draw from an inexhaustible supply until 1890. After this year there was an almost permanent shortage of suitable applicants, a situation that only improved after 1980. Because of the meagre recruitment results the selection process kept on wavering between the needs and ambitions of the (colonial) land and air forces.

The developments to be discerned with regard to geographical, religious and social origin over the past 175 years in the 'officer material' admitted to the RNLMA, is reflected in the four tables presented below.

Table 1: Geographic origin (place of birth) cadets RNLMA 1828-2003

All figures indicate percentages

Year/ province		Northern Netherlands	Central Netherlands	Western Netherlands	Southern Netherlands	Netherlands East Indies	Netherlands West Indies /Suriname	Abroad	Belgium
1828-1830	RNLA	2	26	39	12	2	0	10	9
1836-1895	total	6	26	35	15	13	2	2	
	RNLA	8	26	42	17	4	0	3	
	RNLIA	2	27	25	11	28	4	2	
1896-1934	total	5	16	38	12	28	1	1	
	RNLA	6	19	44	17	12	0	1	
	RNLIA	3	12	29	6	45	1	2	
1935-1940	total	8	16	36	10	30	0	0	
	RNLA	12	19	46	15	8	0	0	
	RNLIA	1	12	20	9	63	0	1	
1948-1974	total	10	20	44	21	4	0	1	
	RNLA	9	20	45	20	5	0	1	
	RNLAF	14	24	37	24	0	0	0	
1975-2003	total	9	28	32	27	0	0	3	
	RNLA	8	26	35	28	0	0	4	
	RNLAF	7	36	26	28	0	0	2	

Northern Netherlands: Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe
Central Netherlands: Overijssel, Gelderland, Utrecht, Flevoland
Western Netherlands: Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Zeeland
Southern Netherlands Noord-Brabant and Limburg

Table 2: Religion of RNLMA cadets 1828-2003

All figures indicate percentages

Year/religion		Protestant	Roman Catholic	Jewish	Islamic	None
1828-1830	RNLA	79	21	0	0	0
1836-1895	total	91	9	0	0	0
	RNLA	90	10	0	0	0
	RNLIA	92	7	0	0	1
1896-1934	total	64	18	1	0	17
	RNLA	64	21	1	0	14
	RNLIA	65	15	0	0	20
1935-1940	total	61	20	0	0	19
	RNLA	63	20	0	0	17
	RNLIA	57	19	0	1	23
1948-1974	total	40	43	0	0	17
	RNLA	42	41	0	0	17
	RNLAF	33	49	0	0	18
1975-2003	total	24	38	0	0	38
	RNLA	24	37	0	0	39
	RNLAF	24	41	0	0	35

Table 3: Social status fathers RNLMA cadets 1828-2003 ³

All figures indicate percentages

Year/ social layer		Layer 1	Layer 2	Layer 3	Layer 4	Layer 5	Layer 6
1828-1830	RNLA	49	41	9	1	0	0
1836-1895	total	33	50	11	4	2	0
	RNLA	38	50	8	3	1	0
	RNLIA	25	51	15	6	3	0
1896-1934	total	19	44	22	12	3	0
	RNLA	20	41	24	13	2	0
	RNLIA	19	46	19	12	4	0
1935-1940	total	9	38	28	22	3	0
	RNLA	8	33	34	21	3	1
	RNLIA	12	45	17	24	2	0
1948-1974	total	16	30	27	21	4	2
	RNLA	17	31	26	20	4	2
	RNLAF	10	31	31	22	6	0
1975-2003	total	8	32	30	24	5	1
	RNLA	8	34	30	22	5	1
	RNLAF	7	25	30	30	5	3

Table 4: social occupational background RNLMA cadets 1828-1003⁴

All figures indicate percentages

Year/occupational group	Commissioned Officers	Non-Commissioned Officers	Others (semi-) civil servants	Free Professions	Tradespeople industry	Skilled and unskilled labourers trade and industry	Others employees trade and industry
1828-1830 RNLA	35	0	41	10	14	0	1
1836-1895 total	39	1	32	11	13	2	2
KL	42	0	29	12	13	2	2
RNLIA	31	2	39	10	15	1	1
1896- total	32	6	30	5	19	3	5
1934 RNLA	33	8	22	6	25	4	2
RNLIA	30	5	36	5	13	2	9
1935-1940 total	15	5	37	5	20	2	16
RNLA	9	7	33	7	28	3	13
RNLIA	23	2	42	3	8	1	21
1948- total	15	5	34	8	15	6	17
1974 RNLA	14	5	35	8	16	6	16
RNLAF	15	8	32	8	10	6	21
1975- total	8	4	28	6	15	9	30
2003 RNLA	10	4	26	6	14	10	30
RNLAF	4	4	34	5	18	8	27

From these, and other more detailed data⁵, it can be concluded that at the time of the foundation of the RNLMA the average cadet came from the social elite. The upper middleclass and the nobility – that supplied 20% of the cadets between 1828-1830 – were keen on sending their sons to Breda, which is exactly what King William I had intended. The officer professionalization that he wanted to realize through the KMA, did by no means imply an ambition to democratize the officer corps. In spite of the choice of Breda as its location, the large majority of the cadets came from the Northern Netherlands and were protestant, as had always been the tradition in the former Army of the Dutch Republic.

After the secession of Belgium the ties between the protestant Netherlands and the RNLMA became increasingly close throughout the 19th century. It is not clear whether Dutch Catholics avoided the KMA, or whether the RNLMA tacitly fended them off. In spite of this catholic under-representation there was a considerable influx from the southern part of the Netherlands, in particular from the protestant elite from the province of Noord-Brabant⁶. The north of the country provided few cadets in relation to the density of the population. Surprisingly, the coastal provinces were not only an important recruitment area for the navy, but also for the RNLMA. Apart from that,

a considerable number of cadets came from the Dutch and Indo-European (Dutch-Indian) communities in the colonies, especially Java. The majority of these cadets returned to the colonial army on completion of their studies. In spite of the rural character of the 19th century Dutch society, 75% of the cadets from the Netherlands came from the larger Dutch cities, with The Hague, and not the capital, coming out on top, a position 'the residence' has retained to this day⁷. Moreover, they were often garrison towns, which was connected with a high degree of self-recruitment in the officer corps (39% of the cadets came from officer families). The officer profession was also very popular among civil servants, albeit the higher classes, for in the 19th century the RNLMA population still retained its socially elite character. To a somewhat lesser extent this also applied to the cadets that opted for the East Indien Army. In the Netherlands there was some reluctance towards colonial service among the better classes. Conversely, the intermediate layers (social layer 3) were more enthusiastic, due to the lower school fees necessary to fill the ranks. The colonial elite did not have this hesitation.⁸

It can be said that the 19th century cadet population was rather homogeneous with regard to its social and religious origins. The cadet often belonged to the flower of the protestant Netherlands and came from an officer or (semi-) civil servant milieu, but in any case almost exclusively from the better social circles. The geographical origin of the cadet was more heterogeneous, certainly also because of recruitment from the colonies, although many had in common that they came from garrison towns.

Throughout the 20th century the cadet retained his metropolitan or urban origin. With the disappearance of the urban garrisons after 1960 cadets coming from these towns only formed a minority. Nevertheless, even today a military presence in a town is a stimulant for application at the RNLMA.

During the first decades of the 20th century a modest democratization began to develop at the RNLMA. Improved educational opportunities, the removal of the financial barrier to the RNLMA, and the needs of the (colonial) army up to 1919, contributed to the sons of the middle class (social layer 3) – usually sons of (small) tradespeople – and to a lesser extent the lower middle class (social layer 4) making their appearance at the Academy. The emancipation of the catholic part of the population was also a factor in this. Up to World War II the number of catholic cadets doubled. Because of their social origin this had a slightly downward effect on the social composition of the RNLMA population, especially for cadets destined for the Netherlands Army. The social background of the cadets destined for the East-Indian Army also conformed to this trend, but it retained a more elite character than that of the Netherlands army, one reason being the extremely high percentage of self-recruitment in the Dutch East Indies (approx. 50%)⁹. Besides, the influx from the colonies went through a rapid growth after 1896, due to the closing down of the institutes for officer education there. Incidentally,

among the cadets born in the colonies, that made up more than 25% of the total RNLMA population, there had been handful native cadets since 1918.

So, in 1930, there were on average more cadets from the colonies, of catholic and of middle class or lower middle class stock, than in the 19th century. Nevertheless, until 1935 the RNLMA remained an education for the higher social layers, from which two-thirds of its cadets originated, and it was still, as in the 19th century, very popular among sons of officers (33%) and (semi-) civil servants (29%). It was not exceptional in this respect. The Technical University at Delft in that same period could boast an even greater popularity among the highest social circles and had fewer students from the lower middle classes than the RNLMA, as a comparative study shows.¹⁰

The period between 1935-1940, when the German and Japanese threat caused an increase in recruitment, proved to be a catalyst in the process of democratization at the RNLMA. The acute need for officers led to an increased influx of sons of office clerks and lower civil servants (so of the lower middle class (social layer 4)), whereas the *relative* share of cadets from the officer milieu fell by more than half, and with it the share of the higher social layers. Sons of labourers remained a rarity at the RNLMA, even at that time (see Table 4)¹¹. In the period between 1836-1895 their number was 2%, between 1896-1934 it was 3%, and in the years of military crisis until 1940 it was 2%. There were no simultaneous major changes in geographical or religious backgrounds of the cadets.

World War II and the decolonization war changed all this. With the loss of the Dutch East Indies as a recruitment area, an ongoing personnel requirement for the army due to NATO-obligations, and an Air Force that had to build up its place on the Dutch recruitment market, it was especially the cadets from the southernmost provinces that filled the gap. Recruitment results there showed the steepest rise. The southern influx ran almost completely parallel to the simultaneous increase in the number of catholic cadets, giving shape to the catholic emancipation at the RNLMA to such an extent that after World War II there was an over-representation of the catholic community. In general it was catholic cadets who, more so than their fellow students of other denominations, ensured that the democratization process at the RNLMA, that had gathered momentum after 1935 in spite of an increased social selection in the fifties, proved to be irreversible. Again, however, it was almost exclusively limited to the (lower) middle classes (social layer 4) and the number of sons of labourers remained 6% until 1974.¹² The tendency for democratization was strongest within the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF). Although this new Service recruited 15% of its cadets from the officer milieu in the first decades of its existence, it was especially popular among sons of intermediate and lower civil servants and intermediate skilled employees.¹³

Thus, 'the' cadet during the first few post-war decades still often came from a larger

military town, one in two still came from the higher social circles, though less from the officer milieu than in 1935, whereas the number of cadets coming from a (semi-) civil servant background still increased somewhat. The long-standing exclusive ties between the protestant community and the RNLMA of the past had been severed, which was closely related to the increased influx of catholic cadets from the southern provinces.

This influx kept on growing after 1974, resulting in more than 25% of cadets coming from the towns of Brabant and Limburg over the past few decades. This did not manifest itself in a growing number of catholic cadets, as after the sixties secularization also made its way into the catholic south. This process has also been reflected at the RNLMA during the past few decades. The southern cadets, together with the growing number from the middle of the country, had to compensate for the decreasing recruitment results, especially in the west of the country. This decline is probably related to a fall in recruitment from the officer class – by far the sharpest in the RNLAF – and (semi-) civil servant milieu, which is so abundantly represented in the west of the Netherlands. The result is that for the first time in the history of the RNLMA the military and civil servant milieu was not the dominant one anymore. This diminished self-recruitment and the greater accessibility of secondary education since the sixties are the main causes for the ongoing democratization of the recruitment at the RNLMA. Nevertheless, over the past few years still one third of the cadets have come from higher social circles, the others mainly from the (lower) middle classes (layers 3 and 4), whose numbers have gone up to more than 50%, and - although the number of children of labourers has gone up lightly to 9% - hardly any from the bottom two layers that encompass the least educated part of a shrinking labour class.¹⁴

Social and catholic emancipation has affected the RNLMA over the past 175 years. Especially in cases of extreme peril, as in the years of military crisis between 1935-1940 and the post-war construction years, new groups got and took their chance. New examples of emancipation have emerged over the years: women have had to be admitted since 1974 and departmental target numbers should determine the number of ethnic cadets since 1998. In comparison to the rest of the RNLA and RNLAF the RNLMA has relatively many females with an annual influx of 12% since 1989, although it is still way behind civil society. The integration process of the new Dutch has so far been almost exclusively limited to the rank and file. The pace at which women and ethnic cadets can make good the arrears depends on the needs of the RNLMA and armed forces in general, the enthusiasm for the RNLMA and its attraction on women and newcomers, and the social pressure - the policy of affirmative action – on the RNLMA and the entire armed forces.

Conclusion

The Dutch officer education, at least insofar it took place at the RNLMA, has always been a hybrid. It had to produce an officer who could function as a lieutenant, but who had also acquired the intellectual foundation for further study. At the same time he was expected to have built up a network and acquired the norms and values of the officer. The problem forces itself upon the reader: there are hardly any circumstances imaginable in which it is possible to optimally attain all these targets. The history of the RNLMA education can be summarized as a quest for the unreachable ideal, without daring to make a radical choice for a different system which gives clear priority to either science, or military professionalism or character building. The idea of *training on the job*, as the Israelis do, has never received any serious consideration. The British system of taking in civil university graduates is impossible in the Netherlands, as the basis for recruitment would become too small. The German system, in which a university study is provided in a civil environment and the officer school is only a short education in which military subjects are taught, has never enjoyed much popularity in our country. The reason is that the armed forces attach so much value to generating an officer corps in an institute of their own under close scrutiny of the leadership.

Nevertheless, the RNLMA seems to be shifting towards civil higher education. The Breda committee of 1921 was far ahead of its time. The educational renovation of 1960 brought the civil academic world within the walls of the Castle, but the education did not attain an academic level straight away. That still required a protracted development in which the foundation of the Faculty (1992), and the awarding of civil study credits to RNLMA graduates, that will eventually lead to a Bachelor degree recognized outside the Castle (2006/2007) as an important landmark. Simultaneous with this, the boarding school system in effect disappeared, and the character development, the instilling of professional norms and values, the esprit de corps, came under pressure. This is a development into the direction of a military high school with a campus, in which the aspirant officer receives his academic professional education. At the same time, however, the problem presents itself of how and where to realize the necessary military training and education. The Dutch dilemma of military training, academic education and transfer of values and norms, together with the instilling of an esprit de corps, has not been solved either in the 21st century. A look at the plans of almost a century ago, which in hindsight appear to have foreseen the development reasonably accurately, shows that, especially with the contracting out of parts of the education to civil universities and the large extent of freedom the cadets enjoy nowadays, the 'Military High School' has materialized. Character development and group formation, cohesion and military training pay the price for this, a development which is reinforced by the tendency to scale-up and the heterogeneous background of the cadets. As long as the organization is not prepared

to give more time, and therefore money, to its officer education, the dilemma will not be solved.

Notes

- ¹ This article is entirely based on *Studeren in uniform. 175 jaar Koninklijke Militaire Academie 1828-2003* [Studying in uniform. 175 years Royal Netherlands Military Academy 1828-2003] This study in Dutch was published in September 2003 and comprises contributions by drs. J. Coenen, dr. W. Bevaart, dr. J.W.M. Schulten, drs W.P.R.A. Cappers, drs. H. Roozenbeek, dr. W. Klinkert, and prof. dr. P.M.H. Groen. The latter two authors were also the editors. For the present article is primarily based on the introduction, conclusion and chapter 8 of *Studeren in uniform*.
- ² h.b.s. is the abbreviation of Hogere Burger School (Higher School for Civilians). This new secondary general school type was intended for the middle class. Pupils were taught in modern languages, economics and science and it gave access to Higher Vocational Education. Classical languages did not feature in the h.b.s.-curriculum, which is why the education did not give access to the universities.
- ³ The classification on social prestige was established on the basis of occupational categories, following the stratification model developed by K. Mandemakers for his survey of the social backgrounds of Grammar School and HBS pupils in the Netherlands and his earlier study into the origins of students of Technical University Delft. For this see: K.Mandmakers, *HBS en Gymnasium. Ontwikkeling, structuur, sociale achtergrond en schoolprestaties Nederland, circa 1800-1968*. (Amsterdam, 1996), in particular pp. 222, 223 and D. van Lente, K. Mandemakers, en R. Rottier, 'De sociale achtergronden van studenten aan de hogere technische opleidingen in Delft 1842-1940'. *Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis*, XIX (nov 1993) 4, 432-462. See also: K, Mandemakers, *Negen classificaties voor 19^{de} en 20^{ste} eeuwse beroepstitels*. Amsterdam, 1995. This social-historical survey was directed at the Dutch situation and encompasses a longer period. Mandemakers based his classification on social prestige on the work of the Dutch sociologist J.J.M. van Tulder, *De beroepsmobiliteit in Nederland van 1919 tot 1954. Een sociaal-statistische studie*. Leiden, 1962. He arrived at a classification of six social layers on the basis of a representative sample among the Dutch population in 1953 of the social prestige attributed to 217 representative occupations, a survey which was repeated in 1983 and which generated almost the same ranking on the 'prestige ladder' (see: H. Sixma, en W. Ultee, 'Een beroepsprestigeschaal voor Nederland in de jaren tachtig', *Mens en Maatschappij*, 58-4 (1983), see: in particular pp. 370-372). Mandemakers expanded this 'occupational prestige list' to 229 professions (see:

Mandemakers, *Negen Classificaties*, pp. 9-11), making use of the comparative survey of J.D. Treiman, *Occupational prestige in comparative perspective* (New York, 1977) pp. 414-421. The original classification of van Tulder is as follows (van Tulder, *beroepsmobiliteit*, p. 22):

Layer 1	Mainly free and academic professions, executive officers of large companies, secondary school teachers, very senior civil servants
Layer 2	Mainly higher employees, executive officers of small companies, senior civil servants, large farmers and market gardeners, intermediate technicians
Layer 3	Mainly large to intermediate old and new tradespeople, intermediate civil servants, intermediate farmers and market gardeners, intermediate employees
Layer 4	Mainly small old and new tradespeople, skilled labourers, small farmers and gardeners, office clerks, lower employees, lower civil servants
Layer 5	Mainly practised labourers, lower civil servants
Layer 5	Mainly unpractised labourers

It is important to note that *skilled* labourers are classified in *social layer 4* (small tradespeople/lower middle class) in van Tulder-Treiman-Mandemakers' system.

The number of children of skilled, practised and unpractised labourers can be found in table 4, which presents a division between 'skilled and unskilled labourers' and 'other employees'. For further reference, see: *Studeren in uniform*, chapter 8.

4 For the social-occupational classification the classification developed by K. Mandemakers for his survey of HTS and HBS pupils was used, see note 3.

5 Chapter 8 of *Studeren in uniform* presents a much more detailed analysis of the available data. When necessary those results are summarized here with a reference to the relevant table.

6 See tables 10, 11, 18 and 19 *Studeren in uniform*, pp. 521-522, 531.

7 See table 6 *Studeren in uniform* p. 511.

8 See tables 10 and 11 *Studeren in uniform*, pp. 521-522.

9 See table 11 *Studeren in uniform*, p. 522. Of the cadets born in the colony in 1836-1894 64% came from an officer family; between 1895-1934 this was 46%. For cadets born in the Netherlands these percentages were 34% and 25%, respectively. Officers are classified in layers 1 and 2 of the social prestige stratification that is used here.

¹⁰ See table 15 *Studeren in uniform*, p. 527.

¹¹ As explained in note 3, skilled labourers are classified in social layer 4 in the social prestige classification presented in table 3. The category of skilled and unskilled labourers in table 4, in which the social occupational background of the fathers of cadets are presented, does not quite match the social status layers 5 and 6 in

table 3, which, incidentally, also contains the lower civil servants (see classification scheme note 3).

¹² See remark note II.

¹³ See table 9, *Studeren in uniform*, pp. 516-517.

¹⁴ See remark note II.

The last knights

A preliminary study of the developments in the habitus of the Cadets' Corps

René Moelker

Abstract

On the basis of theoretical and empirical considerations the author concludes that values of chivalry, such as courtesy, politeness, etiquette, courage and honour are still relevant for the modern Cadets' Corps. In particular rules of conduct, which find expression in etiquette, are the subject of investigation in this chapter. As a result of a far-reaching democratization of recruitment – cadets come from all layers of society – the cadets' society cannot be called chivalrous anymore. Nevertheless, the values of chivalry are still cherished, as they are functional for the work of the officer. They guarantee safety and security within an environment that is still characterized by a great extent of inequality in rank and Corps status. Moreover, they allow a group of future officers to distinguish itself from other professional groups in civilian society. A number of hypotheses, inviting further research in the subject conclude the chapter.

Introduction: military educational institutes as hotbeds for values and norms

The start of lectures, classes and meetings of the Cadets' Corps and other gatherings are often rather noisy affairs. Cadets are chatting, sharing the latest bits of news or gossip and joking, while the speaker or chairperson of the meeting is clearly making preparations to begin. He wants to make a start, but cannot break through the buzz. At that moment there will always be a cadet to shout out in a loud voice 'politesse'. The term betrays a French influence in the educational system, but it also clearly indicates that in certain circumstances aspirant officers should have the decency and respect to listen to a speaker. The fact that it is used implies that the Royal Netherlands Military Academy (RNLMA) is a place where something like 'politesse' still has real meaning.

It always strikes visitors to the RNLMA that people greet each other, sometimes perfunctorily, for the Cadets' Corps has the rule that the military always salute each other, but also often spontaneously and voluntarily. A civilian, unfamiliar to the RNLMA, is often greeted out of politeness. A female visitor will find doors opened for her, an almost unique experience nowadays! There are general norms, often indicated by the broad term 'common decency' and specific ones that only apply to cadets, such as the rules regarding outward appearance, behaviour and dress. General manners and rules of conduct for cadets, as laid down in 'the Blue Book' or the booklet 'White on Black' in particular, indicate that courtesy and chivalry are still values that apply to the population of cadets.

To what extent do these 'chivalrous values' still play a role in the socialization of the cadets? That is the central question of this chapter. It is a preliminary study, as the method of investigation, the theoretical refinement and empirical profundity have not been perfected as yet. The investigation's main aim is to generate hypotheses, while constructing an image of reality by means of 'sensitizing concepts'. That construction is realized by studying

- the history of the military profession as a fusion of military and civilian values;
- the theoretical foundation for an explanation of class- and rank-bound values and norms;
- the objectives of the Cadets' Corps;
- examples of etiquette;
- punitive measures.

In the final section conclusions will be drawn and hypotheses which may function as starting points for further investigation are presented.

Professionalization: a fusion of civilian and military values

Not all cadets will know 'how to behave'. One reason for this may be their changed social backgrounds, but there are also the changes in society, which result in the traditional rules of conduct no longer providing any guidelines. In the days when officers were solely recruited from higher circles of society, everyone knew how to behave. After all, the existing etiquette had been developed by society's elite - the nobility. For the medieval aristocracy the art of warfare was an exalted form of sport, and certainly not a profession that required technological or scientific knowledge. Officers led the actual fighting and concerned themselves little with the technical aspects or logistics.

The first professionalization of the officer profession took place in an organization in which technical aspects began to influence warfare first, the Royal Navy. Incidentally, but not without importance in the context of this article, the form of address 'Mister' in the 16th and 17th century navy was exclusively reserved for noblemen and officers, and only later became a general epithet for civilians.

Medieval naval battles were exact copies of land battles. A ship was boarded and subsequently a hand-to-hand fight would take place. (Teitler, 1974) Developments in artillery, such as the heavy gun, allowed a battle from a distance. It was possible in the 17th century to beat an opponent by sinking his ship - from a distance. This, however, implied that officers knew how to navigate. The profession of the officer had to be merged with that of the sailor. All of a sudden officers had to know about ocean currents, winds, sailing, rigging, but also the sailor's language of command. More so even, noble officers had to make their own some of the language and customs of a professional

group that was generally despised for its low descent. In the middle of the 17th century even booklets were issued to teach the officers the common sailor's argot.

The composition of the officer corps was strongly influenced by the technological requirements of certain military environments. As the more technologically advanced arms, the Navy, the Engineers and Artillery had a relatively large proportion of non-aristocratic recruits. These arms depended on civilian technological know-how of navigation, mathematics, fortifications and ballistics, but at the same time they wanted to establish one officer corps, with one *esprit de corps*. The officers that were commoners had to be socialized in the chivalrous values of the officer corps in order to be able to function at the Court, to fulfil diplomatic functions (naval officers were required to speak several foreign languages) and to behave in accordance with the values and norms of the officer. This situation brought about quite a few tensions for the fledgling Royal Navy. In 1578 privateer-captain Francis Drake, a commoner, had Thomas Doughty, an aristocrat, decapitated because tensions between the two had risen too high. In the 18th century, however, a training system was developed that managed to combine the good things from both social layers.

Over time, conflicts like that between Drake and Doughty could be resolved by means of a new institution, the education of the 'midshipman'. Officers traditionally were to be found aft, and sailors fore. In principle, noblemen considered it beneath them to carry out the craft that, willy-nilly, belonged to a sailing profession. The problem of training noblemen without loss of reputation along with commoners was solved by positioning them amidships. Due to this 'middle position' the 'midshipmen' learned the craft from an experienced hand, whereas they acquired fencing, dancing and all other skills an officer should possess from a captain or an almoner. (Elias, 1950; Moelker, 2003b) Court manners, too, were taught. Midshipmen, or in Dutch 'adelborsten', were thus introduced to the values and norms of the chivalrous elite, of which courteous manners and etiquette constituted a natural element.

In the Army, too, technological developments caused a shift in recruitment. Engineer and artillery schools demanded a technical and mathematical background (see the historical contributions elsewhere in this volume). The commoner element in the officer corps grew steadily, but the term of address 'jonkers' ('squires'), which was still in use long after World War II, clearly demonstrates the parallel to the midshipman-system. The function of military academies is to generate a fusion between civilian knowledge and aristocratic - chivalrous, if you please, - values and norms. Sometimes the concepts of '*esprit de corps*' or 'character development' are used, while referring to the above-mentioned socialization and chivalrous values.

Courtesy is only one of those values of chivalry. It concerns values that have to be regarded as traditionally military. Courage, loyalty, honour, discipline, subordination,

perseverance are among them. These values are functional for officers. Thus, courtesy and etiquette enabled one to move in diplomatic circles at Court. Courage and discipline were essential when ships or men had to be held in line during a firefight. Together with technical expertise and scientific knowledge these values and norms form the cultural capital for the officer.

Theoretical exploration: origin and habitus

The relation between the status of the officer and the manner of recruitment in a modern society was already studied in the middle of the 19th century by the French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville. (1994) In an aristocratic society the military occupation was still seen as a respectable pastime for young noblemen, whose status in life was derived from their social position and not their military rank. In a more egalitarian society, on the other hand, the armed forces recruit people of humbler descent, whose status does depend on their military rank. In other words, precisely because there is more recruitment from the commoners, it becomes essential, also out of considerations of status of the officer profession, to pass on values of chivalry to future generations of officers. After all, they have not been imbued with these values from birth. Investing in cultural capital, therefore, is extremely sensible. Paul Bourdieu's habitus-theory explains why and how, but first some data about the social background of cadets are presented below.

The Netherlands has for a long time retained recruitment from the nobility and upper classes. In 1872, 22% of the generals and colonels in the Army were of noble descent. In 1912 this was 12% and in 1950, 0%. Around 1950, 22% of the cadets came from 'military' families. For the Royal Naval College this was 30%. In other countries a similar development can be discerned, with a decreasing proportion of nobility. (Van Doorn, 1974: 13ff.; Abrahamsson, 1972; Moelker and Soeters, 2003a)

Van Doorn's work shows that prior to and immediately after World War II there were hardly any officers from working class or farmer families (1 - 2%). For the sake of comparability with the past the same class division was used by Moelker and Soeters in their survey (1998), which showed that in 1995 17% of the RNLMA cadets were from the lower classes (working and farmer classes). Over time, the middle class began to be represented more and more. The percentage of cadets with a middle class father rose from 28% between 1918-23, to 38% in 1948-51, to 59% in 1995. The percentage of cadets/officers from the upper classes fell (41%, 38% and 14% respectively), as did the percentage of cadets/officers whose fathers had been officers (26%, 13% and 9%, respectively). A similar development was found in the recruitment from NCO families (4%, 9%, and 1%, respectively). What can be deduced from these figures is that the social background of cadets/officers increasingly began to mirror the average working population. A recent

survey of Groen and Klinkert (see elsewhere in this volume) yields different data, partly because more accurate methods were used, partly because a different class division was used. However, the trend is comparable.

The changes in the composition of the officer corps also have consequences for the values and norms of this corps. Bourdieu's habitus-theory (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977) sheds an unexpected light on this. It distinguishes economic, social and cultural capital. Economic capital can be measured by property and income, and social capital by the social contacts a person has. His knowledge, good manners and good taste make up his cultural capital.

Taste is a way to distinguish oneself - a tool for distinction- from others (Bourdieu, 1984). It also betrays someone's status. In general, the taste of the social elite enjoys a higher reputation than that of others. That is even true when it concerns a sense of humour. (Kuipers, 2001) Higher circles can distinguish themselves through their taste and because taste is part of their cultural capital, these circles can reproduce themselves by means of this distinction (hence, the title of Bourdieu's classic from 1977, *'La Reproduction'*). After all, the chances of acquiring the different capitals are not equal for everyone. The division of chances is dependent on the habitus, the internalized values and norms of the group to which one belongs. Their habitus enables people to react adequately on new situations by means of their expectations. Representatives of higher social circles expect their children to choose an education or profession that offers them high prospect of economic success. Cultural capital and the habitus, acquired in one's milieu, facilitate (school) career. As the talent to assess risks and grasp opportunities is reserved to a higher social layer, it is relatively beyond reach for individuals belonging to the lower social layers.

As habitus consists of internalized values and norms, it allows one to act as a matter of course, recognize opportunities and grasp them at the moment they present themselves. It allows one to move in a certain way within a specific group of people, to communicate with them and to function in a manner accepted by that group.

Etiquette enables people to move among other people because it is part of the habitus. They do not have to ask themselves each time 'how to behave', but they automatically follow the rules of conduct - if they have internalized them well enough. The previous section showed that values of chivalry, and consequently etiquette, are functional for officers. The theory is clearly borne out by the conclusion that rules of conduct are indispensable in contact with other people; they are a precondition for interaction. Rules of conduct 'bring people of diverse backgrounds together and allow them to interact without threat of the situation collapsing into a struggle of competing self-interests... the chances of developing a more civilized society are increased'. (Finkelstein, 1989:139; Elias, 1939)

Etiquette, courtesy and other values of chivalry are especially important within groups that still show great inequality. Etiquette allows people to interact, irrespective of their social status, and in view of the diverse backgrounds of the present-day cadets, this fact underpins the importance of rules of conduct. Etiquette makes the interaction between people of unequal rank safe and predictable. In his latest book, entitled '*Respect in a World of Inequality*', Richard Sennet (2003) maintains that the way in which people can show respect is dependent on the way in which they can develop impersonal manners. These manners manifest themselves in ritual role play (you know the CO also acts out a role) and accepted rules of conduct. High and low can chat in a relaxed manner, make jokes, etc., because there are rules to govern polite conversation.

It is important to stay far from personality cult and the quest for authenticity. This glamorization of the individualistic personality cult was already the butt of criticism in Sennet's famous '*The Fall of the Public Man*' (1977). In his latest book he takes his criticism even further. In his view it is impolite and offensive - disrespectful - to harp on one's personal merits. The personality cult only leads to people placing themselves above others, and that is something completely different than when someone is a functional superior. In the latter case he only plays a role, and emotions, personal feelings and narcissistic tendencies are kept outside the work atmosphere.

It would take too far to fully elaborate Sennet's complex argumentation. His voice is one of many in a discussion on the effects of an egalitarian society. It is a discussion on the role of rules of conduct in a society in which everyone is becoming increasingly equal, and in which etiquette is criticized from an 'anything goes' or 'must be possible' attitude. It seems as if the civilization process has changed course and less and less importance is attached to manners and rules of conduct. (Wouters, 1976) Values and norms often change content, while traditional meanings lose their hold. (Brinkgreve and Korzee, 1978) Emotional authenticity and individual originality seem to gain weight. People should express their emotions. But this may also be a form of styling, or a sort of role play à la Sennet. For this reason Zeegers (1988) does not speak of presentation of emotionality but of cultivated social representations. Wouters (1990) states that people have such control over their emotions that it becomes possible for them to flout fixed rules of conduct. Such control do we have over our passions, that we even behave decently on a nude beach, where the dress code dictates that we be naked. He calls this the 'controlled decontrolling' of emotions and passions.

Let us leave this complex discussion behind. What it makes clear, however, is why among cadets the discussion on norms and values, and in particular the restrictive rules of conduct, flares up from time to time. This is demonstrated by the discussions on the objectives of the rules of conduct in the following section. Even in a world in which differences of rank and class are still very relevant, cadets do feel the need for individ-

ual self expression. The strict rules of conduct seem to limit this self-expression, and they seem to become a burden. An author like Sennet, on the other hand, argues that social intercourse is facilitated when certain institutions – rules of conduct – are observed. In his view it is precisely those rules that allow individual self-expression.

Objectives

The rules of conduct^I acquire their normative significance as cadets who want to be members of the Corps make a promise that binds them to a trust system. That promise is as follows: ‘I promise on my word as a cadet, at all times to be honest, faithful to the Corps and obedient to the Senate, that I promise’. This Cadet’s Promise morally commits him to the values and norms of the Corps.

Objectives, statutes and documents in which the rules of conduct have been laid down, provide an explanation of their significance. The rules of conduct reflect the norms and values of chivalry, but whether these norms and values still have the same meaning as in the past largely depends on the explanation that is given to them. It is expressed in the objectives.

In 1952 cultural and intellectual development were stated as the objectives of the Cadets’ Corps. In the 1969 statutes the objectives were:

- Making an essential contribution to the officer education of the cadet;
- Cultivating comradeship and solidarity among its members in order to constitute a close community;
- Stimulating a common behaviour in dealing with the outside world;
- Establishing and maintaining contacts with other student societies, military associations and other institutions.

The present objectives of the Cadets’ Corps can be found on the internet:

- Contributing to the personality development of its members;
- Contributing to the development of the physical condition of its members.

Apart from these specific Corps objectives, the objectives to a large extent run parallel to those of the RNLMA, as formulated in its official ‘Mission Statement’, the core of which is formed by the phrase: ‘The RNLMA is the only military-scientific institute that educates officers for the Royal Netherlands Army and Air Force and the Royal Marechaussee’.

Although the present-day objectives have a different ring to them, the continuity appears to be great, considering how they work out in practice. One of the concrete examples with regard to the development of personality is the concept of integrity.

Besides, the guarding of norms and values, the following of the norms and values of the officer corps, solidarity and relations with student societies outside the RNLMA come back in the modern texts.

Of all times, too, seems to be the concern about the tension between ideal and reality. The older documents contain warnings – civilian values and norms are on a slippery slope, future officers do not know how to behave, or the influx of cadets from other classes necessitates a constant attention for the socialization in norms and values.

During the Corps meeting of 6 March 1953 there were warnings against the ‘slipping into vulgarity and triviality instead of an inward civilization and self-discipline’. On 14 June 1952 the chairman of the Senate stated he saw the social, intellectual and cultural education of the cadet as the Corps’ main task, because ‘from a social point of view the officer belongs to a certain class which should be at the same intellectual and cultural level as that of academics’. So, the Senate has an educational value. It is therefore that in 1965 the Senate stated that the prospective officer’s behaviour was expected ‘to be in keeping with the norms of the social regions of the higher circles, in which the officer profession used to be embedded’. (Klinkert, 1998: 21)

In the period during which Lieutenant General Van der Wall Bake was Commandant of the RNLMA a ‘guide regarding the social intercourse of officers of the army and air force’ was published. This guide from 1967 had been written for officers in general, but from its preface it becomes clear that this particular version was expressly intended for educational purposes at the RNLMA (incidentally, there were more regulations intended for all officers, such as VS 2-2525 ‘Manners and Correspondence’). The introduction to this guide states the goals of the specific rules of conduct:

The officer is expected to be a civilized and educated person, who knows how to behave in any environment... After all, the officer comes into contact with distinguished and high-ranking persons...his services can also be required in functions that bring him into direct contact with diplomatic life and society... apart from that, as a military superior, the officer is expected to set an example for his subordinates in inward and outward civilization, showing himself to be truly ‘superior’. Moreover, through his good manners the officer makes life in the officers mess more pleasant for his colleagues and himself... It has to be realized that the officer corps cannot accept a mediocre level of civilization. The decay that set in during the war years, fortunately, has been reversed, so that good manners are widely appreciated once more.

From 1986 onwards the Cadets’ Association Board has published a Blue Booklet that functions as a guide to ‘good Corps or Mess membership’. In the 1993-4 edition of the Blue Booklet the Chef du Protocol Hugens wrote with regard to the so-called ‘lending’

behaviour of certain Corps members, that the norms of decency were interpreted wrongly, 'another example is the way in which some of you deal with colleagues (and others) that come from a different cultural climate. Seen against the background of your future function, I find these matters worrying'.

The level of civilization of the officer, according to these objectives, finds its roots in the past. It has to be guarded, for apparently there is the threat of decay or blurring of standards, caused either by wars, that threaten the level of civilization, or the continuous democratization

of the influx of cadets, making it necessary to familiarize cadets from the lower circles with the civilization norms of the officer. The rules of conduct are also functional, for an officer has to be able to behave in all environments, and certainly in circles where diplomacy and good taste are held in high esteem.

From time to time the rules of conduct need to be adapted because they have become old fashioned or impractical. In 1993 the Corps rules from the 'Blue Booklet' were even symbolically carried to their grave because they were felt to be too restrictive. New, more generally phrased, rules were presented in the brochure 'White on Black' in 1994. (Klinkert, 1998, 23) In this booklet the seven values of the Cadets' Corps, that today are seen as the standard for the behaviour of the cadets, are described. These seven rules will be discussed later.

The preface to the 2001 edition of 'White on Black' says the following on values, norms and rules of conduct:

'White on black', because not everything has to be black on white. This is the essence of this book and the Cadets' Corps. All the rules and customs that apply in our Corps, and that are also stated in 'White on Black', do not stand on their own. Their main function is to provide a good preparation for officership. Adherence to the rules and customs... is a guarantee for behaviour that will never let you down and therefore increases your self-confidence. This is true for your functioning in the Cadets' Corps, but in particular for later in the officer corps and civilian society as well.



It clearly differs from the introduction in the earlier publications. Of course, it is also about future functioning, but it is not anymore about learning behaviour that is dispositional, as if officer behaviour were acquired by birth, permanent and unchangeable. Much more than in the other introductions, this preface implies that behaviour is situational. There is an implicit recognition that there is a suitable behaviour for every situation, and that the norms of conduct provide 'a guarantee for behaviour that will never let you down'. The norms give a level of civilization for the behaviour that belongs to the officer, but the reference to the environments the officer will frequent is absent. The preface does not refer to the past, it does not point at an origin that in certain cases did not fully match the officer profession; it refers to a future as an officer, instead. The desired behaviour can be learned.

Outward appearance

Obviously, a training institute has many rules and regulations regarding dress. The most interesting ones, however, are those that relate to the off-duty hours of the cadets. After all, they will reveal the way in which the rules of conduct have an effect on an individual's life. In their spare time many cadets can be seen casually dressed, but in 1993-94 serious discussions were held on whether it was to be allowed to go into town 'collarless'. The official guidelines of the Corps, as laid down in the Blue Book, were very explicit, indeed. Men were not allowed to wear earrings and they had to have a decent hairstyle. The armed forces as a whole have freedom of hairstyle, but the Cadets' Corps has different rules. Side-whiskers were not to grow longer than halfway the ears and a beard was forbidden. Clothing had to be decent, and dungarees were not considered decent. Jeans were allowed, but not with repairs, damaged or bleached. Ladies in military dress were expected to wear their long hair held together by means of a ribbon or clip in neutral colours. With regard to trousers the same rules applied as for the men. Decent blouses or turtleneck sweaters were recommended, but 'when a sweater is worn, a collared blouse has to be worn underneath'. Needless to say, with regard to wearing a skirt, the length of this garment was also prescribed.

In 2001 these rules still applied more or less fully. There were some minor differences, but they did not change the essence of the regulations. Thus, in 2001 a beard or moustache was allowed if the direct commander and the Chef du Protocol approved. The section on 'outward appearance' is interesting:

As a cadet, and later as an officer, you are at all times a representative of the Armed Forces and at this moment of the RNLMA, in particular. That is why a correct appearance and dress are expected of you. They determine the 'first appearance', and the good image of a(n) (future) officer.

Associating with ‘fairy’ or ‘gnome’

In the past rules with regard to ‘social intercourse’ used to be very strict. Until several decades ago the leave arrangements were so restrictive that there was hardly an opportunity to make contact with civilians. One of the reasons for establishing the Cadets’ Corps in 1898 was to make the rules and regulations regime more bearable by providing relaxation and a social life of sorts. (Klinkert, 1998)

Leave arrangements were made less restrictive, but the rules of conduct with regard to contact with the young ladies of the Breda society meticulously dictated what was allowed and what was not. In the regulations (1967) regarding social intercourse of officers of the army and air force there are many rules that may seem old-fashioned nowadays, such as, ‘In the company of a lady, always let her go first when getting into a means of transport’, ‘Always leave the best part of the road to a lady’, ‘In uniform, do not walk arm in arm in public without a good reason’.

On Cadets’ Corps parties, of which the Assaut – the Cadets’ Annual Ball - is the high point, there are many rules to be observed. The 1993-1994 Blue Book, for instance, forbids excessive intimacies. What is to be qualified as such, is not specified, however. But the behaviour can never run out of hand far, because ‘the cadet is responsible for the behaviour of his ‘fairy’ or ‘gnome’’. ‘Fairies’ and ‘gnomes’ are the invited guests of the cadets on activities like the Assaut. When evening dress is required (as is the case with the Assaut), the ‘fairy’ has to wear an evening gown ‘down to several centimetres above the ankle’. Some regulations are of a more practical nature, such as, ‘When your ‘fairy’ is wearing an evening gown, take a taxi instead of a bike or motorcycle’. Other rules concern polite manners, such as, ‘never exclude a ‘fairy’ from conversations with your colleagues’, ‘talk about something else from time to time’, and ‘do not force yourself upon someone else’s ‘fairy’’. Courteous behaviour is expressed in such regulations as, ‘assist a ‘fairy’ when she wants to sit down’, ‘walk to the left of your ‘fairy’ and in the street, walk on the street side’.

The most striking thing in the 2001 edition of ‘White on Black’ regarding relations with the other sex is that the subject does not have its own section anymore. There are, however, instructions regarding the dress of partners during (gala) balls. Again it is stipulated that a public display of intimacies with one’s ‘fairy’ or ‘gnome’ will not be tolerated, and that the partner is at all times responsible for his/her guest. The cadets are advised to inform their partners about the traditions that apply within the Cadets’ Corps.

Table manners

The Cadets’ Corps sees it as its task to familiarize aspirant corps members with table manners. In order to teach them, a very clear instruction video has recently been made.

For the sake of the instruction cadets, who give the right example, are dressed in their ceremonial dress. This underlines the fact that formal table manners may always be important, but most certainly so at formal occasions like ceremonial dinners. It is only logical, the cadets state in their video, that the officer is familiar with table manners, for instance, at a regimental dinner. In doing so, they say that these table manners are part and parcel of the Academy.

The video first explains general civilian etiquette. Table seating, tableware, the arrangement of the many sorts of cutlery, the position and function of the serviette, and all other matters that are of importance at a dinner are discussed. Thus, it is better to wish each other a pleasant meal rather than a 'tasteful meal', as this in fact expresses some doubt as to the tastefulness of the meal. Under no condition is food to be brought to the mouth by means of the knife. Handling a fork is quite an art, for instance, in dealing with those awkward peas. What is quite funny in the tape is the use of almost 'vulgar language' to explain that eating in a common manner is not allowed. The voice-over in the video says, 'We do not plant the fork upright in a piece of meat in order to cut slices'. Other instructions are 'Take moderate helpings (do not be greedy), eat without making noises, with your mouth closed, and drink without slurping. Do not hang over the table. Do not bend forward with every bite. Sit up straight, legs next to each other, not crossed'. The protective attitude of placing an arm around the plate is rejected as a custom that stems from times of extreme poverty or situations of extreme food rivalry (think of prisons). This sort of behaviour clearly is not civilized.

The fact that it has become necessary to teach table manners to new generations of Cadets, means that they do not exist as a matter of course within the population of aspirant Corps members. With regard to specific values and norms typical for the Cadets' Corps some education is entirely in place. The Corps has some different table manners, although it has to be said that they have all but disappeared in the daily routine because of the introduction of the academy restaurant. The specific table manners dictate that the progress of the dinner is determined by the table eldest - a cadet with the highest seniority among the table companions. The more junior cadet pays his respects to the table eldest, or he introduces himself to him. When serving out the food, the dishes are to the left. Preferably, the lion emblem is kept clean. Should it become stained, it has to be wiped clean. In a cold meal a slice of bread is eaten by starting right hand bottom, and working counter-clockwise. Second-year cadets are allowed to place hands and wrists on the table. Third-year students may rest their elbows on the table between courses. To indicate one has finished the cutlery is laid down on the plate, round side up to show the lion emblem. The knife lies above the fork.

Punitive measures

Values and norms, etiquette and other regulations of the Cadets' Corps are not without obligation. They are guarded by a five-man strong Senate of the Cadets' Corps, assisted by a Chef du Protocol. This functionary, who is sometimes called the sixth senator, is responsible for changes in and compliance with the rules of conduct. The Senate can impose punishments of varying severity. It can admonish, impose obligations, deny rights, suspend or expel. In its 1969 statutes, rules and regulations/ disciplinary regulations, it is stated that, 'a cadet who has violated the Cadet's Promise, who has shown conduct, unworthy of the Corps, or conduct through which he has not fulfilled an obligation he was under as such, can be punished by the Senate'. In the statutes there is a further elaboration of the code of honour, 'Honesty, as mentioned in the Cadet's Promise, also means no cheating'. Indeed, in those days the Cadets' Corps itself saw to it that anyone found cheating during tests was punished. Nowadays, 'White on Black' still condemns all forms of dishonest behaviour; after all, 'You promise to be honest at all times. And by doing so you declare that as a cadet and aspirant officer you want to be free of lies'.

In order to guard values and norms the Senate established a Disciplinary Council (originally, in 1957, an honorary Council), and an Appeal Council. The Disciplinary Council is an organ that assesses the behaviour of Corps members in case there are complaints from other Corps members. The minutes of the Corps meeting of 7 December 1999 show that this body is very much alive, 'In comparison to previous years we have dealt with more cases than our predecessors. This does not mean that cadets have begun to behave more badly, it only means that the cadets are taking values and norms more seriously'. Apparently, there is some sort of cycle for the guarding of values and norms, with an upswing in 1999.

Corps meetings contributed to compliance with values and norms, for it was here that the criticism was voiced. (Klinkert, 1998: 25) Thus, cadets were 'held accountable for their behaviour, for instance, 'being in a public place, embracing a "fairy"' (1958), or 'Do not show in the train home that you have had enough of it' (1959). In the seventies there were still punishments for 'taking off one's jacket in a public place' (1971). With regard to values of chivalry the attitude towards the emerging phenomenon of the 'female cadet' is of importance. The Corps meeting debated on 'the extent to which a female cadet should be accepted as such, in other words, should a female cadet be treated like a male cadet, or as a woman first and foremost'? The meeting decided: 'A female cadet remains a woman, whom we also have to respect as such, when approaching her as a cadet'.

In recent years, too, it has regularly happened that cadets have had to be reminded of values and norms. This is shown, for instance, in a letter from the secretary of the

Cadets' Association Board and the Chef du Protocol from 1995:

Recently it has regularly happened that Corps members have taken their dinners with a sweaty body... After having done exercise it is normal to wash/shower first, before changing and going to dinner... If in the future again a situation, in which even *normal civilian decency* norms are violated, present itself, the Corps member will immediately be removed from the dining hall.

Severe punishments, including the expulsion from Corps activities, were demanded for a number of fourth-year Air Force cadets in 1996 who had really gone too far. They showed up at the Academy in wrong civilian dress (no collar, shirts hanging out of their trousers), they urinated against the wall of the dining hall and the Cadets' bar, and they stole the piano from the Spijker (the Cadets' bar) with the intention of throwing it down the stairs.

Informalizing and renewed explicitation

The complaint that cadets do not know how to behave is of all times. As is the criticism that the RNLMA is characterized by too many rules. This regularly gives occasion to debates on how strictly and explicitly the rules should be formulated. Times of tight regulation are followed by a relative relaxation, almost like a cycle in the extent of regulation. In 1993, the Blue Book, was, as mentioned above, symbolically buried, to indicate that the old rules had become obsolete. 'White on Black', the booklet that replaced it, departed from some seven generally phrased values of the Cadets Corps:

- 1 Act in the spirit of the Cadet's promise;
- 2 Show respect and tolerance towards others;
- 3 Honour the valuable traditions;
- 4 Show effort and creativity;
- 5 Show collegiality and bring solidarity;
- 6 Take your own responsibility;
- 7 Dress and behave decently.

In parallel with developments in civilian society this 'deregulation' can be seen as a movement towards informalization. (Wouters, 1985) In accordance with the idea in civilization theory (Elias, 1939), an increased affect control allows a less explicit mentioning of (all too explicit) manners as conduct becomes more and more civilized. But the informalization that started in the sixties is already on the wane, according to youth sociologists such as Ter Bogt and Hibbel (2000). In the nineties the young are again fairly attached to traditional values and norms. Even the traditional institution of marriage enjoys an increase in popularity.

As mentioned above, the subtitle of 'White on Black' is 'because not everything is black on white'. This title is a clear indication of the informalization tendency. Certain norms of civilization do not have to be put in writing, but belong to an attained level of civilization. However, the swing of the pendulum that characterises developments of regulation and deregulation also applies to the informalization tendency among cadets, as in 2001 the seven values are even more explicitly explained than in 1993! 'White on Black' counts 32 pages and with that it is 11 pages thicker than the old Blue Book. It is at least as explicit as the old booklet, if not more so. The values and norms are elaborately presented and explained. But there are also topics that were not discussed in the 1993 version, such as 'correspondence' and 'forms of address'.

Conclusions and hypotheses: values of chivalry without chivalry

The central conclusion of this chapter is that values of chivalry still have their place in the life of a cadet and consequently also in officer socialization. At the same time the chivalry itself has eroded. The origin of etiquette and values of chivalry are to be found historically in the nobility and the system of knighthood. Because of the democratization of the recruitment, cadets are increasingly coming from all layers of society and the natural foundation for the values of chivalry has disappeared. Earlier prefaces to the guides for etiquette identify the changing social composition of the Cadets' Corps as one of the legitimizations for the socialization in manners and rules of conduct.

There are several reasons for the fact that the values of chivalry still exist, while chivalry itself has disappeared. The first is that etiquette and values of chivalry are functional for the work of the officer. Courage, honour, and discipline are values and norms that are essential on the battlefield or in aerial combat. Courtesy and etiquette were once essential requirements because officers often found themselves in diplomatic or court circles. The relevance of these values and norms, however, has not decreased, for nowadays especially peace operations require diplomatic skills of the officer-communicator/officer-diplomat. (Soeters, 1998) Norbert Elias, as one of the first, already pointed at the fact that military training institutes proved to be able to meet the need for both scientific and professional know-how as well as make a contribution to the socialization of cadets within the framework of values and norms of the officer corps. Probably military academies are the most suitable institutions to bring about a fusion between civilian knowledge and military-chivalrous values and norms.

The second reason can be derived from Richard Sennet's work. The manners/rules of conduct of the etiquette system give a certain firmness and safety within an environment that is strongly characterized by inequality in rank and status. Not only is there a great inequality between cadre and cadets, but also among the cadets themselves, espe-

cially in the relation between senior and junior year-cadets. Etiquette remains important because there will always be inequality at a military academy. Rules of conduct allow people of unequal rank to communicate with each other in a civilized way.

A third reason is the urge felt by every group to distinguish itself from others. In 1965 Van Hessen could still maintain that military academies, apart from providing professional knowledge, of old had also had the function of elite formation. 'Elite' in his view meant a group of people who demand a number of privileges for themselves on the basis of very specific knowledge, power of position, values and norms. When officers were still mainly recruited from the nobility, it was obvious that their values and norms were also those of the noble elite. Whether elite formation is still one the functions of the RNLMA and the Cadets' Corps remains open for debate. On the one hand, there is a reluctance to use the term 'social elite'. On the other, there is still a lot to be said for the argument of the chairman of the Senate of 1952, quoted above, who maintained that the officer should be formed 'at the same intellectual and cultural level... as that of the academics'. If academics are considered a certain elite, then this also holds good for officers. Let us leave the question about whether the RNLMA still has the function of elite formation. It is, however, possible to speak of what Pierre Bourdieu calls the need to distinguish oneself. Socialization in a very specific habitus and cultural capital results in a professional grouping of officers that reproduces its esprit de corps. In doing this, it distinguishes itself from other professionals, not necessarily as a group that feels superior to others (for that would be elite formation), but different (and unique) and therefore distinct from others.

The objective of this preliminary study into developments of the habitus of the Cadets' Corps was to generate hypotheses, which is why this chapter is concluded with a number of them. They relate to the period from the sixties onwards and the describe trends that are still ongoing.

- 1 Etiquette at the RNLMA is retained, as it enables a safe communication between people of unequal rank and status. As long as this inequality exists, etiquette will have a function.
- 2 The difference between cadets and students at civilian universities with regard to values and norms will increase because universities are exposed to a larger extent to influences from the broader society (where there is less inequality).
- 3 Within the cadet population the discrepancy between the norm and actual behaviour will increase. After all, the norm remains stable, whereas the behaviour evolves. This can lead to:
 - a. adjustment of the norm;
 - b. an increase in 'furtive' behaviour;
 - c. a policy of tolerance, where the norm still exists on paper, but where the

behaviour is adjusted to the norms and values of the broader society.

- 4 There is a cycle in which 'innovation and modernization', on the one hand, alternate with 'restoration' and 'warnings against the slipping and blurring of norms', on the other.
- 5 Punishment will keep pace with the social development, so it will not only become more lenient, but its limitations as an instrument will become clearer from the sixties onwards.

Whether these hypotheses are correct or not, will have to be borne out by further investigation. Finally, institutes of officer education aim at reaching a fusion between civilian knowledge and military values and norms – in the present chapter these values and norms were called values of chivalry. Their whole point is that 'one knows how to behave as an officer'. What this means, can differ in different times. The curriculum, the comprehensive body of knowledge that is offered to the cadets during their education, is probably not decisive for the functioning of an officer (another hypothesis worth investigating!). Character building is most likely the factor that gives the education at the RNLMA its surplus value. In order to build character one needs time, and that is why the education lasts four years! In his book *'The Credential Society'* (1979) Randall Collins maintains that the 'hidden' curriculum of the institutions is at least as important as the official one. The things students learn outside the lectures, are often precisely the things that determine professional success. All the more reason to cherish the remaining values of chivalry, though not without a simultaneous critical evaluation of whether they are still relevant, or whether they are too different from civilian society and whether they facilitate or hamper the functioning of cadets.

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Notes

- ¹ Orders to cadets have been left out of consideration here, as these documents pertain to RNLMA-imposed regulations, rather than the internal Corps rules themselves.

The German model – between past and future

The continuous struggle between humanistic general education and professional training of the German officer 1808 – 2002

Dieter Kollmer

Abstract

Prusso-German officer training has always been a combination of practice and theory. In contrast to the pure ‘Cadets’ Academy education’ of other nations, the Prusso-German aspirant officer for centuries has first learned the practical soldiering of his arm or service on all levels before enriching these experiences with theoretical knowledge in special officer courses. The article reviews the development of Prusso-German officer training throughout the past two centuries, describing the various preconditions, main emphases, objectives and results. It also compares briefly the German and Dutch approaches of educating their aspirant officers and cadets. The conclusion discusses the recent problems and the future challenges of the German officer training.

Basic principles of the Prussian-German officer education^I

Prusso-German officer education has of old been a combination of practice and theory. In contrast to the pure ‘Cadets’ Academy-education’ of other nations, the Prusso-German aspirant officer for centuries has first learned the practical soldiering of his arm or service on all levels (in the rank of private, NCO and Warrant Officer), before enriching these experiences with theoretical knowledge in special officer courses. This ‘continuing swing between the academic and practical characters of the education’ (Bald, 1982:101) forms another constant factor in the permanent struggle for the optimal education of new generations of officers. Reforms in officer education were usually realized much later than political, social, economic and scientific changes. (Kutz, 1982: 13) Therefore, the development of the Prusso-German officer education is best described by the various preconditions, main emphases, objectives and results.



Saxonian cadet early 19th century

Saxonian cadets' school early 19th century



Officer education after the Prussian Army reform of 1808

In early 1808, after several disastrous defeats of the Prussian army by Napoleon's armed forces, the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm III tasked General von Scharnhorst (Hornung, 1997; Schieder, 1985: 5-20)² to reform the officer recruitment and education of the royal Prussian army. In their battles with Napoleon's troops the Prussian officers had shown considerable shortcomings, mainly related to their insufficient intellectual flexibility. Scharnhorst concluded that the intellectual and discerning capacities of the officer had to be increased by offering a broad education, in order to live up to the demands of modern warfare in the era of Enlightenment. (Bertram, 1969:166ff) Thus, the reform of the officer education was determined primarily by the changes in the conduct of war, created by the French Revolution and the ensuing military conflicts. But also the Enlightenment, with its ideal of the broadly educated individual, had an influence on the reorganization of the officer education within the context of the Prussian army reform of 1808. (Bertram, 1969:169-173)

In order to achieve these lofty objectives, the main emphasis of the officer education in the Prussian army was fundamentally changed: away from the voluntaristic character building of the traditional, feudal officer, towards the intellectual education of a modern, dynamic officer. (Demeter, 1962: 76ff; Hackl, 1995: 199ff) Henceforth, the level of education was going to be the determining criterion for the professional development of the officer and not his noble background.³ This is where the continuous struggle for the consolidation of the humanistic education in the Prusso-German officer education found its origin. It is a struggle that even at the beginning of the 21st century still flares up from time to time.⁴

The continuous change in the Prusso-German officer education during the 19th century

The reformed officer education along Scharnhorst's lines ran fundamentally counter to the ideas of the traditional voluntaristic feudal officer corps of the Prussian army. (Demeter, 1962:76) After Scharnhorst's death in 1813 the opponents of the changes

rallied. It was in particular the largely uneducated landed gentry⁵ that protested against the King's 'ingratitude' for faithful services that had been rendered for centuries.⁶ The weak King immediately reacted so that in the years to come the education was constantly modified to the demands of the landed gentry, who were the traditional suppliers of officer recruits.

The appointment of lecturers for the new education centres, too, gave trouble. The lecturers were often officers, who held a simultaneous command in the local garrison. Because of this double duty the level dropped so deeply, that a lecturer of the '*Allgemeine Kriegsschule*' in 1830 commented:

What was wrong with the school (the '*Allgemeine Kriegsschule*') is that it just was not a school. [...] In fact anyone could do as they pleased' (Brandt, 1969:200). This development prompted the reformer General Hermann von Boyen to warn that 'general education of the officer [is] important, if he is not to lose the respect of the other classes. (Bertram, 1969: 65)

In this period of time there were a few responsible officers who actively opposed the pushing back of the general education element in the officer education. These generally broadly educated officers did not strive for a scientification of the officer education, but rather the application of the latest scientific insights to the military profession, in order to keep up with the technological, political, social and economic changes in the state and society. Between 1840 and 1872 their most prominent representative was General Eduard von Peucker. (Bald, 1978: 21-28) It was also on his initiative that the new Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV issued an order that made the civilian educational ideal an integral part of Prussian officer education. As a consequence of the Revolution of 1848, even, all military education centres were to be dissolved and the officer education to be transferred to the universities, in order to increase the level. These attempts, however, were rejected by the army on grounds of absence of any practical elements. Conservative circles, mostly comprising the landed gentry, vehemently opposed the civilian educational tendencies in the officer education, as they found



Saxonian cadets early 19th century

it increasingly more difficult, mainly for financial reasons, to prepare their offspring adequately. (Kutz, 1982: 17)

From 1871 onwards, on the initiative of General von Peucker, the possession of a university entry certificate became a prerequisite for every officer candidate. The only exception was made for those candidates who had gone through cadets' schools before their application. They were to ensure the continued supply of new generations of officers from the so-called 'preferred circles'. (sons of noblemen, soldiers and senior civil servants) (Bald, 1982: 102ff) This was a concession mainly to the landed gentry, who would otherwise have increased their opposition against this development even more. The result was a dualism in the officer education between a highly theoretical and a purely practical education, as the graduates of the cadets' schools were immediately appointed as lieutenants in these years. The result was a quite heterogeneous Prussian officer corps. (Demeter, 1962: 85)

Officer education in the German Empire 1871-1918

After their successful conduct of the Unification Wars (1864-1871), especially the victorious Prussian officer corps lay claim to a prominent role in the German society. This claim, however, was out of keeping with the social and scientific developments in the German empire. The clear mismatch between claim and reality caused the military to position itself in a self-elected 'intellectual isolation'. A critical and open exchange of ideas with the leading layers of society was absent in the years following and this eventually led to a flawed development, or rather misperception in the officer corps of the Imperial Army, which would prove to be disastrous. As a result 'education' was held by many, mainly noble, officers as a civilian achievement that was incompatible with the 'practical interests of the military' (Bertram, 1969: 61ff; Bald, 1982: 102). This irrational 'hostility towards education' (Bald, 1982:103) even went to the extent that the officer education was designed diametrically opposed to the generally accepted and enlightened realization, that in view of technological progress, leading functions could only be fulfilled adequately by broadly educated professionals. (Ostertag, 1990: 305ff) Lacking the expertise to solve the problems of the day, the officer corps declined more and more into an uncritical instrument of an obsolete political and social order. (Bertram, 1969: 85)

The decades-long efforts of the reform-oriented officers around Eduard von Peucker, who, first as German War Minister (1848-1849), later as Prussian General Inspector of military training and education (1854-1872), had used the full weight of his influence to create a broad academic officer education, were undone within a few months. The conservative powers prevailed and with regard to the question of the main emphasis of the officer education they were to dominate the discussion on the main effort of the offi-

cer education for many decades to come. (Bald, 1978: 21ff) From 1873 onwards the Chief of the German General Staff, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, the elder, pushed through an increasingly military education, because of bad experiences with the military performance of the subaltern officers during the Unification Wars. (Bertram, 1969: 72; Hackl, 1995:202)

From now on the officer education in the Prussian army lay in the affective learning domain - the building of strength of character and temper - , rather than in the cognitive domain - the intensive transfer of academic knowledge. In the German Imperial Army there was not a single institution to further the higher education of any interested and talented officer. (Bertram, 1969: 73) Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the writings and biographies of older officers, who were socialized in this period, reveal a lack of any special interest in a broad general education. It was more the daily military routine, the upholding of personal 'honour' and the 'building of character' that determined the life of most aspirant and subaltern officers in the German empire (Ostertag, 1990: 308ff). Consequently, the determining criterion for the careers of most officers was not the demonstrable aptitude as an officer, but rather a readiness to fight duels, outward bearing and a strong will in what was deemed to be 'noble tradition'. (Bald, 1982: 105)⁷

Moltkes nephew and his later successor in the function of Chief of the General Staff of the Prussian Army, General Helmuth von Moltke, the younger, increased the imbalance between military-specific educational content and more general aspects of the education even further in 1907 with his reform of the officer education (Hackl, 1995: 203). Thus, a cabinet order, instigated by him, simply forbade the discussion of social-political problems in the officer education. (Nittner, 1980: 95) The attitude of *Kaiser* Wilhelm II clearly supported this development (Demeter, 1962: 88), which was eventually to prove a fatal one because of the military-technological progress and the ensuing tactical innovations before and during World War I.

A false sense of honour ('a hero's death'⁸), a lack of know-how about the potentials of modern technology and a persistence in the tactical principles of 19th century warfare caused extremely high losses among the subaltern officers of the Imperial Field Army in the beginning of the war. (Ostertag, 1990: 309ff) The decisive mistakes of the German generals during the war can be traced back to the same causes. Hardly any of the senior decision makers possessed the ability to assess the significance and consequences of their military decisions with regard to the coming developments. The officer education of the Empire had failed completely in this respect. Most officers had been ill-prepared to conduct a war in the industrial age. Flexibility and imaginative leadership in Von Clausewitz' sense remained exceptions. This negligence was to cost the German nation dear.

Officer education in the Weimar Republic 1921-1933⁹

The experiences from World War I should have led to fundamental changes in officer education of the armed forces of the first German republic. Unfortunately, the terms of the Versailles Treaty dictated an education for the future officer of the new German Armed Forces which was strictly military, weapon-technical, craft-oriented (Hackl, 1995: 204). This accorded with the private interests of the leading military in Germany, as in the emotional disputes on who bore the main guilt of the military defeat, the actual losers - the German military - escaped their responsibility. Worse even, those who wanted to lay part of the blame on the military were accused of defeatism. In the eyes of the officer corps everything had been done right and the reputation of the Army remained unblemished. As a result, the *Reichswehr* could continue to educate its officer recruits in the way the Imperial Army leadership had been used to doing (Ostertag, 1990: 312ff).

Under these circumstances the Chief of the Land Forces General Hans von Seeckt¹⁰ rebuilt the *Reichswehr* (Klein, 1985: 19), and quite consistently he fell back on the Imperial education concept: 'character before achievement' was his premise (Bald, 1982: 107). In spite of the fact that this model was more oriented towards the practice of the officer profession, the entry requirements for the aspirant officers were raised. The reason for that was, on the one hand, the closing down of the cadets' schools, that in the past had enabled the 'preferred classes' to pursue an officer career without a university entry certificate, and the great number of candidates for the small number of officer functions in an army of 100,000 men, on the other. (Demeter, 1962: 103) This in its turn had an effect on the preparatory education of the successful applicants: between 90 and 100% of the candidates who were admitted to the *Reichswehr* in the period of the Weimar Republic had at least obtained their university entry certificate (Bald, 1982: 115). Building on this preparatory education the military-specific education attained an extremely high level in the *Reichswehr*. (Demeter, 1962: 106)

In stark contrast to this, the political and general education of the aspirant officers in the Weimar Republic was reduced to an absolute minimum. (Klein, 1985: 19) The battalion and regimental commanders were responsible for the political education, and its intensity and quality were directly dependent on whether they had any interest in the subject. (Bertram, 1969, 88ff) Very often the result was an extreme view of the world. This was deliberate, as von Seeckt pursued the aim of keeping the army completely out of the general political mainstream, so that it could not be used by one political faction against another, as had been the case in the early years of the Weimar Republic. Unfortunately, the consequence was that many, especially subaltern, officers did not grasp and appreciate the political development in the German Reich in the early thirties. (Bertram, 1969: 97)

The demise of the traditional Prussian officer corps in the Third Reich

After the seizure of power by the Nationalsocialists the 'unpolitical' officer corps of the *Reichswehr* was completely swept off its feet by the social and political developments. (Klein, 1985: 19ff) At first the leadership of the *Reichswehr* had enthusiastically welcomed the 'remilitarisation of the Reich', only to realize very soon that the build-up of armed forces ten times their size could not be realized by representatives of the usual 'officer classes' only. (Kroener, 1991: 280)¹¹ The subsequent integration of the former police and reserve officers and NCOs into the officer corps of the Wehrmacht during the expansion of the armed forces, and the enlargement of the officer corps from 4,000 *Reichswehr* officers to 24,000 *Wehrmacht* officers from 1935 onwards, resulted in an extremely heterogeneous social group. A uniform level of education was out of the question, and the same applied to the socialization and the sense of identity of the German officer. Bit by bit the old Prussian officer corps was systematically broken down by the Nationalsocialists.

The integration of the *Wehrmacht* in the people, aspired to by the 'Nationalsocialist movement', also entailed a fundamental change in the education of officers. The number of those who could produce a university entry certificate, fell by almost 30% up to 1939, compared with that of the Weimar Republic. (Kroener, 1991: 291) That is why the *Wehrmacht* was unable to attain the level of education of the *Reichswehr* officer; worse even, in the Third Reich an educated officer was deemed a contradiction in terms. This went to the extent that officers were officially forbidden to use academic titles. (Bald, 1982: 108ff) Developments like these fully reflected the intention of the Nationalsocialist leadership to position the 'able' in key functions of society, without the arrogance of class or education. An eagerness to bear responsibility, a superior ability, an untiring care, character and achievement became the decisive selection criteria for the future *Wehrmacht* officer. (Klein, 1985: 19) Besides, the Nationalsocialist ideology was gradually introduced into the officer education. The extent to which this development led to a changed behavioural pattern among the young officers, cannot be clearly understood anymore nowadays. (Klein, 1985: 19) It is, however, beyond doubt that the Nationalsocialist ideology as well as the high losses in the course of WWII fundamentally changed the structure of traditional selection criteria and educational mechanisms of the officer corps of the German armed forces. (Kroener, 1991: 282ff) The high social mobility, aspired for by all sectors of society, could therefore be realized especially among the young ambitious military leaders because they were in great demand. (Kroener, 1991: 269ff)

During WWII the *Wehrmacht* command tried to carry out the so-called 'selection of the best', putting 'character and heart above reason'. (Bald, 1982: 108ff) Hitler even personally stated in 1943 that only strong-willed, eager men, immune to stress, could

become officers. The decisive criterion from this point in time onwards was ‘proof of military aptness’, which would enable ‘the officer candidates without the formerly required scientific education to become fully-fledged officers’. (Bald, 1982: 109) Subsequently, the education became exclusively practical and it fell mainly into the hands of front-experienced officers. (Hackl, 1995: 206) The Nationalsocialist ideology and the high losses during the war had turned a class-oriented, value-based, political-social elite into a purely functional elite. (Kroener, 1991: 283) It was also because of this reason that the once relatively homogeneous group lost the fraternal ‘norm guarding’ of its own code of honour. The result was a differentiated perception within this important social group with regard to the events of the war, the assassination attempt of 20 July 1944 and the discussions on the new armed forces in a democratic community.

The build-up of the *Bundeswehr* in the context of *innere Führung*

With the handing over of the certificates of appointment to the first 100 volunteers on 12 November 1955, the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr had already given a clear signal by their choice of date. Gerhard von Scharnhorst’s 200th birthday was intended to symbolize a completely new start. (Klein, 1985: 13) From the outset the politicians wanted to prevent the founding of the armed forces of the second German republic taking place outside the political mainstream, as had been the case during the Weimar Republic. For this purpose a concept was developed that made it the personal responsibility of every leader to take care of his own general and political education, and that of his subordinates. This so-called *innere Führung* did not only comprise political education, but also military pedagogy (leading of men) history, military law as well as complaints regulations and disciplinary rules became elements of this new internal structure of the nascent *Bundeswehr*. This entirely new concept was to facilitate the integration of the armed forces in the democratic structures that had already been firmly estab-



Genealogical table of
the German officer schools 1616 - present

lished in the Federal Republic of Germany by that time.¹² The indefatigable pioneer of the *innere Führung* was the former *Wehrmacht* Major Wolf Graf von Baudissin.¹³ He ardently worked for a new role for the armed forces and with it the officer corps within the democratic society of the Federal Republic of Germany. In order to emphasize the importance of this decisive change, already in the first year of the *Bundeswehr* the 'Centre for *innere Führung*' was set up as an educational and research centre to conduct ongoing critical research into this important concept.¹⁴

That this step was necessary was clear from the lengthy discussions on the officer education in the building-up phase of the *Bundeswehr*. Officers who had been socialized in the *Wehrmacht* were of the opinion that the army was a 'fraternity of men who fight and share one destiny' and that, consequently, the officer education should be oriented in that direction. (Bald, 1982: 109; Kroener, 1991: 295; Kutz, 1982: 38ff) Especially during the first decade of the *Bundeswehr* the military skills of the officer were stimulated by the many senior officers who had served in the war. From their point of view general education, though appreciated, was unimportant for the practical military profession, for some even inconvenient. (Blad, 1982: 134; Kutz, 1982: 41ff) Concepts such as discipline and obedience were still very prominent in the education of the new officer generation.¹⁵ Longwinded discussions between 'practicians' and 'theoreticians' were the result. These problems could only be resolved with the alternation of the war to the post-war generations. (Nittner, 1980: 96) The revolutionary concept of *innere Führung* established itself as the years passed, and nowadays the German Armed Forces are impossible to imagine without this stable core, which, naturally provides the foundation for the education of new officer generations.¹⁶

The development of the officer education in the *Bundeswehr* during the Cold War

In view of the very high pace of the build-up (an envisaged 600,000 men in five years) the first aspirant officers of the *Bundeswehr* received only a very short education, with many already being promoted to 2nd lieutenant after 14 months (Kutz, 1982: 93). As a consequence, they could not be adequately educated to become officers in the *Bundeswehr* and many had to acquire important professional knowledge through self study in the course of their careers. On top of that an insufficient educational level of the candidates made matters even more difficult, with only 68% of the aspirant officers having obtained their university entry qualification. (Bald, 1982: 108ff) So in the early years the high demand for personnel influenced the intellectual quality of the education. On top of that the education was mostly of a practical military nature in the first decade of the *Bundeswehr*, which, up to a certain extent, was also due to the many lecturers with war experience. (Kutz, 1982: 55ff) For the time being, education as a whole remained the

playing field of an insecure army, which, in the absence of an official policy, educated officers on the basis of its own war experiences.

This situation changed from the mid-sixties onwards, when the realization took hold that it was high time to adapt the officer education to social and scientific progress. To begin with, the university entry qualification was made a compulsory pre-requisite for an aspirant officer of the *Bundeswehr*: more than 97% of the officers commissioned since 1965 have met this condition. (Bald, 1982: 117ff) Between 1965 and 1971 the contents of the education was adapted in three phases to the assumed social and psychological development stages of officers. The emphasis in this concept was an 'effective mix of theoretical and practical, general and military professional-technocratic elements.' (Kutz, 1982: 88ff)

In the discussions between the 'practicians' and 'theroreticians' during the longest period of peace that Germany had known in the twentieth century, the balance had once again tipped in favour of the latter. (Bald, 1982: 117) This development was mainly due to the decisive change during the second decade of the Cold War in the image of the officer profession, whose challenges increasingly corresponded with those of civilian executives. Realizing that an officer can only meet the broad intellectual challenges of his profession if he is educated at a high level, the Ministry of Defence promulgated the best possible education for its officers when it made a general pre-university certificate and a university study obligatory in 1970. (Bald, 1982: 119) For this purpose the two *Bundeswehr* Universities in Hamburg and Munich were established in October 1973. Since then every future officer in the *Bundeswehr* who wishes to serve at least twelve years in the armed forces, has had to follow a university study. The study is organized and exams are taken according to the rules and regulations of the educational institutions of the respective federal states.¹⁷ The Army's main objective of this approach is the automatic adaptation of the education of its leaders to the general level, in order not be cut off from social and scientific progress. Therefore, the officer acquires an education that also qualifies him for civilian professions, which will facilitate the changeover, should he choose to leave the armed forces.¹⁸ The range of subjects corresponds with that of a medium-sized civilian German university. The officer student of the *Bundeswehr* can choose from among a range of subjects as diverse as political economy, business economics, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, information technology and aeronautics and space technology, history, political science and educational science.

The maximum target, set in 1972, of every staff officer of the *Bundeswehr* having completed a university education, had to be abandoned very soon, however: every year only two thirds of the officers obtain a university degree. Nevertheless, a solid, completed academic education greatly increases career opportunities. This is clearly shown by the


fact that the percentage of undergraduates and graduates increases with rank in the hierarchy of the organization. (Blad, 1982: 130ff) The academic background is an important foundation for the higher courses, making it unnecessary to use valuable time to acquire basic knowledge. In this respect, too, the universities of the *Bundeswehr* have established themselves over the years as an integral part of the officer education and the organization cannot very well be imagined without them anymore nowadays. (Klein & Lippert, 1993, 198)

After the end of the Cold War, however, the last few years have seemed to show a redressing of the balance into the direction of the 'practicians'. Not least as a result of the first missions abroad, which, naturally, to a large extent make a demand on the practical side of the officer profession, the voices of those who argue for an essentially stronger practical officer education become louder. (Bald, 1982: 119; Kutz, 1982: 96ff; Trull, 2002: 9) This urge is difficult to understand in the light of an environment that is becoming increasingly complex. The *Bundeswehr* officer has to be an educator, teacher and leader at the same time. In order to fulfil the no-doubt difficult duties towards his subordinates, he has to be able to understand complex subjects and to translate them in the vein of what his superiors require him to do. As only very few people can do this from birth, it has to be learned systematically. Also in this respect the study at a university is an ideal preparation for a leadership task in the armed forces of a highly industrialized service, because an officer can only live up to his responsibilities as a leader if he can fully understand the consequences of his actions. This is only possible, however, when he understands the complexities of his job, its place and meaning in the totality of things. What it leads to when the majority of German officers are not capable of doing this, the German people had to experience twice in the 20th century.

Elaboration: officer education in the German army in the beginning of the 21st century

The young people who nowadays want to become officers in the German army mainly come from civil servant families. In principle they have obtained their university entry certificate, and they are mature enough to go to university. (Trull, 2002: 9) Never before

German warrant officers
sitting a military law test



in German history have the general conditions for the education of aspirant officers been so good as in the last twenty years. Nevertheless, it is a great challenge in the so-called fun society at the turn of the century to make young people who want to become officers understand why their service is of importance for the society in which they have grown up. (Trull, 2002: 13)

The traditional contents still make up an important part of the officer curriculum in the *Bundeswehr*. The future officers will have to master the art of joined and combined warfare¹⁹, with the education in joint operations becoming more and more important (Korff, 2002, 5). In his political education the aspirant officer must internalize the values of the freedom-loving democratic constitutional state, because he is the quintessence of the society which, as an officer, he has to defend in case of an emergency. This is especially important, as, unfortunately, in their school education the young people are not made aware of this. (Trull, 2002: 12)



Infantry school

Besides, in the light of new threat scenarios, additional competencies must be built up. Since the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and the ensuing melting away of the confrontation of only two camps, war has been subject to the rules of globalization (Korff, 2002: 2). The task of soldiers was, and is, always clearly defined by a political mandate and bound by the general national and international legal position. Friend and foe, on the contrary, cannot always be distinguished clearly, and this makes it impossible to provide uniform guidelines for a concrete pattern of behaviour. In order to enable the future officers of the *Bundeswehr* to live up to their great responsibility, to make the right decisions in each situation on their own, the basic convictions of German society are taught as a firm ethical and values-oriented foundation. For this purpose the aspirant officers get subjects such as political education, military history and military law. Along with language education, these subjects serve to increase an inter-cultural competence in the aspirant officers, which in future will allow them to understand the behavioural patterns of the people in the countries they are supposed to protect.

Coming from society that for more than fifty years has lived in true peace, to be sent to countries that find themselves in a state of war, requires a disciplined, humane and upright attitude in a military leader. In the subject of leadership great store is set by the development of this characteristic, in particular.

The missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan have shown that the officer can very quickly find himself in a situation in which, involuntarily, he has to make local level political decisions, simply because he is often the highest authority present. In the Federal Republic, so far, it has been valued, on the basis of historical experience, that the soldier behaves impartially in the execution of his duties and acts without any political considerations. Because of this, extra course material has been added to the officer curriculum, stressing the importance of thinking and acting beyond the confines of the actual military task itself. (Korff, 2002: 4) To this end the aspirant officers at the Army Officer School get classes that already prepare them extensively for their future tasks within the framework of the broader task spectrum (EAS) and peace support operations (PSO). (Korff, 2002: 4) These classes build on the general knowledge gained from subjects such as political education, military law and military history, and they should equip the officer to make confident, well-balanced decisions in cases like the ones described above. The deployment within the EAS and PSO, however, have also led to curtailments in the officer education. Thus, the commander of the Cavalry school, General Trull, complained that because of the justified claims of the units deployed abroad, the tasks in Germany itself could not be executed adequately anymore. Worse even, that parts of the officer education, in spite of great efforts, cannot not be realized anymore because the defence budget and personnel department do not provide enough personnel to fulfil all these important tasks. (Trull, 2002: 10) This is a serious development that can only be stopped by a clear political decision. Either more educators are appointed, which comes down to more vacancies and higher costs, or the decision makers spend less money on EAS and PSO tasks of the *Bundeswehr*.



German Officersschool, Albertstadt, Dresden

The process of adaptation to the new security and global situation has only just begun in the *Bundeswehr* and it will take a lot of time to bring the opportunities and demands of this new situation into line. The people in the *Bundeswehr* responsible for solving these vast problems have, however, the best possible prospects: an extensive, sound officer education, practical as well as theoretical!

A brief comparison between the modern Dutch and German officer education

The Dutch as well as the German officer education has the aim to prepare young people as efficiently as possible to assume leadership positions in their respective armed forces, in the political, social, technological and military environment of the beginning of the 21st century. To realize this, both countries have chosen a very different approach, based on their own traditions and developments. Contrary to the Dutch cadets, who receive their initial three-year education and socialization at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy at Breda, the aspirant officer of the German Army receives an education which offers a constant alternation of practice and theory, troop command and school. The climaxes of this education are the six-month officer course at the Officer School of the Army in Dresden and the three-to four-year university study at one of the two *Bundeswehr* universities. It can take up to seven years before the German officer takes up his first long-term command, after which he is immediately available as a fully-fledged platoon commander and 2iC of his company.

The advantage of the Dutch system is without doubt the Corps spirit that grows during the education at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy. Going through three years together means getting to know the strengths and weaknesses of one's fellow cadets, not exclusively of one's own year group. An identity is created and emotional ties are forged. The only thing cadets who get this very good military education lack is the practical element that their German counterparts experience from their first day of their education. The constant alternation of theory and practice is the strength of the German education. What is problematical here, though, is the early division of the aspirant officers into arms and services, which, in their eyes, are to some extent very different from each other. Because of this the arms and services rather than the officer corps (or cadets' corps) often become the identification model for the young people.

It is important for the future of both educational systems that, in order to achieve a greater efficiency of joint and combined deployments and an even closer European co-operation, the most important educational and leadership procedures of all potential partners are known. It is desirable, moreover, that in the medium term common standards in the officer education be developed, based on the co-operation established so far in the former 3 (GE) Panzerdivision and the German-Netherlands Corps.

Conclusion

The Prusso-German officer education has been a constant mix of practice and theory since 1808. In contrast with the pure 'cadets' education' of other nations the German aspirant officer first learns the practical soldiering of his arm or service on all military levels, after which he enriches this experience with theoretical knowledge acquired in special officer courses. Nevertheless, as historian Detlef Bald states:

...the to-ing and fro-ing between 'practicians' and 'theoreticians', between character building and scientific education [...] has repeatedly led to a neglect of an education that goes beyond the purely profession-related know-how, with a receptiveness to the world, problem awareness and a responsibility for the environment, with an insight into historical-political, economic and social relations' (Bald, 1982: III)

This was certainly also caused by the fact that wars time and again gave the military leadership the conviction that only the harsh reality of battlefield experiences could give the young man the adequate tools for carrying out his leadership tasks. Conversely, during longer periods of peace, in broad sections of the more progressive officer corps, the need to enlarge academic knowledge on the basis of practical skills made itself felt. Naturally, this wish was always closely connected to the need to bear in mind the technological, economic and social developments of the German society.

The Prussian army reformers of 1808, in particular Gerhard von Scharnhorst and Hermann von Boyen, laid the foundation for the German general officer education. Over the past two hundred years the importance of a comprehensive education of the officer in the German Armed Forces has steadily increased. In the course of time, the realization has taken hold that only the educated officer will be capable of understanding the consequences of his actions, and thus fulfil his task. (Nittner, 1980: 107) The discussion about the value of a general officer education developed in parallel with the emancipation of the middle classes from the nobility in Germany. Here, too, general education played a prominent role. The expenses of a broad education and a university study became a lever in the hands of the wealthy middle classes employed against the politically and socially ruling nobility. In the ever-increasing pace with which the world changed, it became inevitable to further develop the classic educational ideas. The German military was reluctant for a very long time to fundamentally change the selection and education of its new officers, that had been steeped in noble tradition. Only the fatal development during the Third Reich and World War II broke open the closed class of the Prussian officer corps and changed it into a functional professional class in a modern industrial society. (Kroener, 1991: 296) This fundamental change was of major importance for the development of the fledgling *Bundeswehr* in the first years of its exis-

tence. The education of the aspirant officers was designed on the basis of the principles of a democratic society and not those of the officer corps, as had still been the case in the Weimar Republic. It is true, at first there were still some considerable problems on account of the demands and methods of those who had taken part in the war, but this changed when the war scenarios tended towards nuclear war and the war generation was phased out. With the decision to make a university study a part of every officer's education, the *Bundeswehr* made a qualitative leap forward, which is amply demonstrated by the extent to which graduates take up key positions in the armed forces.

The education has been adapted to EAS and PSO and will be adapted to new future challenges. It is important to ensure that the 'practicians' do not get the opportunity again to change the officer education into a sort of super practice-oriented sergeant-major education, based on the alleged demands of the task. Particularly in the computer and internet era the importance of the division of labour has increased considerably in the military. It has always been the task of the officer to take decisions to implement them. This has to be done with an awareness of a multitude of aspects. In order to be able to deal with them adequately, the aspirant *Bundeswehr* officer needs an expert and competent education at the highest level, which means a broad theoretical education and training of the intellect. Only when he understands the consequences of his actions will the officer be able to take adequate decisions. History has shown more than once that especially when this fact was neglected, it resulted in poor estimates and decisions, with horrible consequences for the subordinates. After all, in critical situations in our profession, it is often a matter of life or death.

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Notes

- ¹ The expression "Prussian-German officer education" limits the history of officer education in the German states between 1806 and 1918 exclusively to the Prussian system. It was the basis for the development of the German officer education after 1918. However, any conclusions about the professional identity of the present-day *Bundeswehr* officers cannot be drawn from it.

- ² With regard to the person of Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst see: Klaus Hornung, 1985, pp. 5-20.
- ³ For a comprehensive overview of the reform of the officer education see: Marie-Nichollette Hoppe (1990).
- ⁴ For this see the propositions of Christian Trull. (...) p. 9.
- ⁵ It is only a paradox that most Prussian army reformers belonged to the nobility. Von Gneisenau, von Boyen and von Peucker had been elevated into the peerage in the course of their military careers because of their outstanding achievements for the Prussian state. Von Scharnhorst and von Clausewitz grew up as young noblemen in university towns and were thus not confronted with the problem the landed gentry faced in attempting to educate their offspring adequately.
- ⁶ For the resistance against the reforms of the officer education after 1805 see Bald: Offizier, p. 101; Demeter: Offizierkorps, p. 78f; Hackl: Ausbildung, p. 200f; Kutz: Reform, p. 13f.
- ⁷ For the criticism on these behavioural norms in the German society, see also: Heinrich Mann (1918).
- ⁸ For the consequences of the internalization of the honour code also among German intellectuals, see: Walter Flex (1916).
- ⁹ On 23 March 1921 the "provisional *Reichswehr*" became the *Reichswehr* of the Weimar Republic when the *Reichswehr* Act came into effect. For this, see: Harold J. Gordon (1959).
- ¹⁰ Friedhelm Klein, 1985, p. 19.
- ¹¹ Bernhard R. Kroener, 1991, p. 280.
- ¹² More precisely on the idea of the integration of a military apparatus into the structures of the fledgling German democracy: Martin Kutz, pp. 71-94).
- ¹³ On the person of Wolf Graf von Baudissin, see: Dieter S. Lutz, 1995, pp. 11-19. His most important monographs on this theme are without doubt 'Soldat für den Frieden' - Entwürfe für eine zeitgemässe *Bundeswehr* ['Soldier for peace' - Designs for a modern *Bundeswehr*]. Munich 1969 and 'Nie wieder Sieg!' ['No more Sieg!']. Programmatistische Schriften 1951-1981. Munich 1982
- ¹⁴ More precisely on the origin of the Centre for *innere Führung*, see: Ulrich Hundt, 1995, pp. 55-70.
- ¹⁵ BAMA, BW 2/856, Der Generalinspekteur der *Bundeswehr* [The General Inspector of the *Bundeswehr*]; Tgb. Nr. 25/27, 15 June 1957
- ¹⁶ On the present-day importance of *innere Führung*, see: Reinhard Mutz 1995, pp. 121-134).
- ¹⁷ On the curriculum and objectives of the academic parts of the officer education, see:

Paul Klein/Ekkehard Lippert, 1993, pp. 191-200.

¹⁸ Statistics indicate that around 90% of university graduates in the *Bundeswehr* find a fitting civilian occupation immediately after leaving the *Bundeswehr*. For this, see: Klein/Lippert: (1993: 197ff).

¹⁹ Deployment with all Services and together with international partners.

Restructuring the Belgian Royal Military Academy

Philippe Manigart

Abstract

The article first describes the past and present of the academic education at the Belgian Royal Military Academy, a university institution charged with the common basic education of career officers of all Services. It then explains the fundamental restructuring process that is now under way, i.e. the decision to follow the recommendations of the so-called Sorbonne-Bologna declarations and to implement a Bachelor/Master structure. This process can be seen as a logical consequence of two independent developments: the advent of postmodern military organizations and the gradual harmonization of higher (civilian) education systems in the European Union. The third and final section of the article analyzes the socio-demographic characteristics of the present students body and their motivations to enter the Academy and begin a military career.

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to describe the fundamental restructuring process of the basic military and academic education of career officers that is now under way in Belgium. This process can be seen as a logical consequence of two independent developments: the advent of postmodern military organizations and the gradual harmonization of higher (civilian) education systems in the European Union.

On the one hand, effective performance of the task of the officer in the postmodern period with its new missions, most of them in a multinational framework (peace support operations), requires additional skills and capabilities. In this respect, Moskos and Burk (1994: 147) speak of the *soldier-scholar* or *soldier-statesman*. Officers are indeed more and more entrusted with extramilitary tasks of a political nature (relations with local authorities and the local population, with the media, with NGOs, with the other national contingents, etc.). In other words, they must have a more advanced, diverse and less purely military-technological academic training, in order to be able to face all these new contingencies (study of foreign languages, political sciences, sociology, foreign cultures, etc.). One of the aims of the present reform of the officer educational system in Belgium is to offer this more diverse curriculum.

On the other hand, at the European level, a slow, difficult, but nonetheless probably irreversible organizational integration of armed forces can be observed. The 1992 creation of the Eurocorps and the 1999 decision to set up an EU rapid reaction force of 50-60,000 men by 2003 are steps in this direction. In this context, there is a need for more

cultural interoperability, and therefore of increased multinational academic exchanges between institutions of military education. In order to make these exchanges possible, a certain harmonization of the various curricula seems necessary.

In fact, these developments parallel similar ones in the civilian sector. The advent of the European Single Market and the resulting need for increased labour mobility within the EU borders have indeed made the progressive Europeanization of higher education inevitable. In order to realize this goal, the so-called Sorbonne-Bologna declarations^I proposed, among other things, that each signatory country adopt the Anglo-Saxon model of higher education, i.e. a Bachelor-Master (BaMa) structure, in order to facilitate the mobility of students within Europe (possibility to have part of one's education completed in another university) and the comparison of the degrees awarded by European institutions of higher learning. So, in order to facilitate (two-way) exchanges with civilian universities and other military academies, the Belgian Royal Military Academy decided, in 2001, to follow these recommendations and adopt the so-called BaMa structure.

But before explaining the content of the reform, an impression of the past and present of the academic education at the Royal Military Academy will first be given. In the third and final section of this chapter, the socio-demographic characteristics of the present students body and their motivations to enter the Academy and begin a military career will be described.

Origins²

The Belgian Military Academy was founded in 1834, i.e. four years after Belgium's independence, by a French officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Chapelié, who had been given the task by King Leopold I to design the formation of officers. He was the first commander of the Academy. The fact that the Academy was founded by a French officer is not anecdotal. It meant that the preference was given to the French model of the 'Grandes Ecoles',³ and more specifically of the 'Ecole Polytechnique' in Paris and it explains the dominance, to this day, of engineers - and the engineering curriculum - in the formation of officers. The first purpose of the Academy was to form officers of the Artillery and the Engineers, the technical arms of the day. Officers of other services only got practical training and usually came up through the ranks of NCOs. Only in 1849 did the general staff move to a yearly recruitment for other services and was a second type of formation created, for Infantry and Cavalry.

In 1914, the Belgian authorities disbanded the Military Academy, so that after World War I the Academy had to start again from scratch. In 1935, the Academy celebrated its centenary by introducing several innovations, including a new name: from then on, the Military Academy became the Royal Military Academy.

In 1935 lectures were for the first time given in both national languages (i.e. French and Dutch) to the 96th Artillery-Engineers and the 81st Infantry-Cavalry. Until that time indeed, all courses at the Academy had been only in French. This is not surprising given the fact that, until the 1930s, French was the only official language within the armed forces and officers were all French-speaking (which does not mean that they were no Flemish officers, only that they were not Dutch-speaking). It may be added that, in October 1834, by regulation, the use of Dutch had been prohibited in the armed forces. It was not until 1938 that a Bill concerning the use of languages in the military was passed through Parliament and implemented. This Act imposed bilingualism for all officers and reinforced the unilingualism of units. In their dealings with administrative authorities, the language of the region had to be used.⁴ In 1939 the proportion of candidates for the Royal Military Academy who were French-speaking was 81%. Only in the 1950s did the proportion of Dutch-speaking candidates begin to reflect their proportion in the general population. (Werner, 1974: 19)

After the end of World War II and the reopening of the Academy in 1946, a commission was set up to design a new curriculum which would be better adapted to the new post-war environment (creation of new Services, i.e. Air Force and Navy, alongside the Army; a changing society and new technological developments). The result was to opt for an academic education at university level, complemented by a basic military training. This university education is what constitutes the equivalence of the officer statute with level 1 of the civil service.⁵

Two study tracks ('divisions') were created: the Polytechnics Division replaced the former Artillery-Engineering Section, with courses lasting five years, and the All Arms Division replaced the pre-war Infantry-Cavalry Section. From the beginning, the identity, and therefore the program of the Polytechnics Division, was very clear: forming engineers on the model of civilian universities. The degree was made equivalent to the legal degree in engineering. Academic courses taught at the Academy were therefore, for the most part, similar to those of civilian universities, with an obvious emphasis on military technologies. For the All Arms division, however, it was a completely different story. There was and, as will be seen later, there is still no such consensus. The Commission (made mostly of engineers) introduced a proposal to change the courses into a technical training adapted to the ever-increasing mechanization of the armed forces. Others were more in favour of a more military-oriented formation. Finally, as is often the case in Belgium, a compromise was reached: a three-year programme with exact and behavioural sciences. Only three intakes, however, would follow this curriculum.

During the Korean War, the Royal Military Academy was temporarily obliged to reduce the All Arms officer training to two years. Interestingly enough, no such cut was

made in the Polytechnics curriculum, once again clearly revealing the inferior status of the younger division. In 1955, the curriculum of the All Arms division was again expanded to three years, whereas in 1962, the Defense Minister decided to add another year, making it four years and equivalent to a 'licence' degree.

Finally, it must be mentioned that even though the Air Force and Navy became independent Services in 1946, they were too small to establish their own military academies. The Royal Military Academy was therefore given an interforce mission. Later on, even the officer cadets of the 'Gendarmerie'⁶ and Medical Services were trained at the Academy.

Present⁷

To quote its mission statement, 'the Royal Military Academy is a university institution, charged with the common basic education of career officers of all Services.'⁸ Career officers constitute the largest category of officers in the Belgian armed forces: they represent just over 79 % of the total number of officers.⁹ The other categories of officers are: complementary officers (limited to the rank of captain-commandant)(19 %), auxiliary officers (in the Air Force only)(1%), and short-term officers (two to three year contracts)(0,1 %).

The Royal Military Academy comprises two Faculties (formerly known as 'Divisions'): Polytechnics and Social and Military Sciences (formerly 'All Arms'). The education in the Polytechnics Faculty corresponds to that of civil engineer and lasts five years; the education in the Faculty of Social and Military Sciences corresponds to a university degree ('licence') and lasts four years. Education at the Academy is divided into two directorates: the academic directorate and the military directorate.

Academic Education

As in civilian universities, the academic year is divided into two semesters, each ending with an exam session. The final year ends with a third semester (from September to the end of November) during which the student spends most of his time writing his final paper. Once they graduate and before joining their units, the young officers spend some time in an arms school or a training centre. There they get the specific professional training for the arm or service they belong to.

The curriculum of the first two years of the Polytechnics Faculty ('candidatures') consists of a common core. The next three years, however, vary slightly from the scheme adhered to at civilian universities, in the sense that a common core is also adopted in the third and fourth year (no specialization, therefore). To a great extent it consists of

applied science courses with a military content: chemistry of explosives, ballistics, aerodynamics, nuclear physics. Only in the fifth year does specialization really begin and students may choose from among four options: armament, construction, mechanics and telecommunications. Compared to engineers from civilian universities, military engineers are therefore more polyvalent. This can largely be explained by the smaller number of students in the Polytechnics Faculty (142 in June 2002) than in civilian universities.

If the academic curriculum in the Polytechnics Faculty is very similar to the one of Engineering Faculties at civilian universities, this is not the case with the other Faculty, the Faculty of Social and Military Sciences. The degree awarded by this Faculty indeed does not correspond to any degree at civilian universities (contrary to what its name would suggest, i.e. social sciences). The identity of this Faculty is therefore less clear than that of the Polytechnics Faculty. The proclaimed aim of the studies at the Social and Military Sciences Faculty is to form human resources and material managers. The courses taught during the first two years are common to all students while the program of the following two years (the 'licences') vary according to the Service (Army, Air Force and Navy) and the arm/service (Medical Service) to which the future officer belongs. This explains why the denomination of the degrees varies: 'licence' in social and military sciences, if they belong to the Army or the medical service, 'licence' in aeronautical and military sciences, if they belong to the Air Force, and 'licence' in maritime and military sciences, if they belong to the Navy.

Whereas the education of polytechnician students is mostly based on the exact and applied sciences, the training of students in Social and Military Sciences is, in a certain way, a mixture of 'soft' and 'hard' sciences, largely a result of the existing influence structure within the military elite^{IO} and at the Academy.^{II}

During the first two years, the emphasis is laid on 'soft' sciences (called by the misnomer 'behavioural sciences' at the RMA), such as law, philosophy, sociology, psychology, history and economics. But subjects related to exact and applied sciences are also taught: mathematics, statistics, mechanics, nuclear physics. During the next two years, the curriculum comprises a common core including courses in military history, management as well as leadership. The 'optional' courses vary according to the Service or arm/service and are mostly technical. Students of the Army and Medical Service receive courses in construction, management, arms systems and telecommunications. Management, mechanics and telecommunications are the courses the future officers of the Air Force receive. For the Navy, the courses are either operations or management.

During the second year, in March, students must pass what is called the legal test of thorough knowledge of the second national language (Dutch or French). Their appointment to the rank of second lieutenant depends on their success in the test. The more

and more international nature of Belgian armed forces operations has led to a growing emphasis on the study of English: if the yearly number of periods during the first year is low (15 in Polytechnics and 30 in the Faculty Social and Military Sciences), it doubles during the second year and keeps the same volume during the next two.

Military training

The mission of the Royal Military Academy is naturally not only to provide university graduates to the armed forces; above all, it wants 'to form officers who are capable of leadership in varied complex and exceptional circumstances in the service of the national and international community,'¹² and military training is one very important (and specific) aspect of this formation.

In the domain of the basic military training of the future career officers, the RMA has been charged with that part which is common to all the Services. After the RMA, this common formation is complemented by a more specialized one given in the Schools of the different arms and services.¹³

Even before beginning the academic studies in the first year, entering cadets have to go through a period of military initiation in which they are taught basic military notions and skills. After that, military training at the RMA is concentrated in two periods of military camp in every academic year: one period of two or three weeks around Easter, and a second period of four weeks in July. In the first two years, military training is oriented towards acquiring individual technical and functional skills and knowledge from the level of ordinary soldiering through to the level of the section commander. Towards the end of the second year, cadets have to prove their skills by obtaining the elementary qualification as a paratrooper in the commando training center in Marche-les-Dames. From the third year onwards, cadets are sent abroad to experience other training camps and other armies.¹⁴ Most of the time is spent on leadership training as a platoon commander, the primary command level of the officer. Cadets also obtain the elementary qualifications as a parachutist in the paratrooper training centre in Schaffen.

Finally, academic education in the domain of leadership is mixed with practical training modules of command skills and techniques spread over the four academic years. In the end the training is complemented with conferences by leading figures from the military, industrial and political world.

Vision 2010¹⁵

On November 10 2001, as part of the whole restructuring process initiated by his Strategic Modernization Plan 2000-2015,¹⁶ the Defense Minister, André Flahaut, organized a workshop at the Academy dedicated to the future military education and training in the Belgian armed forces. Part of the session was devoted to the education of officers at the RMA. What resulted from this workshop was the decision by the Minister to fundamentally reform the entire officer educational system. The two guiding principles of this reform are 1) to anchor the academic education given at the Academy in the so-called Sorbonne-Bologna process, i.e. to adopt a Bachelor/Master structure beginning in the academic year 2003-2004, 2) to implement the *Strategic Vision RMA 2010*, and 3), to increase the gender, ethnic and educational backgrounds diversity of the student body. Two working groups were created within the Military Academy with the mission of implementing these guiding principles in the two Faculties. However, given the specificity of the Polytechnics Faculty (engineering sciences), it meant that, if the third objective was to be attained (increasing diversity by attracting also students with a lighter mathematical background),¹⁷ most of the changes would have to be concentrated on the Social and Military Sciences Faculty.

From the academic year 2003-2004 onwards, the Polytechnics Faculty will offer one Bachelor of Sciences (BS) in three years with 60 ECTS (European Transfer Credit System) each, followed by one Master of Applied Sciences (MS) in five semesters. In the Master, students will have the choice between four options (Mechanics, Construction, Weapons Systems and Telecom).

For the Faculty of Social and Military Sciences, it has been decided to have one Bachelor of Arts (BA) in Social and Military Sciences (three years, or 180 ECTS), immediately followed by two separate Masters of Arts (MA) (three semesters, or 90 ECTS).

The Bachelor will consist of a common academic core (77% of the total ECTS) and optional courses (23%). The common core will comprise seven modules: 1) Language and Communications (27 ECTS), 2) Leadership, Ethics and Deontology (19 ECTS), 3) Political and Military Sciences (19 ECTS), 4) Behavioral Sciences (19 ECTS), 5) Economics and Management (19 ECTS), 6) Contemporary Military Technologies (19 ECTS) and 7) Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Sciences (16 ECTS). Among the optional courses, there will be a training course ('stage')(3 ECTS) and an interdisciplinary project (3 ECTS).

Students of the Faculty of the Social and Military Sciences will have to choose between¹⁸ a Master in Management and Weapons Systems and a Master in Defense and Political Sciences. The first Master is rather 'hard'-oriented and technical (with a solid background in mathematics), while the second is more 'soft'-oriented (social sciences in the broad sense of the word). The aim is that by diversifying the academic

training (two Masters instead of one 'licence' now), the Belgian armed forces will get a more diverse officer corps, with more diverse skills that will therefore be better adapted to the new complexity of our times.

Given the fact that at present (see below), the bulk of the students of the Faculty of Social and Military Sciences comes from 'maths-heavy' options in high school (six hours or more a week), an increase in the diversity of the recruitment (as the Minister wishes) will have to come mainly from the 'soft' Master.¹⁹ A possible stumbling block, though, is the fact that there is only one BA, which means that all candidates to the Social and Military Sciences Faculty will have to pass the same entrance exam (which includes a maths section) and receive the same mathematical and technical core courses in the first three years. This could cancel out the positive impact of two Masters (and, more particularly, a non-quantitative one) to the extent that it could deter people who are 'maths-averse' from coming to the Academy in the first place. It would therefore condemn the Academy to keep tapping the same – comparatively small and highly sought after - recruitment pool of young people with a strong mathematical background. A better solution would have been – as it had been originally foreseen – to develop two BAs (one 'quantitative' and the other in the Humanities, leading each to two MAs). After all, the mathematics and technology modules in the BA are mainly necessary for those opting later for the 'hard' MA. Two BAs would have had the benefit of being more transparent to future prospects and of truly opening the recruitment to the Academy to segments up to now largely untapped, i.e. young high school graduates who, because of the necessary mathematical background, were not attracted to such studies until now and were choosing instead to study law, sociology, psychology, political sciences, history, etc. in civilian universities.

Vision 2010, however, is not limited to a reform of the academic curriculum of the Academy; it also envisages a fundamental change in the overall way cadets at the Academy are educated and socialized. So, in the future, the emphasis will be placed not only on a more interdisciplinary approach at the academic level (for example, by introducing problem-based learning, multi-disciplinary research projects, and training courses in military units or civilian organizations) and a more diverse and interactive array of learning methods, but also on more integration between the academic and military parts of the training. In order to improve leadership training, and in particular to develop their sense of initiative and responsibility, the involvement of students in all aspects of life at the Academy will also be expanded. In view of the Europeanization of higher education and of defense, part of the training of future cadets will take place outside the Academy, either in other European military Academies or in Belgian or European universities (hence, the introduction of the European Credit Transfer System in the academic curriculum).

Finally, in the logic of the Strategic Reform Plan 2000-2015 (more flexibility, more joint, and more interservice cooperation), the choice of Service will be postponed until the end of the second year for most students. At present, when they enter the Academy, cadets must choose the Service in which they will serve for the rest of their professional life (Army, Air Force, Navy or Medical Service); as of 2003, all students, except candidates pilots and aspirant Navy officers, will have to make their choice during the second year. The idea is that they will be better informed about the nature of the various Services and the career paths available. Those who want to become pilots (in all branches of Services) will undergo extensive testing and training during the first year; those who succeed go on with their training as pilots; the others will be returned to the main group of cadets. The same logic will apply to officers wanting to serve in the Navy.

Sociography of the students of the Academy

This last section presents some background information on the present-day student population of the Royal Military Academy: its social composition, the motivations to enter the Academy and the career intentions. The data come from various surveys carried out by the Chair of Sociology of the Royal Military Academy among students of, and candidates to the Academy.

Who they are

The great majority of the students of the Military Academy are enrolled in the Faculty of Social and Military Sciences (72% in 2002 against 28% in the Polytechnics Faculty).²⁰ 96% of the cadets were Belgian, the other 4% from a foreign country. (Luxembourg, Tunisia, Benin, Congo, Gabon)²¹ All foreign students were enrolled in the French-speaking classes. Among the Belgian cadets, 53% were Dutch-speaking and 47 % French-speaking, i.e. a slight departure of the 60/40 proportion in Belgium. 61 % of the cadets were from the Army, 31 % from the Air Force, 7% from the Navy and 1 % from the Medical Service.

16% of the students were female, compared to 77% of the total officer corps.²²

It is interesting to note that the proportion of female cadets has been steadily increasing the last years, following in fact a trend observable in higher education. For example, in 1988, there were only 3% female cadets at the Academy.²³ Most of the female students are in the Social and Military Sciences Faculty, the Polytechnics Faculty, like its university counterparts, remaining largely, a male fortress: in 2002, only 7% of the Polytechnicians were female against 19% of the students of the Social and Military Sciences.

From a 2000 survey (Vande Cappelle: 2000), it appears that 19% of the RMA students had a father who was or had been in the military.²⁴ Since the end of World War II, recruitment at the Academy has come in fact mainly from the (lower and middle) middle class, due largely to the fact that in Belgium the military profession is not a very prestigious one.²⁵ For example, in the 2000 survey, 24 % of the students had a father who was a middle manager, 22% a father who was an employee and 13% from the working class.²⁶

In terms of educational background, 78% of the students surveyed in 2000 were coming from high school sections with 6 hours of mathematics a week or more (94% in Polytechnics and 67% in the Social and Military Sciences Faculty). Compared with the average high school graduate, this is a huge overrepresentation of people with a heavy mathematical background. For example, in the French-speaking part of the country, in 2001, only 36% of the last-year high school students were in such sections. Although it is true that there is also an overrepresentation of high school graduates with a heavy mathematical background (6 hours a week or more) among first-year university students, except among engineers, the imbalance is less pronounced than at the RMA. For example, in 2001, at the Catholic University of Leuven, the overall percentage was 54% and at the University of Ghent, 45%.


Why they come

Since 1992, the Chair of Sociology has asked applicants or entering cadets why they had applied to the Royal Military Academy. Figure 1 shows the 2001 results for applicants.²⁷

As can be seen, the two most often cited motivations were: the training at the Academy combines intellectual and physical abilities (78% said it was a very or extremely important reason) and it is a job full of action (72%). These two reasons can be called 'postmaterialist', i.e. motivations emphasizing self-fulfilment and participation (Battistelli, 1997). The attractiveness of peace-support operations abroad, another motivation that can be categorized as postmaterialist, was cited by 44% of the respondents as a very or extremely important reason. Among entering cadets (and not applicants) who were interviewed in 2000, the percentage was even higher (58%). What is even more interesting is that this proportion has been steadily increasing since 1997. In that year, this reason was cited by 34% of entering cadets and in 1999, by 48%.

Job security, still the most important job expectation of Belgians (young and old alike), was cited by 46% of the applicants and came in fifth position. It should be noted that this motivation is less prevalent among applicants to the Military Academy than among a cross-section of young Belgians.²⁸ This can be, however, largely explained by the higher educational level of RMA applicants: the higher the educational level, the less

Figure 1: Why they apply to the Military Academy
(% 'very or extremely important reason', applicants 2001)



occupational one tends to be and the more postmaterialist (Inglehart, 1997).

At the other end of the scale, there are the rather typically traditional, or institutional motivations, such family tradition (3%), prestige of the uniform (16%) and patriotism (20%).

What are their plans

From a 2002 survey among all RMA cadets about their motivation,²⁹ it appears that 20% of the respondents were definitely planning to spend their entire professional life in the military. More students of the Faculty of Social and Military Sciences than Polytechnicians were thinking so. (24% against 10% respectively) 64% thought it was very likely they would stay except if it did not correspond to their expectations .(in which case they would leave) 12% were thinking of just spending a few years in the military and then leave in order to get a civilian job and 4% were even planning to leave as soon as possible to get a job outside. This mainly applied to Polytechnicians, to the extent that their degree is fully equivalent with the degree of engineer in a civilian university and their training very much valued and sought after in the civilian sector: 17% of them were planning to leave after a few years and 5% as soon as possible against respectively 10 % and 3% of the students of the Social and Military Sciences Faculty.

Conclusion

The reform process currently under way at the Royal Military Academy is intended to make future Belgian career officers better able to face the challenges of the 21st century. As could be seen, the restructuring process is a logical consequence of two independent developments: the advent of postmodern military organizations and the gradual harmonization of higher (civilian) educational systems in the European Union. By adopting the Bachelor/Master structure for the education of its cadets and by offering a more diversified academic curriculum (two Bachelors and three Masters instead of the present two 'licences'), it is hoped to both increase the range of skills and capabilities of future officers and to facilitate multinational academic exchanges with other (military and civilian) institutions of higher learning.

But while it is clearly true that, as a result of the implementation of *Vision 2010*, the curriculum at the Academy will become more diversified at the Master level, it is equally true that, at the Bachelor level, the emphasis on a technical education (mathematical and technical skills) remains too strong. Because it was decided to have only one Bachelor in Social and Military Sciences instead of two (as initially conceived), all cadets choosing this Faculty will have to master mathematical and technical skills, irrespective of their choice of Master. This could cancel out the positive impact of having created two Masters (and, more particularly, a non-technical one), to the extent that it could deter people who are 'maths-averse' from coming to the Academy in the first place, therefore condemning the Academy to keep tapping the same – comparatively small and highly sought after - recruitment pool of young people with a strong mathematical background.

So it remains to be seen whether one of the goals of the restructuring process, namely making the recruitment for the Academy more diverse (in terms of skills, gender, and ethnic origin), can be achieved without having a purely non-mathematical/technical option to attract the young people who until now have not opted for the Academy and who choose instead to study law, sociology, psychology, political sciences, history, etc. in civilian universities. Needless to say, such people are very much needed in the new post-modern military organizations. As a consequence of the ever more frequent peace-support operations, more emphasis is indeed given to 'soft' (social, human) skills. By failing to attract and train enough people with such skills, the danger to see a growing proportion of officers being recruited outside the Academy could materialize. This could in turn threaten the very *raison d'être* of a military academy in a small European country.

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Notes

- ¹ *Joint Declaration on Harmonisation of the Architecture of the Higher Education System*, signed by the Ministers of Education of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom in Paris, the Sorbonne, on May 25 1998 and *Joint Declaration of European Ministers* signed in Bologna by 29 countries on June 19 1999.
- ² For a more detailed history of the Academy, see Koninklijke Militaire School (1984) and the special edition of the military weekly Vox of April 28, 1999 on the Royal Military Academy.
- ³ This explains the official name of the Academy, i.e. *Ecole Royale Militaire* (translated into *Koninklijke Militaire School*).
- ⁴ For more details on linguistic diversity in the Belgian armed forces, see Manigart (1999).
- ⁵ In Belgium, entrance to the various rank categories is conditioned by the obtained degree: university degree for the majority of officers (level 1 of the civil service); high school degree or non-university college for NCOs (levels 2+ and 2 of the civil service); junior high school or elementary degree for privates (levels 3 and 4 of the civil service).
- ⁶ With the disappearance of the Gendarmerie as a result of the restructuring of the various police corps into one integrated police force with two levels (federal and local), the Academy stopped forming officers of the Gendarmerie a few years ago.
- ⁷ Based on the special edition of the military weekly Vox of April 28, 1999 on the Royal Military Academy.
- ⁸ Vox (1999: 3). It should be noted, however, that the RMA does not train only future Belgian officers. It also trains Luxembourgers (every two years in the Faculty of Social and Military Sciences, alternating with Saint-Cyr) and Tunisian Gendarmes. Since more recently, there have also been cadets from Benin, Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville. In 2002, there were 26 foreign students at the RMA on a total of 496 (or 5%). Discussions are under way to also receive officers from other countries.
- ⁹ Not all career officers, however, have passed through the RMA. There are bridges between the various officers tracks (complementary and short-term officers can become career officers if they meet certain criteria), and between NCOs and officers ('social promotion'). In 2002, graduates of the RMA represented 68 % of all career officers. Source: MoD
- ¹⁰ Although in 2002, Polytechnicians accounted for only 17% of all career officers, they represented 41% of all Flag and General officers. In contrast, only 24% of the Flag and General officers were graduates from the Social and Military Sciences Faculty although they accounted for 51% of all career officers. Source: MoD.
- ¹¹ In 2002, 21 out of the 30 civilian professors of the Academy (or 70%) were former

graduates of the Polytechnics Faculty; only 4 (or 13%) were former graduates of the All Weapons division and 5 (or 17%) came from a civilian academic institution. This also reflects a very high degree of endorecruitment among the Faculty (83%).

¹² Quoted from the Mission statement of the RMA.

¹³ Students-pilots of the Air component and deck and technical officers of the Navy begin their specialized training while still at the RMA. Students-pilots start their flight training in the third year while Navy cadets begin training as seamen/seawomen in their first year.

¹⁴ These include the maritime environment of the Waddenzee in the Netherlands, the mountainous terrain north of the Provence in France, the desert south of the High Atlas in Morocco, and the high mountains in Slovenia.

¹⁵ The implementation of Vision 2010 is a work in progress. The summary presented here is based on first-hand information from the author/participant and on various internal working documents.

¹⁶ See Flahaut (2001).

¹⁷ A comparative study (Manigart, 2001b) of the educational backgrounds of students of the RMA and other universities had indeed shown that a far larger proportion of students of the Social and Military Sciences Faculty came from high school orientations with a heavy emphasis in mathematics (six hours/week or more) than in non-engineering civilian Faculties. 94% of the students of the Polytechnic division and 67% of those of the Social and Military Sciences Faculty had received six or more hours of mathematics a week in the last year of high school compared with only 36% of last year high schoolers.

¹⁸ The cadets will not, however, be completely free to choose one of the two Mas: to a great extent, their choice will be constrained by their choice of Force (Army, Air Force, Navy or Medical Service) and of Arms. For example, the Air Force wants all of its officers to choose the 'quantitative' MA in Management and Weapons Systems.

¹⁹ From the social composition of civilian universities it appears that female students and students from ethnic minorities tend to be underrepresented in engineering and sciences Faculties and tend to choose 'soft' sciences, like psychology, sociology, law, etc.

²⁰ This is in sharp contrast to the composition of the academic staff: of the 55.4 full-time equivalent teaching personnel at the Academy, 56% are in the Polytechnics Faculty and only 44 % in the Social and Military Sciences Faculty. Furthermore, as already said, in 2002, two-thirds of the civilian Faculty members (23 out of 30) were former graduates of the Polytechnics Faculty.

²¹ Unless otherwise mentioned, the results presented here come from the whole popu-

lation (Belgians and non-Belgians).

²² 2001 statistics. See Manigart (2001a).

²³ Source: Royal Military Academy, Chair of Sociology (survey among all cadets)

²⁴ In 2002, the percentage of people in the military among the working population was only 1%.

²⁵ See, for instance, Manigart (1993a).

²⁶ Military father not included.

²⁷ These people were surveyed during the selection procedure. Only a portion of them were later accepted to the RMA. For more details, see Resteigne (2001).

²⁸ In a 1993 representative telephone survey of 1001 young Belgians aged 15-25, 93% of them found job security 'rather important' (Manigart, 1993b). This dimension was clearly the top job expectation. This result was in line with international comparative surveys (such as surveys from the *European Value Systems Study Group*), showing that Belgians attach far more importance to job security than others.

²⁹ For more details, see Wauters (2002).

Educating peacekeepers

Problems experienced during deployments and deficiencies in preparation for PSO

Ellen Bleumink, René Moelker and Ad Vogelaar

Abstract

In this article the correlation between the problems military personnel encountered during peacekeeping operations and the deficiencies they experienced during their education/training prior to deployment is analyzed. Education and training should be designed in such a way that the kind of problems soldiers are most likely to meet in a certain mission are taken into account. Mission-oriented training should be tailor-made to fit specific missions. Language, communication, diplomatic and military skills should be part of every course. Academic training in military academies should provide a broad basis, comprising a general and diverse range of disciplines that prepares aspirant officers not so much for a specific mission but that enables them to solve unexpected problems that may arise from unanticipated situations. A mix of disciplines is necessary, for it is impossible to know in advance what problems may come up. Most probably the officer will be confronted with several problems at the same time. This is why multi-disciplinary education is to be preferred. General analytic academic skills, lateral thinking and creativity are skills flexible officers of the (near) future need to develop.

Introduction

The last decade has brought drastic changes for the military, the most pervasive of which was the increased focus on peace-enforcing and peacekeeping operations as well as disaster relief and humanitarian aid. For many armed forces Peace Support Operations (PSO) have become their primary task or even their *raison d'être* in the post-Cold War era. With PSO holding such a prominent place in their mission focus, the armed forces realize that they have to develop knowledge of and skills for these operations. An important issue for the armed forces and their military role is the shift from the use of force against an enemy to the interposition as a 'third' party between opposing parties. This shift brings about great changes for the military units and their commanders and they realize they have to be adequately equipped and prepared for these new tasks.

Scientific knowledge and understanding of the human factor in these operations is still in its infancy (Essens, Vogelaar, Tanercan, Winslow, 2001). Much effort should be devoted to developing theory and models for predicting performance and effects. In addition, instruments are needed to select, train, and develop military units and their commanders properly for these operations. This article aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge regarding the preparation for PSO.

Changes in operational characteristics

A number of authors stress the difference between PSO and war operations. Dixon (1993) adopts an interesting approach. In comparing PSO with war operations - the only kind of operations for which commanders actually prepared themselves until a few years ago - he identifies a number of differences that have far-reaching implications for the skills of commanders. Dixon states that PSO, like war, can be described by such aspects as object, aim, ways, and means, and this will yield a number of criteria for military leaders performing PSO.

According to Dixon, the object of war is the imposition of the will of one party on its enemy. The object of PSO, however, is eliminating the causes of instability through some forum that settles the issue and maintains order. The issue in PSO relates to political and societal actions rather than the employment of military forces for traditional national purposes. According to Dixon, a tactical leader must, therefore, understand that '...the greatest military consideration ... is the non-military objective of the operation'. (Dixon, 1993: 7) This requires the tactical leaders to consider and assess the political consequences of the actions they contemplate.

Secondly, the aim in war is rendering an enemy powerless. The aim of PSO is to prevent competing groups from creating a situation of uncertainty or anarchy. The parties should retain their power, however, exclusively for constructive purposes. The actions of the peace support units should enable the various groups to maintain a semblance of power or control and resolve the situation by other means. Providing support to existing organizations is central to the development of acceptable courses of actions during PSO. Therefore, the plan should focus on stabilizing the situation and establishing the conditions that allow existing or previously functioning organizations to perform their tasks. This requires tactical commanders to interact extensively with many external groups. The tactical leader must comprehend and facilitate the actions of these groups. He must also have such an awareness of the culture of the society and its organizations in which the operations take place, that he/she can foresee potential consequences of his/her actions. Only by understanding the uniqueness of each situation and the groups involved, can the leader possibly stabilize the situation in order to resolve the crisis by means other than force.

Thirdly, whereas war inherently focuses on destruction, PSO must stress the avoidance of destruction. According to Dixon, the conduct of operations in PSO must be styled in such a way that existing damage is lessened or repaired, while simultaneously measures to prevent a continuation of destruction are taken. An overwhelming or inappropriate use of force can be counterproductive and worsen the situation. As Swannack and Gray (1997) state, all actions of the unit must be seen as neutral, altruistic, and supporting the peace process in order to gain the local inhabitants' trust and

confidence. For the operation it could help, however, when the tactical leader ensures that the groups involved understand the capabilities of the intervening force by showing its strength and determination.

Fourthly, whereas the means of war consist of force, those of PSO should encompass compromise and moderation of violence. In these operations, a measured level of force, appropriate to the situation, is the proper response. As Manwaring (1998-99) states, the blunt force of military formations could be counterproductive, whereas the more subtle use of 'soft' political, economic, psychological, and moral power - supported by information operations, careful intelligence work, and surgical precision at the more direct military or police level - would be imperative. Force should only be used in order to halt incidental acts of violence. Military forces should be very careful not to be drawn into large-scale battles with one of the parties. Therefore, negotiation rather than violence should be the norm for resolving the crisis. According to Dixon, tactical leaders, although still warriors, must become negotiators and mediators, reserving the use of force to the last resort. For the tactical leader it means that he or she must realise that the decisive element is not military force. Furthermore, he or she should be aware of the fact that the use of force will change the nature of the environment and potentially undermine the accomplishment of the object. Unwarranted violence applied by the peacekeeping force can turn all the parties against the intervening force. According to Lester (2001), successful commanders therefore demonstrate good judgement and understanding of use of force and diplomacy.

A fifth criterion should be added to object, aim, ways and means: co-operation. Today, commanders of many Western armed forces find themselves co-operating with units from the former Warsaw Pact countries, Southern Europe, and even Third World countries. But not only that, besides working with military allies and the former warring parties, the intervening force also has to work with the existing local Governmental organizations, with Civilian and United Nations Police Organizations and with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). It is well-known that all parties involved have their own interests, customs and culture, follow their own procedures and structures, and in many cases have their own language. On top of all that there is close media coverage. Working together with many different organisations is a relatively new phenomenon for military commanders and what they need is an open mind towards other cultures and people with very different backgrounds (professional or other) in order to be able to make the co-operation successful.

The difference between war and PSO has fuelled a debate amongst scholars and the military which has greatly stimulated the development of theoretical models and ideal typical approaches of the soldier's tasks and identity. Janowitz (1971) hypothesizes a change from the warrior type of military to a constabulary force where the soldier is a

‘manager of violence’. Burk and Moskos (1994) and Soeters (1998) extend the metaphor even further, and speak of the ‘soldier-diplomat’, the ‘soldier-scholar’ and the ‘soldier-communicator’. These ideal types epitomize the development in tasks and task identity of the military that is caused by the increased importance of PSO.

Attitudes towards PSO and the need for change

Experiences in the early nineties proved that adjusting education and training to the new tasks is necessary indeed. Many soldiers had and still have an ambivalent and sometimes even hostile attitude towards the peacekeeping task. (Miller, 1997) Reports of positive attitudes, as in the case of Portuguese peacekeepers (Carreiras, 2000), are exceptional. In many cases where norms and values became blurred, the warrior-attitude appeared to be dominant. (Horvat, 2000; Kernic, 1998; Johansson, 1997, 2001; Winslow, 1997, 1998) The warrior-attitude even hampered the aims of PSO, resulting in misbehaviour and hostility towards the indigenous population, whereas a more humanitarian attitude would have proved to be advantageous to the performance of peacekeepers (Miller and Moskos, 1995). Francke (1997) concludes that, in order to meet the requirements stemming from PSO, to mend negative attitudes and to improve performance, the training and education of the next generation of military leaders will have to change.

Changes in required education and training

One of the changes entails that commanders need to be educated and trained more broadly than ever. Officers do not only have to be able to conduct a military operation, they should also have an understanding of political and societal developments in the countries to which they have been deployed for PSO. In addition, the commanders should be able to make decisions on a large number of civilian tasks that have to be performed in the peace-building stage of an operation. Furthermore, they must possess a knowledge of the background and the cultural aspects of the mission, which implies an understanding of the traditions and values of the different ethnic groups, the causes of the war, the current political situation and UN’s role in it. They should clearly understand why the mission is important in the broader international perspective and support the goals and meaning of the mission. Moreover, the soldiers need better and/or more training in negotiation and conflict resolution techniques and master the local language to a certain extent. Being broadly educated should guarantee an open mind when they have to deal with a variety of problems. The British Doctrine Committee (1999) assumes that the British armed forces will be involved in conflicts in which psychology

is as important as technology, and where cross-cultural, socio-psychological means will be required to create the conditions for peace. In the same document, it is also stated that the increasing complexity and diversity of the future security environment will demand an increasing range and depth of skills, possibly including those that have not been anticipated and included previously. Cross-cultural awareness and language training will become more important along with the ability to deal with agencies in the area of conflict. Commanders have to work together adequately with a great variety of organisations with many different backgrounds, procedures, and cultures. These aspects of military operations require much of the general education of officers. To further this general education, commanders have to prepare their units in such a way that they can work effectively under varied circumstances. These developments mean that officers should be broadly educated in a large number of disciplines to be able to create flexibility of thinking when required (Caforio, 2001, 2003).

Present study

The present study departs from an international perspective, gathering data from as many as ten nations, and it specifically investigates the correlation of problems encountered during PSO with the deficiencies experienced. The following questions will be answered:

1. What kind of problems do officers meet during deployments?
2. What kind of deficiencies did officers experience in their academic and practical preparation?
3. Are the problems encountered during deployments and the deficiencies experienced in the preparation for PSO correlated?

After a brief discussion of the methodology, the article continues with the analysis of the above questions. In the conclusion several recommendations will be offered for fine-tuning future missions and required education and/or training.

Method

Participants and procedure.

In order to answer the research questions the data collected by Caforio et al. (2001) are used. These data form part of an international comparative research by a team of researchers. The questionnaire used to gather the data was administered to a sample of

officers from all Services of ten different nations who have taken part in different kinds of PSO (Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Sweden and the United States of America). A minimum sample of 30 officers, preferably of various ranks, who have participated in PSO was required for each nation. The researchers administered the questionnaire in a timeframe that ran from June 2000 until September 2000. Of the 416 questionnaires that were administered, 408 were

Table 1: sample sizes

Country	Frequency (sample size)	Percent
Bulgaria	19	5,5
France	21	6,1
Italy	49	14,1
Netherlands	37	10,7
Poland	17	4,9
Russia	19	5,5
South Africa	111	32,0
Sweden	23	6,6
USA	26	7,5
Hungary	25	7,2
Total	347	100,0

useful for the purpose of this research. A preliminary analysis showed that there is an overrepresentation of army officers (85% army officers). Therefore, a deliberate choice was made to analyse only army officers. This brings the number of questionnaires suitable for analysis down to 347. Table 1 gives the sample sizes.

Measures

The questionnaire consists of 34, mainly closed, questions that are grouped into five sets: the officers' experiences, satisfaction, education, socio-demographic data and 'being outspoken' (to give each respondent the possibility to add personal comments and observations). The officers' experiences (the problems they encountered during PSO) and their perceptions of deficiencies in preparation for PSO are important for answering the research questions. The items used for measuring the problems the officers met during PSO are subdivided into a set that indicates the problems with civilian

counterparts and local parties and in a set of items dedicated to the problems with officers of other nations. The sets of questions contain the following items:

1. Did you face any difficulties in your relationship with civilian counterparts? If so, what kind of difficulties? The respondents could respond to the following possibilities (dichotomous variables): communications problems, language problems, different frame of mind, bad faith / disloyalty, pursuing personal profit, partisanship, making rules observed, keeping freedom of movement and other difficulties.
2. Did you face any difficulties in your relationship with officers of contingents from other countries? If so, what kind of difficulties? Respondents were asked to reflect on the following possibilities (dichotomous variables): interoperability problems, ethic code problems, diverging interpretations of mission, diverging interpretations of ROE, divided loyalties, professional preparation problems, language, communication problems, cultural differences, rivalries and other difficulties.

Two subsets of items were intended to measure deficiencies in preparation. The first set related to academic education, whereas the second set was devoted to the issue of training. The items used were:

1. Did you experience any deficiencies in your education with regard to the particular features of PSO in which you took part? If so, in which topic? The following possibilities (dichotomous variables) were offered: international law, international affairs, history, psychology, sociology, languages, religion, economics, mass communication techniques, intercultural management techniques and other topics.
2. Did you experience any deficiencies in your training with regard to the particular features of PSO in which you took part? If so, in which topic? The officers could respond to tactics, logistics, topography, leadership, administration, communications, regulations and other topics (dichotomous variables, multiple answers were allowed).

To answer the first two research questions (problems encountered and deficiencies experienced) frequencies were calculated. The third question was answered by making use of factor analysis and correlation techniques. Factor analysis is used to reduce data and discern clusters of variables. The next step in the analysis was to correlate the 'problems' factors with the 'deficiencies' factors.

Experienced problems during deployments

In response to the question: 'Did you face any difficulties in your relationship with civilian counterparts?' army officers from all participating countries indicated as the most

urgent problems (upper half of table 2, total):

1. A different frame of mind: 44 %
2. Language problems: 32%
3. Communication problems: 30%
4. Bad faith: 22%

It is striking that the first three topics are culture- and communication-related problems. Some countries deviate from the general trend. Army officers from the Netherlands mentioned as their top-four problems: different frame of mind (46%) communication problems (46%), language problems (43%), pursuing personal profit (41%). Other countries also have difficulties communicating. Being a native speaker of English is not always the solution, for military from the USA and South Africa report language and communication problems as well. The main problems the Hungarians face are frame of mind (44%) and communication problems (40%). Italy, Russia, Poland, France and Bulgaria report relatively few problems with communication and language. A possible explanation for this deviating position could be that the military from those countries keep to themselves and do not interact much with local parties or local civilian organisations. 'Keeping freedom of movement' pops up as a problem mainly because of high scores for Sweden and Russia. The items that score lowest are also very interesting. 'Partisanship' and 'making rules observed' do not seem to be large problems to most nations participating in PSO. Remarkable exceptions regarding 'making rules observed' are Russia and the USA. 37% of the Russian and 35% of the American officers state this is a problem, while the percentage for all countries is much lower (11%).

In response to the question: 'Did you face any difficulties in your relationship with officers of contingents from other countries?' army officers from all participating countries mentioned (lower half of table 2, total):

1. Language problems: 20%
2. Cultural differences: 14%
3. Diverging interpretations of mission: 13%
4. Divided loyalties (NATO, UN, country, etc.) 13%

Language problems, cultural differences, diverging interpretations of the mission and divided loyalties towards organizations like NATO, UN, the own country, and so on, are common problems army officers have to deal with in the interaction with officers from other countries. But again there are remarkable differences. Army officers from the Netherlands^I most frequently mentioned language problems (38%), cultural differences (35%), interoperability problems (24%), diverging interpretation of mission (24%), communication problems (24%) and problems with preparation (24%). On the

whole, the Hungarians reported only a few problems with the exception for interoperability problems (24%), language problems (24%) and ethical problems (24%). The Dutch, the French, Poles and the Swedes reported much more trouble than other countries with languages and language related problems, whereas the Russians mainly experienced difficulties with ‘diverging interpretation of mission’. On the whole, South

Table 2: Problems encountered with civilian counterparts and local parties (upper half) and officers from contingents from other countries (lower half) in % (Ntotal=347, N in countries: see table 1)

	Bulgaria	France	Italy	Netherlands	Poland	Russia	S.Africa	Sweden	USA	Hungary	Total
Different frame of mind	42	29	27	46	47	53	57	30	31	44	44
Language problems	16	24	18	43	29	21	38	35	38	32	32
Communication problems	21	10	8	46	6	11	42	35	38	40	30
Bad faith	5	48	12	14	24	42	25	26	12	16	22
Keeping freedom of movement	11	43	2	32	12	21	15	61	27	32	22
Pursuing personal profit	5	19	6	41	12	32	18	13	15	20	18
Partisanship	11	33	10	3	24	37	8	4	8	8	12
Making rules observed			18	3	6	37	7	9	35	8	11
Language	11	10	27	38	35	16	9	48	12	24	20
Cultural differences	21	14	12	35	6	5	8	35		16	14
Diverging interpretation mission	11	33	10	24		42	3	17	12	12	13
Divided loyalties (NATO, UN, etc.)	16	38	12	16		16	4	35	12	12	13
Interoperability problems	21	14	12	24	12	21	3	13	4	24	12
Professional preparation problems	11	5	16	24	6	5	5	39	8	16	12
Ethic code problems		24	4	22			5	30	4	24	10
Communication problems		10	2	24	6	21	7	26	8	12	10
Diverging interpretation of ROE	11	10	4	14	18	16	3	9	4	12	7
Rivalries	5		10	8	12	11	3	9	12	16	7

Africa and USA experienced only a few problems with officers from other countries. Language related problems do not seem to be a major problem to military from these anglophone countries in their interaction with officers from other countries. The fact that countries like France or Bulgaria do not report many problems with language may be interpreted in two ways; either their training in language skills is sufficient, or they did not have much contact with officers from other nations.

Deficiencies in preparation

In response to the question: 'did you experience any deficiencies in your education with regard to the particular features of the PSO that you took part in?' army officers from all participating countries mentioned as the four most serious deficiencies:

1. Languages: 34%
2. International law: 25 %
3. Intercultural management: 22%
4. International relations: 20 %

As can be seen from Table 3, languages, international law, intercultural management and international relations are topics in which a lot of officers from all participating countries experienced deficiencies in their education. But of course the order of the deficiencies differs for all countries. Dutch army officers experienced deficiencies in intercultural management techniques (32%), sociology (24%), languages (24%) and psychology (22%) but not so much in international law or politics. In Hungary the order is again slightly different: law (32%), history (32%), languages (28%), and intercultural management techniques (24%). In the United States officers indicated that what they lacked most was intercultural management techniques (42%). Even though English is the most accepted language in the world, 31% of the American military indicated that they experienced a language deficiency in their education. Probably the respondents wanted to acquire more knowledge of languages of local populations. Regarding language, France and Bulgaria score well below average. Poland and Italy score highest in indicating language as a serious deficiency.

In response to the question: 'In which topic did you experience deficiencies in your training with regard to the particular feature PSO that you took part in?' army officers from all participating countries mentioned:

1. Logistics 18%
2. Tactics 15%
3. Administration 15%
4. Communication 14%

Army officers from the Netherlands mentioned as the most serious deficiencies tactics (24%), leadership (24%) and regulations (22%). In Hungary they were related to administration (36%). Bulgaria experienced a serious deficiency in the field of logistics (47%) Although Russia also reports deficiencies regarding this topic, even more deficiencies are experienced in the field of tactics.

Table 3: Experienced deficiencies in education (upper half) and training (lower half) in % (Ntotal=347, N in countries: see table 1)

	Bulgaria	France	Italy	Netherlands	Poland	Russia	S.Africa	Sweden	USA	Hungary	Total
Languages	21	19	55	24	59	32	32	26	31	28	34
International law	37	24	33	14	47	42	16	22	23	32	25
Intercultural management	11	14	12	32	6	21	27		42	24	22
International relations	21	33	27	14	24	32	15	22	15	16	20
History	11	14	10	8	24	11	16	35	19	32	17
Religions	21	14	16	11	24	32	11	22	27	20	17
Sociology		5	8	24	12	21	15	17	12	16	14
Mass communication	11	19	20	3	35	26	17		4	8	14
Psychology		14	8	22	24	37	12		12	16	13
Economy	5		8	5	18	5	8	4	4	4	7
Logistics	47	14	14	11	24	42	18	9	15	12	18
Tactics		5	2	24	6	58	13	13	31	16	15
Administration	32	14	8	14	29	5	13	4	15	36	15
Communication	16		8	16	12	21	17	9	15	12	14
Regulations	16	10	4	22		5	17	13	4	16	12
Leadership	16	5	2	24		5	5	9	4	16	8
Topography				3		5	7	13	4	4	4

Correlation of 'problems' with 'deficiencies'

To answer the third research question (What is the correlation between the problems and the deficiencies?) the data were first factor-analysed using principal component analysis to find clusters of problems (table 4) and clusters of deficiencies (table 5). After demarcating the clusters, correlation analysis was performed on these clusters.

All variables in the set of questions designating 'problems encountered during deployments' were entered in a principal component factor analysis² to find out how these problems could be clustered in factors that more or less indicate the essence of the problems. The analysis revealed five components or factors (table 4; the factors are presented in the columns). High factor loadings are represented in black print to facilitate interpretation. Together these factor loadings in black print represent a cluster. The factors are labelled by a common denominator to the variables. The higher loadings are the most influential in the labelling process.

The first factor comprises interoperability problems, professional preparation prob-

lems, language, communication problems, cultural differences and rivalries. By labelling this factor ‘operational and communication problems’, the factor is interpreted as such.

Table 4: factor analysis ‘problems encountered with civilian counterparts (cc) or with officers from other countries (ooc)

Variables	Factors	Operational and communication problems	Problems with rules	Breaches in trust and ethical problems	Differences in perception	Communication problems with civilian counterparts	Communalities
Interoperability problems (ooc)		,49	,14	,16	,23	,10	,35
Professional preparation problems (ooc)		,57	,11	,22	,00	,02	,39
Language (ooc)		,74	,04	-,05	-,09	,19	,59
Communication problems (ooc)		,46	-,04	,09	,03	,28	,30
Cultural differences (ooc)		,68	-,25	,08	,26	-,09	,61
Rivalries (ooc)		,50	,44	-,06	-,18	,10	,48
Partisanship (cc)		-,18	,72	,24	,12	-,14	,62
Making rules observed (cc)		,01	,65	-,03	,01	,26	,48
Diverging interpretation of ROE (ooc)		,33	,52	-,01	,30	-,18	,50
Bad faith (cc)		,00	,41	,50	,08	,25	,50
Freedom of movement (cc)		,02	,09	,68	-,14	,27	,56
Ethic code problems (ooc)		,43	-,06	,44	,02	-,08	,39
Divided loyalties (nato, un, country)(ooc)		,27	-,02	,64	,21	-,14	,55
Different frame of mind (cc)		,03	,13	-,17	,74	,08	,60
Pursuing personal profit (cc)		-,03	-,05	,21	,59	,31	,49
Diverging interpretations of missions (ooc)		,26	,25	,32	,46	-,06	,45
Communication problems (cc)		,13	,02	,18	,30	,61	,51
Language problems (cc)		,14	,07	-,03	,02	,72	,54
Eigen values		3,5	1,7	1,3	1,2	1,2	
% of variance explained		20	10	7	7	7	

All loadings in this cluster pertain to the items about officers of other countries. The second factor was interpreted as ‘problems with rules’ as it consisted of the variables: partisanship, making rules observed and diverging interpretations of rules of engagement (ROE). The third factor ‘breaches in trust and ethical problems’ is characterised by high

factor loadings on bad faith/disloyalty, to keep freedom of movement, ethic code problems and divided loyalties. The fourth factor ‘differences in perception’ consists of such variables as ‘different frame of mind’, ‘pursuing personal profit’ and ‘diverging interpretations of missions’. The final factor ‘communication problems’ comprises communications problems and language problems (with civilian counterparts only)

The factor analysis of the deficiencies experienced in training and education resulted in seven clusters of variables (table 5). The clusters were labelled after the most dominant academic discipline underlying the constituting variables. The variables clustered in the factor ‘law and communication’ are international law, languages and mass communication techniques. High factor loadings on the second factor are for the variables psychology, sociology and intercultural management techniques. Hence the label ‘behavioural sciences’ to characterise this factor. The third component comprises inter-

Table 5: factor analysis ‘deficiencies in education’

Variables	Factors	Law and communication	Behavioural sciences	International political science	Military operational science	Management and control	History and geography	Economics	Communalities
International law		,67	-,06	,37	,02	,17	-,05	,08	,62
Languages		,48	-,12	,16	,16	,13	,47	,12	,55
Mass communication		,71	,08	-,01	,03	-,03	,05	,04	,54
Psychology		-,04	,72	,07	,19	,05	-,07	-,01	,57
Sociology		-,02	,76	-,10	,01	,17	,19	,14	,68
Intercultural management		,44	,52	,14	,06	-,08	-,06	-,02	,53
International relations		,24	-,04	,73	-,05	-,04	,07	-,02	,60
Religions		-,01	,10	,73	,13	,15	,10	,13	,62
Tactics		-,11	,12	,13	,70	-,22	-,00	-,25	,66
Logistics		,17	-,06	-,18	,68	,30	,02	,10	,63
Communications		,15	,02	,11	,63	,07	,03	,14	,50
Leadership		-,10	,09	,09	,01	,63	-,01	-,23	,48
Administration		,20	,04	,05	,07	,72	-,02	,25	,63
Regulations		,10	,18	,09	,05	,45	,14	-,50	,52
History		-,22	,12	,30	,04	,14	,64	,13	,61
Topography		,13	,02	-,05	-,03	-,12	,82	-,12	,72
Economics		,11	,10	,16	,04	,03	,05	,74	,60
Eigen values		2,7	1,6	1,4	1,2	1,1	1,0	1,0	
% of variance explained		16	9	8	7	7	6	6	

national relations and religions and was labelled ‘international political science’. Knowledge of religions belongs to this factor as religion is one of the causes of intra- and interstate conflict and as such it can, with some imagination, be considered political science. The fourth factor is aptly labelled ‘military operational science’ and is characterised by tactics, logistics and communications. The factor ‘management and control’ consists of the many managerial tasks of a leader indicated by high loadings for leadership, administration and regulations. The sixth factor comprises history and topography and is labelled according to the highest factor loadings. The seventh factor ‘economics’ comprises economics (as is evident from the label)

Table 6: correlations between ‘deficiencies’ and ‘problems’ (n = 347)

Problems	Deficiencies in education	Law and communication	Behavioural sciences	International political science	Military operational science	Management and control	History and geography	Economics
Operational and communication problems		,15**	,06	,13*	,04	,18**	,07	,11*
Problems with rules		,34**	,18**	,13*	,17**	-,01	,03	,16*
Breaches in trust and ethical problems		,05	,13*	,09	,07	,15**	,09	,04
Differences in perception		,11*	,28**	,15**	,13*	,05	-,07	,03
Communication problems with civilian counterparts		,08	,23**	-,01	,01	,06	,04	,01

significance: * p 0,05; ** p 0,01

The five clusters indicating types of problems that the officers have encountered during PSO and the seven clusters that form the disciplines which officers feel they lack in their education and training prior to deployment are interrelated. Statistically this interrelation can be calculated by correlating ‘problems’ with ‘deficiencies’. Based on the clusters found in the principal component factor analysis, five Likert-scales were constructed for ‘problems’ and seven for ‘deficiencies’. Subsequently, these scales were correlated³. In table 6 the significant correlations are flagged by two asterisks, whereas the P < ,05 significance level is marked with one asterisk. Zero-correlations are in grey printing.

Table 6 must be interpreted very carefully. Non-significant correlations for ‘history and geography’ do not mean that these disciplines are irrelevant. It may be that these disciplines have already been dealt with sufficiently in education and training. Geographical and historical facts about conflicts are indispensable in preparation for

deployments, so they have probably been incorporated in curricula and courses already. When the problems officers encounter during deployments one by one, are checked briefly, the following pattern emerges. When the officers are confronted with operational and communication problems the experienced deficiencies in education and training lie in the disciplines 'law and communication', 'international political science' and 'economics'. The latter discipline probably indicates a need for administrative know-how and practical information on regulations. (it is probably not macro-economics or accounting that is regarded a deficiency) A wide range of disciplines is needed in order to prepare for 'problems with rules'. They seem to be related to 'law and communication', 'behavioural sciences', 'international political science', 'military operational science' and 'economics'. 'Breaches in trust and ethical problems' is correlated with 'behavioural sciences' and 'management and control'. When officers have to deal with 'differences in perception' they feel that their education and training has been insufficient in the areas of 'law and communication', 'behavioural sciences', 'international political science' and 'military operational science'. 'Communication problems with civilian counterparts' is interrelated with 'behavioural sciences'.

Conclusion: coping with ambiguity

Since the 1990s participation in PSO has become a permanent element of the tasks of the military. PSO tasks differ from traditional military war tasks since the object of PSO is not to impose the will of one party on the other but to eliminate the causes of instability. The aim is not to render parties powerless but to help them reconstruct society and the way to reach this is to avoid destruction by means of minimal use of force. Instead of violence, PSO aim to moderate violence by using 'soft' power and diplomacy. The military realize the changes of object, aim, ways and means by collaborating with armed forces and civilians from all over the world. As tasks were added to the job, the military profession grew more complex than ever before. The metaphor for the profession shifted accordingly, from the soldier as warrior, to manager of violence, to soldier-diplomat/soldier-communicator. Military officers have to be able to switch from 'Article V'-behaviour to behaviour consonant with peacekeeping operations (which includes an attitude of inhibition towards the use of violence). PSO demand a new kind of 'flexible officer'. (Caforio, 2001, 2003) In this study opinions of 347 officers from 10 countries on education and training have been analyzed. The following questions were answered:

1. What kind of problems do officers meet during deployments?
2. What kind of deficiencies did officers experience in their academic and practical preparation?

3. Are the problems encountered during deployments and the experienced deficiencies in the preparation for PSO correlated?

The most frequently mentioned problems with civilian counterparts and local parties during deployments were 'different frame of mind', 'language problems', 'communication problems' and 'bad faith'. The most frequently mentioned problems with officers from other countries were 'language problems', 'cultural differences', 'diverging interpretation of the mission' and 'divided loyalties regarding NATO, UN, own country, etc'.

The most frequently mentioned deficiencies in the military education were 'languages', 'international law', 'intercultural management' and 'international relations'. With regard to training 'logistics', 'tactics', 'administration' and 'communication' were at the top of the list.

Besides five clusters of problems officers encountered during PSO, factor analysis identified seven clusters of deficiencies in education and training. In order to educate and train officers for PSO, the education and training should be designed in such a way that the kind of problems that soldiers are most likely to meet in a certain mission are taken into account. Here, a distinction must be made between the mission-oriented training soldiers undergo shortly before deployment and the academic education at military academies. Mission-oriented training can be tailor-made to fit the demands of specific operational situations. When the majority of the expected problems stem from operational and communications problems mission-oriented training should emphasize law and communication, international political science and management and control. When the most likely problem soldiers encounter is with rules, behavioural sciences, military operational sciences and economics should be incorporated into the curriculum, whereas less emphasis should be given to management and control. A course designed to meet the problem of breaches in trust and ethical problems should provide lessons in behavioural sciences and management and control. Differences in perception call for a range of disciplines comprising law and communication, behavioural sciences, international political sciences and military operational sciences. Communication problems with civilian counterparts form a problem that can be mended by teaching more behavioural sciences.

Apart from the automatic recommendation to provide for tailor-made mission-oriented curricula that are problem driven, there are some complexities to be considered. Firstly, especially in dealing with PSO it is not always possible to know in advance what problems will be encountered. Secondly, languages do not only seem to be the largest deficiency in training and education, they are also the largest problem encountered. Therefore, priority should be given to improving practical language skills (speaking, negotiating, basic knowledge, role-playing, etc.). Thirdly, problems never occur in isola-

tion, which means that they will most likely occur in pairs, or, worse still, bearing in mind Murphy's law,... everything will go wrong at the worst possible moment. In that case the military will have to prepare for a broad array of eventualities.

So far, recommendations have been given that were intended to improve mission-oriented training. However, the academic education at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy should be designed differently. It should be based on a broad general set of disciplines. During their academic education cadets cannot possibly know what deployments they will ever take part in, so it is better to prepare for a mix of problems. All academic subjects and training topics should be incorporated in the education of officers (and the educational staff should not shy away from English reading material or classes in English).

But most importantly, officers should be educated and trained to become flexible, for the most common problem they will encounter is ambiguity. Vocational training (learning the basics of the military profession) is necessary, but will not equip the officers of the future with the mental skills to cope with ambiguity. The more vocational training, the more the risk of trained incapacity. Officers will not be able to generate new solutions to new situations. They are most likely to find themselves in circumstances that change from deployment to deployment and that are often ambiguous. In these situations it takes abstract thinking capacity to arrive at new solutions. Officers will need to analyze a situation, to predict most likely outcomes, to plan operations, to deal with people of all sorts and so on. Officers will need to be able to change their plans when required by a changed situation. That is why officer education should put conceptualization of problems above practical problem solving topics or routine prescriptions dictated by field manuals or bureaucratic regulations. When equipped with the proper intellectual tools and military skills, future officers should be able to cope with ambiguous and unpredictable situations. Academic reasoning, lateral thinking, creativity and analytic powers are the skills flexible officers of the (near) future need to develop.

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Notes

- ¹ Being Dutch the authors have taken the liberty of discussing the Netherlands first.
- ² Here principal component analysis was applied using varimax with Kaiser normalisation as rotation technique. The number of factors was determined by use of the 'Eigen value = 1' extraction criterion and visual evaluation by use of a scree-test.
- ³ Correlations can amount to + 1 or - 1 meaning a perfect positive or negative correlation. Zero means that there is no interrelation at all. As all statistics are based on probability, testing decides on the question which of the correlations differ significantly from zero and which are not significantly different from zero. A significance level of $P < .01$ means that we have 99% certainty of a correlation not being zero.

The Royal Marechaussee

Frans Crul and Hans Leijtens

Abstract

The Royal Marechaussee (KMar) has undergone drastic changes during the past decades. It has developed into a modern police force with a military status executing a great variety of tasks in a flexible manner. In the year 2000 the KMar decided to establish its own initial education for its aspirant-officers and to entrust it to the RNLMA. The article discusses the reasons for this breach with the past and its consequences for the education and training.

Introduction

In 2000 for the first time in the history of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy (RNLMA) a cadet was admitted, who, after rounding off his education, was destined directly for the Service of the Royal Marechaussee (KMar). A year later the initial officer education for this Service was fully entrusted to the RNLMA. This was the first Service to send its aspirant officers to Breda since the arrival of the first Air Force cadets in 1939. What is the background of the KMar and why did it choose to set up its own initial officer education at the RNLMA?

The Royal Marechaussee: a police corps with military status

The Royal Marechaussee has had a long and rich tradition as a police corps. The term ‘marechaussee’ was first used in the Netherlands in the days of the Batavian Republic. In 1803 the decision was made to station a company of Marechaussee in the south of the country in order to protect the population from ‘robbery, plunder and other inconveniences’. Two years later it was reinforced with a company of *gendarmerie* in the fight against contraband and as a support for the police in case they were not able to provide adequate safety to the population. The stationing was later extended to the east of the country. Subsequently, in the era of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the French annexation (1806-1814), the Netherlands had a *gendarmerie* closely modelled on the French example.

The formal history of the KMar begins in 1814. After the fall of Napoleon the Netherlands regained independence under its monarch King William I. A new army was built up and a ‘Corps Marechaussee’, after the French model, was established in 1814. The Corps was tasked with maintaining law and order and guarding the safety of the border and the rural districts, especially in the southern part of the country. Its

strength was seven companies, totalling approximately 1,000 men. With the establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815 the Marechaussee was given the designation 'Royal'. It is not possible anymore to reconstruct the considerations which motivated the King to set up the KMar. Historically, the usual explanation for the necessity to establish the Corps lies in the special circumstances described above. From a political perspective it can be added that the King wanted a centrally controlled police corps as a counterbalance in the new decentralized union, which would allow him to make his influence felt if need be, in a literal and figurative sense. From the very first it was determined that the Minister of Defence was to control the corps. The authority over the corps lay with a number of (central) authorities, dependent on a particular assignment the KMar was given to carry out. The most prominent of these authorities was the Minister of Justice.

The secession of Belgium was an important event for the KMar at the time. As many men came from the Southern Netherlands, a drastic reorganization became unavoidable. Elements of the corps were actively involved in the 'Ten Days' Campaign against Belgium in August 1831, as scouts, protection units of logistic convoys and command posts, and as dispatch riders. Incidentally, in Belgium a *gendarmerie* corps was established, better known as the Rijkswacht in the Flemish part of the country, which at the beginning of the 21st century amalgamated with the (Federal) Police. After the Belgian revolt the strength of the Marechaussee crumbled to a mere 400-500 men, mainly stationed in the provinces of Zeeland, Noord-Brabant and Limburg. The reorganization of the KMar also had consequences for its embedding within the armed forces and the officer corps. From 1843 until 1909 the Inspector of the Cavalry exercised supervision over the corps and cavalry officers were regularly stationed there. For a long time the strength of the corps remained more or less stable, although a unit was stationed in the east and north of the country in 1889 and 1893, respectively. In the 19th century the KMar often provided military assistance when public order was disturbed so badly that the police could not cope anymore. This could be the case in all sorts of situations, such as village fairs, where alcohol was consumed profusely, or strikes and socialist riots. From the end of the 19th century the strength grew from 600 to well over 750, including twenty officers at most. In such a small organization opportunities for promotion were very slim indeed.

The officer education of the KMar from the 20th century onwards

The year 1909 marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the KMar. The Service got its own Inspector, directly under the Ministers of War and Justice. On top of that, it got its own initial training institute for the rank and file and NCOs at Apeldoorn.

(1913) The officers, however, were still recruited from the armed forces, in particular the Royal Netherlands Army. In the past the transfer to the KMar had not been encumbered by any specific requirements; from 1933 onwards the officers needed a certificate 'of more extensive legal knowledge'. The transfer went via detachments to the KMar training centre and one of the divisions in the country. After obtaining his certificate for the legal course, the new officer was sent to the staff of the commander of a division. The functions requiring direct leadership were still the domain of the NCOs at the time. The number of brigades was large and every town of importance in the outer (border) districts had one, although their average strength was modest. The career of an officer often developed at the district staffs or at the next higher level of division staff. For the majority of the officers at the time the function of District Commander often was their end function. During the interbellum period the KMar went through turbulent times. After the establishment of the Police Corps, tasked with policing the field army, at the beginning of the 20th century, the thirties saw the beginning of a movement to amalgamate the KMar, the Police Corps and the then State *Gendarmerie* into one corps which was to be called State Police. This discussion led to the State Police Decree, in which both the KMar and the State *Gendarmerie* were merged into the State Police. Subsequently, there was the fundamental discussion on the question of the status of the State Police (i.e including the KMar): civil or military. The outbreak of World War II put an end to the discussion. Formally, everything stayed as it was: the KMar was a police corps with a military status.

The war in fact also meant the demise of the KMar training. The Marechaussee Officer Training School (SOOM) at Apeldoorn, intended to create a cadre for the post-war period was abolished as early as 1941 and police school at Schalkhaar, based on the German model, was not an acceptable alternative. The regular KMar officers became POWs in 1942, those who did not have this status, went underground or joined the

C. Smit - Slots, one of the first female officers of the Royal Marechaussee. She was originally a logistics officer, trained 1984-1988 at the RNLMA, and transferred to the KMar in 1992.



resistance. In fact the KMar lost its officer cadre, and all that was left were NSB members and a few reservists.

In 1945 the KMar had to rebuild quickly and virtually from scratch. The discussion on the police organization that had been ongoing since World War I was resumed with renewed enthusiasm after the war. The Police Corps, in the interbellum period tasked with policing the armed forces, disappeared and a State Police Corps was established to assume the police task in the rural areas. The Municipal Police retained the police tasks in the municipalities with a population of more than 25,000. As a result of these organizational adjustments the position of the KMar changed: contrary to what had been intended before the war, the corps was not a part of the State Police. The tasks given to the KMar encompassed the rendering of military assistance to the police, frontier guard duty and policing the armed forces. The officers of this renewed corps came from the former Police Corps and the Royal Netherlands Army. The majority of the remaining pre-war officers were taken up by the State and Municipal Police. As of December 1945, 38 officers with these backgrounds were stationed with the KMar. Together with the still available pre-1940 officers the total came to 50. In the same month six pupils from the Marechaussee Officer Training School (SOOM) joined the Corps.

After World War II the KMar continued its recruitment from the Services. From 1967 it became possible for Royal Netherlands Navy and Royal Netherlands Air Force officers to transfer to the KMar. Besides, since the 1980s NCOs were trained to become officers of special services. The corps wanted officers with troop experience and recruited through yearly campaigns in the *Landmachtmededelingen* (Army Notices), or later, *INFOOP* periodicals. RNLMA officers had already passed a selection and had personal experiences working ‘with the troops’, and the KMar was keen on having them. Besides, it was necessary for those stationed in the KMar units attached to the Army Corps, to know how the day-to-day army routine worked. Finally, the small number of KMar officers required, would make an own education inefficient.

In order to be transferred to the KMar the applicant had to submit a request, which, on acceptance, was followed by six-month retraining course at the KMar training centre (OCKMAR). It goes without saying that the emphasis of this course did not lie on initial officer training or education, but on the job-specific aspects of the work of a KMar officer. Apart from leadership aspects the officer functions within the KMar are also characterized by aspects regarding contents and expertise, relating largely to the formal qualifications KMar officers have to meet and which are laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The officer fulfilled and still fulfils an important role in the law of criminal procedure, because of his status as criminal investigator and assistant prosecutor. He also has special authorities within the context of maintaining public order. In the retraining course, therefore, the emphasis lies on political science, constitutional

law, administrative law, criminal law, road traffic law, legislation with regard to weapons, ammunition, drugs, disposal of the dead, etc. On top of that there is an extended practical training period in the general police services of the KMar, several working visits to KMar units, visits to courts of justice and a detachment to a KMar or police unit.

This approach worked very well for the KMar, within the framework of the tasks laid down in 1954: guarding the safety of members of the Royal House, policing the Netherlands Armed Forces, frontier guard duty and the monitoring of aliens, the rendering of assistance to civil police, assistance in bringing suspects to trial and executing criminal sentences and, guarding the Netherlands Bank. The distance between officers and the NCOs and men was great and although both groups called a disadvantage, a clear division between the domain of the officer (the higher management) on the one hand, and the domains of NCOs (middle management) and men (execution) on the other hand, was considered as workable. Incidentally, since 1978 the officer corps has taken in female officers.

A modern police corps

In the past decade the KMar has again changed greatly. It has evolved into a modern police corps with a military status, fulfilling a great variety of tasks in a flexible way. The most important task areas in 2003 are: law enforcement (including the military police task), maintaining legislation and rules and regulations with regard to aliens and rules and security. The KMar is still a corps under the authority of the Secretary of Defence and as such an instrument of the central authority. Within (and among) these task areas the central authority can set priorities, which makes the KMar an effective instrument for safeguarding the vital interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The KMar takes up a special position in the overall Dutch police and security organization. On the one hand, this special position is due to the range of duties specific to the KMar and the ensuing place in the spectrum of instruments at the disposal of the authorities, and on the other hand, it is legitimized by the way in which these tasks are executed. The main difference with other police organizations, such as the regional police force, National Police Services, and special investigation services (a.o. Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Department) lies in the way in which this execution of professional police and security duties is realized on the basis of values and norms, principles and foundations closely related to its military status. Incidentally, the KMar as a police corps along military lines has European counterparts in such corps as the French *Gendarmerie*, the Italian *Carabinieri* and the Spanish *Guardia Civil*.

For the KMar the evolution of tasks obviously had organizational consequences. The number of KMar brigades has decreased considerably with a simultaneous increase of

personnel, which makes the present-day brigades complex, multi-disciplinary units, consisting of multiple departments. The command functions at brigade, and to a lesser extent, department level, have changed fundamentally in the process: of old the domain of the experienced expert, they have evolved into all-round management functions, although their successful fulfilment is still very much dependent on an affinity with the police job. As a consequence, these functions have shifted from the NCO to the officer domain.

The functions of brigade and department commander have hitherto been occupied by officers who have either transferred from the NCO ranks, or officer ranks of the other three Services. Although on an incidental basis KMar officers were educated at the RNLMA since 2000, there was no initial training until 2001. NCOs moving up to the officer ranks received a short, additional education and officers coming from the other Services still follow the retraining course, which lasts nine months, including a practical training period.

In 2000 it was decided to set up an initial KMar training, as an integral part of a new personnel policy. The arguments for this were founded on the changed function requirements, on the one hand, and the increased importance of an influx of young officers at the base of a pyramidal personnel structure, on the other. Once the decision to set up an initial officer education had been taken, the objectives of the education were defined. What functions are going to be fulfilled by the officers, what are the core competencies required for those functions? A choice was made to train the officers for the function of department commander, the most important competencies of which had already been described in the officer profile of the basic segment of the KMar personnel. Subsequently, an orientation was carried out into the way in which the required competencies could be developed. In doing this, a pragmatic approach was adopted: the numbers of aspirant officers would not be so great that the development and implementation of an initial officer education by the KMar itself would be efficient. That is why it was considered to what extent (combinations of) existing educational programmes and the institutions to teach them could cover the need for education. Needless to say, the embedding of the KMar within the Ministry of Defence from an organizational and control view played an important role. The eventual choice for the RNLMA was based on educational as well as organizational grounds.

The professional profile of the KMar officer encompasses a number of competencies that reflect his military status, which, as was described above, is the foundation not only for the KMar's organizational competencies, but also its unique position in the police and security organization. They give the organization its specific character, and every single one of them is a characteristic of the KMar serviceman/woman in general and the officer in particular. Although a number of KMar competencies are very similar to those

of police officers or managers of the Immigration and Naturalization Office, many others are typical for military officers. It concerns not only military competencies in a narrow sense, such as battlefield survival, but also in a broader sense, such as command and control and military (operational) tactics, that can be applied in police operations. The RNLMA education is the only one to offer the possibility to develop these specific competencies. As it was also possible there to develop the other competencies within existing and still-to-be-designed programmes, the choice for the RNLMA was easy.

In which way are these programmes realized in order to attain the objectives formulated on the basis of the professional profile? Although the development is not quite finished yet, the first contours begin to emerge. The KMar officer education has three streams: the four-year Bachelor course, the two-year course for academically educated candidates (cadets with a completed Higher Vocational or University education), and the course for NCOs retraining to become officers, which lasts up to one and a half years. All streams get off to the same start: cadets go through Basic Military Training (AMO), followed by Elementary Leadership Training (AKO) and finally Advanced Leadership Training (ALO). They partake in these phases together with Army and Air Force cadets, on the basis of a common syllabus. Their instructors are KMar NCOs, so that the specific KMar element can be brought in from the very beginning of their training. After six months of AMO/AKO/ALO the three streams differentiate.

The cadets following the Bachelor education go through the Joint Officer Education (GOO), in which they receive a programme of several basic modules of military sciences, management and public administration sciences, and technical sciences jointly with their Army and Air Force colleagues. After the GOO the KMar cadets follow the management and public administration Bachelor course. They differentiate within this programme and follow a so-called Minor in law and police sciences. Although the Bachelor and the Minor in it are still being developed, it is clear that the Minor will probably comprise such subjects as criminal law, constitutional and administrative law, law concerning aliens, military criminal and disciplinary law, administrative sciences, public administration, criminology and police and security studies. The Bachelor programme also encompasses a practical training period, during which the cadets get acquainted with the operational tasks of the KMar. At the moment there are still ongoing discussions on the draft programme with the client, the Commander in Chief of the KMar, and subsequently the Faculty of Military Sciences in formation will see to an efficient realization. On completion of the Bachelor course the cadets go through their Arms Specific Training (VTO). During this training, which takes place at the KMar National Training and Knowledge Centre (LOKKMar), in particular the function-related competencies, which constitute the professionalism of the KMar officer, is developed. VTO takes six months, after which the education is formally completed. At the moment

it is still being investigated whether there is a need for additional training, in particular in the area of criminal investigation, special duty police or alien affairs.

The academically educated cadets and those in the retraining programme follow the Introduction into Military Management (IMB) module and the Basic Officer Training (BOO) after having gone through the initial AMO/AKO/ALO sequence. IMB takes about six months and consists of three themes: armed forces and society, management and (peace) operations. During the first theme the KMar cadets follow a programme which is partly joined, partly specific. The latter explicitly deals with the build-up and embedding of the police and security organization and the position of the KMar in this. The management theme is followed together with the other cadets, after which the operations theme is KMar-specific again. It covers the task areas of the KMar and its history and it is completed with brigade simulation exercise. After the Basic Officer Training the academically educated cadets follow a post-academic programme. The cadets on the retraining course continue their education at the LOKKMar, where they take their Arms Specific Training (VTO). The academically educated cadets receive their VTO after the post-academic programme.

The KMar education at the RNLMA is not definite yet, at the moment. The first few years have shown that in many respects the RNLMA education is too military-technical or too military-operational for the KMar. There is hardly any link-up with work of the KMar organization and it will have to be developed step by step. In particular those cadets who have already served as NCOs notice this. It is the challenge for the KMar to win its place in the educational building, in which not only the KMar can do justice to its specific tasks, but where there is a mutual understanding and respect between Army, Air Force and KMar. As long as no choice is made to incorporate the KMar fully into the civilian police force, the co-habitation at an educational institute like the RNLMA has to have an added value for all parties concerned.

The tension between management science and military science

Jan Oonincx

Abstract

Institutions for officer education, and the RNLMA is no exception, have always faced the problem of relevancy of the contents of their curriculum. The educational history of the RNLMA is replete with 'course-corrections' and since the 1960s there has been a tension between the roles of the officer as manager and warrior. The present article describes the relevant factors that account for this tension and the many ways in which it manifests itself.

Introduction

This year the RNLMA celebrates its 175th anniversary. Since the establishment of the officer education at the RNLMA in 1828 there has been a continuous reflection on the desired content of the study programme. There have been strong variations in this content over time and they have depended on the officer profiles used at a given time. An essential characteristic of the education is its continuous adaptations as a result of the changing demands of the officer profession. Therefore the education can be qualified as strongly dynamic. Since the 1970s there has been a drastic change or renovation every ten years or so, and there are even intermediate 'corrections'. At this moment in time an intense effort is made to realize a rather fundamental change: the introduction of the Bachelor-Master structure.

Of old there has been a certain tension between the various visions on the education requirements, which seem to have been dominated by a strong emphasis on a management approach since 1980.

The following section presents the factors (nine in total) that create the field of tension in the education along with the effects of certain recurrent bones of contention. One point in particular will be addressed: the tension between management science and military science. Finally, some conclusions will be given.

Factors of tension

The complexity of the officer profession

Officers have to be able to operate in environments as divergent as peacetime management, combat situations and violence in war, peacekeeping and peace enforcing situa-

tions, internal conflicts and crisis situations resulting from political, religious, or ethnic strife. In particular in international joint and combined operations they have to work in environments that seem to become increasingly complex, and therefore more risky. Kofi Anan once expressed this complexity in a conversation with his military advisor Major-General F.E. van Kappen, Marines (ret.) as follows, 'Peacekeeping is like giving first aid to a rattlesnake'.

The above-mentioned complexity seems to be less in peacetime situations and in the normal day-to-day management. In spite of what is often said about the armed forces' very complex external and internal environment, which is supposed to make decision-making, control and management exceedingly intricate, it is not more or less so than for other companies or government organizations of the same size. Incidentally, it cannot be ruled out that the internal environment and management of the armed forces is made more complex than is strictly necessary.

The officer has to be able to act adequately in different environments (peacetime, crisis control situations, humanitarian operations and war). Depending on the situation he has to play the role of warrior, diplomat or manager. In the course of his career as an officer he will have to function on various levels, such as the executive, policymaking and managerial levels. Because of the many demands made on him, an almost spontaneous tension emerges between the time available for education and the time needed to prepare the officer for the execution of his function in all roles, in different situations, on different levels.

The many facets of the officer profession

As was mentioned above, the officer has to be all: soldier or warrior, diplomat and manager. But he also has to be an integral administrator, leader, head, decision-maker, planner, monitor, stimulator, example and change manager. He must be up to a physically demanding job, and he also has to have mental strength, which is directly related to the essence of his profession, the handling of (the ultimate form) of violence. He must be able and prepared to use violence, but he must also be strong enough mentally and physically to undergo it. (Van Kappen, 2003: 53) The heart of the military profession lies in the handling of the (ultimate) instrument of violence.

In combat situations and in crisis circumstances, on the one hand, but also in peacetime management, the officer must be able to lead his subordinates effectively, and this is where the tension emerges. Leading means a totally different thing in either situation. In this respect, too, Van Kappen (Van Kappen, 2003: 54) provides a telling example: 'Thinking and deciding behind a desk, with a cup of coffee in a comfortably warm room, with all the reference books at hand, with soft, relaxing music in the background and a

good night's rest, is not such a big thing. There are many people who can do that'. And he is right here, especially also because for many important issues there is a longer period for project groups or staff departments to prepare a decision and, if necessary, external advisors can be called in. Although Van Kappen does not actually say it, these are the specific circumstances in which decision making takes place in peacetime circumstances within the armed forces. There are many officers, indeed, who can do this, and in practice there are many officers who do just that.

This brings up the interesting question (and an important point of tension) of whether decision-makers for the peacetime management of the armed forces must have received a military officer education. The answer may very well be negative, as it is questionable whether this an essential requirement for the decision-making and the command and control of the peacetime management, with regard to such aspects as personnel, materiel, finances, training, controlling, information, and auditing.

It is exclusively for command and control purposes in combat and peace operations (warfare, peacekeeping, peace enforcing and crisis control operations) that officer qualities are needed, making a military officer education an absolute necessity. Effective leadership in these circumstances stands in stark contrast to that of peacetime management. Van Kappen substantiates this as follows, 'Thinking and deciding "on your feet", under time pressure, hungry and tired in an environment of chaos and violence, that's what it is all about. There are not many people who can do this without an intensive training; besides, it cannot be learned from a book' (Van Kappen, 2003: 54).

Nor from theory, it could be added. It requires quite a bit of practice, experience and training to make the right decision in a split second, under the pressure of enemy fire and snipers, possibly with dead or injured soldiers in full view. There is no doubt that stressful situations such as these require a different sort of leadership than the above-mentioned office conditions. It is for this good reason that in the military training much attention is given to handling stress. Here, too, there remains a certain tension between the stress and the fear that actually come up in combat situations and the stress and the fear generated in adventurous training activities such as diving, parachuting, working at heights and abseiling. They are of a different order.

50 years of peace

After World War II the Dutch armed forces almost exclusively and continuously operated in a peacetime environment. The chance of an officer losing his life in an armed conflict during the Cold War was estimated to be many times lower than the chance of someone becoming involved in a fatal car accident in the almost car-less island of Schiermonnikoog. In fact, after World War II the officer profession was one of the safest

and risk-free professions of all.

The statement that 'content and quality of military training and education are best served by an occasional war' may be a bit bold, but it nevertheless harbours an element of truth in it. It is likely that the officer training would have been completely different if the Dutch armed forces had had to operate regularly and in a prolonged war situation at home or abroad. In the post-World War II period a field of tension developed itself, perhaps unintended and almost unnoticed. There was no more fighting; training, planning and managing, all the more. By and by the armed forces began to be seen as a (training) company, to be managed as if it were an organization from the world of business. The armed forces became a company. This view gained momentum when around 1990 the *Beleid Bedrijfsvoering Defensie* (BBD - Defence Management Policy) was developed, in which there was much attention for *Verbeterd Economisch Beheer* (VEB-improved economic control).

The policy framework for improved management was based on a number of principles, a.o. result-responsibility of commanders, decentralization, unless..., mutual trust and independent action. The policy framework also encompassed a new management concept, featuring such principles as management at arm's length, line management, output control and a separation of policy and execution. Simultaneously a new planning and control system was introduced. Operation schedules, management contracts and covenants were used as instruments in the practical realization of the management control cycle. This policy from 1993 was developed and implemented over the years and it was brought up to date in the BBD 2000. The field of tension will be obvious: in this period management science had won the day, in theory, in the education as well as in practice, against military science, much to the disappointment of many operational officers.

Barrack style or university style

For years the question whether the officer education should be vocational or academic has been a source of tension. That it is still very much topical appears from the re-structuring of the academic education of the faculties at the RNLNC and the RNLMA in order to tie up with the Bachelor-Master structure. This factor of tension could not be more plain than in the invitation to a symposium held on 15 May 2003 on the occasion of the RNLMA's 175th anniversary, entitled 'Captains of industry? Trends and challenges in military education'.

The symposium dealt with the tension between the military education in 'barrack style' and the academic education in 'university style'. One of the points made was that this tension has become topical because of the changing tasks of the armed forces and the military profession. It may very well be possible that these changes have the poten-

tial to break through this field of tension, as the new tasks of the armed forces point at an education that enables the officer to execute his military job, rather than lead a company in a academic way.

For the time being, however, the tension seems to be there, which leads to the following questions:

- Can the military identity be retained in an officer education based on a university model?
- Can the education have a (sufficient) academic level if it takes place in barrack style?
- Can a military officer of good quality be educated when an education is chosen (consciously or not) that intends to train future 'captains of industry'?

Answering these questions will exercise the minds of many commanders responsible (including the Commanders in Chief) and educators involved (including military and civilian lecturers) for some time to come. The academic part of the education is being restructured and this seems to point at a choice for the university style. Following the example of the universities, the armed forces have opted for the introduction of the Bachelor-Master structure. The faculty staff of the Faculty of Military Sciences in formation have the important task to guarantee and develop the military character of the education. Within the context of the formation of the Faculty of Military Sciences and the introduction of the BaMa-structure, there are also ideas to open up the academic part of the education to civilian students, in particular for subjects such as strategy, military science, crisis control, logistics and management. Concurrently, the possibility is studied of cadets and midshipmen following a part of their education at civilian universities even more than is already the case.

Another possible point of tension is the question of who determines the content of the curriculum: the military, who state their needs (the Commanders in Chief), the Board of Governors, or the Faculty Board of the Faculty of Military Sciences (professors, lecturers and scientists). Military people all too easily take it for granted that it is the military top; after all, who pays the piper calls the tune, besides, who knows better than the leadership of a Service what is necessary and good for the education of their officers? Often the academic staff too easily assume that it is the departments and their professors; after all, who knows better than the expert lecturer what academic education encompasses and how it should be organized, certainly with a view to academic recognition of the programmes by the universities?

There is still one more minor field of tension with regard to the question whether officers should be educated for their first function(s) or for an extended career within the armed forces. The short education for the first function only, should be much more practical and hardly academic; conversely, the 'long' education should be much more

conceptual and theoretically founded. Parallel to this is the distinction between the terms of commission: BBT (short-term commissioned officers) for a limited number of years, directed at fulfilling the subaltern officer functions, who follow a short education and BOT (long-term commissioned officers) for an extended career, directed at fulfilling key functions in higher ranks in the military organization, who follow the long course.

Patronizing or own responsibility

A permanent field of tension concerns the question if and to what extent the cadet and midshipman can be given their own responsibility during their education. Does the education of a professional, independent, active, creative and responsible future officer benefit from giving him a high degree of responsibility or by taking him by the hand? Military educators tend to set priorities for the cadet and midshipman by indicating exactly when and how something must be done. In doing so, a strong emphasis is laid on following rules, regulations and procedures and on checking whether the detailed assignments have been carried out accordingly by the cadets and midshipmen. In other words, they are under close scrutiny.

Most civilian lecturers prefer to give them more freedom and are convinced that patronizing is the wrong way to instill a sense of responsibility. They are of the opinion that their students have a responsibility of their own for completing their education, in any case the academic part. This implies the cadets and midshipmen must be able to make their own choices. The road to the desired final result is paved with priorities of their own choice. This does not mean that the lecturer may neglect to confront the cadets with their achievements or absence thereof. This field of tension, therefore, is directly related to the extent and intensity of coaching of the cadets and midshipmen.

The recurrent discussions on the (extent of) lecture attendance shows there is a field of tension between lecturer (military or civilian) and student. In this respect the cadets tend to compare their situation with that of university students, but this comparison does not quite hold (or rather, not hold at all). The university student faces the strict assessment of his study results and, moreover, is not paid to follow the education. The military student is paid, though. He is an employee, enjoys a decent income and can make use of excellent facilities for sports, messing, accommodation and study (almost) free of charge. The discussion on lecture attendance can be closed once and for all by stating that paid employees can be expected to meet the targets that have been set for them. It goes with the job to attend lectures and participate actively in them in order to have the best chance of achieving satisfactory study results.

Three pillars

The officer education is founded on three pillars:

- Military training and education by the Department of Military Training and Education
- Academic study of and research into military management (academic education) by the Faculty of Military Sciences in formation
- Character development and group building, realized to a large extent within the Corps of cadets and midshipmen

Throughout, there is the need to expose the aspirant officers to all sorts of stressful situations, so that they can cope with the heavy trials of the battlefield and the possibly traumatic experiences they may have when they are sent out in peace operations to crisis areas and disaster situations. This is done, for instance, in the introduction period, by physical exhaustion and sleep deprivation, by being forced to sleep in a dormitory, by adventurous training activities, the boarding school system, strict social control and sometimes by isolation. This is not all, for sports and games, not to mention important social occasions (Corps days, parties, sports contests, etc.) lay considerable claim on the remaining available time.

The three pillars interfere with each other as far as their objectives, requirements, claims on available time are concerned and, according to some, they offer aspirant officers the opportunity to more or less hide behind one or more of them. Another reason may be the fact that the number of aspirant officers has grown, whereas the number of lecturers and cadre has decreased as result of the need to educate more efficiently, effectively and cost-consciously.

Teaching and research

Particularly among civilian lecturers tensions may rise when the teaching load becomes too high compared with the time available for research. In general the career possibilities of civilian lecturers are better served with good research results and articles published in renowned international journals than with good teaching results only. For military lecturers the opposite is true.

With regard to teaching there is also the tension between the general legitimation of the subject taught and the applied or military nature of it. This implies that civilian lecturers must know the military organization and they must be able to prove and explain the relevance of their subject to the cadets and midshipmen.

With regard to research there is a tension between conducting general academic research, on the one hand, and the need for carrying out defence-oriented academic

research, on the other. Research is and remains one of the foundations of good military academic education. It has to be defence-oriented, and it can be mono-disciplinary as well as multi-disciplinary. The accreditation of the education within the BaMa-structure, aspired for by the defence institutes of higher education, greatly increases the need for this defence-oriented research. As it is, this ambition brings along obligations with regard to the relation between teaching and research, in that the development of knowledge by the students has to take place through an interaction between teaching and academic research in the relevant disciplines. Accreditation is impossible when the academic military education is not fed by research results from its own educators.

Strings of function and educational requirements

For many years now officer profiles have been used within the armed forces. They form the starting point for the requirements that an officer should meet in order to be able to adequately and competently fulfil the expected roles in the various environments on all levels. These requirements have a direct bearing on requirements with regard to character building, personal characteristics, ambitions and experiences. Usually this leads to long lists of competence and function requirements. The most recent of such lists at the RNLMA contains an enumeration of 42 competence points, plus an additional 10 personal characteristics, at which the education is supposed to be directed. But this is not all. Each of the pillars has more and sometimes contradictory requirements for the cadets and midshipmen. To name a few:

- the academic education by the Faculty: the cadets have to follow academic education, make assignments, study independently, pass tests, write a final paper, do written and oral presentations, possess social and communicative skills, etc.
- the department of military training and education: the cadets and midshipmen have to have a good physical condition, their physical toughness must be trained and military skills acquired, they have to accept military discipline, leadership qualities have to be further developed, they have to learn command and control, map reading, shooting, fighting, ...etc.
- character development and group building in the Cadets' Corps: foster personal development, solidarity and group cohesion, impart camaraderie, fellowship and loyalty, learn how to cooperate, organize, and network, instill obedience, trust and confidence, norms and values, build up mental resilience, observe etiquette, but also adopt a critical attitude and 'zacve'(independent, active, creative, responsible, ethical, etc.

In the academic part of the education lists like these can be found along with elaborate and detailed enumerations of objectives, conditions and knowledge requirements of all the subjects of the education.

Taken together all this (some one hundred requirements) can cause some trouble, especially when it is not sufficiently clear in which way all they are or have been translated into the curriculum and how it is tested whether they have all been realized, ultimately at the moment of handing out the officer certificates.

Military science and management science

The managerial aspect of the initial officer education as a management education has become very successful over the past decades, to the detriment of the military aspect of the education. Where should the primacy lie in the educational philosophy: with the managerial or the military approach? Or is there a possibility for a middle way?

In the present article there will be no plea for a one-sided managerial approach, as this element has gone too far within the military education over the past few years. So some criticism is called for here, which will involve a limited repetition of some of the arguments used before.

The Dutch armed forces have not seen any operational action for almost half a century. Officers who had graduated from the RNLMA found themselves in an army that was almost exclusively occupied with peacetime management, planning and training. In fact the organization had become a training factory. The education had to lead as much as possible to external certification, and even a bureau was established for the purpose. External educational and certificate requirements became more important than military ones.

The *raison d'être* of the armed forces had been lost out of sight, even if there was much thinking and discussion on their justification and objectives. Throughout the organization countless mission statements were formulated. The primary process, however, became increasingly less important as a basis for the content of the officer education.

A military officer education of its own within the defence organization can only be justified if the officers get something there which they cannot get anywhere else. That education must be founded on the justification of the armed forces themselves. It is all about an officer education which enables them to carry out their essential tasks, derived from the objectives of the armed forces.

Those objectives do not justify the education of managers, organizations experts, sociologists, psychologists, ICT experts, technicians, engineers or personnel managers, jurists, or logisticians, rather than officers. It was, however, going in that direction.

The primacy should lie with the academic preparation for the future profession,

although for the execution of that profession the officer must have the necessary knowledge of management, sociology, psychology, ICT, personnel management, law, logistics and a number of other specialisms.

As a parallel may serve the education of the Military Administration of the past. Until the 1980s the RNLMA produced more than half accountants. When this was stopped it was replaced by the education for almost half managers. Later still, managerial know-how was an important part of the common education of all cadets. There was some sense in that, as very many, if not all, officers were employed in the peacetime organization at the time. But the armed forces do not need their own education institute for that, as a management education can be found in many places outside the organization.

Much has changed, however, over the years. More and more officers are sent out to take command of military personnel during operations in the context of peace mission, a fact which has had resulted in more interest for military science.

With the advent of BaMa and the opening up of the military education to civilian students and the opportunities for further study of officers at civilian academic institutions, the danger increases that once again the focus of attention is not primarily an education that is optimally geared to the realization of the new mission of the armed forces. New budget limitations and a wish for further embedding of the armed forces in the Dutch society intensify this danger.

Management, or to put it more widely, management science must remain a major element in military education, but it should be coordinate and in service to it. Its content should be determined not by the knowledge needed by officers employed in the management of peacetime armed forces – no military education is needed for that - , but in the management of the armed forces as an expeditionary organization. This requires a basic knowledge of management science to be applied to the management of expeditionary missions.

The above-mentioned non-specific subjects should be taught and given military relevance in such a way that the management and control of expeditionary missions (preparation, execution, winding down) run as smoothly as possible.

The contrast between ‘military science’ and ‘management science’ should not be exaggerated. There is only a seeming contrast when ‘management science’ goes over into ‘military science’, and the borderline is often difficult to define. Several subjects which are now presented as military are in essence normal civilian subjects. This holds good, for instance, for international relations, ICT, logistics, sociology, psychology, history and technology. These subjects belong to ‘management science’, but only deserve a place there if they have been given sufficient military relevance. They have to be re-moulded into subjects that are rightfully called ‘military science’, and they become ‘military ICT’, ‘military sociology’, ‘military psychology’, ‘military history’ and

‘military technology’.

The military educational institutes should not educate future top-of-the-bill managers, but top-of-the-bill officers. Of course these officers must have a critical attitude, and preferably be creative, they must have stamina, must be good achievers, able to cope with pressure and stress, have leadership qualities, be able to negotiate, be good change managers, be dynamic, etc.; but all this must be directed at functioning adequately in crisis and war situations.

This will lead to a different content of these subjects than when they are exclusively geared to peacetime management in stable circumstances like those occurring in other companies and organizations. And the level must be academic. Studying these subjects must contribute to acquiring an academic level. The lecturers of the Faculty of Military Science impart this academic attitude by stimulating the critical faculties of the cadets. In this way an academic military officer education will be established. It will produce officers who meet the required profile of academic intellect, capable of acting critically and independently, able to control the spectrum of violence, trained to make the right choice in difficult circumstances, bent on the conscientious execution of their task.

Conclusion

The fields of tension described above have positive as well as negative effects. The leadership and educators responsible must ensure that in the end the positive effects are the dominant ones. It will keep the organization ready to continually fine tune the programmes to the officer requirements. The primacy in a high quality officer education lies with military science, and management science is a major contributor to that education in a serving role. Military education cannot do without science, especially because of its role in developing the critical intellect of the future officer.

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Athens versus Sparta

The new missions and the future of military education in Europe

Karl W. Haltiner

Abstract

With regard to officer socialization, Sparta represents the old model of military education, which - applied in an intraorganizational and isolated manner - focuses on military skills and an attitude of loyal service to the nation. Athens, on the other hand, stands for an open education in a broad spectrum of academically founded intellectual capabilities in the service of politics and diplomacy. Are we moving away from Sparta and on towards Athens? The article tries to answer this question by presenting a closer look at the changes in the operational and socio-political context of armed forces and by illustrating trends in the new conception of the officer education in Europe. The main conclusion is that the European way leads towards Athens without leaving Sparta behind entirely.

Introduction

Military organizations have always served several purposes, but mainly those that were closely linked to the use of collective force. In the age of the nation state, armed forces were not limited to warfare and protection of the national territory, they were also the symbolic bearers of national sovereignty and identity. This is why the professional officer was rightly defined as a manager of violence and at the same time as a servant of the state. (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1963) In most nations the training of future leading soldiers includes a socialization with patriotic values additional to warfaring skills. Traditionally, this education is not given within the framework of the general national education system, but in specific non-public institutions: the military academies. Their purpose can be classically defined as ‘... inculcating future officers with loyalty and commitment to the profession of arms and a willingness to serve their country on and off the battlefield’. (Franke & Heinecken, 2001: 567)

However, since the end of the Cold War the armed forces of the modern democracies have served almost exclusively other purposes than warfare, not in the national but increasingly in an inter- and multinational setting. They have been utilized primarily for what can be called interventions of a policing type, be it in classic peacekeeping and humanitarian missions or in more muscular peace restoring operations. Post-Cold War soldiers are sent off to prevent potential armed conflicts, to enforce law and restore public order, to mediate in unsolved conflicts and protect minorities in case of humanitarian catastrophes, to organize and monitor elections, find and help displaced persons and

refugees, and to reconstruct war-damaged civilian institutions and infrastructures. Soldiers have been taking on the roles of diplomats, referees, public servants, street workers, constables and policemen, but rarely have they been used as what they were originally trained and skilled for, namely as soldiers for the defence of their nations. Of around fifty operations since the end of the Gulf War in 1991 almost all were of the new non-military type^I (Moskos, Williams & Segal, 2000: 297). These 'Military Operations Other Than War' (MOOTW) are not new in an historical sense. What is novel, however, is their dominance as a form of military action, on the one hand, and their geo-strategic and political importance, on the other.

Obviously, the traditional nation state function of the military, the waging of war in the interest of one's own nation, remains only one and maybe not even an important task of military organizations of modern democratic states. Their armed forces are becoming some kind of multi-functional organizations entrusted with a variety of state tasks. The use of collective force has statistically become an exception and only one among many tasks.

What are the consequences for the officer education of this mutation of the military organization from a warfighting instrument into a multi-functional policing tool? Is the old training system, according to which officers are trained in isolated schools that focus on the training for the brutality of war and the loyal service to the nation, a thing of the past? Is a new model for the education of tomorrow's officers needed, a model that offers more than warfare skills, that allows officers to play new roles ranging from managers of violence to politically trained advisors and diplomats to social workers? And if this is the case, is a socialization different from the standard national educational system still up to date?

While Sparta represents the old educational model that focuses on military skills and on an attitude of loyal service to the nation taking place in an intraorganizational and isolated manner, Athens stands for a an open education in a broad spectrum of academically founded intellectual capabilities in the service of politics and diplomacy (Lovell, 1979). Are we moving away from Sparta and on towards Athens? In order to answer these questions the changes in the operational and socio-political context of armed forces will be examined. Subsequently, some trends in the new conception of the officer education that can be observed in Europe will be discussed. Finally, an attempt will be made to formulate some theses about the future of the officer education. The main assertion will be that the European way leads to Athens but that Sparta will not be given up entirely.

The new operational context: the constabularization of the European armed forces

In order to understand the consequences of the military and political developments for the re-conceptualization of the officer education, the main characteristics of the new operational context and the ensuing mutations within the structures of the armed forces have to be outlined.

National armed forces are used as constabulary forces to secure international order, to de-escalate, to secure peace on behalf of a supranational power. It is therefore possible to speak – in the words of Morris Janowitz – of an increasing constabularization of the European military. (Janowitz, 1971) Almost all Europeans have reacted to this with an explicit re-definition of their armed forces that amounts to a considerable expansion of the possible range of missions. Without losing their capability for combat, military organizations are turning into instruments for the creation of international order and even ‘nation-building’. The capability for a new quality of civilian-military relations is indispensable, the soldier’s field of competencies is extended to include those of a policeman, social worker and diplomat.

It is possible to speak of an ongoing constabularization of the military, not only on an international but also on a national level. (Haltiner, 2000) The blurring boundaries between external and internal security accelerate this process. This change of functions of the armed forces is made visible in support missions in the areas of border control (e.g. in Austria), the fight against organized crime and terrorism (e.g. Italy, USA), the protection of diplomatic institutions, airports or strategically important civilian infrastructures in the aftermath of September 2001. (France)² Both requirements of the new missions, the enlarged skill spectrum of the military personnel as well as the increasing amount of troops deployed for out-of-nation duties, necessitate the use of volunteers and render the upholding of large numbers of citizen soldiers obsolete. The following criteria are characteristic of the new strategic and political context of armed forces operations. (see also Boëne et al., 2001: 30)

The dissolving link between the military and the nation, end of in-group ethics

In the 19th and 20th century the traditional logic of the national armed forces was based on a distinction between inside (nation, alliance members) and outside (potential enemy territory). The role of the armed forces was to protect and to defend the inner territory. Thus, the identification of the officers and the soldiers with national values and interests was of the utmost importance, a socialization based on those values was to guarantee the necessary motivation. This tight bond with the national territory is dissolving with the use of armed forces in international crisis stabilization. The logic of accelerated globalization also applies to military organizations. Already during the Cold

War, the system of nuclear deterrence based on the weapons monopoly of a few great powers, was no longer based on nations but on power blocs. The focus is shifting from territorial and national systems to regional and ideological criteria. (democracy, human rights, humanitarian international law, protection of minorities) The ongoing communalization of military tasks enhances the de-nationalization of the militaries. The formerly close relationship between national threat and national independence that had legitimized the mass armies has dissolved in the course of a decade. The emerging 'global soldier's' ethics and morals are faced with new demands. What such morals should look like is still being discussed in politics and in the military establishments.

Internationalization of conflicts and multinationalization of the militaries: Today, most missions of armed forces take place within an international or intercultural context, and normally with multinational troops. While in the past, at best the staffs, i.e. the highest hierarchical level of the militaries, were multinational, multinationalization has now reached troop level as well, i.e. the lower levels of hierarchy. The management of intercultural competencies has become a prerequisite for successful stabilization and peace-keeping missions.

International law: International law plays an important role in the new missions other than war. The Rules of Engagement determine the mission and the limitations in the use of force. Respect for international law is one of the most important foundations for the legitimization and evaluation of the new operations. In order to guarantee them, the military leadership is faced with completely new challenges. This requires not only knowledge of international law but also the ability to communicate it, to enforce it diplomatically where necessary.

New forms of conflict: Conventional conflicts between sovereign national states have been replaced by civilian, religious, gang or ethnic wars. They are marked by diffuse power structures, missing force monopolies and often changing boundaries between enemies and allies, by asymmetrical warfare that uses the civilian population as basic resource, by migrations and humanitarian catastrophes (Kaldor, 1999). Interventions in these bottom up-conflicts demand high competencies in almost all social roles of human behaviour.

Hypermediatization: Nowadays, military operations take place in the spotlight of the media and this in real-time (Boëne et al. 2001, p. 32). The days when the military could act without spectators are over. Operations are taking place in front of the eyes of the public – and the enemy! Public opinion – national and international – decides on the

legitimacy of an operation. The relations with the media and the ability to communicate become indispensable for successful military actions on the spot.

The impact of constabularization on the militaries

What are the consequences of the obvious constabularization, i.e. the growing use of the military for policing operations? In order to underline the differences between the old and the new military tasks and their consequences for the education of officers, the differences between military and police organizations in an ideal-typical way will be presented below (Haltiner, 2000, Geser, 1996):

Traditionally, military organizations are top-down organizations specialized in threatening with and using collective violence against foreign armed forces. In other words: they are focused on inter-social macro-violence or on 'hard power'. The use of massive macro-violence demands a high degree of coordination. The organizational rationale is therefore based on a leadership strictly structured from top to bottom with a closed chain of command organized according to the principle of centralization. The information relevant for action moves down from the top, the competence to initiate action is strongly limited at the bottom of the hierarchic structure (Feld, 1959; Lang, 1965).

The borderline case of a war is the measure of the quality of organization not only in times of war but also in times of peace. The organization in all its details is imprinted with the capacity for massive force application and the risk of macro-violence. However, meanwhile operations including violence on a large scale, have become rare. The low amount of experience feedback into the social environment is apt to lead military organizations to an overly strong inward orientation. Their structural prerequisites for permanent learning are weak (Lang, 1965: 838; Battistelli, 1991). The individual is instrumentalized and de-individualized in favour of the group, i.e. the soldier is expected to sacrifice his individual freedom and, if inevitable, his life for a collective goal. There is a net primacy of the community. Members of the collective are taken care of in an institutionalized fashion. Soldiers generally live in 'total institutions' (Goffman, 1961). Morale and cohesion as well as a high *esprit de corps* are vital ingredients for combat motivation and are part of the socialization and training. The military, while being a highly bureaucratic institution, has therefore essentially communitarian structures. This only reinforces the tendency towards inward orientation, or even 'castellation'. In classic military operations the enemy can be identified, making it easier for the soldier to show unambiguous behaviour as a player in traditional warfare. The soldier's actions are aimed at attacking and destroying an enemy, if necessary by all means. Ambiguous situations are disconcerting for the soldier and often provoke the falling back on trained,

reflexive behaviour. Military organizations are therefore, on accord of their internal nature, top-down organizations.

Police forces stabilize a certain social order. One of the means of the police is the use of 'soft power'. In order to prevent intrasocial 'micro-violence' (Geser, 1996: 70) the police may make use of controlled force while respecting at the same time the integrity of persons and goods as much as possible. The police are supposed to react to disturbances of public order in the shortest possible time span, while observing the criteria of nonpartiality and adequacy. The rules of engagement are based on bargaining and diplomacy, not on destruction (Vicaire, 2000). The diversity and the possible ambiguity of the areas of action confronts the police officer with highly diverse role expectations and demands excellent psychological, social and professional competences. He has to deal with ambiguities, which are part of his everyday surroundings. A clearly defined image of the enemy is lacking and would only be an obstacle. The quality of police work is therefore dependent on 'the quality of lower level policemen: on their moral integrity, sound judgement and personal authority as well as on various professional skills' (Geser, 1994: 1). Therefore, police organizations are, as a rule, environmentally open organizations, i.e., their close integration into a social environment provides them with relevant information for their actions and is therefore an important prerequisite for their success. The police officer at the lowest hierarchical level must have comparatively large 'on-the-spot' decisional competences and must be multifunctional. From the perspective of organization theory, police organizations are bottom-up organizations.

Apparently militaries and police organizations are unequal sisters. Therefore peace-keeping and similar policing missions are non-essential and uncomfortable missions for traditional military organizations. The basic principles of the military organization and its inner rationale are opposed to the basic principles of the police organization in many ways. Trying to accomplish 'Operations Other Than War' with an organization made for war, potentially creates a series of dilemmas. They range from the question of adequate force intensity, the adequate degree of responsibility delegation to new forms of civilian-military relations (Haltiner, 2000). This does not necessarily mean that soldiers refuse 'Operations Other Than War' or feel uneasy about them (Caforio, 2002). Nevertheless, a cross-national assessment in which officers from nine states with experiences in 'Operations Other Than War' participated makes clear that 'the new type of operations require different professional performances of the officer from those needed for traditional war operations' (Caforio, 2002: 23). Particular problems emerge from the fact that the decision making process and therefore the responsibility in the framework of peace operations has a tendency to shift to the lower levels, as is the case in

police operations. The fact that even the most junior officers see themselves pushed into a political role and have to make decisions, the consequences of which they are often unable to estimate, seems particularly stressful. Another obstacle is the insecurity that stems from the fact that the different reference groups to be dealt with in Peace Support Operations constantly call for new skills in interpreting unfamiliar situations. Moreover, making contact with the local population, with members of international organizations, with NGOs and members of other armed forces demands high diplomatic, psychological, sociological, linguistic and legal competences. The officers are confronted with forms of stress that are different from combat stress (Britt, 1995, Williams, 1995). Rules Of Engagement changing with the situation and the simultaneousness of different cultural settings demand a flexibility of behaviour that goes far beyond what is part of the traditional soldier's role. It comes as no surprise, then, that after the evaluation of their MOOTW-experience almost 70% of the officers in the above-mentioned assessment come to the conclusion 'that the functions carried out in MOOTW require more and different preparations from what was given to them' (Caforio, 2002: 153). Moreover, the vast majority of them think that a series of special training courses as preparation for MOOTWs does not suffice and that the basic education should be changed or completed by a new skill profile. The author of the assessment, tellingly entitled 'The Flexible Officer', former Italian General Giuseppe Caforio, goes one step further in his final conclusion by saying 'One notes, that it is the officers of the countries where the educational process is still of the traditional military type who report higher percentages of shortcomings in training, and, correlatively, who reveal that they encountered greater difficulties in relations with the social actors, especially in PSOs. This is tantamount to saying that a military training closer to university standards, particularly centered to behavioural sciences, seems to produce cadres who find themselves more at ease in handling the tasks proper to MOOTW' (Caforio, 2002: 153).

Change of the socio-economic context in Europe

In addition to the changed strategic context, the end of the Cold War brought about changes in socio-economic context and in civilian-military relations that have to be taken into account when thinking about a new conception of the officer education. These changes are:

Demilitarization of the Societies: In Europe an era of conscription that lasted for two hundred years is coming to an end. Mass armies are disappearing. While in the past chances were good that the majority of the male population would acquire military experience and skills, the part of the population with military experience is now becoming

minuscule. More and more people know the military only from hearsay. Europe's populations are getting increasingly demilitarized. This fact is reinforced by a change of values. In the past values such as self-discipline, subordination and obedience were considered socially desirable not only in the military but also in the family, the school, the economy and the administration. Under these circumstances military education was seen as a somewhat more severe exponent of a general educational ideal. Military education was perceived to be a form of character building and therefore of general value to society. With the individualization and the pluralization of lifestyles these values lost their importance. This change of priorities is linked to a changing social position and civilian role of the military. If in the past the forces had been considered as conveyors of national pride and cohesion they were now perceived as simply being a part of the public services, like any other state institution. With the loss of their symbolic and charismatic functions they have become increasingly subject to cost benefit and effectiveness analysis.

Ghettoization of the Military: The end of conscription and the professionalisation of the armed forces have led to a retreat to the barracks and potentially to a remilitarization of the military core. This is why there is a re-emergence of questions about the democratic control of the military (Haltiner, 2002).

Cost Savings: Since the end of the Cold War Europe's armed forces have been reduced and defence budgets cut. This calls for painful cutbacks in the armed forces not only in terms of investments but also with regard to education. Optimization is the order of the day.

Some consequences of the changed context for the future of the officer education in Europe

What, then, are the consequences of the changed operational and socio-political context for the officer education? Some scholars have argued that it would be enough to complement the curricula of the traditional officer education in order to achieve better performances in operations with a constabulary character. In particular they have in mind additional education in languages, law, psychology and similar subjects of the behavioural sciences (Boëne et al., 2001). Others plead for a basic rethinking of the officer education with regard to the completely changed role of armed forces in the social, political and strategic context. (Maniscalco, 1995, quoted by Caforio, 2001: 23) The latter view seems to be more pertinent, as it seems likely that the consequences of the presented contextual change will lead the education of military professionals away from the 'Sparta'-model, primarily oriented towards a socialization that is centered on

the development of a military mind. It will produce a more open academic education that is based on the 'Athens'-model and centered on general studies. This in fact means:

- The focus on military combat remains necessary but does by no means suffice anymore.
- An education mainly consisting of the instillation of patriotic values and practical skills as provided in classic military academies not only attracts the wrong men and women, it also misses the goal of an education that is supposed to produce competent military professionals that meet today's new exigencies.
- The competence profile of the modern officer should be based more on professional capabilities and less on merely practical skills.
- An integration of the military professional training into the national educational system with regard to a better permeability between civilian and military professional fields is necessary both from a conceptual and a financial point of view.
- The education has to meet university standards. For financial and pedagogical reasons it should therefore be provided in places where the environment is beneficial to studying and where the necessary teaching resources can be found, viz. in civilian universities.

These hypotheses and postulates can be justified as follows:

Dysfunctional Selection

The stage of life in which values are acquired is, as proven by the behavioural sciences, pre-adolescence. After this stage of life values are normally merely reinforced or weakened but do not change anymore. This means that, as a rule, values can no longer be acquired in classic military academies, they can only be reinforced at best. It has been shown, that the choice to become an officer is mainly the result of self-selection and not an effect of value building through socialization in the academies. (Bachman, Sigelman, Diamond 1987, Stevens, Rosa, Gardner 1994, Hammill, Segal & Segal, 1995) Military academies mainly appeal to persons with patriotic values and a status quo-oriented mind. In other words, they may not attract persons who would envisage a temporary occupation as an officer without holding especially conservative or patriotic values. It is very doubtful whether the military socialization in the classic military academies is able to attract the right kind of people with regard to 'flexible' officer, so much in need in the future. There are many indicators that the 'Sparta'-model of military education gives the wrong incentives when it comes to finding military professionals of a new all-rounder type.

Dysfunctional effects of the traditional officer socialization

The US American military academies are paradigmatic for military educational institutions oriented towards character building and national education. It is true that the curricula of the US academies have much in common with the mainstream higher education in America. But their primary role consists in the development of character, the inculcation of values, particularly of unique military values underpinned by moral-ethical considerations. The focus lies on the duty towards the country, discipline and education to absolute loyalty to one's own nation. The cadets are supposed to become loyal servants of their collective always willing to subordinate their own interests to those of the collective. For the academies, character development and molding seem more important than the provided education. However, the more the military loses its national frame of reference and the more 'Military Operations Other Than War' prevail, the less important this nationally focused educational component becomes. It can even become dysfunctional. In their recent study Franke & Heinecken (2001) conclude that the support of US military academy cadets for peace operations weakens in the course of their socialization, while their conservative basic attitude and warrioristic attitudes are strengthened.

There is no doubt that the willingness to make sacrifices will remain an important virtue of military professionals. But the question is if it should not rather be based on rational conviction about its necessity than on an emotional conditioning of an in-/out-group thinking. In-/out-group thinking has proved to be quite dysfunctional in international peacekeeping operations (Winslow, 1999a, 1999b).

Capabilities instead of skills

According to Samuel H. Huntington it is the professionalism of the modern officer that sets him apart from the noble *homme combatant* of the past (1957). In modern sociology the term professionalism is attributed to social positions concentrating key knowledge that is vital for the society. This term is normally used for doctors, lawyers, teachers and engineers, which are all professions based on an academic education and practice with high exigencies. Their goal is not only to impart knowledge but also the ability to use the acquired knowledge to structure and solve complex problems. The difference between a profession and an occupation is that the latter primarily requires formulaic application skills. A good example is the nurse who serves the doctor or the craftsman with special skills for the handling of a problem. A closer look at the curricula of the classic military academies reveals that the officer education largely consists of a kind of half-academic education at college level. Broad general knowledge is combined with military-specialist training and physical performance enhancement. Often it is not

very clear what is more important: the military-specialist training or the academic curriculum. It can be assumed that both fields are in direct competition instead of complementary when they are taught in the same institution, e.g. the military academy (Moelker, 2000).

Tight curricula with no freedom of subject choice are hardly beneficial to academic learning. Moreover, 3 to 4 years are insufficient for this double-track education. Therefore, the focus of education in academies is directed more at the transfer of formulaic procedures. Lessons learned from historic situations as well as universally applicable tactical and strategic principles that can easily be internalized therefore still represent a major part of the military curricula. In German there is a word that accurately expresses this training focused on application skills as the learning of the *Kriegshandwerk*. Such formulaic skills may not have become obsolete at all, because military actions in war and peacetime operations will continue to be characterized by much uncertainty and unforeseen situations. Mastery of basic and formulaic application knowledge may give an advantage in particular stress situations. Nevertheless, the presented necessity of a shift from combat-centered know-how to problem-solving capacities in order to enable people to act adequately in socio-political and diplomatic situations requires more than a mere completion of the traditional academy curriculum and the traditional teaching methods. It calls for a rethinking of the classic military academy approach as a whole. Instead of mere skills, officers need special intellectual capabilities that are normally acquired in academic studies. Mastery of methods and communication capabilities are more important than pure content knowledge. This is why officers should complete academic studies as they are offered at universities. The subject of these studies is rather irrelevant, even though general studies in behavioral sciences would be preferable with regard to the new missions. The primacy of methodological over content knowledge has always been characteristic for an academic education and for the so-called professions. Therefore, a real professionalisation of the officer function, as has been called for by Huntington, is still to come.

Integration into the civilian educational system

Several reasons indicate that the establishment of a true academic curriculum for the officer education is not possible at military academies. First of all, as has been explained above, the introversion and castellation in total institutions with a military character is not beneficial to the academic learning climate. Secondly, the maintenance of academic institutions next to the existing civilian universities will become too expensive and, with regard to the decreasing defense budgets of the small and mid-sized states in

Europe, less and less affordable. Thirdly, only academic studies that are recognized by civilian standards can give the necessary incentives to guarantee the recruiting of future officers on a qualitatively and quantitatively high level. The civilianizing of the studies guarantees the permeability between the military and the civilian employment market and thus puts an end to the image of the officer profession as being a one-way street. Moreover, the restructuring of academic studies taking place all over Europe according to the two-phase model of the three-year Bachelor's and the successive two-year Master's degree based on the Bologna-Declaration, brings an increase in national and international permeability of studies and universities. This represents a good chance for the military to reformulate its educational needs in a flexible manner. A form of coordination and collaboration between the military and the civilian educational establishments will therefore become inevitable.

Military education

The postulated civilianizing of the officer education poses the question of the right moment for the specific military training: prior to the academic studies, simultaneously, or subsequently. There are several possibilities that will probably lead to different solutions according to the traditions in the different countries. Furthermore, there is the question of how the different phases of an officer's career have to be reconceived and assessed in the framework of the continued educational process. It may be reasonable – as the European trend suggests – to modify the basic as well as the higher military education in the war colleges, so that it is no longer service-related but respects the 'joint' principle. This would not only make sense in terms of cost-effectiveness, but would also accommodate certain new competence profiles. Here again, the consequences of the new missions can be observed.

Conclusions

Europe's Trend from Sparta to Athens

There is no state in Western or Eastern Europe that has not put its armed forces through a fundamental reform since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, numerous states have begun to reconceive their officer education (Caforio 2000). Three models are emerging:

- Sparta-Model: Adherence to the model of closed military academies and military universities with a reform of the education within the existing establishments.

- In-Between Model: Military education is mainly provided in military institutions, but in some partial cooperation with civilian universities. The coordination of the studies lies in the hands of the armed forces.
- Athens-Model: Combination of military and civilian education, consecutive or simultaneous, in close collaboration with civilian universities. The coordination lies in the hands of the officer candidates themselves.

The 'Sparta' model is still the dominating one in France, Great Britain and in parts of Eastern Europe. Admission to the educational establishments is based on a competitive selection system. The military and the 'civilian' education are provided simultaneously and the courses as well as the educational establishment are based on military principles. The academic formation is seen as a mere supplement to the military one, which ultimately predominates the curriculum. The inculcation of values remains an explicit part of the formation. Examples are France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Poland and the Czech Republic. In many of the academies of these countries, the in-house academization of the studies is pushed in collaboration with civilian universities and the former rigid introversion of the military academies is decreased (Netherlands, Poland).

The in-between model can be found in Sweden, Switzerland and Italy. These countries have established contractual cooperation between the military education and the civilian universities. The officer candidates complete some parts of their studies in military and others in civilian institutions. The studies lead to an academic title that is fully recognized in the civilian educational system (Bachelor, Master), they obviously do not any longer take place in a closed and isolated institution and the academic part plays an important role. The Netherlands is implementing a Bachelor system at this very moment. They started with a pilot in early 2003. If the Netherlands succeeds in having this Bachelor accredited and make contractual agreements with universities regarding follow-up Master studies, it will have moved from the 'Sparta' model to the in-between model without separating military inculcation of values and academic training. Preconditions will be, as indicated above, accreditation and opening up to the civilian academic world.

So far, the pure 'Athens' model can only be found in Germany and Slovenia and – for some of the graduates of the basic officer education – in Switzerland. The military and the civilian education are separated chronologically and take place at different locations. The studies take place mainly in civilian universities, adhering to the freedom of teaching and research, even if they are run – as in the case of Germany – by the Ministry of Defense. Military education is considered to be completing civilian education.

To sum up: The officer education in Europe is clearly opening up and approaching civilian educational standards even though the 'Sparta' model is still predominant. It can therefore be concluded that in Europe, other than in the USA, officer education is moving away from Sparta and approaching Athens.

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Notes to Haltinger

- ¹ Even when serious fighting was going on, a declaration of war was mostly absent.
- ² At the same time, in a parallel development, a kind of militarization of the police seems to be emerging. Existing military police corps are expanded qualitatively and quantitatively (*Gendarmerie*, *Carabinieri*, *Guardia Civil*, *Bundesgrenzschutz*, the *Netherlands Royal Marechaussee*), and where they do not yet exist a creation of police corps organized according to military principles is taken into consideration (Switzerland). An exception are the Belgian *Rijkswacht* who have demilitarized and are now a part of police-forces (Easton, 2001).

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