Samenvatting

The deep political and security crisis in Iraq can only be described as a failed SSR effort. Since the U.S. led invasion of 2003, became the Stabilization Force in Iraq (SFIR) responsible for the reformation of the Iraqi SS. The present Iraqi security circumstances show that since the last U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011, the security situation deteriorated in which several parts of the country have been occupied by the IS. The aim of this research is to examine how the SFIR policy on security sector reform from 2003-2011 impacted the present state security providers in Iraq.
The research was carried out with a combination of different methods based on extensive desk research and qualitative interviewing. Desk research served to present an insight into the concept of SSR, the implemented SFIR policy on SSR and its impact on the present SSP of Iraq. The qualitative interview with Professor Joris Voorhoeve provided additional information.
SSR is a project established to rebuild post-conflict states in order for them to meet the needs of their citizens. SSR can be defined as a collective term that includes activities in support of defence, armed forces, intelligence reform, demobilization, reintegration, and the reduction of armed violence.
The reforming programmes provided minimal training carried out with poor knowledge of the Iraqi nation. After the transfer of authority to the IIG, the Iraqi SSP were unable to provide public security. The security situation deteriorated in which it counteracted the reconstruction process. Since the U.S. withdrew from Iraq, former Prime Minister Nour al-Maliki rearranged the SS to gain power in which Sunni Muslims have been completely removed from the government. These events resulted in an increase in insurgent groups over the last few years.
In conclusion, this research shows that the impact of the SFIR policy on SSR from 2003-2011 on the present SSP was caused by multiple factors. Firstly, the expectations of the coalition pre-war planners appeared to be incorrect. Proper preparation would have to be carried out to provide insight into the political situation. Secondly, disagreements related to the occupation caused an increase in disunity. The Iraqi nation should have been involved in the process of designing, managing and implementing the security policies. Thirdly, the removal of the Baath party and ISF caused an increase in insurgency and violence. The coalition should have understood the political construction before the removal of the Baath party and ISF. Fourthly, the programmes provided minimal training and therefore did not respond to the needs and interests of the Iraqi nation. The coalition should have involved the Iraqi nation in the reform programmes in order to suits its needs and gain its support. Finally, the transfer of the authority deadline caused a shortage in time. A more stable reconstruction structure would have been essential in order to reach long-term success.