Samenvatting

This thesis aims to test the credibility of the Responsibility to Protect principle ("R2P") by looking at how the principle was applied in Libya and addressing the question of why R2P was not applied in Syria. The first part of the thesis is about the origins and definition of R2P. The second part compares the reactions of the international community to the conflicts in Libya and Syria. The third part aims to analyse this information by addressing the question of selective application of R2P. The thesis concludes with four recommendations to the United Nations that may make timely and decisive application of R2P in future conflicts easier and more consistent.
R2P entails that the sovereignty of states is not only a right, but also a responsibility. It gives the international community a responsibility to protect populations of other states if these states fail to protect these populations themselves. R2P was adopted by the UN in 2005.
Uprisings in Libya began in mid-February 2011 as part of the wave of revolutions in the Arab World that came to be known as the Arab Spring. Given Gaddafi's clear incitement to crush the opposition and rapid escalation of the conflict, the United Nations called on the international community to exercise its responsibility to protect. R2P was applied through Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Resolution 1970 called for non-military means to stop the Gaddafi regime from attacking its population. Gaddafi's refusal to respond to the measures led to the adoption of Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011, which allowed UN member states to employ "all necessary means" to protect the Libyan people.
The intervention was initially led by the US, UK and France, but soon taken over by NATO. Given the clear incitement of Gaddafi to crush the opposition, it seems fair to assume that NATO's intervention prevented the Gaddafi forces to commit serious crimes against humanity. The intervention in Libya is therefore considered as a textbook example of how R2P should be applied in future situations.
However, when the uprisings in Syria began, the international community was far more reserved about intervention. Although R2P was developed as a principle that applied to all states at all times, Syria proved that there are many other factors involved apart from the protection of civilians. First of all, whereas regime change in Libya improved the living conditions of the population, regime change in Syria would not guarantee the safety of minority groups, due to ethnic tensions in the country. Second, whereas the opposition in Libya was quite well-organised, the opposition in Syria was fragmented. Even after almost a year, it is unclear who the opposition
in Syria is. This made it difficult for coalition forces to provide coherent assistance. Third, there has not been one event in Syria that immediately triggered an intervention. In contrast to Gaddafi's hate speech, the language of Bashar al-Assad did not constitute in incitement to crimes against humanity. Moreover, in Syria a battle on the scale of Benghazi had not taken place. Fourth, the Arab League urged the Security Council to take action on Libya, but was more careful with Syria, illustrating the importance of regional organisations. Fifth, given the location of Syria in the Middle East, a large-scale conflict in the country constitutes in a significant risk of a regional war. Moreover, whereas the Libyan government did not have any close allies, the Syrian government maintained close relationships with other governments in the region, including Russia and Iran. Sixth, in terms of logistic possibilities, Syria was a far more difficult case than Libya. Whereas Libya is located on the coast and within reasonable distance of EU air bases, Syria is not. The imposition of a no-fly zone in Syria was therefore not possible. Finally, the permanent members of the Security Council, especially Russia and China, maintained close political and economic ties with Syria, especially in the field of oil politics and arm purchases, which made intervention in Syria far less attractive.
All the factors that have played a role in the decision to intervene in Libya but not in Syria have to a certain extent undermined the credibility of R2P. In terms of geopolitical and logistic considerations, Libya was a relatively easy case. Yet, Syria proved that economic, social and geopolitical considerations remain paramount to the protection of populations. Moreover, Libya and Syria proved that the Security Council - at least in its current composition - is not the appropriate body to authorise R2P interventions. It failed to prevent the crimes against humanity committed against civilians in Syria. Moreover, although R2P was adopted by all governments in the world, the decision on R2P intervention is now made by a Council that is dominated by Western countries. An independent commission or secretariat of R2P should therefore look into the possibility of enlarging the permanent membership of the Security Council, as to make implementation of the principle in the future easier and more consistent. This requires an amendment to the Charter of the United Nations. Furthermore, when the Security Council fails to authorise an intervention, the authorisation should be transferred to the General Assembly, to avoid that one or two permanent members block all possibilities for intervention to protect their own national interests.