De grootste kennisbank van het HBO

Inspiratie op jouw vakgebied

Vrij toegankelijk

Terug naar zoekresultatenDeel deze publicatie

Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace

Rechten: Alle rechten voorbehouden

Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace

Rechten: Alle rechten voorbehouden

Samenvatting

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker’s effort nor manager’s attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.

OrganisatieHogeschool Utrecht
AfdelingKenniscentrum Innovatie en Business
LectoraatInternational Business and Innovation
Gepubliceerd inJournal of Economic Psychology Vol. 31, Uitgave: 4, Pagina's: 676-686
Jaar2010
TypeArtikel
TaalEngels

Op de HBO Kennisbank vind je publicaties van 26 hogescholen

De grootste kennisbank van het HBO

Inspiratie op jouw vakgebied

Vrij toegankelijk