Across all health care settings, certain patients are perceived as ‘difficult’ by clinicians. This paper’s aim is to understand how certain patients come to be perceived and labelled as ‘difficult’ patients in community mental health care, through mixed-methods research in The Netherlands between June …

This paper describes a study into consumers' reasons for buying socially responsible (SR) products, such as Fair Trade products and organic meat. As opposed to other studies, we use a qualitative approach based on 25 in-depth interviews and include several different products in the research. This leads …

Tourism studies carried out on the "Experience Economy" and on "Authenticity" are mostlyfounded on a subjectivist epistemology. In this article it is argued than an objectivist approach offers a valuable counterpart. This approach will be developed on the basis of the ideas as "Kruithof" who proposes …

Established out of the desire to bring humanitarian relief in man-made human disasters, such as war and other armed conflicts, international humanitarian law (IHL) prescribes the legal obligation of the conflict parties and armed forces to permit ICRC's humanitarian operations. All over the world the …

Established out of the desire to bring humanitarian relief in man-made human disasters, such as war and other armed conflicts, international humanitarian law (IHL) prescribes the legal obligation of the conflict parties and armed forces to permit ICRC's humanitarian operations. All over the world the …

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We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker’s effort nor manager’s attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, …

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We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate a manager’s attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when management attention is …

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