Commonly used game and decision theoretic models fail to explain the empirics of deterrence. This has unjustly led many theorists to criticize the (rationality and other) assumptions underpinning of such models. No serious game theorist will contend that his theoretic model will possibly take account …

The concept of deterrence has dominated Western strategic thought for some seven decades. It shows no signs of easing its grip. In the face of any new security threat, such as terrorism or cyber-attacks, one of the fi rst questions to be asked is ‘ can this be deterred? ’ Even when the answer is not very …

Commonly used game and decision theoretic models fail to explain the empirics of deterrence. This has unjustly led many theorists to criticize the (rationality and other) assumptions underpinning of such models. No serious game theorist will contend that his theoretic model will possibly take account …

In this thesis, we develop mathematical models for the optimal deployment of security forces addressing two main challenges: adaptive behavior of the adversary and uncertainty in the model. We address several security applications and model them as agent-intruder games. The agent represents the security …

In this chapter we consider a security game between an agent and an intruder to find optimal strategies for patrolling against illegal fishery. When patrolling large areas that consist of multiple cells, several aspects have to be taken into account. First, the current risk of the cells has to be considered …

In this chapter, we propose an ethical framework for serious game design, which we term the Ecosystem for Designing Games Ethically (EDGE). EDGE expands on Zagal’s categorization of ethical areas in game design by incorporating the different contexts of design and their use. In addition, we leverage …