Samenvatting

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is back in the business of deterring aggression on the part of Russia. This return to great power deterrence has brought widely acknowledged military challenges related to power projection, force modernization, and burden sharing but also and notably a political challenge of de fi ning NATO ’ s collective political ambitions for a continental order in which Russia will not become like the West. Like during the Cold War, the most convincing posture for NATO has become one of deterrence by punishment, building on a fairly dynamic military ability to strike Russia at a point of choosing, as opposed to defending every entry point to Alliance territory. However, NATO, not sure of what political order it represents, struggles to read Russia ’ s political character and intent and size its military posture accordingly. NATO ’ s political de fi cit effectively robs it of a middle ground from where it can build its military posture and invest in its upkeep. In the 1960s, NATO forged such a middle ground as an essential platform for strategic adaptation; today, NATO ’ s full deterrence posture is suffering from the absence of such a middle ground. Thus, a comprehensive politico-military posture of deterrence visà -vis Russia will require NATO ’ s reengagement with its own political fundamentals.