De krijgsmacht is een cruciale partner in nationale veiligheid. De grondwet kan niet anders worden geïnterpreteerd. Maar de Defensienota mist een strategisch fundament dat recht doet aan de grondwettelijke taak van de krijgsmacht en maakt geen beredeneerde keuzen voor de bijdrage aan nationale veiligheid. …

This article examines the role of emotions in papal discourse about European integration. Expanding on the ‘emotional turn’ in history, it develops an analytic framework to study emotional valence in constructing the past and future. Analysing Pope Pius XII's three major post-war encyclicals (Communium …

This article analyzes How do emotion norms and emotional norms (de)legitimize the EU as a security community? Conceptually, the article expands on the emotional underpinnings of a security community by distinguishing between emotion norms and emotional norms. This then allows to examine emotional (de)legitimation …

In 2017 NATO initiated Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltics to deter Russia. While most studies analyse eFP from the perspective of NATO or the troop contributing countries, this chapter addresses the question how the host nations, i.e. in this contribution Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, perceive …

Since the introduction of India’s cold start and Pakistan’s full spectrum deterrence doctrines, the subcontinental deterrence landscape has been characterised by strong cross-domain dynamics. In extremis, if both states adhere to the threats issued in their doctrines a Pakistan-supported militant attack …

The deterrence of non-state actors is a relatively understudied and not particularly well-understood aspect of deterrence studies. This chapter contributes to the emerging body of knowledge on this matter by coining the idea of localised deterrence. Based on a discussion of counterinsurgency theory it …

This chapter examines the use of deterrence by President Putin of the Russian Federation against potential democratic revolts. It combines insights from the literatures on democratic revolutions and social movements on the one hand and deterrence and coercion on the other. This exploratory research sketches …

Russian disinformation has thus far proven to be unconvincing for most Dutch target audiences. This is the conclusion of the present chapter. Information and disinformation have become effective weapons in international politics. This is part of a development where the weapons and concepts used in deterrence …

Commonly used game and decision theoretic models fail to explain the empirics of deterrence. This has unjustly led many theorists to criticize the (rationality and other) assumptions underpinning of such models. No serious game theorist will contend that his theoretic model will possibly take account …

This chapter takes the starting point that the power to deter consists of three components: (physical) capacities, concepts (strategy, plans, decision-making procedures) and will (moral, determination, audacity). In case one of these components is underdeveloped or not in place, (coercive) power fails. …